

ARMY HISTORY

Summer 2016

PB 20-16-3 (No. 100) Washington, D.C.

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


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The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by e-mail to usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

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The opinions expressed in *Army History* are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. The bulletin's contents do not necessarily reflect official Army positions and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army regulations. The bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material to keep the Army knowledgeable of developments in Army history and to enhance professional development. The Department of the Army approved the use of funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983.

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Issue Cover: A carving of a Native American with headdress made by members of the 26th Division /Courtesy of Jeffrey Gusky

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

This issue of *Army History* presents two articles on very disparate topics. The first offers a rare glimpse into the lives of American soldiers on the Western Front during World War I. Authors Alisha Hamel and Paul Rutz examine the carvings made by members of the 26th Division while housed in underground quarries and caverns in France. These soldiers left their literal impressions in the rock and provided us with a snapshot frozen in time. Beyond what portraits or service records could tell us about these men, the engravings in these French caves are more personal in nature and offer access to the soldiers' thoughts and feelings.

The next article looks at the age-old topic of civil-military relations through a rather unique lens. Probably unknown to most American readers, author Kevin Davies introduces us to the Australian Defence Central Camouflage Committee (DCCC). Composed of an array of civilian scientists, artists, and others, it was tasked with implementing a national strategic camouflage policy in the early days of World War II. Almost from the beginning, the DCCC was met with consternation and trepidation from the branches of the Australian armed forces. Although the DCCC was operating under a mandate from the civilian government, the military—particularly the Australian Army—pushed back. It saw the responsibility for camouflaging its installations as solely within its purview.

In place of the regular Army Art or Artifact Spotlight, this issue furnishes an interesting look at how a unit's history and heritage can influence the design of its insignia. This piece also highlights the role a command's history office and museum can play in revising a unit's heraldry.

In the Chief's Corner, Charles Bowery discusses his plans for a new Army Historical Enterprise. This endeavor is intended to streamline our strategic historical efforts, gain the most value from diminished resources, and strengthen the Army historical community's shared purpose through increased collaboration. As always, this issue features an excellent crop of engaging book reviews.

I continue to invite our readers to send us articles on the history of the Army and encourage constructive comments about this publication.


Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



Summer 2016



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THE YANKEE DIVISION IN THE UNDERGROUND CITIES OF WORLD WAR I

BY ALISHA HAMEL AND PAUL X. RUTZ



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PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THE DEFENCE CENTRAL CAMOUFLAGE COMMITTEE, 1940-1943

BY KEVIN DAVIES





THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

Enterprise is a term we see a lot in the Army these days. The dictionary defines an enterprise as “a project or undertaking, typically one that is difficult or requires effort.” Army leaders tend to use the expression to convey a team effort or collaborative approach to accomplishing complex missions.

I believe the time has come for an enterprise approach to the work of history and historians in the United States Army, with the intent of fostering collaboration among a diverse group of professionals. What we have at this moment is a distinctly non-enterprise method, broadly separated into educators and official historians, with subdivisions in the education community by institution and major command, and subdivisions in the official history community by functions, such as applied history, research and writing, and public history. The Army Historical Program continues to make valuable contributions in every one of those areas, but our “silo” mindset makes us less effective than I think we could be.

I propose the Center of Military History (CMH) act as the advocate and integrator of an Army Historical *Enterprise*, which will be composed of a large, diverse community of historians operating along some commonly accepted lines of effort, with the broad objectives of fostering historical-mindedness in our soldiers and deepening the connection between the American public and its Army. This enterprise approach can have a number of positive effects.

- *It will improve the “product” we offer to the Army.* For example, an agreed-upon framework of professional themes that is taught in institutions of military education at all levels and reinforced by our museums and official history publications will have more depth and consistency. An established set of strategic efforts for our command history community will result in measurable improvements to the Army’s historical record.
- *It will maximize resources in a shrinking Army.* We should have some strategic discussions about what the various members of our community do on a daily basis, identifying redundancies

and gaps. The work that we have initiated on the Army Museum Enterprise is a good example of this type of analysis. “Digital history” in several forms (eBooks, social media, virtual staff rides, and so forth) has tremendous potential for innovation, cost savings, and a better delivery of historical perspective to the force.

- *It will deepen a sense of community, shared purpose, and collaboration among all of our historians.* Regardless of institution or career program, Army historians should be aware of expertise and professional friendship everywhere they look, not rivals for missions or resources. We should get back to conducting developmental events that span all of the career fields in our community. New Army conference policies will make this easier.

CMH is uniquely positioned to act as a voice for the Army history community within the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I can use our budgetary authorities and the wide latitude that my boss, the Army’s senior career civilian, gives me to advocate for all our needs in terms of resources and command emphasis. While I write this, I am, of course, aware that many of you will perceive this offer as another iteration of various attempts by the Center to “take over” direction of the Army Historical Program. That has been tried, but it is simply impossible, and it is not necessary. The Army teaches its soldiers the concept of mission command, with subordinates exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. So why should we not apply that principle to our own program, though with one critical difference. In this case, CMH is not the commander! You all have commanding officers and civilian bosses. What you have in me is a strategic integrator to further your objectives, or rather *our objectives*.

We have an opportunity in late July at the Council of Army Historians to begin this conversation again in a productive way. I hope you all will want to be a part of this team of teams, and I welcome your feedback and ideas.

Army Historians Educate, Inspire, and Preserve!



NEWSNOTES

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY RELEASES NEW PUBLICATION

The Center of Military History recently published the inaugural brochure in its new U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series. *The Mexican Expedition, 1916–1917*, by Julie Irene Prieto, examines the operation, led by General John Pershing, to search for, capture, and destroy Francisco “Pancho” Villa and his revolutionary army in northern Mexico in the year prior to the United States’ entry into World War I. This campaign marked one of the final times cavalry was used on a large scale, and it was one of the first to use trucks and airplanes in the field. While Pershing’s troops failed to capture Villa, both Regular Army troops and National Guardsmen stationed on the border gained valuable experience in these new technologies. This publication has been issued as CMH Pub 77–1 and is available for

purchase by the public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.




NEW BATTLEFIELD ATLAS AVAILABLE FROM THE COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE PRESS

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press has released its newest publication titled *Battlefield Atlas of Price’s Missouri Expedition of 1864*, by Charles D. Collins Jr. In the fall of 1864, a large Confederate force launched a major raid on Missouri. This incursion would culminate in Kansas City in the Battle of Westport, a Union victory that effectively ended Confederate resistance in the state. This atlas offers a guide to that attack and includes over seventy-five maps that recount the operation in detail. A PDF version is available as a free download from the CSI Web site: <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/csi/pubs>.

U.S. ARMY WOMEN’S MUSEUM OPENS NEW EXHIBIT

The U.S. Army Women’s Museum (AWM), located at Fort Lee, Virginia, is the only museum in the world dedicated to Army women. The museum honors women’s contributions to the Army by telling their stories with interactive exhibits and videos throughout its galleries. The AWM serves as an educational institution, providing military history training and instruction to soldiers, veterans, and the civilian community.

The AWM’s newest exhibit, pictured here, captures the work of female engagement, cultural support, and provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The success of these missions helped lay the groundwork for the recent removal of all gender-based restrictions on military service.



ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Lt. Col. Alisha Hamel, U.S. Army Reserve, currently works for the U.S. Army Center of Military History as the chief of the Museum Support Center–Anniston in Alabama. Prior to this assignment, she was the command historian for the Oregon National Guard and worked as the special projects officer for the state of Oregon’s sesquicentennial celebration and the Lewis and Clark bicentennial. She has written numerous articles for various publications including the *Huffington Post* and the *Oregon Legionnaire*.

Dr. Paul X. Rutz, a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve, received his Ph.D. in theory and cultural studies from Purdue University in 2011. That same year, Rutz moved his painting studio to Portland, Oregon. He has had exhibitions at the Mark Woolley Gallery and the Smithsonian Institution. He has also displayed a series of dual-media portraits of combat veterans, titled “Between Here and There.” Rutz’s writings about visual culture have appeared in the *Huffington Post*, *Modern Fiction Studies*, and *PDX Magazine*.

A self-portrait carving of Private Sweetman



The Yankee Division in the Underground Cities of World War I

BY AIISHA HAMEL AND PAUL X. RUTZ

Almost a century ago, a young soldier from New England named Archie Sweetman carved a self-portrait into a limestone cave wall deep underground in France. He signed his name and hometown in pencil: “Sweetman of South Boston.” A visitor can still see the carving—a man’s profile in helmet—and the signature as if the artist had left the cavern just moments ago. One can almost imagine the soldiers, with Sweetman among them, as they walked up the long stone staircase toward the explosive roar, poisonous gas, and lunar craters awaiting them aboveground.

That Picardy cave—its exact location remains a secret—is part of an elaborate underground network of quarries, mines, and natural caverns that housed thousands of troops from both sides during the First World War. Deep enough to provide safety from artillery fire but still close to the trenches, these spaces provided rest areas for reserve troops rotating in and out of the lines, and occasionally

they presented another fighting front as both sides tunneled and booby-trapped for advantage.

Archie Sweetman, a twenty-year-old National Guardsman from Medford, Massachusetts, stayed in these caves on and off for roughly six weeks in February and March 1918, before heading up to help repel the last-gasp German offensives. He and his comrades engraved their literal impressions on their temporary home, building worship spaces, leaving behind equipment, and inscribing images of women, horses, political figures, symbols of America, and praise for the 1918 Red Sox. Though they were the most prolific, the Americans were not alone in their expressive output. The French, British, Germans, and troops of many other nationalities did the same kind of creative carving in these underground labyrinths, together fashioning a rare trove of communication from this war that is still found exactly in the location where it was made.¹ This article focuses on one of

the many stories preserved here and the importance of safeguarding it.


FROM MILITIA TO EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The 26th Division was the first full-strength American force to arrive in France and the first National Guard unit to fight there.² Its 104th Infantry became the first American military organization to be decorated by a foreign government.³ Like all National Guard divisions, the 26th had its origins in the 1903 Militia Act, also known as the Dick Act, named for Ohio Congressman Charles Dick, who championed the bill. An update to the 1793 militia law, it provided organized federal supervision and aid to the state militias and arranged them into two categories: the *Reserve Militia*, all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and the National Guard, or *Organized Militia*, which would be called up and commanded by the president in time of war.⁴ With the passage of the National Defense

Act, signed by President Woodrow Wilson in June 1916, federal law further declared state militias to be the nation's primary military reserve and laid out a legal mechanism to involuntarily draft Guard members en masse into the Regular Army.⁵ These laws set aside any ambiguity about the role of the National Guard in wartime and provided clear authority for the Wilson administration to deploy it outside the troops' states of origin.

After Congress declared war on Germany in April 1917, the job of readying millions of troops for deployment overseas began in earnest. Brig. Gen. Clarence Edwards received orders to organize the 26th Division that August, bringing together troops from National Guard units throughout New England. He established a headquarters in Boston. The division found its nickname when General Edwards called a press conference and asked for recommendations. At that September 1917 meeting, reporter Frank P. Sibley of the *Boston Globe* suggested "Yankee" because virtually all its men were from New England.⁶ The newly christened Yankee Division was the size of a Civil War corps, more than 27,000 men, with primary combat power in the form of three brigades—two infantry and one field artillery.⁷ American divisions were enormous, even by Europe's new twentieth-century standards. An infantry division of French or German troops at the time numbered about 14,000.

Although National Guard units had participated in an expedition to Mexico the previous year and had deployed to Cuba and the Philippines to fight the Spanish at the turn of the century, 1917 was the first time Americans mobilized so fully to prosecute a foreign war. According to Sibley, who followed the Yankee Division overseas and reported from the trenches, to prepare for this war meant creating the types of new units being employed in the modern European combat situation, including "trench-mortar batteries, machine gun battalions besides the machine gun companies attached to each infantry regiment, and ammunition, sanitary, engineer, and supply trains."



Counting engineers, aviation squadrons, and tank units, the United States deployed two million troops to the Western Front by the November 1918 armistice, with another two million ground troops preparing to go. The force sustained about 320,000 casualties. If these numbers are compared to the just over 300,000 troops recruited and trained for the Spanish-American War, the sheer scale of this new force makes clear that America was entering new combative territory.⁸ The term *American Expeditionary Forces* shows the novelty of the situation.

Initially, the Wilson administration announced that the 1st Division, a Regular Army division, would lead all others across the Atlantic. However, "Edwards was the only commander who could promise definitely, when the military authorities called on the telephone, to have a division organized



General Edwards

Library of Congress

by September 1.”⁹ Sibley cites the unit’s “community spirit” as an asset because its members came from one relatively small, yet thickly populated region of the United States with many veterans of the Mexican Expedition. Having joined as “volunteers for service rather than for pay,” many of the junior officers and senior enlisted men had drilled together for years prior to being called into full-time service.¹⁰ They had, in short, an exceptional esprit de corps and some disdain for the Regular Army.¹¹

INJECTING NEW BLOOD INTO AN OLD FIGHT

In late 1917, the American units began arriving for trench warfare training in France with an enthusiasm long squeezed out of the Europeans, who had been suffering—and hearing about the agony of their entrenched brothers, fathers, uncles, and neighbors—since 1914. According to historian John Keegan, the fresh U.S. troops “fought with a disregard for casualties scarcely seen on the Western Front since the beginning of the war.”¹²

On their arrival, and for months following, the New Englanders depended on the French for everything from instruction to equipment, especially when rolling kitchens and other key goods failed to arrive from the United States. The Yankee Division troops attended schools with the French Military Mission to learn the latest strategies in trench warfare, including artillery training in how to conduct “rolling” and “box” barrages to support advancing infantry, at Camp Coëtquidan, Brittany, close to the French artillery center at Rennes. In early February 1918, 26th Division artillery units began their combat apprenticeship at Chemin des Dames, northeast of Soissons. Every battery and battalion rotated from the caves to man the trenches under French guidance. Battery A of the 101st Field Artillery unleashed the first shot by a National Guard unit on 5 February, and two days later the 101st Infantry entered the line for the first time.¹³

The division remained in this location, shifting the untested Americans between trench and underground city,

until the German spring offensive kicked off on 21 March. Sibley, the embedded reporter, described “the wonderful French quarries” where the Americans rested, wrote letters home, and carved into the walls. “They were not great open pits, like our quarries at home. They were more like elaborate mines, with broad tunnels. In almost any one of them a battalion could be comfortably housed; in one or two of the largest there was room for a regiment or more. . . . They were all lighted by electricity; some had their own water supply; all were fitted up with floored and ceiled rooms.”¹⁴

Keegan and other historians caution that the arrival of American troops was not necessarily the *fait accompli* some short histories of the war make it out to be. The situation was more complicated than that. The Germans had closed the war with Russia and moved fifty divisions to the Western Front, for a total of 192 against the allies’ 178 divisions, just before the Americans began arriving in late 1917.¹⁵ The possibility of a German breakthrough was very real during their 1918 offensive, before the bulk of America’s massive new army was able to cross the Atlantic. However, the Germans made a number of poor strategic decisions.

Tanks, for example, could have made the difference. During this offensive the Germans had little ability to press advantages—to chase retreating troops and exploit gaps. Before 1914, cavalry played this role, and now it would be mechanized armor. The British and French had put much effort into developing tanks, fielding hundreds of them by late 1917. By contrast, the Germans were slow to develop their own, fielding only a few dozen of their clumsy design. It was more common for them to turn captured allied tanks on their original owners.¹⁶

All German missteps aside, there is no doubt the American forces helped make 1918 a decisive year, in part because they helped break German morale as late summer turned to fall. Toward the end of September, Germany’s Generalquartiermaster Erich Ludendorff informed Kaiser Wilhelm

II that his forces had become crippled by a sense of “looming defeat,” due to “the sheer number of Americans arriving daily at the front.”¹⁷ After the German spring offensive petered out in August 1918, a new all-American army under General John J. Pershing had been ordered to “reduce the St. Mihiel salient,” a bulge in the lines approximately twenty-six miles wide and fifteen miles deep.¹⁸ They tackled this task with fervor, moving on 27 August into heavy fighting at St. Mihiel, then on to the Rupt sector, assuming command of that area of operations on 8 September. The Americans were able to launch a massive and successful attack on 12 September, partially screened by rain and mist in which they neutralized the initially withering German machine gun fire.¹⁹ That evening, with orders to proceed to Vigneulles, a transportation hub seven miles behind German lines, the Yankee Division found itself in a race with the U.S. 1st Division, which was pushing up from the south. The two divisions connected at dawn the following morning, closing the salient.²⁰ Action in the Meuse-Argonne offensive followed later that month, and in October, the division moved to the area around Verdun, performing raids in support of several operations, chasing retreating German units up to the morning of 11 November and the end of hostilities. All together the Yankee Division spent roughly 210 days serving in the line, and forty-five days in combat, making it easily the longest-fighting American combat division in the war.²¹

Without context, the numbers outlined above and the mass movements of troops and supplies involved in the conflict are difficult to comprehend. To some extent, an emphasis on systems of movement, training, and manufacture is the only way to make sense of the vastness of the war, and that seems to be how many of the officials who prosecuted the conflict viewed the situation. For Ludendorff, thinking in terms of the mass of troops and materiel was crucial. In his memoirs of the war, he wrote, “Enormous masses of ammunition, such as the human mind had never imagined

before the war, were hurled upon the bodies of men who passed a miserable existence scattered about in mud-filled shell-holes. . . . Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine gun jammed with the mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.”²² Other senior leaders emphasized what cannot be captured by statistics. In his *Principles of War*, France’s Ferdinand Foch noted, “We have mentioned *particular cases* instead of *general cases*, for in war there are none but particular cases; everything has there an individual nature; nothing ever repeats itself.” Foch stressed the importance of what cannot be quantified, that it takes more than general cases to know the war. His example puts in context Ludendorff’s “enormous masses” as a mere tool for navigating our relationship to this historical event, like a map that notes key features but cannot possibly echo the experience of being in the landscape itself. From this perspective, the underground cities of World War I are a gold mine of intimate information.²³

SEARCHING FOR THE MEN AMONG THE “ENORMOUS MASSES”

The enthusiasm and energy of the Yankee Division soldiers are still engrained on the walls of these caves and quarries. Combined with service records, photos, and other information, these caves provide a snapshot of a moment in time during the Great War. Sweetman’s 1919 service card lists his unit, his place of residence, the fact that he was wounded “slightly,” that he convalesced from July 1918 until Christmastime, and that his rank at discharge was private first class. But what did he feel as he deployed in and out of the trenches? What came to mind when he thought of home or what he was doing in France?

Sweetman’s self-portrait in the cave and his compatriots’ other carvings on the walls tell more about them personally than their uniformed, youthful faces can show in official photos stripped of context. To get the same level of engagement

from a photograph, one would need to walk into the shop where the image was taken, breathe the same air as the doughboys, touch the camera that took their portraits, go down the street and kneel at the altars where they prayed, and walk a little farther to see where they posted their mail and ate their meals. In the caves, all this and more is still sitting where the Yankee Division left it in 1918.

Retired Brig. Gen. Leonid Kondra- tiuk, former chief historian of the National Guard Bureau, asserted the importance of these underground spaces. “All the soldiers are dead, of course, but they left something of themselves in those caves,” he said in a recent interview. “In a way, it’s an artifact that still lives.”²⁴ The men mentioned throughout this article all served in the 101st Infantry as part of the 26th Division. The combina- tion of signatures, photos, service cards, and their human touch in the caves animates the individual men, sometimes to chilling effect. An unsettling feeling accompanies seeing Joseph Miller’s cave etching next to the card that confirms he died of wounds sustained during the St. Mihiel Campaign. His signature and address, mapped out with pencil, remains only partially engraved in the wall—cut short by duty, just like his life. Some men inscribed their names together, as did Edward Labbe, Earl Howland, and Patrick Joyce, united as members of 2d Platoon, Company E. Others, such as Thomas O’Halloran, smoothed out a limestone rectangle or two for them- selves. O’Halloran’s name, unit, and hometown are legibly, if somewhat hurriedly, carved. Yet he creatively breaks up the year with “19” and “18” diagonally split by “USA.” He would be wounded in action soon after creating this engraving.


For his part, Archie Sweetman did very well. Wounded in a poison gas attack on 22 July, he received a Purple Heart while convalescing for four months and returned to his unit more than a month after the armistice. He traveled back across the Atlantic the following spring. After an honorable discharge in late

April 1919, Sweetman attended the Massachusetts Normal Art School in 1923, going on to a career as a successful commercial artist in his hometown of Medford, Massachu- setts. He painted scenes around the world and was chosen by the U.S. Navy to portray the USS *Constitu- tion*. He lived to be nearly 100 years old.²⁵ Pam Fisher, Sweetman’s nurse for the last five years of his life, said in an interview, “He was a wonderful man, kind, gentle, and had a mind of his own. He didn’t have much family, and the fact that he left his portrait there is a wonderful way for people to remember him.”²⁶

A CALL TO KEEP HISTORY ALIVE

The Great War’s centennial has piqued some new interest in recall- ing its stories, with a commission set up by Congress in 2013 and a design competition for a new memorial to be built in Washington, D.C.²⁷ In early 2015, President Barack Obama presented the Medal of Honor to relatives of Pvt. Henry Johnson, an African American soldier of the 369th Infantry (who had received the Croix de Guerre, France’s highest honor for bravery), and Sgt. William Schemin, a Jewish soldier of the 4th Division.²⁸ This overdue official recognition

Service record of Archie W. Sweetman



State Library of Massachusetts

JOSEPH MILLER
42 PLANTATIONS
WORCESTER MASS



78
Serial number

* White * Colored.

MASSACHUSETTS
(State)

(County)

Mass June 19/16 on 19
Date of birth: 22 9/12 Yrs

Co E 101 Inf to
to 23 Dec 1918, Co F 101

12/18

OFFENSIVE: Aisne-Marne;
Toul-Roucq, Pas Fini.

July 22, 1918

from to
Apr 28/19 at *Cambridge, Mass*
ated for other cause give reason
ed 10 per cent disabled.

Miller
(Surname)

Residence: None
(Street and house number)

Joseph A.
(Christian name)

Charlestown
(Town or city)

22,800
(Army serial number)

* White * Colored.

MASSACHUSETTS
(State)

(County)

* Enlisted * R-A: * N. G. * E. R. C. Inducted at Charlestown, Mass
Place of birth: Cambridge, Mass

Age or date of birth: on Apr 6, 1917
21 2/12 yrs

Organizations served in, with dates of assignments and transfers: Co A 5 Inf Mass NG
(Co A 101 Inf) to death.

Grades, with date of appointment: Pvt Apr 6/17; Corp July 14/18; Pvt Aug 17/18;

Engagements: Humbert Plantation;
St Mihiel.

Served overseas from Sept 7/17 to death, from Flincy Second battle of Marne
Died Sept 13, 1918, of wounds received in action.

Other wounds or injuries received in action: None

Person notified of death: Sarah Miller
5 Marion Street (Name)

Remarks: (No. and street or rural route) (City, town, or post office)

Form No. 734-7, A. G. O. * Strike out words not applicable. † Dates of departure from and arrival in the U. S.
Nov. 22, 1919. (If none, so state) (Degree of relationship) (State or country)

Charlestown, Mass
(City, town, or post office) (State or country)

3-7367

Service record and photo of Joseph A. Miller



9

Labbe, Edward J.
(Surname) (Christian name)

Residence: **30 Twilight St** (Street and house number) **Boston** (Town or city) **MASSACHUSETTS** (State)

* Enlisted **1-1-16** * N. G. * **Inducted at** **Quebec Canada** Age or date of birth: **30 1/12 yrs** on **June 25, 1886**

Place of birth: **Quebec Canada**

Organizations served in, with dates of assignments and transfers: **Co E 9 Inf Mass N G (Co E 101 Inf) to disch**

Grades, with date of appointment: **Pvt; Pvt 1st Aug 1/17; Corp Aug 18/18**

Engagements: **Chemin des Dames; La Meuse Boucq; Houppy Bois; Melieu Bois; Seichenrey; 2 battle of Marne; St Mihiel; Beaumont; June 19 18**

(Over)

* Wounded in action (degree and date): **Severely Slightly** to **June 19 18**

Served overseas from **Sept 7/17** to **Apr 6/19**, from **Apr 28/19** at **Cp. D**

* Honorably discharged on demobilization: **Apr 28/19** (If separated for other cause give reason)

In view of occupation he was, on date of discharge, reported **per**

Remarks: **R.F.D. March 25, 1917 - Mustered March 30, 1917 s**
Authority for change see W.D. file re-wounded

Form No. 784-9, A. G. O. * Strike out words not applicable. † Dates of departure from and arrival at place and regiment.



Howland Earl B.
(Surname) (Christian name)

Residence: **841 2 St** (Street and house number) **S Boston** (Town or city) **MASSACHUSETTS** (State)

* Enlisted in **NG Boston Mass** (Army serial number) **60,736** (Race: White or colored) **White**

† Born in **Bethlehem, NH** (County) **May 29/17**

Organizations: **Co E 9 Inf Mass NG (Co E 101 Inf) to disch**

Grades: **Corp Aug 19/18**

* Engagements: **DEFENSIVE: Champagne-Marne, France; Meuse-Argonne, (Lorraine), Toul-Boucq (Lorraine), Troyon (Lorraine), Pas Fini (Ile de France), Rupt**

† Wounds or other injuries received in action: **None.**

† Served overseas: **Sept 7/17 to Apr 6/19**

§ Hon. disch. **Apr 28/19**

Remarks: **Cited in G.O. No. 88, Hqs., 26th Div**
R.F.D. May 29 1917
See Date File Apr. 13/28.

Form No. 784-14, A. G. O. * Insert "R. A.", "N. G.", "E. R. C.", "N. A." as case may be, followed by place and date of enlistment. † Give place of birth and date of birth, or age at enlistment. ‡ Give dates of departure from and arrival at place and regiment.



Joyce Patrick J.
(Surname) (Christian name)

Residence: **Co Devens** (Street and house number) **Boston** (Town or city) **MASSACHUSETTS** (State)

* Enlisted in **NG Watertown Mass** (Army serial number) **60,645** (Race: White or colored) **White**

† Born in **Boston Mass** (County) **May 28/17**

Organizations: **Co E 9 Inf Mass NG (Co E 101 Inf) to disch**

Grades: **Pvt 1st Aug 30/17; Corp Aug 19/18**

Engagements: **Champagne-Marne; Aisne-Marne; St. Mihiel; Meuse-Argonne; Defensive Sector**

† Wounds or other injuries received in action: **None.**

† Served overseas: **Sept 7/17 to Apr 6/19**

§ Hon. disch. **Apr 28/19**

Remarks: **R.F.D. May 28, 1917.**
per cent disabled on date of discharge, in view of occupation.

Form No. 784-14, A. G. O. * Insert "R. A.", "N. G.", "E. R. C.", "N. A." as case may be, followed by place and date of enlistment. † Give place of birth and date of birth, or age at enlistment. ‡ Give dates of departure from and arrival at place and regiment.

AUTO - RIFLE SQUAD
2ND PLATOON
Co. E 101ST U.S. INF.

Corp. A. C. Bloodgett
Malvin C. Lane
Francis E. Lombard
Harold F. Lombard
Michael F. Harman
Howard Earl B.
Patrick J. Joyce Corp

Service records and photos of Edward J. Labbe, Earl B. Howland, and Patrick J. Joyce

Courtesy of Jeffrey Gusk

T. F. O'HALLORAN
CO. G. 101ST INF
WORCESTER
MASS.

U.S.A.
1918



O'Halloran, Thomas F. (Surname) (Christian name) 61,186 (Army serial number) * White Colored 9

Residence: 40 Gardner St Worcester (Street and house number) (Town or city) (County) MASSACHUSETTS (State)

* Enlisted ~~R.A.~~ * N.G. * E.R.C. * Inducted at Worcester Mass May 26/17

Place of birth: Worcester Mass (State)

Age or date of birth: 19 5/12 18

Organizations served in, with dates of assignments and transfers: Co G 9 Inf Mass Reg (Co G 101 Inf) to discharge of Red Co 9 Inf Mass 11/8

Grades, with date of appointment: Pvt; Pvt 1 cl Aug 22/17

Engagements: DEFENSIVE: Champagne-Marne; OFFENSIVE: Aisne-Marne; Meuse-Artois; DEFENSIVE SECTORS: Chemin-des-Damas; Toul-Boucq - Pas Fini.

* Wounded in action (degree and date) - Slightly Severely July 27, 1918

Served overseas from Sept 7/17 to Oct 5/19, from July 22, 1918

* Honorably discharged on demobilization: Sept 29/19

In view of occupation he was, on date of discharge, reported (If separated for other cause give reason) 0 per cent disabled.

* Remarks: RED MAY 26, 1917 Authority for change see W.D. file re-wounded.

Form No. 734-9, A. G. O. * Strike out words not applicable. * Dates of departure from and arrival in the U. S.

TESTIMONIAL ISSUED

State Library of Massachusetts

Service record and photo of Thomas F. O'Halloran



Courtesy of Jeffrey Gusky



Courtesy of Jeffrey Gusky

partially acknowledges the war's pivotal importance in world history. More than one noted historian has employed the word *Armageddon* to describe it.²⁹ And the men who lived through those climactic changes have left their palpable impression under the Picardy farmland.

The need for action to preserve this precious accident of historical conservatism has grown since the summer of 2014, when American physician and photographer Jeffrey Gusky began publishing photos of the underground cities in *National Geographic*, the *New York Times*, and other outlets.³⁰ Previously known to just a handful of historians and enthusiasts, the caves look eerily attractive in Gusky's black and white photos and have generated plenty of enthusiasm around the world. As a result of their newfound popularity, these sites are in danger from vandals and well-meaning tourists, as well as natural causes. General Kondratiuk commented on the importance of keeping these carvings unmolested: "Life and artifacts are so ephemeral that when the soldiers came home most of the stuff they brought home was thrown away over the past hundred years."³¹ In the face of that inevitable decay, the troops of the Yankee Division built a body of work of immense historical importance. These underground spaces should be held up next to the poetry of Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, or Ernst Jünger's memoir *Storm of Steel* (Leisnig, Germany: Robert Meier, 1920), as rare points of access to the minds of the troops who fought in those trenches—treasures that deserve dedicated preservation and study. This is U.S. Army history; it just happens to reside in France.

AUTHORS' NOTE

Special thanks to retired Brig. Gen. Leonid Kondratiuk, who tracked down the service records and photos of some of the men who created the carvings and to Dr. Jeffrey Gusky for his work documenting the underground cities and for allowing the publication of his photos in this article.



NOTES

1. Some of the underground sites used by both sides for rest and relaxation, such as the Caverne du Dragon, are open to the public as museums. This article focuses on caves that are not yet reorganized for relatively frictionless public viewing.

2. On 9 November 1917, the 26th became the first complete American division overseas, according to the following sources: Emerson Gifford Taylor, *New England in France, 1917–1919: A History of the Twenty-Sixth Division, U.S.A.* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), pp. 29–31; Harry A. Benwell, *History of the Yankee Division* (Boston: Cornhill Co., 1919), p. 25.

3. The 104th Infantry had its colors decorated on 28 April 1918 with the Croix de Guerre by French corps commander General Fenelon Passaga for gallantry during the Battle of Apremont from 10 to 13 April. Benwell, *History of the Yankee Division*, p. 76.

4. James Parker, "The Militia Act of 1903," *North American Review* 177, no. 561 (August 1903): 278–87, at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25119439>.

5. There had been attempts by state governors to assert authority over their own militias when the federal perspective on the militias' use clashed with their own, including Governor Martin Chitenden's attempt during the War of 1812. Carl Edward Skeen, *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), p. 113.

6. Frank P. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division in France* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1919), p. 10.

7. Taylor, *New England in France*, p. 31.

8. Department of Veterans Affairs Fact Sheet, *America's Wars*, 2015, at http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf.

9. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division in France*, p. 19.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

11. Byron Farwell, *Over There: The United States in the Great War, 1917–1918* (New York: Norton, 1999), p. 96.

12. John Keegan, *The First World War* (London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 409.

13. Taylor, *New England in France*, p. 73.

14. Sibley, *With the Yankee Division in France*, p. 54.

15. Keegan, *The First World War*, p. 373.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 410.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

18. Taylor, *New England in France*, p. 218.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 221–23.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

21. Frank Sibley, who spent virtually the entire war with the division, wrote that the dispute over the numbers has to do with when command officially passed and how historians count artillery activity as part of the total time in the lines. He championed the 210-day number (p. 14). Others, including Byron Farwell, quote 205 days, and 45 days in combat. The 1st Division, the next closest, fought 28 combat days (p. 96).

22. Erich Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story: August 1914–November 1918*, Volume II (New York: Harper & Bros., 1919), p. 105.

23. Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War* (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), p. 11. On the next page, Foch offers examples. Asking how to compare two regiments, he wrote, "Under the same name they represent two utterly different quantities. Illness, hardships, bivouacking at night, react on the troops in various ways."

24. Telephone Interv, Alisha Hamel with Leonid Kondratiuk, 18 May 2015.

25. Ken Maguire, "Archie Sweetman is remembered," *Town Crier*, Wilmington ed., 12 Jan 1994, p. S1.

26. Telephone Interv, Alisha Hamel with Pam Fisher, 30 Jun 2015.

27. The winner of the competition was to be selected in January 2016 with construction to follow, at <http://www.worldwar1centennial.org>.

28. Michael D. Shear, "Two World War I Soldiers Posthumously Receive Medal of Honor," *New York Times*, 3 Jun 2015, p. A11.

29. Keegan, *The First World War*, p. 372. See also Peter Hart, *The Great War: A Combat History of the First World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 461.

30. Examples of Gusky's press follow: *National Geographic* (<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2014/08/ww1-underground/hadingham-text>); *New York Times* (<http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/the-hidden-cities-of-world-war-one/>); BBC (<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-29409433>); PDN (<http://potd.pdnonline.com/2014/08/28104/>); and ABC News (<http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/power-players-abc-news/beneath-the-trenches--the-secret-world-of-the-great-war-revealed-221659798.html>).

31. Alisha Hamel and Paul X. Rutz, "Racing to Preserve the Underground Cities of World War I," *Huffington Post*, 24 May 2015, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/racing-to-preserve-the-un_b_7430910.html; Interv, Hamel with Kondratiuk, 18 May 2015.

U.S. ARMY INSIGNIA SPOTLIGHT

THE CANDY CANE RETURNS

127TH BRIGADE ENGINEER BATTALION, 1ST BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

After forty-eight years the 127th Brigade Engineer Battalion was reactivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in October 2013 to be part of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division. At that time, the 127th needed a new beret flash and uniform oval (background trimming) for its parachutist badges. The new flash and oval held a red center representing the engineer corps, which was surrounded by the blue and yellow of the 504th Infantry, 1st BCT, 82d Airborne Division.

During an event in early 2015, Lt. Col. Dominic Ciaramitaro, commander of the 127th, and Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Randolph Delapena met a veteran of the 127th who inquired about the colors of the unit's oval. He showed them one he wore while assigned to the unit in the 1950s and informed them it was called the Candy Cane. The oval had a blue center wrapped with red and white stripes and edged with blue. The colors mirrored the shoulder sleeve insignia of the 11th Airborne Division, the commanding unit for the 127th during World War II. Both leaders saw an opportunity to honor the unit's history and heritage by finding a way to get the original uniform piece back on the chests and headgear of their airborne engineers.


Research began with a trip to the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum at Fort Bragg. The museum staff researched the 127th's history looking for the Candy Cane. Images of unit training during the 1950s, along with several sources, confirmed the veteran was correct. The museum's curator, James Hallis, wrote a memorandum for the unit to send to The Institute of Heraldry highlighting the historical significance of the Candy Cane oval and requesting its return. On 29 September 2015, the institute approved the World War II-era oval, with a complementing beret flash, for the 127th.

On Friday, 8 January 2016, the 127th Brigade Engineer Battalion removed the existing red, blue, and yellow oval from its uniforms and replaced the insignia with the design from the World War II era. The ceremony took place outside the battalion headquarters. Colonel Ciaramitaro and Command Sergeant Major Delapena asked James Hallis to pin the oval on their uniforms to begin the ceremony. Subsequently, the commander and command sergeant major then pinned each company commander and first sergeant, respectively. The process repeated throughout the ranks with each trooper of the battalion receiving the change. Once each soldier had the oval on his or her uniform, berets were donned, complete with the new flash. The battalion now recognized its heritage and honored those airborne engineers who served before them in New Guinea, Leyte, and Luzon.




Opposite Top: 127th Brigade Engineer Battalion's oval and flash ceremony, 8 January 2016

Opposite Middle: James Hallis, curator of the 82d Airborne Division War Memorial Museum, pins the unit's new oval on Colonel Ciaramitaro.



2013–2015
airborne background
trimming (oval)



2015 to present
airborne background
trimming (oval)




2015 to present
beret flash and
127th Brigade
Engineer Battalion
distinctive unit insignia

**ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR**

Kevin Davies completed a master's degree in defense studies from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He has also written for *Studies in Intelligence*, the *Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers*, and the *Marine Corps Gazette*.



A poster from the Camouflage Research Station warning of the dangers of incomplete camouflaging efforts



PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

THE DEFENCE CENTRAL CAMOUFLAGE COMMITTEE, 1940–1943

BY KEVIN DAVIES

INTRODUCTION

The period between December 1941 and July 1942 was a dark time for Australia. The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, conquered Singapore—taking with it thousands of Australian soldiers as prisoners of war—and had pushed through what is now Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. With the bombing of Darwin and the midget submarine raid on Sydney, it was clear that Australia was under serious threat. In response to the danger, the Australian government created the Defence Central Camouflage Committee (DCCC) to organize and implement the nation's strategic camouflage plan. The DCCC evolved from the Sydney Camouflage Group, a volunteer organization of concerned civilian scientists, artists, and military personnel, into a nationwide body that sought to bring together the combined skills of the scientific, artistic, and military worlds and use them to conceal important establishments from the enemy.

Although initially well received, differences between the military and the civilians led to a clash of authority that

undermined much of the good work done by the DCCC. The purpose of this article is to investigate the history of the DCCC and its leaders and analyze the failures from the perspective of civil-military relations.

AUSTRALIAN PRE- AND EARLY WAR CAMOUFLAGE EFFORTS

During World War I, Australia quickly, and painfully, learned the importance of camouflage. The introduction of new technologies such as the airplane, and with it, aerial reconnaissance—and later aerial bombing—meant that military forces not on the front line were no longer protected by simple distance. It also meant that it was possible to spot a large buildup of forces, potentially warning the enemy of an impending attack. To prevent detection, elaborate camouflage schemes were developed. From the replacement of the prewar uniforms, such as the French *pantaloon rouge*, with terrain-matching colored or disruptive-patterned clothing as well as the strategic camouflage efforts prior to the German 1918 spring offensive, it was obvious that in order for soldiers,

airmen, or sailors to survive they had to be able to hide in plain sight.¹

In the years before World War II, it is unclear to what extent the lessons learned in World War I had been lost by the Australian military. The field of camouflage was “confined to zoologists and a few field naturalists especially those interested in animal colouration and the phenomena of vision.”² Contradicting this is Brig. John L. O'Brien, who stated,


Despite the impression that could be gained for m.s to indicate that the Army was not greatly interested in the subject, it was actually a live one among units even prior to World War II. Because it was rightly not taken as the be-all and end-all of fighting a war, the super enthusiasts probably do not realise that this was so, or if they did, probably sneered at the efforts as unscientific and elementary, which they probably were. To many a soldier's sorrow the subject of “Camouflage and Concealment,” was too often standard procedure for a dull officer to occupy the time of bored soldiery by lecturing. Nevertheless, a lot of

good practical training was often done. My own pre-war [experience was] mostly with artillery units and the subject of Camouflage and Concealment was a standard major consideration in the selection of gun positions, wagon lines and particularly O.P.S.³

This disagreement may be explained by several factors, such as whether or not one considers teaching camouflage techniques to soldiers or researching it by scientists as constituting a strategic effort. Such differences in perspective help to account for the eventual clash between civilian authority and the military that occurred in Australian camouflage undertakings in early to mid-1942.

Whatever the case, by 1938, Australia did not have a strategic camouflage organization or plan ready in case of war. As the threat of war in Europe, and increasing fear of Japanese expansion, penetrated the Australian strategic outlook, tentative steps toward a national camouflage plan began. The same year, following a recommendation made by the Defence Committee regarding aerial photography of military installations and other prohibited areas, the military service boards and Munitions Supply Board investigated the feasibility of camouflaging a “secret plant.”⁴ The issue of concealment was raised for a second time at a Council of Defence meeting on 25 January 1939 when the service boards were required to advise the government about possible measures to camouflage military establishments.⁵

While the military was taking these steps, small groups of civilians were also developing camouflage techniques and materials for use in the impending conflict. In April 1939, two civilians, V. E. Tadgell of the *Orient Line* shipping company and Sydney Ure Smith of the Council of the Society of Artists, met with representatives of the Navy Department to “inquire whether or not there was any part that could be played by artists in the event of war.”⁶ The eventual outcome of this meeting was the creation of the Sydney Camouflage Group. This organization consisted of civilian scientists, artists,



Sydney Ure Smith, c. 1948

and military representatives. Its first chairman was the chair of zoology at the University of Sydney, Professor William John Dakin.


With the creation of the Sydney Camouflage Group, work began in earnest, although unofficially and on a small scale. The body developed schemes for camouflaging water, gas, and oil facilities, as well as military installations. It conducted site visits to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aerodrome at Richmond, New South Wales, and undertook studies at the forts in North Head, Sydney. It set up experiments and basic camouflage training at various army camps.⁷ With the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Sydney Camouflage Group gained the attention of the highest levels of government.⁸ It was during 1940 that the seeds were sown for the DCCC.

WILLIAM JOHN DAKIN

No study of camouflage efforts in Australia during World War II is possible without mentioning Professor William John Dakin.⁹ He was born on 23 April 1883 in Toxeth Park, Liverpool, Lancashire, England, to William and Elizabeth (née Grimshaw). Upon completing a Bachelor of Science, with honors, in zoology in 1905 and a

Master of Science in 1907, both from the University of Liverpool, he spent 1907–1908 at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität in Keil, Germany. His time there included a tour at the biological station on Heligoland in the North Sea. This posting allowed him to develop a deeper love of oceanography. He also spent a season in Italy at the Naples Zoological Station with the British Association for the Advancement of Science and in 1909 moved to Ireland where he eventually worked as an assistant lecturer at Queens University of Belfast. The following year he returned to the University of Liverpool where, in addition to teaching, he completed his doctorate in 1911, studying osmotic pressure and the blood of fishes. In 1912, Dakin took a senior assistantship at University College before applying for the chair of biology of the newly established University of Western Australia. Upon acceptance and before leaving for Australia, he married Catherine Mary Gladys Lewis (who also held a science degree) on 15 January 1913.

The move to Australia was a turning point in Dakin’s life. He established a biology club, became the president of the local chapter of the Royal Society from 1913–1915, and was assigned



William Dakin, c. 1943

to assist public health services in Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Perth. In 1920, he left Perth to take the job of chair of zoology at the University of Liverpool and remained there until 1928. On 24 January 1929, he returned to Australia, this time to assume the position of chair of zoology at the University of Sydney and stayed until his retirement in 1948. It was during his tenure at the University of Sydney that he became the technical director of camouflage at the Department of Home Security (DHS).

These rather dry details do not truly reflect the depth of this man. Dakin was a passionate scientist who made major contributions to science in general and Australian science in particular. What little is written about him indicates that he was an excellent teacher who inspired his students. He was also interested in educating people about science when he produced for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation the long-term series called *Science in the News*. According to authors Allen Colefax and Ann Elias, this brought him “tremendous popularity” among the general populace and “the disapproval of purist colleagues who believed academia should be free of popular application.”¹⁰ Aside from his career in science, he was “a brilliant lecturer, and an expert on yachting, photography and radio design. He was also an acknowledged authority on whaling, a tireless campaigner for the wider teaching of Biology in schools, a fine pianist and a landscape artist of considerable merit.”¹¹ During his lifetime, Dakin published over sixty scientific papers, two textbooks, a history of Australian whaling, the manual *The Art of Camouflage*, as well as several magazine articles. His finest work was the posthumously published *Australian Seashores*. For his incredible contribution to science, the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science awarded him the Mueller Medal in 1949.

William Dakin died after a long battle with cancer on 2 April 1950 at his home in Turramurra (a suburb of Sydney) and was survived by his wife and their son.

THE DCCC

The DCCC evolved from a suggestion made by the director of Civilian Defence and State Cooperation “that all state governments might be requested to examine the problem of camouflage in consultation with local Army and RAAF Headquarters. It [also] was pointed out that there was a lack of adequate information relating to camouflage.”¹² The Defence Committee, an advisory group to the minister for defence, considered the proposal and made the following recommendations:

i) As in the case of lighting restrictions, the probability of the need arising for the camouflaging of places of national importance is remote. Nevertheless, the Committee consider it desirable that plans should be prepared in advance for camouflaging selected places in Brisbane, Newcastle-Sydney, Port Kembla, Melbourne-Geelong, Fremantle and possibly Port Moresby and Rabaul.

It was agreed that the list of places of national and military importance (including Services and Munitions establishments), together with an estimate of the cost, distinguishing Services, Munitions and civil establishments, should be prepared by the Standing and Sub-Committee with the Director of Civilian Defence and State Co-operation and a representative of the Department of Supply and Development added—the Sub-Committee to collaborate with the Service Departments and the Department of Supply and Development to the extent necessary for the purposes of its investigations.

ii) After consideration of the report, the Defence Committee will submit a recommendation as to the extent to which, in its opinion, camouflaging should be taken, and the basis of distribution of the cost.¹³

The report was well received and, based on it, the Defence Commit-

tee in August 1940 recommended the establishment of a Camouflage Committee and that it should provide advice on

- a) The general principles which should be followed in connection with the camouflage of Service and Civil establishments
- b) The nature and extent of the preparatory work which should now be undertaken and the organisation required for this purpose
- c) The places of national and military importance which it is considered should be included in the scheme for camouflage
- d) The estimated costs of camouflaging the approved establishments, the basis of distribution of the costs between Commonwealth, State and owner of the establishment
- e) Any other relevant aspects.¹⁴

One important factor behind the creation of a single, centralized camouflage authority was the desire to avoid the chaos and waste of resources caused in Britain by the existence of four separate camouflage departments.¹⁵

Events then moved swiftly. In November 1940, the first meeting of the Camouflage Committee was held at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne with representatives from the armed services, relevant government departments, and members of the Sydney Camouflage Group. The one-day meeting extended out to a week, during which the shape of the DCCC, its roles and responsibilities, costs, and the need for commonwealth legislation were determined.¹⁶ On 28 March 1941, the Defence Committee recommended that the DCCC be established, and it was approved by the War Cabinet on 9 April 1941.¹⁷ In addition to the DCCC, the War Cabinet, as per the recommendations, approved the creation of an experimental camouflage station at Middle Head, Sydney, directed by the DCCC and administered by Department of the Army. The station was located in the School of Military Engineering and was designed and equipped by Professor Dakin.¹⁸

While the wheels of government turned to create the DCCC, the Sydney Camouflage Group was making steady progress developing camouflage tools and techniques for use by the Australian military. The best example of this was a sixty-page manual entitled *The Art of Camouflage*. This guide, referred to as *The Art and Method of Camouflage* in the minutes of the November 1941 meetings, gave Australian forces a clear and easy to understand reference on the art and science of camouflage.¹⁹ Using examples from a variety of sources, both natural and synthetic, it explained how to conceal objects properly, whether they were air-, land-, or sea-based targets.²⁰ It also discussed how to detect enemy camouflage efforts. An initial order of 1,000 copies was placed, and it continued to be used throughout the war.²¹

The first meeting of the DCCC convened at Victoria Barracks on 2 May 1941. The chairman was Lt. Col. R. M. V. Thirkell, and Dakin was appointed the technical director. Pursuant to the requirements of the federal government, the DCCC tasked each state with creating its own camouflage committee. Additionally, camouflage priorities were developed, and the importance of the

experimental camouflage station was reaffirmed.²² With an initial fund of £9,000, and annual budget of £5,000, DCCC's work began with eighteen camouflage projects either under way or awaiting funding.²³

Regular meetings occurred as the various aspects of the DCCC began to take shape. By the fourth meeting of the DCCC executive committee, held on 14–15 July 1941 at Victoria Barracks, regulations governing the camouflaging of military and civil establishments were drafted for the government.²⁴ Meanwhile, formation of the state committees commenced, and they contained a bewildering array of individuals from a number of decidedly nonmilitary positions. A document titled *Suggested Defence State Camouflage Committee—Executives* listed the chair of the Melbourne Committee as Darryl Lindsay, keeper of the prints, National Gallery, Melbourne, while the chair of the Perth Committee, Professor A. D. Ross, was a physicist from the University of Perth.²⁵ Committees composed of scientists, architects, soldiers, and artists, among others, brings to mind Sir Winston Churchill's famous comment to Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, regarding the eclectic characters

working at Bletchley Park to crack the German Enigma code: "I told you to leave no stone unturned, but I did not expect you to take me so literally."²⁶

Because the responsibility of the DCCC was nationwide, which included Papua New Guinea and Rabaul and covered both civil and military establishments, a strong regulatory framework was required. Draft regulations were prepared at the committee's fourth session.²⁷ These official guidelines, put into effect as of 7 August 1941 under the National Security Act of 1939–1940, defined the functions of the DCCC as follows:

- a) To prepare lists of places of national and military importance to be camouflaged
- b) To conduct experimental work in relation to camouflage of establishments and all types of Defence and Civil equipment
- c) To prepare and approve plans for camouflage schemes, and to coordinate and control such schemes
- d) To maintain records of all available camouflage information
- e) To co-ordinate and direct activities of State Defence Camouflage Committees
- f) To advise the Minister concerning any matters referred by him to the Committee.²⁸

Initially under the Department of Defence Coordination, the DCCC moved to the camouflage section of the newly created Department of Home Security by July 1941.²⁹ As part of the DHS, the DCCC now came under the authority of Minister for Home Security Hubert Peter Lazzarini. Alexander W. Welch, the secretary of the DHS, became the DCCC chair; Colonel Thirkell the deputy chair; and Professor Dakin remained the technical director.³⁰

September to December 1941 was a highly productive time. The Camouflage Research Station at Middle Head became operational and began conducting experiments. Furthermore, the first project with the RAAF started at its aerodrome Williamtown, New South Wales, receiving a complete camouflage and concealment effort.³¹ It was during this time that the first




National Portrait Gallery of Victoria

Darryl Lindsay



University of Western Australia

A. D. Ross



problems between the DCCC and the army developed. According to Dakin,

A small disagreement in policy with the Army Authorities directly controlling the Research Station had already occurred to cloud the otherwise bright prospects for useful work. The fact was that at this early date Army was not following the instructions laid down in regard to the functions of the Defence Central Camouflage Committee.³²

In Dakin's opinion, the root cause of this matter was civilians and military personnel having to work together and the natural allegiance of the army personnel to their service. Whatever the reason, the outcome was, according to Dakin, "the Department of Home Security itself scarcely realised that the control of the Camouflage Research Station was passing out of the hands of the DCCC."³³ This "small disagreement" was a portent of things to come.

WAR REACHES AUSTRALIA

The attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (due to time zones, the strike occurred on 8 December in Australia), suddenly made the necessity of camouflage a vital strategic issue. Within eight days of the

assault, plans for the concealment of eleven aerodromes around the Northern Territory were developed. On 14 January 1942, a work crew of twenty-three men departed Sydney on board the SS *Zealandia* headed for Darwin to conduct camouflaging efforts.³⁴

The *Zealandia* arrived in Darwin in early February. Unfortunately, due to labor problems, it was not possible for the materials to be unloaded. Despite this setback, and keen to get on with the job, the men started painting RAAF hangars. On 19 February 1942, the Japanese bombed Darwin. Among the casualties was the *Zealandia*, sunk along with most of the camouflage supplies in its hold.³⁵ This loss, due to the distance between Darwin and other major population centers, meant that camouflaging in that area was not possible, precisely when the peril was greatest.

The bombings of Pearl Harbor and Darwin had finally awakened Australia to the need for major camouflage efforts and, as a result, all three services undertook these endeavors with avidity. A meeting of the Advisory War Council on 23 December 1941 reported that the navy "is co-operating to the full," the army and RAAF had allocated £100,000 and £50,000, respectively, toward camouflage, and the Minister for Home Security had approved the use of £50,000 for bulk purchase of camouflage materials.³⁶ Given the importance of the program and the limited resources available, areas were prioritized to receive al-

locations. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on 22 April 1942, the following cities were listed as vulnerable (10 being the most):

- 10. Darwin, Port Moresby
- 9. Townsville, Brisbane
- 8. Sydney, Newcastle, Kembla
- 7. Perth, Fremantle
- 6. Melbourne, Geelong, Whyalla, Port Pirie, Hobart
- 5. Yallourn, Lithgow, Waddamana
- 4. Salisbury, Adelaide


Furthermore, the committee prioritized the camouflage of establishments in the following order (1 being most important):

- 1. Operational aerodromes
- 2. Bulk Petrol and oil storages
- 3. Power houses and munitions factories
- 4. Coastal fortifications, fixed anti-aircraft batteries, and RAAF stations not included in 1
- 5. Explosive and ammunition depots
- 6. Camps and stores depots
- 7. Other service installations³⁷

During this time, those employed by the DHS in concealment endeavors reached a peak of around a hundred.³⁸

THE CAMOUFLEURS

To focus solely on the bureaucratic aspects of the camouflage effort in general, and the DCCC in particular,






serves as a great injustice to the men and women who comprised the DCCC and their major contributions to the art and science of camouflage. Titled *camoufleurs*, their story is a fascinating one, both for what they did and for who they were.³⁹


The people who worked for the DCCC came from an array of backgrounds. The Australian art community featured prominently in the camouflage efforts and, by far, the two biggest standouts were the modernists Frank Hinder and Max Dupain. Together they “used techniques of abstraction, cubism and surrealism to help the military camouflage and conceal soldiers, aeroplanes and military equipment.”⁴⁰ This resulted in inventions like the “Hinder Spider,” which was “a portable and collapsible frame for hanging camouflage nets over guns in the field.”⁴¹

Throughout the country, the camoufleurs worked to hide aerodromes, oil depots, and other military and



Courtesy of the Art Gallery of New South Wales Archive

Frank Hinder



National Library of Australia

Max Dupain in his camoufleur uniform



Australian War Memorial

An aircraft hangar camouflaged to look like a general store

civil installations from the enemy. Even establishments like the Mount Stromlo Observatory in Canberra received their attention.⁴² Nevertheless, the camoufleurs did face existential issues about their beliefs and war.

In her book, Ann Elias dedicated an entire chapter, titled “Conscience,” to how the Australian art world in general, and the camoufleurs in particular, saw themselves as participants in the war. She mentioned several artists and others, both from Australia and abroad, who were committed pacifists but ended up in uniform. She also noted that one camoufleur, Ralph Shelley, was a conscientious objector and refused to swear an oath of service to the military forces of the Commonwealth

of Australia. Dakin eventually had him removed from the DHS.⁴³ In addition to the ethical quandary faced by many artists, it was also difficult to categorize the camoufleurs. They were not war artists recording history with paint and brush, nor were they soldiers serving in military units bound by martial rules, regulations, and traditions. However, although they were civilians and non-combatants, they were still playing an active role in the war effort. Because they were not completely artists, but also not entirely soldiers, these individuals were left in a state of military



Australian War Memorial

General Steele



Australian War Memorial

Accredited camoufleur shoulder slide with badge

and governmental legal limbo. This state of uncertainty exacerbated the natural and understandable desire of the camoufleurs to serve the nation in a time of mortal danger. Elias noted that “the artists who worked in camouflage were committed to working for the national good. They shared a high sense of national duty, wanted to shield and safeguard citizens against external violence, and were committed to border protection against Japanese invasion. Camouflage was a way of bringing specialist skills to national protection.”⁴⁴ To many in the army, or at least its chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Clive S. Steele, this gave the perception that the camoufleurs were just looking for something to do, whether or not the army actually thought it was needed.⁴⁵

Because of their sense of duty and their desire to serve, several camoufleurs were eager to relocate either to northern Australia or into the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), primarily to Papua New Guinea. However, those that did deploy often struggled to adjust to the foreign cultures, the tropical climate, and military environment.⁴⁶ Such discomfort may have played into the hands of the military by demonstrating that it alone should handle matters relating to camouflage because civilian artists were not mentally strong enough for the rigors of war. This seems unlikely as many other artists enlisted in the armed forces and saw combat.⁴⁷ The only real difference between these serving artists and the camoufleurs was that one group was part of the military, while the camoufleurs were civilians employed by the DHS.

Regardless of the issues, what is beyond doubt is the quantity and quality of the work produced by the camoufleurs. The Research Station at Middle Head was at its height in early 1942. It was conducting experiments with everything from imitation rocks and artificial trees to the concealment of radar installations and paints capable of avoiding detection by infrared photography.⁴⁸ In addition to *The Art of Camouflage* manual, the DCCC produced numerous bulletins, booklets, films, and posters.⁴⁹ The station also designed and ran instructional programs concerning

camouflage. In all, the DCCC held fifteen courses and trained 450 officers.⁵⁰

CLASH OF AUTHORITY

With established priorities, available funding, and a clear strategic necessity, there should have been little to impede the effective work of the DCCC. However, this changed on 5 June 1942, when General Sir Thomas Blamey, commander, Allied Land Forces, SWPA, and commander in chief, Australian Military Forces, issued the following general routine order (GRO):

General Staff.

G.71. Unit Camouflage

1. The construction and maintenance of camouflage works for a military unit or installation is primarily the responsibility of that unit.

2. The unit should seek engineer advice, if required, from the appropriate Engineer Commander.

3. The Engineer Commander concerned will—

(a) Provide necessary engineer stores

(b) Decide whether engineer assistance is required and, if necessary, provide it


(305/733/465)

V.A.H. STURDEE

Lieutenant General,

Chief of the General Staff⁵¹

This GRO, coming seemingly out of nowhere, caused great consternation within the DCCC, and Dakin was quick to investigate. In a letter to Lt. Gen. Vernon Sturdee, Dakin wrote that it “seems to indicate that in the future all Army Camouflage is to be a matter for the Army alone” and “this seems to cut right across the Camouflage Regulations and Organisation set up by the Commonwealth Government.”⁵² The response from General Sturdee was that “this was a purely domestic instruction to Army units telling them that camouflage is primarily the responsibility of the unit and that if they wanted assistance they should apply to the appropriate Engineer Commander concerned.”⁵³ The rationale for this



GRO was, as stated in a 19 June 1942 memorandum from Secretary of the Army Frank Sinclair to the Secretary for Home Security, due to the “re-organisation of the military forces into Field Army and Lines of Communication commands, and the placing of the forces on an operational basis.” The memorandum also requested that the regulations governing camouflage be amended to allow “for the operational responsibility of the Army.”⁵⁴

While there was no question that the army had control of camouflage efforts when deployed overseas, this GRO included establishments within Australia and contradicted the existing regulations. A complicating factor was a directive issued by General Doug-

las MacArthur on 23 July 1942 that gave subordinate commanders, both American and Australian, responsibility for the camouflaging of military installations.⁵⁵

Despite not having made any complaints about the DCCC prior to the 5 June GRO, especially after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and Darwin, the navy and RAAF embraced the proposed amendments. The Department of Home Security vigorously fought the changes, arguing that to do so would result in a situation similar to that of Britain in the pre- and early war years, the very situation the DCCC was created to prevent.⁵⁶

The military eventually prevailed. On 15 October 1942, a submission made to the War Cabinet requested

approval for the following amendment to the national security (camouflage) regulations:

20. Nothing contained in these regulations shall prevent or interfere with—

(a) the camouflage treatment in the course of his duty by any member of the Defence Force, of any place, premises or property of, or used by, any part of the Defence Force, or of any other place, premises or property which, in the opinion of an officer of that force, requires to be camouflaged for the purpose of any offensive or defensive naval, military or air force operation; or

(b) the camouflage treatment in the course of his duty by any member of any foreign Power allied or associated with His Majesty in any war in which His Majesty is engaged, or of any place, premises or property of, or used by any Force of such Power.⁵⁷

These amendments appear to have been approved sometime between October and December 1942. While the armed services were now able to control their own camouflaging programs as they saw fit, the DHS remained the lead research body for camouflage and the official advisory authority.⁵⁸ The army ceased training with the DCCC and ran its own courses independently, but the RAAF continued to have the DCCC train RAAF officers.⁵⁹ From then on, the camoufleurs operated either on civil projects or with the RAAF. Toward the end of 1942, the need for camouflaging civilian establishments ceased.⁶⁰

Another point of contention was the accreditation of camoufleurs either deployed to military establishments in Australia or operating overseas. As mentioned earlier, the camoufleurs struggled with their identity.⁶¹ According to Professor Dakin, whenever a camoufleur deployed,

The same problem has arisen, viz, no arrangement has been made to give our officers any official status and a uniform. They have neither the standing of a war artist, or even



General MacArthur confers with Prime Minister Curtin.

National Archives of Australia



Capt. R. J. Ryrie, camouflage officer of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, camouflaging the roof of an officer's mess, 4 November 1942

a “camp follower” such officers for the Australian Comforts Fund, Salvation Army, canteens or other bodies.⁶²

One consequence of this was that “they have most serious difficulties in carrying on their work because no one outside the RAAF officers immediately concerned can decide their rights, privileges, or standing. They may even be arrested as having no right to be in the area.”⁶³ A graver issue was that the camoufleurs were not eligible for compensation should they be wounded or even killed in the line of duty.⁶⁴ At a meeting of the Defence Committee on 12 March 1943, it was recommended that camoufleurs be accredited with the RAAF, though remaining in the

employ of the DHS.⁶⁵ Prime Minister John Curtin, also the minister for defence, agreed with the proposal and the accreditation went into effect soon after.⁶⁶

THE END

The year 1943 brought with it the virtual end of the DCCC. This happened for two reasons. First, the change in the strategic situation saw Japanese forces pushed away from Australia, and second, the changes in regulations brought by the army had eliminated any role for the DCCC. However, the RAAF continued to use the camoufleurs in place of its own camouflage teams. The last meeting of the DCCC took place on 11 December 1942. A report produced on camouflage activities from December


1942 to 30 October 1943 was sent to the civilians on the DCCC, but, ultimately, “The practical need for the DCCC had passed away.”⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the camouflage section of the DHS remained, in ever decreasing numbers, until the end of the war.

ANALYSIS OF THE CLASH

The discord between the DCCC and the military was, at its heart, an issue of civil-military relations. According to David P. Mellor, a contemporary of Dakin, “The inevitable clash between army and civilian authorities came not over the question of who had more experience, but over the question of who should control camouflage activities. The Army’s real concern was with what it believed in the circumstances to be a serious waste of man power on unnecessary camouflage schemes.”⁶⁸ Capt. Keith McConnel of the Royal Australian Engineers noted that the army “rightly resented the imposition of civilian authority over matters upon which they rightly felt themselves not only better qualified, but morally entitled to make their own decisions.”⁶⁹ Author Samuel P. Huntingdon noted that

Just as war serves the ends, the military profession serves the ends of the state. Yet the statesman must recognize the integrity of the profession and its subject matter. The military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civilian control exists when there is proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.⁷⁰

In light of this, it seems that the army did undermine the concept of civilian authority when it issued the GRO. The civilian authority, through the Defence Committee, had provided guidance to the military in the form of the DCCC and had done so at the request of the armed forces. Furthermore, as repeatedly stressed by Dakin, there was never any question about the right of the military to camouflage as it saw fit when deployed. What was at issue was the camouflage strategy for a nation at war. Captain McConnel’s comment




about the army being “better qualified [and] morally entitled to make their own decisions” ignores the debatable nature of the army’s competence to handle the matter and that camouflage was also needed for civilian establishments—decisions the army was not “morally entitled” to make.⁷¹ Given that the Defence Committee had tasked the DCCC with carrying out the assigned requirements, the army was obliged to work within that construct. If the army had a problem with this, it should have made it known at the DCCC’s inception. Additionally, the minutes of the DCCC’s executive committee do not indicate that any branch of the military had a problem

with the setup prior to 1942, despite having many opportunities to voice trepidations.⁷²

Any concern about the possibility of wasted resources does not hold much weight as an argument against the DCCC. “It would be a mistake to regard the energy and material expended on camouflage for civil defence and for the R.A.A.F on the Australian mainland [as wasted]. Like many other precautionary measures, it seemed essential at the time.”⁷³ Regardless of the ongoing debate as to what threat the Japanese actually posed to Australia, the DCCC did prioritize its resources and was not afraid to cease camouflaging operations if they were deemed unnecessary.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the resource argument ignores the vital scientific contributions made by the DCCC. The research done was of the highest quality and was hardly a waste of money and materials. The creation of multiple, independent camouflage bodies, similar to Britain early in the war and after the dissolution of the DCCC, was far more wasteful than a single statutory body tasked with implementing government policy.

The existence of the camouflers created another issue regarding civil-military relations. That the camouflers were civilian is beyond question, but they were not war artists, journalists, or other civilians passively participating in the war effort. The camouflers were active, though non-combat, participants trying to devise and implement ways of hindering the





civilians in war, especially when they are following a government mandate but operating in areas under military control.



NOTES

1. Jessica Talarico, “5 Facts About Camouflage In The First World War,” *Imperial War Museums*, n.d., accessed 6 April 2015, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/5-facts-about-camouflage-in-the-first-world-war>. The British had already been issuing khaki uniforms prior to the start of World War I.

2. Rpt, William John Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, Rpt and apps. A–R, pt. I, p. 7, 81/77, Australian War Memorial (AWM). This is an account of the work by the Australian government’s camouflage section of the Department of Home Security during the war (1939–1945), together with a history of the development of camouflage in Australia in connection with World War II.

3. Ltrs, Brig John L. O’Brien to David P. Mellor, 14 Mar 1955, sub: *Camouflage Methods: Outline of the formation and operation of Camouflage Units in the Australian Military Forces*; O’Brien and Maj Gen Clive Selwyn Steele to Mellor, 19 Nov 1952, sub: *Camouflage* appearing in Mellor’s official history, *The Role of Science and Industry*, 54/161/3/9, AWM. The letters were compiled by Capt Keith H. McConnel, Royal Australian Engineers.

4. “Early History of Organisation For Development and Control of Camouflage in Australia,” *Establishment of Camouflage Organisation and procedure, 1941*, including *The Art of Camouflage*, Sydney Camouflage Group, ed. William John Dakin (Sydney: Australasian Medical Publishing, 1941–1958), A5954/396/2, National Archives of Australia (NAA), Department of Defence (DoD).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 7.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

8. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 9.

9. Ursuka Bygott and K. J. Cable, “Dakin, William John (1883–1950),” in *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981), accessed

enemy’s plans. Because they were not so much civilians in war, but civilians at war, there was a certain dissonance between them and the military, which felt camouflage was solely its domain. This disagreement may explain, in part, why the matter of camoufleur accreditation was a problem.

Fortunately, for Australia, the change in strategic fortunes meant that these issues were resolved in a politically convenient, though intellectually unsatisfying, manner—the military camouflaged as it saw fit, the DCCC folded, and eventually the war was won. David Mellor summarized the situation best when he said, “If one factor emerged more clearly than any other from the experience, it was the difficulty of coordinating scientific effort and defining limits of authority in a sphere of interest to the armed services and civil defence.”⁷⁵

CONCLUSION


The circumstances and issues surrounding the DCCC make clear conclusions difficult. It is beyond doubt that the members of the DCCC were highly skilled patriots who were committed to using their unique skills to protect their country from harm. It is also true that poor preparation prior to World War II meant that they were unable to bring their skills to bear, as demonstrated by the bombing of the *Zealandia* with camouflage materials

still on board it, precisely when these items were needed the most. Because the DCCC could often not implement its programs in full, there is a question about whether such a large effort was even necessary. Nevertheless, all involved in the DCCC produced exceptional work and should be commended for what they accomplished.

This clash of authority provides a clear example of the problems inherent in civil-military relations. Given that the DCCC was operating according to the instructions of the government, it is more than likely that the army was out of line when it issued the GRO of 5 June 1942 without first consulting the DCCC. Had the DCCC not been established while Australia’s situation was so dire, there could have been more time to identify potential problems before they occurred. The DCCC was created because initially the military did not have the strategic capability or the resources to implement its own camouflage program and because civilian locations also needed camouflage. The army should have accepted the DCCC or voiced its concerns when repeatedly given the chance to do so. By issuing the GRO, without notice or consultation, the army challenged the concept of civilian authority over the military. The accreditation difficulties for the camoufleurs, in addition to the dangers faced by those deployed, raise questions about the proper role of

- 7 May 2016, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/dakin-william-john-5863>. Unless otherwise referenced, all biographical information is sourced from Bygott and Cable; Allen N. Colefax, "Professor William John Dakin, D.Sc., F.Z.S." *Australian Journal of Science* 12, no. 6 (June 1950): 208–09.
10. Colefax, "Professor William John Dakin," p. 209; Elias, *Camouflage Australia*, p. 58.
 11. Colefax, "Professor William John Dakin," p. 209.
 12. "Early History of Organisation For Development and Control of Camouflage in Australia."
 13. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 9.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 15. Rpt Extract, Capt J. L. Manafield, Britain Home Defence Services, Subcommittee, 1941, app. III; Staff Notes, *Camouflage in Australia: Camouflage, activities, policy and control*, 3 Jun 1942. Both in A705/62/4/88, NAA, DoD.
 16. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, app. A.
 17. War Cabinet Minutes, Sydney, Agendum No. 126/1941, 9 Apr 1941, Establishment of Camouflage Organisation, A5954/396/2, NAA, DoD.
 18. *Ibid.*; Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 13.
 19. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, app. A.
 20. *The Art of Camouflage*, Sydney Camouflage Group, ed. Dakin.
 21. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, app. A.
 22. Minutes from executive committee meetings, Defence Central Camouflage Committee, SP110/4/1, NAA, DoD.
 23. "Early History of Organisation For Development and Control of Camouflage in Australia"; Minutes from executive committee meetings, SP110/4/1.
 24. "Early History of Organisation For Development and Control of Camouflage in Australia."
 25. *Ibid.*
 26. Simon Singh, *The Code Book: The Secret History of Codes and Code-Breaking* (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), pp. 178–79.
 27. Minutes from executive committee meetings, SP110/4/1.
 28. "Early History of Organisation For Development and Control of Camouflage in Australia."
 29. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 23.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
 34. *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
 36. Rpt, Minister for Home Security, Agendum 151/1941, 31 Dec 1941, sub: Questions raised by the Advisory War Council, A5954/396/2, NAA, DoD.
 37. *Ibid.*
 38. Correspondence files, Department of Home Security, A453, 1942/21/2632, NAA, DoD.
 39. Several sources seem to contradict where the line between Defence Central Camouflage Committee and camoufleurs occurs. As such, for the purposes of this paper, they are part of the same body under the control of the Department of Home Security camouflage section until 1943.
 40. Ann Elias, "Hidden history: Max Dupain, modernism and wartime camouflage," *Conversation*, 26 Jul 2013, accessed 27 April 2015, <http://theconversation.com/hidden-history-max-dupain-modernism-and-war-time-camouflage-16362>.
 41. Ann Elias, "The Organisation of Camouflage in Australia in the Second World War," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* (n.d.): 5, accessed 11 January 2015, <http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j38/camouflage.asp>.
 42. Rpt, Department of Finance, Mount Stromlo Observatory: *Camouflage, 1941–1942*, A292, C20974, NAA, DoD.
 43. Elias, *Camouflage Australia*, Chapter 8.
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
 45. Ltr, O'Brien and Steele to Mellor, 19 Nov 1952.
 46. Elias, *Camouflage Australia*, pp. 111–23.
 47. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
 48. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 85.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. Australian Military Forces Board, IN-STNS 1-75, GRO 1-725 (Melbourne: Australian Government, 1942), p. 2152.
 52. Ltr, Professor William John Dakin to Lt Gen Vernon Sturdee, 13 Jun 1942, A453, 1942/21/2632, NAA, DoD.
 53. Ltr, Sturdee to Dakin, 20 Jun 1942, A453, 1942/21/2632, NAA, DoD.
 54. Memo, Alexander Welch, Secretary of Department of Home Security, for Secretary of the Army Frank Roy Sinclair, no. 64033, 19 Jun 1942, A453, 1942/21/2632, NAA, DoD.
 55. Directive, General Douglas MacArthur's first Camouflage Directive, Rpt and apps. K–N, pt. III, 81/77, AWM.
 56. War Cabinet, Agendum No. 410/1942, 28 Oct 1942, *Camouflage*, A5954/396/2, NAA, DoD.
 57. Ltr, Alexander W. Welch to Sir Frederick Snedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, 15 Oct 1942, A453, 1942/21/2632, NAA, DoD.
 58. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, pp. 140–41.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
 60. Elias, "The Organisation of Camouflage in Australia in the Second World War."
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 62. Department of Home Security, 1943, sub: Accreditation and Attachment of Camouflage Officers, A5954/396/9, NAA, DoD.
 63. *Ibid.*
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. Minutes from Defence Committee meeting, 12 Mar 1943, A5954/396/9, NAA, DoD.
 66. Ltr, Prime Minister John Curtin to Arthur S. Drakeford, Member of Parliament, A5954/396/9, NAA, DoD.
 67. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 92.
 68. David P. Mellor, *The Role of Science and Industry, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 4 (Civil)* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1958), p. 539.
 69. Ltrs, O'Brien to Mellor, 14 Mar 1955, and O'Brien and Steele to Mellor, 19 Nov 1952, pp. 24–25.
 70. Samuel P. Huntingdon, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 71–72.
 71. McConnell's own work contains a crossed passage that says, "The ideas of deception and concealment held by personnel generally in the early days (of 1941) were not unlike those of the ostrich!" 54/161/3/9, AWM.
 72. Minutes from executive committee meetings, SP110/4/1.
 73. Mellor, *The Role of Science and Industry*, p. 544.
 74. Dakin refers to a large camouflage operation in Victoria that was canceled because it was unnecessary. Rpt, Dakin, *Camouflage in Australia 1939–1945*, p. 96.
 75. Mellor, *The Role of Science and Industry*, p. 544.

BOOKREVIEWS



Review by Frank L. Kalesnik

The colonial period in United States history lasted three centuries, from the arrival of Columbus in the New World to the end of the American War of Independence. Continuous conflict throughout this epoch involved both conventional and unconventional warfare on land and sea. Historians and the general public have long been fascinated with this subject, particularly the French and Indian War (1754–1763), which was part of a global conflict, the Seven Years War (1756–1763). Frontier fighting between settlers and

Native Americans continued until 1890. The commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I, John J. Pershing, served in the last of the Indian Wars, the Ghost Dance Campaign. He applied the lessons learned there in the Philippines and the Punitive Expedition into Mexico. In fact, Indian fighting was the primary occupation of American troops until the twentieth century. Counterinsurgency operations, the modern equivalent of frontier skirmishing, remain high on the list of missions for our armed forces today. Historian John Grenier calls this the “American way of war,” stating,

Early Americans created a military tradition that accepted, legitimized, and encouraged attacks upon and the destruction of noncombatants, villages, and agricultural resources. Most often, early Americans used the tactics and techniques of *petit guerre* in shockingly violent campaigns to achieve their goals of conquest. In the frontier wars between 1607 and 1814, Americans forged two elements—unlimited war and irregular war—into their first way of war.¹

If David La Vere set out to verify Grenier’s thesis, he has done so ably in *The Tuscarora War*. Engaging and entertaining as well as scholarly, there are more than a few surprises in this

account of diplomacy, politics, and war in colonial North Carolina. There were conflicts between factions within the colony, cooperation and competition between the colonies (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia), and war between the English colonists and their French (Canada) and Spanish (Florida) neighbors. Native Americans defied clear distinctions as friends or enemies; different tribes had different agendas, and factions within the same tribe had competing interests. La Vere describes a complicated scenario clearly and directly, examining alternate explanations for events that provide fascinating insights into the time period.

The Tuscarora were an Iroquoian tribe living in an area extending roughly from the Roanoke River in the north to the Pamlico River in the south. Chief Blount led the Northern Tuscarora, Chief Hancock the Southern Tuscarora. This war with European colonists began in 1711, when young Southern Tuscarora men seized Swiss nobleman Christopher De Graffenreid (founder of New Bern), English land surveyor John Lawson, and a pair of slaves. They released De Graffenreid, executed Lawson and one slave, and kept the second slave. They also attacked New Bern and other settlements and defeated local militia led by William Brice.

In 1712, a South Carolina force (composed largely of Indian allies) led by John Barnwell enjoyed greater success, but encountered difficulties when faced with well-constructed Tuscarora fortifications possibly designed by a runaway slave. A second South Carolina

expedition (again composed mostly of Indians) led by Col. James Moore successfully stormed the Tuscarora fort at Neoheroke the following year. Chief Blount sided with the English, capturing Chief Hancock and turning him over for execution. He concluded a treaty with the English in 1718, gaining the Tuscarora tribe's recognition as its king and a reservation in Bertie County.

Many Southern Tuscarora left for New York, joining the Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. The involvement of the Five Nations, particularly the Seneca, is a crucial aspect of the book. La Vere explains that Seneca agents provoked conflicts with the English in other colonies (Maryland and Virginia, for example) as a way of expanding their influence and considers the possibility of Seneca involvement in the Tuscarora War. French and Spanish involvement, particularly in the design of Native American fortifications, is a subject worth further consideration. The War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714) raged at the time, with attacks on Florida mounted from South Carolina, as well as fighting between the northern colonies and Canada. In any case, the author shows that the fighting in North Carolina was not isolated, but part of a larger strategic picture that spanned the globe.

La Vere concludes that both sides applied lessons learned from the Tuscarora War in future conflicts. While he considers the Tuscarora's use of fortifications "unique in the history of American Indian warfare," he notes that "while the forts at Catechna and Neoheroke were formidable, by this time even European colonials had developed ways to deal with such fortifications. . . . Only if the attackers ran out of food or supplies, as in the case of Barnwell, could the forts have a chance of survival"(p. 208). The author concludes,

Other Indians learned from their folly. The historian Wayne E. Lee has pointed out that Cherokee warriors who fought alongside Moore at Neoheroke now realized that forts, no matter how well built, could not

stand up to European sieges. Instead, they noticed that the weak link for a European army was its supply train. So the Cherokees understood they could do much more damage by attacking supply trains than by holing up in forts. The Cherokees had seen the Tuscaroras "cut off," and so later in the eighteenth century, when European warfare came to Cherokee territory, they resisted fortifications in favor of surprise attacks. It worked for a while (p. 209).

The Tuscarora War is recommended to a variety of readers. Colonial, Native American, and North Carolina historians will find it useful. Military readers, particularly those with professional interests in counterinsurgency, low-intensity conflict, and "operations other than war," can also glean important lessons from this work. Americans, both Native and of European descent, have been engaged in this "first way of war" for five centuries and will no doubt continue to do so into the distant future. The lessons of *The Tuscarora War* will still apply.


NOTES

1. John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 10.

Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik earned his bachelor's degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (1983), and his master's degree (1989) and Ph.D. (1992) in American history at Florida State University. He has taught at the Virginia Military Institute and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and was a command historian for both the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps. He also served twenty-two years as a Reserve officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. Kalesnik is currently the command historian for Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.



War in the Chesapeake: The British Campaigns to Control the Bay, 1813–14



By Charles Patrick Niemeyer
Naval Institute Press, 2015
Pp. x, 246. \$44.95

Review by Gregory J. W. Urwin

The War of 1812, this country's first major war of choice, produced the darkest hour in the annals of the early republic. Around dusk on 24 August 1814, a small British army entered Washington, D.C., challenged only by a few snipers. Over the next twenty-four hours, the Redcoats burned several public buildings, most famously the White House, which they also looted. The British then retired to their ships, hoping to cap their triumph by capturing Baltimore, Maryland.

Charles P. Niemeyer, the director of Marine Corps history and the Gray Research Center at the Marine Corps University, presents a well-written and adequately researched history of two campaigns that left Americans with reasons for both shame and pride. Like the War of 1812 itself, operations in the Chesapeake Bay resulted in moments of high drama but achieved nothing decisive. Niemeyer highlights the deficiencies in American defense policy, as well as British inability to fully capitalize on those weaknesses.

When the War of 1812 began, Great Britain found itself locked in what it considered a crusade to save humanity from Bonapartist tyranny. The British regarded the American

declaration of war a treacherous stab in the back, and they yearned to teach “Brother Jonathan” a lesson. The Chesapeake Bay—the wide, winding estuary that granted ocean-going vessels access deep into tidewater Virginia and Maryland—provided the world’s leading naval power an ideal opening for punitive thrusts. With the practiced eye of a veteran military historian, Niemeyer paints the Chesapeake as a target-rich environment, particularly the ports of Norfolk and Baltimore, containing nests for numerous privateers that preyed on British commerce.

V. Adm. Sir John Borlase Warren, commander of the Royal Navy’s North American Station, had several objectives in mind when he descended on the Chesapeake with a substantial task force in early 1813. In addition to neutralizing the region’s privateers with an effective blockade and trapping the frigate USS *Constellation* at Norfolk, Warren intended to panic President James Madison into ordering many of the American regulars tasked with the conquest of Upper Canada—the administration’s main objective—to march southward to defend Washington and other cities and towns within reach of the amphibious British threat. Warren’s second in command, R. Adm. George Cockburn, put this strategy to the test by launching a series of devastating raids starting in late April. In addition to scourging the foe, the British used these forays to feed their sailors and soldiers at enemy expense. They also sought to undermine their victims’ support for the American government and “Mr. Madison’s War.” Cockburn succeeded in demonstrating the Chesapeake’s vulnerability. He exposed another major American weakness by liberating 4,000 slaves who sought freedom by flocking to the British.

Aside from an encounter at Craney Island, where a composite force of local militia, U.S. marines, and sailors from the *Constellation* succeeded in repulsing a British landing attempt on 22 June, the Chesapeake Campaign of 1813 was an unalloyed American disaster. In the months that followed,

the British replaced Admiral Warren with the more aggressive V. Adm. Sir Alexander Cochrane. They also reinforced Cochrane with a small army commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert Ross. Drawing on Alan Taylor’s groundbreaking *The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832* (New York, 2013), Niemeyer recognizes the enormous assistance that Cochrane and Cockburn received from the many runaway slaves who agreed to serve under the British flag in the short-lived “Colonial Marines.” These black soldiers made a welcome addition to the British land force, and they also proved invaluable as scouts and guides.

Admiral Cockburn resumed British operations in the Chesapeake with raiding in late February 1814. In the latter half of August, the British finally moved against Washington. Aside from two relatively green regular infantry regiments that had been raised for service in tidewater Virginia and Maryland, the Madison administration had done little to bolster its Chesapeake defenses. General Ross easily routed a much larger American army composed mainly of militiamen at Bladensburg on 24 August 1814. This humiliating defeat left Washington ripe for the taking.

When the British went after Baltimore two weeks later, they met with a jolting check. In response to the Royal Navy’s depredations of the previous year, Maryland placed Maj. Gen. Samuel Smith in charge of Baltimore’s defenses. A former Continental officer renowned for his dogged defense of a Delaware River fort near Philadelphia during the Revolutionary War, Smith tackled his new assignment with indomitable resolution and resourcefulness. He achieved wonders in fortifying Baltimore and its approaches by both water and land. As the British approached, Smith concentrated 12,000 regulars, militia, and sailors to defend the city—three times as many men as General Ross led against him. In the initial skirmishing in the Battle of North Point on 12 September 1814, an American rifleman shot Ross

from the saddle. That loss shook the Redcoats’ morale, and their advance came to a halt the following day after they confronted Smith’s army posted confidently on Hampstead Hill.


Admiral Cochrane tried to salvage victory from stalemate by using the Royal Navy’s guns to pound Baltimore into submission. First, he would have to fight his way past Fort McHenry, but the British bombardment of 13–14 September failed to silence that stronghold. The defense of Fort McHenry inspired Francis Scott Key to write the “Star Spangled Banner,” but that contest was largely an anticlimax. With the British landing force stymied, Cochrane stood little chance of taking Baltimore with naval might alone.

As in the previous year, the British scored some striking victories in the Chesapeake in 1814. Their successes at Bladensburg and Washington humiliated the Madison administration and provided plentiful ammunition to American critics of the war. Although Madison abandoned Washington, the British were not strong enough to hold it, and the capital reverted to American control as soon as they left. Furthermore, Madison never diverted any American regulars from the Canadian frontier, which frustrated one of his enemy’s main strategic goals.

Charles Niemeyer has made a solid contribution to the military literature of the War of 1812 with *War in the Chesapeake*. His analysis is based mainly on published primary sources, including period newspapers, but he also drew on several archival collections, such as the James Madison Papers at the Library of Congress, the holdings of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, and the National Archives of the United Kingdom. He also furnished a richer context for his story by drawing on nonmilitary sources to describe its geographic, economic, political, and cultural environment. The Chesapeake campaigns drove home the additional danger a slaveholding society faced whenever it fought a power willing to exploit those it held in bondage—something white

Americans had experienced during their original revolt against British rule and something their Southern descendants would face again after the United States became convulsed by civil war.

Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin is a professor of history at Temple University and author of several works on U.S. military history. He is presently working on a social history of the 1781 British invasions of Virginia.



Review by Karl Rubis

Charles Bowery Jr. and Ethan Rafuse have made a valuable, long overdue contribution to Civil War studies. Their book, *Guide to the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign*, part of the U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles series published by the University Press of Kansas, fills a significant void in the literature.

The Petersburg Campaign is often underappreciated, in spite of the fact that it was at Petersburg where Ulysses S. Grant primarily squared off against Robert E. Lee. Fortunately, there has been a renewed interest in this ten-month confrontation, and the editors adroitly explain the advantages of its study in their introduction.

This volume comes closer to an actual staff ride guide of the event than anything published to date. Neither the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) nor the Center of Military History (CMH) has printed one. However, CSI's second edition of the *Overland Campaign Staff Ride Guide* added two stands (Day 3, Stands 13 and 14) for the assault on Battery 5 on 15 June 1864, and CMH has produced an overview history, *The Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns, 1864–1865*. In addition, the best one-volume history of the Petersburg Campaign is Earl Hess' *In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and the Confederate Defeat*. There are several good analyses of certain operations, such as Richard J. Sommers' classic study, *Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg* (New York, 1981). Yet, despite the synthesized narrative of Hess or the intricate detail of Sommers, none of these works do what Bowery and Rafuse accomplish.

The Petersburg Campaign is a big pill to swallow. In their initial section, "How to Use This Book," the editors detail the difficulty of visiting the sites of the campaign. To compensate for this, they suggest several different routes to explore the battlefield, each designed to be accomplished in a single day. This approach guides the organization of the book. Part I, which focuses on events within the grounds of the Petersburg National Battlefield (Eastern Front Unit), covers the opening assaults on 15–18 June 1864, the disastrous attack at the Battle of the Crater, and the futile attack by Lee at Fort Stedman—three popular sites often visited by staff rides led by Army branch historians, such as Ordnance, working at Fort Lee. Part II of the book focuses on the breadth of the Petersburg Campaign and breaks it down into six excursions that examine the operations north of the James

River against Richmond, the remarkable logistical achievement at City Point that sustained the operation, and the westward attempts by Grant to outflank Lee's defenses leading to the penultimate Battle at Five Forks, setting the scene for Grant's massive assault the next day and Lee's evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond on 2 April 1865.

The organization of the book works best when the reader is familiar with the chronology of the campaign. For those unfamiliar with the lengthy fight, this approach might be problematic. Despite the editors' declaration that this is not meant to be a narrative history, a short description of the whole campaign outlining the nine offensives would have been helpful to contextualize the events in the often disparate locations. To be sure, much of this information is included throughout the readings; however, it may be missed in the abundance of detail in each section. For example, First Deep Bottom and the Battle of the Crater are two parts of a single offensive.

This well-written book guides the reader through each location in a straightforward and clear manner. The maps are the biggest hindrance. While there is an ample number of them, the script and symbols are small and difficult to read. Additional minor issues include Smith's XVIII Corps crossed from the Bermuda Hundred at Point of Rocks and Broadway Landing vice City Point to begin its march on Battery 5 (p. 12); it should be July not June in discussing the preparations for the Battle of the Crater (p. 109); and the map for Excursion 1, "From Cold Harbor to Petersburg," does not show the placement of the James River pontoon bridge downriver from Wilcox Landing (in fact, it was not at Weyanoke Point, but just upriver where the distance across is 2,000 feet) (p. 150). However, these minor errors do not detract from a volume that will become one of the standards in the study of the operation.


The Petersburg Campaign covered hundreds of square miles over the course of ten months and set the stage for the end of the Civil War. It is a commendable achievement to

encapsulate that into a one-volume battlefield guide. With a complex story, it is an exercise in hard choices when deciding what to include. The relevance of studying this engagement—with sustained operations in a fixed location over a long period of time against an enemy who denies a single, decisive battle—is undeniable as a foreshadowing of recent and future operations of the U.S. Army.

Karl Rubis is the U.S. Army Ordnance School and Ordnance Corps historian. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Pepperdine University and a master's degree in American history and military history from the University of Kansas. He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2016 and is a graduate of the Naval War College.



Spring 1865: The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War



By Perry D. Jamieson
University of Nebraska Press, 2015
Pp. xviii, 286. \$34.95

Review by Mark L. Bradley

Making its timely appearance during the sesquicentennial of the momentous events it recounts, *Spring 1865: The Closing Campaigns of the Civil War* is the ninth and final volume in the Great Campaigns of

the Civil War series edited by Anne J. Bailey and Brooks D. Simpson. Noted historian Perry D. Jamieson provides an overview of the closing operations of the war in Virginia and the Carolinas, including the campaigns of Fort Fisher and Wilmington, the Carolinas, and Petersburg and Appomattox. Covering so much ground in just 200 pages is no easy feat, as these offensives involved nothing less than the main armies of the war's two major theaters, the Eastern and the Western. Other books have made the attempt, but Jamieson's effort ranks as the most successful to date by virtue of the author's emphasis on the interrelationship of these complex and far-flung operations.

The book is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter describes the Union and Confederate civilian leaders and military commanders and the relative condition of their forces in early 1865. The chapter closes with a brief account of the Hampton Roads Conference on 3 February, the doomed peace negotiations that failed to end the war. Instead, the Federal armies in Virginia under Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant waited for spring to resume active operations against Richmond, the Confederate capital, and the vital rail center at Petersburg, defended by General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. The author notes that Grant's forces were well-supplied and that they greatly outnumbered Lee's army, which was ragged, hungry, and rapidly shrinking due to rampant desertion.

Chapter 2 covers the operations that led to the capture of Fort Fisher, the South's most imposing coastal fortification, and to the fall of Wilmington, the Confederacy's last open seaport. Chapter 3 traces the march of Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army group northward through the Carolinas as well as Confederate General Pierre G. T. Beauregard's feeble attempts to stall his advance. Following Sherman's occupation of Columbia, the South Carolina state capital, General Lee (the recently appointed Confederate general in chief) replaced Beauregard with General Joseph E. Johnston. Lee's directive to Johnston was simple and

to the point—concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman. Jamieson observes that Johnston inherited a command that was widely scattered and that numbered less than one-third the strength of Sherman's forces. The chapter closes with an account of the Battle of Averasboro, in which Confederate Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's corps succeeded in delaying the Federal advance for more than a day, buying Johnston precious time to concentrate his forces for an all-out attack on an isolated wing of Sherman's army group.

Johnston's attempt to defeat the Federals in the Battle of Bentonville is the subject of Chapter 4. On the afternoon of 19 March 1865, the Confederates launched an assault on the Union Left Wing commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. "General Slocum had never delivered a lightning stroke on any battlefield," the author writes, "but neither had he ever committed a blunder" (p. 31). Bentonville reveals Slocum at his steady best. Although the Southerners routed one Union division and the elements of two others, Slocum hurried reinforcements to the front and succeeded in repulsing the final Confederate attack of the day. On 20 March, the Right Wing of Sherman's army group arrived at Bentonville, and contrary to the Union commander's expectation, Johnston chose to remain there despite being heavily outnumbered. Jamieson conjectures that Johnston's reason for remaining at Bentonville was to boost his troops' morale despite the risk of "total disaster" (p. 74). Indeed, on the afternoon of 21 March, Sherman's most aggressive subordinate, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Mower, attempted to cut off Johnston's sole line of retreat at Bentonville; only a desperate Confederate counterattack prevented him from doing so. Intent on linking up with Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's force at Goldsboro, North Carolina, Sherman allowed Johnston to slip away unchallenged.

Chapter 5 shifts to Virginia, recounting the operations around Richmond and Petersburg that culminated in the Confederate assault

on Fort Stedman. Launched early on 25 March, the attack was Lee's attempt to buy some time by striking a hard blow against the Federals. Instead, Jamieson writes, it cost the attackers about 4,000 casualties and "ended in total failure" (p. 103). The fall of Richmond and Petersburg is the subject of the Chapter 6. Starting with the rout of Confederate Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett's force at Five Forks, the author recounts the desperate struggle that led to the Union capture of the Confederate capital and Lee's escape under cover of darkness. Chapter 7 traces Grant's relentless pursuit of Lee's army and the Confederate disaster at Sailor's Creek on 6 April, which cost the Southerners over 7,000 casualties, most of them captured. In assessing the battle's significance, Jamieson notes, "The Army of Northern Virginia had not dissolved, but [the Federals] had destroyed Anderson's and Ewell's Corps. And the disaster did not end there. Gordon's Corps and the main baggage train also met a hard fate" (pp. 147–48).

Chapter 8 covers Grant's encirclement of Lee's army and the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House on 9 April. In drafting the surrender terms, Grant exceeded his authority as a military commander to pledge that "each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside" (pp. 171–72). Jamieson indicates that Grant believed he was acting in a spirit of conciliation consistent with President Abraham Lincoln's "direction 'to let 'em up easy'" (p. 172).

Chapter 9 returns to North Carolina and traces the closing operations between Sherman and Johnston that ended with the latter's surrender at the Bennett Place near Durham, North Carolina. In late March, Grant and Sherman had met with Lincoln aboard the steamer *River Queen*, and the author notes that Grant appeared to come away with a far better understanding of Lincoln's intentions than did Sherman.


This misunderstanding would lead Sherman to promise far more to Johnston than he could deliver. As a result, President Andrew Johnson (who had succeeded the fallen Lincoln) and his cabinet unanimously rejected the agreement, and the Northern press castigated Sherman for being too generous to Southern traitors. Following Grant's arrival at Sherman's headquarters in Raleigh to inform him of the president's disapproval, Sherman and Johnston signed a second agreement that was virtually identical to the Appomattox terms. Chapter 10 serves as a postscript, covering the closing operations in other parts of the South.

Given the scope of this book, it is hardly surprising that the author could not find room for a brief overview of Maj. Gen. George Stoneman's cavalry raid through North Carolina and Virginia, and yet it is worth noting because the attacks were intended to support both Grant's and Sherman's operations. The omission is unfortunate, given the excellence of this volume. Much of the credit should go to Jamieson's command of the relevant secondary sources, which he ably evaluates in a twelve-page bibliographic essay. An added bonus is the extensive use of unpublished primary sources gleaned from several major repositories as well as a few archives that are less well known. In short, this book is highly recommended to any student of the Civil War.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of *Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina* (Lexington, Ky., 2009).



The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914–1917



By David R. Stone
University Press of Kansas, 2015
Pp. vii, 359. \$35

Review by Mark Klobas

The centenary of the First World War has brought no shortage of books on the conflict, and while the majority of them have focused on the pivotal theater of the Western Front, the war in Eastern Europe has received its share of attention. The past five years alone have seen a range of new works, including Glenn Torrey's book on Romania in the war, Michael Barnett's study of the Austro-German offensive in Romania, Michael Reynolds' history of the clash between the Russian and Ottoman empires, and Alexander Watson's examination of the German and Austro-Hungarian war effort. Now David R. Stone has added to this collection with a history of the Russian Army in the war, one that provides readers with new understanding of the most understudied efforts among the major Entente powers.

That we know relatively little about the Russian war effort compared to those of Britain and France, Stone explains, is the result of a combination of factors. Perhaps surprisingly the main reason for this is the lack of attention the war received from Soviet historians, who were far more focused on the revolutions of 1917 than on the war that brought them about. Historical study was also

hampered by the barriers posed by the Russian language, which limited works accessible to Western readers to the memoirs of Czarist officers and other émigrés. These factors are what motivated the author to write this book, as he sought to provide English-language readers with a general account of Russia's experience in the war that draws upon both published Russian sources and more recent studies on the conflict from historians working out of the Russian archives. The result is revisionist history in the best sense of the term, one that strikes down many long-held misconceptions about the war and challenges readers to look at it in different ways.

Stone begins with a summary of the events that brought Russia into the war. In many ways, it is the most disappointing chapter of the book because it is overreliant on traditional accounts and too narrowly focused on Russia's confrontation with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, overlooking how events elsewhere—most notably Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War—led the Czarist regime to refocus its efforts on the region. This is especially regrettable considering the author's description of how the Russian military responded to its defeat with a new field service manual that reflected its experience in that conflict. While it fell short of grasping the lessons of fighting on a battlefield dominated by modern firepower, it was nevertheless current with much of the doctrine of Russia's European counterparts and demonstrates a point Stone reiterates throughout the book: that, contrary to popular belief, the Russian military was far from the backward force as it has sometimes been portrayed. He regards the standard-issue Mosin-Nagant rifle as equal to that of other European rifles and their field artillery as just short of the best, while deficiencies in heavy artillery were shared by both allies and opponents alike.

Thus the author views the army that went to war in August 1914 as no better or worse overall than most of its counterparts. Mobilization proceeded smoothly, and Stone argues contrary to Soviet historiography that

there was little opposition to the call-up of troops. To the degree that the initial war plans failed, the author places the onus on the generalship displayed by the Russian leaders, yet even here he is more forgiving of the commanders than most. He regards the famous feud between General Paul von Rennenkampf and General Alexander Samsonov as unsubstantiated and irrelevant given the very real geographical and technical challenges that inhibited the Russian offensive. And he argues that despite the ultimate failure of the initial Russian campaign in East Prussia, it achieved its primary important goal of drawing German forces from the Western Front, while the Russian campaign in Galicia resulted in a victory albeit at great cost. As Stone delves further into the war, his description assumes a general form familiar to anyone who has read previous studies of the Eastern Front, as Russian victories against the debilitated and badly led Austro-Hungarian Army were offset by German victories against Russian forces to the north. Yet even with the losses suffered over the following year, Russian forces maintained their cohesiveness, buying time while the Russian economy adapted to meet the demands of war.

Here the author lays bare the trade-offs that Russia was making as the war went on. While Russian society adapted to the needs of the war, the cost for doing so was considerable. Particularly hard hit was the officer corps, a body that, then as later, undertook many of the duties performed in Western armies by noncommissioned officers. The casualties inflicted on this group in the bloody battles on the front necessitated replacements by cadets, reservists, and “ensigns,” a rank to which soldiers were promoted but which did not enjoy the status or prospects of regular officers. The insatiable demand for men meant lowering standards that weakened the ethos and political reliability of the force. Yet when well-led and well-equipped, the Russians were still capable of fighting the Central


Powers, which was demonstrated in the Brusilov Offensive in 1916. These battlefield victories, though, were pointless in the absence of a larger strategic goal, and most of the gains subsequently reversed. By 1917, the seeming futility of the war amid the deprivation and sacrifice proved too much for the Russian people, with revolution and the demise of the Russian monarchy the result.

The Russian Army in the Great War provides an excellent overview of the Russian effort in the First World War, one that is likely to stand for some time as the standard English-language work on the subject. Stone succeeds in providing a work that uses the historical literature of the past several decades to give the nonspecialist reader an account of the Russian Army's successes and failings in the war. By the end, the reader is left with a better understanding of how the Russians helped to shape the course of the war, as well as how their effort led to the calamities that followed. Hopefully, he will write a successor study that offers a similarly revisionist examination of the Russian civil war and the forces that fought in it. It would be a logical and welcome follow-up to this book because it was in that conflict when the results of the militarization of Russian society for war, which Stone describes here, bore their deadliest fruit.

Mark Klobas teaches history at Scottsdale Community College in Arizona. A graduate of Texas A&M University, he is the author of several book reviews and is currently working on a biography of the twentieth-century British newspaper editor James Louis Garvin.




Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One: November 1942, The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3



By David M. Glantz with
Jonathan M. House
University Press of Kansas, 2014
Pp. xxiii, 655. \$39.95

Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two: December 1942–February 1943, The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 3



By David M. Glantz with
Jonathan M. House
University Press of Kansas, 2014
Pp. xxiii, 655. \$39.95

Dual Review by Scott A. Porter

Endgame at Stalingrad, a two-book set, is the third volume to finalize David M. Glantz's Stalingrad Trilogy. Volume 1 is *To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April–August 1942*, and Volume 2 is *Armageddon in Stalingrad: September–November 1942*. This third volume

consists of two books, both massive. Attention to detail is the trademark of Glantz, a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer and a world-renowned and well-published expert on German-Soviet operations in World War II. Glantz's long-time editor and contributor is Jonathan M. House, also an expert and author on German-Soviet operations in World War II. In the Preface, the author resolves to answer five questions: who was responsible for developing the concept of Operation URANUS, why did the operation succeed, could the German Sixth Army have escaped encirclement or been recused, why did the German relief attempts fail, and who was most responsible for Sixth Army's defeat?

Book One, *Endgame at Stalingrad, November 1942*, begins where Volume 2 left off. The Wehrmacht's Sixth Army, repulsed from the Caucasus oil fields, was now restricted within the shattered and devastated city of Stalingrad. Conversely, the Red Army's massive buildup of combat power deeper within Russia was prepared to conduct Operation URANUS, a three-front flanking counteroffensive that will destroy two Romanian armies and encircle Stalingrad, trapping all German forces within. In this book are two parts: "Soviet Strategic Planning" and "The URANUS Counteroffensive." The first part is actually much more than the Soviets' strategic planning. Glantz begins by setting the operational and strategic stage in November 1942, describing both the German and Soviet situations along with senior field commanders, including Marshal Georgy Zhukov's communications with Joseph Stalin. After the stage is clearly set, the author delves deeply into the Soviet's formulation, planning, and final preparations for Operation URANUS. It is no secret the author is known for his ability to find German and Soviet primary sources not previously mined by other scholars, and no elements on the planning of URANUS seem to be left out. Although these are very precise and impressive details, what is most notable about the Soviet strategic planning is in the section titled "Reflections." As Glantz

does throughout both books, new information leads to new insights, and in "Reflections" he describes how the Soviet high command was able to keep such a colossal operation shrouded in a dense cloak of secrecy. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting a vicious battle at Stalingrad, and Adolf Hitler and most German commanders remained convinced that the Soviets were incapable of mounting a force large and strong enough to defeat them. Part 1 of the first book ends with a detailed order of battle for both sides, along with a good correlation of the opposing forces.

Part 2 of Book One is all about combat operations, and it is a brilliant piece of scholarship focused on command in war. Included are Hitler's immersion and directives into operational matters on the Eastern Front, primarily focused on Stalingrad. "The URANUS Counteroffensive" chronologically covers the penetration into Axis-held territory; the destruction of two Romanian armies; the double envelopment and reduction of the Stalingrad pocket; and subsequent establishment of the Outer Encirclement Front. The author covers every front and both opponents, complete with missions and key command decisions from the strategic through the upper tactical levels. After each major operation is discussed in detail, Glantz writes his findings in "Conclusions." These are useful not only because he analyzes the significance and consequences of the operations, but also as an explanation for subsequent command decisions and operations.


Book Two covers operations in war-torn Stalingrad from December 1942 to February 1943 and is divided into three parts. During these ten weeks, the Red Army soundly defeated two German attempts to rescue the Sixth Army, crushed various Axis armies, and attacked into Stalingrad for total victory. The author begins the second book much like Book One. In Part 1, "Defeating German Relief Attempts," he sets the operational and strategic stage by describing the German and Soviet situational dilemmas that existed at the time along with the views of Hitler, the German

commanders, Friedrich Paulus and Erich von Manstein, and the Soviet *Stavka* (high command) under Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Nikolai Vatutin. The remaining elements of Part 1 include the three fronts that were affected by two major German relief efforts. Part 2, “The Expanding Soviet Offensive,” begins with the defeat of German rescue attempts and the expanding Soviet offensive set in the last two weeks of December 1942. Part 3, “Operation RING: The Destruction of the German Sixth Army” covers the actions of January 1943. Broken into three stages, Glantz clearly explains the Sixth Army’s situation and the Soviets’ plan and combat operations that would lead to total victory at Stalingrad.

Between the two books are hundreds of maps, tables, illustrations, and raw data that provide the reader with a tremendous amount of useful information. Also covered at the end is the soldier and civilian casualties and materiel losses, which are mind-boggling to say the least. The only major drawback is the legibility of many of the period maps. They are highly detailed yet difficult to read because of their poor quality. The author chronologically covers every aspect of the operations that lead to the Sixth Army’s encirclement and final destruction. With Glantz’s ability to read Russian, many new primary sources from Russia’s vast archives have added significantly to the body of knowledge on the campaign of Stalingrad. The status, orders, and correspondence on every Axis and Soviet major command is certainly a huge accomplishment and indicates the detail the author has painstakingly researched to draw valid conclusions on his five questions throughout this volume, of which this reviewer will not divulge. At the end, Glantz’s “Context, Conclusions, and Summary Judgments” section adds academic value on operations within Stalingrad. The endnotes are extensive, and there is no doubt this is a brilliant work. The team of Glantz and House has once again collaborated and has successfully completed the superb trilogy on Stalingrad. However, these

books do not read like a traditional narrative history. With over 1,400 combined pages of scholarly efforts, Volume 3 is written for professional military historians and provides a gold mine of new information and analysis not written about before. Perhaps the volume’s strongest point is its value as a reference. Because of his detail on dates, units, and operations, the reader can easily research a specific topic and recognize how it fits within the larger campaign.

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Review by R. Scott Moore

In the past few years, the Pacific campaigns of World War II have

gained renewed interest from historians. Most examine the amphibious battles fought in the South and Central Pacific, to include the often overlooked leap-frogging campaign in New Guinea. In *The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942-1944*, Ian W. Toll expands these studies in what is his second volume of a planned Pacific war trilogy. The book picks up where its predecessor, *Pacific Crucible*, leaves off, with the defeat of the Japanese fleet at Midway. Unlike some historians of the war, Toll is unwilling in this study to grant the United States a foregone, if bloody, victorious conclusion to the war. Indeed, if one had not read Toll’s first volume, or lacked an understanding of the first six months of 1942, it would be somewhat perplexing to be in New Zealand preparing to attack Guadalcanal barely ten pages into the first chapter. The offensive would seem to the reader, at best, ill-conceived and hasty, much as it did to those planning it, because Midway’s decisiveness was not nearly as apparent at the time as it is in hindsight.

From that sudden opening, the author weaves a detailed and often engrossing narrative of the next two years of war in the Pacific. Toll recounts the shaky start of the American counteroffensive in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942, detailing the roles of the larger-than-life personalities of Admiral Ernest King and General Douglas MacArthur, the scarcity of resources, clashing perspectives of the Army and Navy, and the difficulties inherent when peacetime forces suddenly find themselves in a war for which they are ill-prepared. No fan of MacArthur, Toll attributes the early success at Guadalcanal to the iron will of King (who he also credits with the idea of island hopping), the tempered command of Chester W. Nimitz, and the inspired leadership of Marine Maj. Gen. Archibald Vandergrift on Guadalcanal and, after October 1942, of V. Adm. William “Bull” Halsey. The author also describes the lackluster Japanese command structure, placing particular blame on Admiral Isoroku

Yamamoto, the combined fleet commander. Toll paints a picture of a commander increasingly marginalized by Tokyo, dispirited after the Battle of Midway, and sequestered aboard the flagship *Yamato* in Truk Lagoon, therefore leaving the details of the Solomons campaign to his subordinates. Eschewing the near worship bestowed on Yamamoto by postwar historians, Toll concludes that much of the culpability for the Japanese defeats in 1942 should be attributed to the admiral's mediocre performance. Fully a third of the book details the organizational and institutional flaws of the belligerents, as well as their ability (in the case of the Americans) or inability (in the case of the Japanese) to adapt to what became a slugging match in the Pacific.

The remainder of the book examines the transformation of the American military as it advances from Guadalcanal to Saipan. Toll, a naval historian, provides a detailed discussion of the growth of the carrier forces from a few carefully husbanded ships into a powerful striking fleet able to range across the Central Pacific. In doing so he recounts advances in aircraft technology and tactics. More interesting, he explores the doctrinal debate that pitted naval aviators and their desire to conduct free-ranging independent operations, epitomized by Halsey, against those, like Raymond Spruance, who tied the carriers to the amphibious assaults of the Central Pacific. The doctrinal debate reaches a peak during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in which neither viewpoint emerges a winner, setting the stage for later controversies surrounding the Battle of Leyte Gulf (which, presumably, will be covered in depth in the final volume of the trilogy). Admirably, the author merges this discussion with a wider examination of the exponential growth of naval forces as a whole in late 1943 and early 1944. He devotes a chapter to the development of the submarine service from an auxiliary beset by poor torpedoes and timid commanders to an aggressive strategic asset that hounded the Japanese naval and merchant fleets. American

shipbuilding and naval mobilization, particularly on the West Coast and at Pearl Harbor, receive full coverage, adding depth to what is more than a campaign study. Full of anecdotes and personal accounts, Toll offers an illuminating, holistic, and highly readable recounting of two crucial years in the Pacific war in which the United States naval forces turned the tide.

Yet, despite being a book that is hard not to like, *The Conquering Tide* suffers from avoidable flaws. It skips past the campaigns in the central and northern Solomons, devoting only a few pages to the crucial fight for New Georgia and offering only passing mention of Bougainville. Similarly, the author largely ignores MacArthur and his drive through New Guinea. While the focus of the book is clearly the naval campaigns in the Pacific, omission of the concurrent actions in the Southwest Pacific is an unfortunate lapse, one that misses the essential context of the two simultaneous campaigns. Finally, the author relies too heavily on secondary sources and memoirs, often taking them at face value. While weaving them into the narrative to add background and interest, he occasionally substitutes them for more careful research. William Manchester, a marine who fought and was wounded on Okinawa in 1945, later wrote a book that served as a cathartic relating to the war, but was not always factual. His memoir becomes a footnoted source for Guadalcanal and Saipan, despite Manchester having not served in either campaign. Nearly the entire chapter on the submarine war derives from the ship's log of a single submarine and the reports of a biased observer. While these flaws, fortunately, do not detract from the wider historical accuracy of the book nor the author's excellent writing style, they are both annoying and preventable.


Taken as a whole, however, *The Conquering Tide* is a positive addition to the historiography of World War II naval operations in the Pacific during two crucial years. Well-written, delving into aspects overlooked by others, and offering a wider and more holistic

view of the naval war, it supplies a pleasant read that remains true to its purpose. When joined with the other two volumes, Toll will have produced a trilogy that, if perhaps not of the caliber of Atkinson's similar effort for the European war, offers a solid history well worth a reader's time.

Dr. R. Scott Moore is the director of the Field Programs and Historical Services Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A retired Marine Corps infantry officer who held a variety of command and staff positions, he earned his master's degree from Duke University and doctorate from George Mason University. Moore has written numerous articles and book reviews in professional journals.



The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable



By Michael W. Myers
University Press of Kansas, 2015
Pp. x, 198. \$34.95

Review by Lewis Bernstein

The Pacific War and Contingent Victory is a very puzzling and deeply flawed examination of a historical proposition. A teacher of Japanese religion and philosophy, the author

Michael W. Myers “problematizes” what he calls “the inevitability thesis” about the Pacific war, to wit, Japanese defeat was a foregone conclusion after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He believes history unfolds in a logical progression based on contingent actions taken by the participants. Therefore, Myers believes logic guides the path to war and governs strategy. He does admit both American and Japanese strategies were inchoate and laments there was no guiding intelligence on either side. In essence, this is an epistemological work directed toward certain obscure beliefs about the Pacific war and the historiography upon which they rest.

He devotes the first third of his book to showing that, had the Japanese changed some of their plans early in the war, they might have forced the United States to negotiate a peace that would have left them with much of their conquests intact. The way this differs from the “inevitability thesis” is mysterious because he replaces one set of faulty assumptions with another.

The author spends the rest of the book explaining how the Americans won the Pacific war and how the Japanese might have won it. There are interesting chapters in which he discusses how American naval tactics and operations changed in the face of new realities and the way in which he perceives strategy evolved during this war. Although his appendices are also valuable because they include a list of the names of Japanese operations, a detailed chronology, and an examination of Japanese merchant shipping, they do not fully compensate for the book’s overall shortcomings.

Generally, the book is a strange mixture of wishful thinking and scholarly ignorance of the field, although the author believes the latter is not a handicap because specialist scholars do not have the benefit of his logical training. However, serious historians have concluded Japanese strategy was flawed because it was based on an exaggerated idea of Japan’s own capabilities and an un-

derestimation of enemy competence, but they do not consider Japan’s defeat inevitable.

Myers discusses Japanese and American strategies and does not locate a single guiding intelligence on either side. In mounting this search, he neglects crucial aspects of planning. Broadly defined, strategy is a fundamental element of foreign policy that deals with preparing for war and the war itself. The conceptual arena is the conference room, and its struggles are fought with memorandums, messages, studies, and plans from the committees entrusted with making war. Its battles are punctuated by debate far away from any actual theater of operations.

On the American side, fighting in a coalition engaged in a global war, conferences decided strategy based on plans and statistics concerning shipping and personnel, choosing allies and operational theaters, as well as creating organizations to distribute men and materiel. Strategy also deals with choosing tactics, selecting and planning territorial objectives, operational timing, moving forces, and committing them to battle.

On the Japanese side, fighting an independent war without consultation with Axis partners, the disagreements over war aims were between the army, navy, and the civilian bureaucracy. Japanese disputes resulted from too many conflicting strategies and mutual mistrust between the principal parties. This is exemplified in Japan’s China policies (almost every Japanese entity in China had a separate and distinct policy toward the Chinese), the conflicting strategic views in the military and the civilian government, and the inability to share bad news with each other.

The most important lessons drawn from any war are usually found in the events preceding hostilities. Important decisions are made before the first shots are fired—that is when the nature of the war to be fought is determined. Myers has a different view of strategy and believes it is the result of a single individual’s knowledge, vision, and authority. This interpreta-

tion ignores the role intraservice parochialism, factionalism, and rivalry play in formulating strategy.

The author successfully shows the Japanese had multiple options they could pursue. However, these were opportunities and not operational plans designed to be executed. The speed and the decisive nature of their initial victories stunned the Japanese military as it had expected long and hard fights in Malaya and Java. Given that the Japanese had been unable to liquidate their war in China and were fearful of Soviet activity, especially after their defeats in 1938 and 1939, they could not marshal the resources needed for a single offensive plan. Their tactical failure to control New Guinea by seizing Port Moresby and their strategic failure at the Battle of the Coral Sea put the Japanese on the defensive in the Southwest Pacific. It also allowed the Americans to launch an opportunistic operation in the Solomon Islands and to draw the Japanese into a war of attrition in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese did not have the military and economic wherewithal to launch offensives after 1943. In fact, the 1944 Japanese attack into India had as its logistical premise using British supply depots as they were overrun.

Myers’ thesis rests on American inability to translate its enormous latent economic capacity into military power and to wield this power against Japan with enough force to destroy the Japanese capability to resist. This needed to be accomplished before the war of attrition induced war weariness, allowing Japan to negotiate a peace settlement thus preserving its gains. To this end, the author devotes two chapters describing American strategic alternatives, the ways in which strategy evolved, and the American accomplishment in waging the Pacific war.

The author fundamentally misunderstands the nature of maritime warfare, with its emphasis on occupying islands for airfields and ports at crucial geographic locations to project air and sea power as a navy transports land power across the ocean. He places too much emphasis

on armies. The Japanese experiences in the Pacific show relying on easily bypassed fixed garrisons served as weights around the neck of a drowning man. These garrisons have no offensive potential without sea and air power to support them. In a maritime war, the role of the navy and air force is to ensure free sea and air passage to allow land forces to strike against an enemy at will. Myers shows the Japanese and American navies were mirror images of each other—both influenced by Mahan and the Royal Navy. He notes both started with similar naval strategies but fails to

understand that the Americans were forced to create new tactics in the face of the initial Japanese successes. While the aircraft carrier emerged as the centerpiece of naval operational art, the majority of naval battles were surface gun battles. Though the author observes that superior economic resources do not guarantee victory, they do make recovery from semi-disastrous tactical mistakes possible.

Overall, this is a greatly flawed book. To his detriment, Myers somehow has missed several scholarly generations of spilled ink over this subject in Japan and the West.

Dr. Lewis Bernstein is currently chief of the Unit History and Force Structure Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has been an assistant command historian at the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, a senior historian at the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and the command historian at the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, in Seoul. He also taught modern East Asian history at Brigham Young University, Boise State University, and the Kansas City Art Institute.



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THE MANAGING EDITOR'S FOOTNOTE

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH

THIRTY-THREE YEARS AND ONE HUNDRED ISSUES

Army History—Past, Present, and Future



This publication, founded in fall 1983 as *The Army Historian*, has enjoyed a long and distinguished tenure as the Army's premier professional history bulletin. With the release of the one hundredth issue, I thought a brief look back at how the magazine started, where it has been, and hopefully where it is going was in order.

The first issue was a bold statement of intent and proposed a new direction for the Army's historical community. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. graced the cover and offered these words, "I am honored to introduce *The Army Historian*, a periodical dedicated to the proposition that an appreciation of military history is a valuable addition to an officer's intellectual background . . . this publication will help us have a better understanding of the value of history. But, in addition, by careful explanation and provocative example, it should attract the attention of those thus far uninitiated in the uses of this valuable discipline." Marsh commenced immediately to use *The Army Historian* as a conduit to announce and enact reform within the Army history program.

The chief of military history at the time, retired Brig. Gen. Douglas Kinnard, noted that Secretary Marsh had "asked for a change in priorities among [the Center of Military History's] missions in order to develop more effective means of supporting the Army through the remainder of the century." Marsh called for "increased support of the Army staff in their planning; support of military history education in the Army; and establishment of a National Museum of the United States Army."

These were certainly lofty goals and noble tasks, and over the years *The Army Historian*, renamed *Army History* in 1989, did what it could to contribute. Time was needed to establish and grow this publication into one that was respected throughout the Army and could have the impact so desired by Secretary Marsh. From the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, *The Army Historian/Army History* cemented itself as the Army's preeminent professional bulletin. *Army History's* reach increased as its readership grew and its high level of scholarship became more widely recognized. A number of talented editors shepherded the journal through its formative years, securing an ever-increasing number of qualified contributors and implementing layout and design changes to make the journal's pages more attractive. In a thirty-year span, *Army History* evolved from a black-and-white "newsletter"

with a few hundred readers to a full-color magazine with a print run of over 10,000 copies and a hard-copy and online readership numbering in the tens of thousands. During these years, *Army History* published articles from a secretary of the Army, John Marsh Jr.; two chiefs of staff of the Army, Generals John Wickham Jr. and Carl Vuono; and a profusion of notable historians and authors, including Jay Luvass, Alfred Goldberg, Theodore Wilson, Edward Coffman, Ronald Spector, Antulio Echevarria, Gregory J. W. Urwin, Victor Davis Hanson, Wayne Lee, Jon Sumida, Charles Neimeyer, Richard Faulkner, and Dennis Showalter, to name a few.

Army History's role in supporting military history education cannot be understated. It is currently utilized by the Army War College, the National Defense University, the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Military Academy, and Army branch schools and museums, and it is distributed extensively to Reserve Officers' Training Corps students. Copies even find their way to, and requests for subscriptions come from, places such as the Air Force and Naval Academies and various government agencies, as well as foreign military service institutions.

In 2008, demand from the public for access to hard copies of *Army History* prompted the U.S. Government Publishing Office to begin selling yearly subscriptions. In that same year, we completed a digitization project that made every back issue available online as a free PDF download.

In my years as the managing editor (2012 to present) and steward of this publication, I have done my best to maintain the high scholarly standards of *Army History* while broadening its appeal, improving its aesthetics, and increasing its audience. The results from a recent online Army survey indicate that we are on the right track and that our efforts have been very successful thus far.

I would be remiss if I did not thank the team of editors, visual information specialists, and cartographers who set their regular workloads aside to assist me with each new issue when the time comes. *Army History* would not be possible without their efforts.

I am very proud of what *Army History* has become, and I am even more excited about where it can still go in the years ahead. I hope you enjoy reading *Army History* as much as I love publishing it.

Here is to another one hundred issues!



ARMYHISTORY