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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

ARMYHISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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MARK A. MILEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
William R. Scherer

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Consulting Historians
Mark J. Reardon
Eric B. Setzekorn

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Issue Cover: Detail from Charles Johnson Post, *Florida Camp Scene*, June 1898 / U.S. Army Art Collection

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Summer 2017 issue of *Army History* offers two engaging articles that, in their own ways, highlight the importance of what has been called the "Sinews of War," or military logistics. The reliability of supply, materiel support, and organization prior to and during wartime is crucial to the success of the mission and is the lifeblood of any operation.

In the first article, Samuel Limneos, an archives technician at the National Archives and Records Administration in Philadelphia, argues that the U.S. Army's Far East Air Force in the Philippines was doomed long before its destruction at the hands of the Japanese on 8 December 1941. Rather than local tactical errors leading to the defeat, Limneos posits that a lack of materiel hamstrung the force, and that in the preceding years, the U.S. strategy in the Pacific had overreached and exceeded what was feasible based on the level of the logistical support provided.

The second article, by Lt. Col. Stephen Messenger, examines the mobilization of troops and equipment in Tampa, Florida, in preparation for the invasion of Cuba during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The operation soon devolved into near-chaos. The arrival by train, unloading, and staging of troops and materiel was an unorganized mess. The lack of centralized command hampered movement, and the embarkation process crumbled into a virtual free-for-all. The lessons learned from this deployment's many failures laid the groundwork for successful operations during World War I and even influenced the Army's current mobilization doctrine.

This issue's Artifact Spotlight highlights the Army's effort to design a functional, yet uniquely American, helmet during World War I. Our Art in the Field Feature follows our Army artist, Sfc. Juan Muñoz, on a deployment with the 126th Military History Detachment and a piece of art he has produced based on that trip.

In his Chief's Corner, Mr. Charles Bowery discusses the status of the Center of Military History (CMH) as the Army faces an uncertain financial future. Mr. Jon Hoffman, in his Chief Historian's Footnote, talks about a new graduate research assistant program being instituted at the Center.

As always, I invite readers to submit articles on the history of the Army and encourage constructive comments about this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

OUR VALUE IN A TOUGH FINANCIAL FUTURE

It is no secret that we are living in tough financial times as an Army, even with some expansion of the force on the horizon. Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley has made two points abundantly clear throughout his tenure: first, that war fighting readiness is the number one priority of every soldier and Army civilian; and second, that expanding strength without increasing resources, which I would argue includes both money and our civilian backbone, is a sure path to a “hollow Army.” Recent guidance from both the Departments of Defense and Army reiterates that. As we contemplate the financially troubling times in the months ahead, we must ensure that all resources go toward building and sustaining readiness. Another path to a hollow Army results from a degradation in the “intellectual readiness” of the force. That is where we as Army historians come in.

How, then, does Army history contribute to Army readiness? Simply put, a historically minded force makes better choices in complex situations, at every level of war—from policymakers and strategists, through operational leaders and planners, to leaders and soldiers in contact with the enemy. Sir Michael Howard, one of the deans of the historical profession, was fond of saying that the victor in conflict is often the side that gets decisions less wrong. Army historians are essential to this process of building historical mindedness, and by extension, readiness. They create opportunities to do this by producing timely, accessible, rigorous, and authoritative work—whether it be a book, staff study, annual historical summary, or museum program. These opportunities flow from establishing a credible, reliable, and professional presence in the

organizations we support, and every interaction matters. When an entity establishes and increases its value, more resources come its way.

The risk of not taking this approach in a resource-constrained environment is not only that we fail in our obligation to contribute to the intellectual readiness of the force, but that we continue on a path to irrelevance and dissolution as an entity. At the recent Society for Military History annual meeting in Jacksonville, Florida, I had the honor of chairing a well-attended and vigorously argued panel on official history in the post-9/11 period. We had a standing-room-only crowd and heard a variety of viewpoints on best practices in the conduct of official military history. Shane Story of the Center of Military History and Conrad Crane of the Army War College provided their unique perspectives from years of historical work both on active duty and in civilian life, and Roger Lee from the Australian War Memorial added the viewpoints of one of our staunchest allies. The spirited dialogue we had tells me that our community remains passionately committed to both the practice of history and to our continued professional value to the Army.

I hope to see as many of you as possible at the Conference of Army Historians here in Washington, D.C., from 24 to 28 July, when we will engage in a variety of discussions aimed at furthering our relevance and value as a key enabler of Army readiness. Until then, keep on Educating, Inspiring, and Preserving the history of our Army!



NEWSNOTES

NEW PUBLICATIONS FROM CMH

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) recently published a new pamphlet in its U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War series, *Turning Point, 1967–1968*, by Adrian G. Traas. The author describes several key operations that took place in South Vietnam. During October 1967, the United States appeared to be making slow but steady gains against the Viet Cong insurgents and their North Vietnamese allies who were attempting to destroy the South Vietnamese government. The enemy was suffering enormous casualties. Hammered from the air by B-52 bombers and disrupted by allied ground sweeps, the Viet Cong base areas in South Vietnam were no longer the safe havens they once had been. The author discusses a critical point in the war that came in 1968 with the Tet offensive, a massive campaign launched by the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong against major urban areas and military installations in South Vietnam. As a result of the surprise attack, the U.S. press and public began to challenge President Lyndon Johnson's assurances of success and question the value of the increasingly costly war. The author concludes that although Tet was a military disaster for the Communists, the conflict had shaken America's will to continue to fight. This pamphlet has been issued as CMH Pub 76–5.

CMH is pleased to announce the publication of *The U.S. Army in the World War I Era* as a part of the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I series. Drawn largely from CMH's two-volume textbook, *American Military History*, the pamphlet provides an overview of the decades leading up to the United States entering the war and its experiences

during the eighteen months of the nation's involvement in the conflict. World War I capped a period of reform and professionalization that transformed the Army from a small dispersed organization rooted in constabulary operations to a modern industrialized fighting force capable of global reach and impact. The more than four million Americans who served during the war, half of whom deployed overseas, helped create the modern U.S. Army. This pamphlet is intended to honor their service and to help the members of today's Army connect with an important element of its past. This pamphlet has been issued as CMH Pub 77–2.

THE 2017 CONFERENCE OF ARMY HISTORIANS

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will host the Conference of Army Historians (CAH) from 24 to 28 July 2017 at the Doubletree by Hilton–Crystal City in Arlington, Virginia. The conference is open to Army and Department of Defense historians and professional historians from other government agencies, academia, and the public. The conference is a biennial event dedicated to the professional development of the military historians of the Army History Program and to the furtherance of the study of military history. The theme for the conference will be “1917–2017: Lessons of History for an Army in Transition.” The event will consist of workshops on subjects of interest related to the Army History Program, discussion panels on historical topics related to the theme, and the presentation of papers. The CAH has no associated fees or costs, other than those related to travel and

lodging (a block of rooms has been reserved at the Doubletree by Hilton for your convenience). For more information, visit the conference Web site: <http://www.history.army.mil/events/cah2017/index.html>.

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY CONSTRUCTION UPDATE

The construction site of the National Museum of the United States Army is changing rapidly and the foundation of the museum is taking shape. The U.S. Army began site preparation in October 2016 and continues preparing the overall infrastructure, including permanent storm water structures and pipes, sewer and utility lines, and roads, throughout the 84-acre site. The Army Historical Foundation instructed its private contractor, Clark Construction Group, to proceed with construction of the main museum building on 8 March 2017.

To date, the most visible progress is in the building's basement. The area has been excavated, the foundation has been poured, and the walls are being erected. This lower level will house a mechanical room, storage areas, the shipping and receiving area, and operational support facilities. Also visible is a twenty-foot-tall mock-up tower of the museum's exterior surface, which will provide quality control and validation of the methods and means used to construct the building's exterior stainless steel panels and glazing.

The next project milestone is the museum building's advance above ground level, which is expected during summer 2017.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Samuel Limneos is an archives technician at the National Archives and Records Administration in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A former active duty soldier, he was honorably discharged in 2015. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Maryland and a master's degree in military history from Norwich University. In March 2018 he will complete his master's in library information science, with a concentration in archival studies, from Drexel University.

U.S. Air Force



P-40s of the 21st Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, Philippines, c. 1941

DEATH FROM WITHIN

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FAR EAST AIR FORCE: STRATEGY vs. FEASIBILITY



BY SAMUEL LIMNEOS

On America's first day of World War II, 8 December 1941, U.S. airpower in the Philippines was decimated by raids of Japanese heavy bombers and light pursuit aircraft launched from installations on Formosa. To add insult to the injury inflicted by Japan on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, only a few hours earlier, the Japanese attack force caught the American Far East Air Force (FEAF) off guard and on the ground. More than two-thirds of the air force was destroyed either while parked or on the runway in desperate attempts by brave pilots to become airborne. President Franklin D. Roosevelt reacted to the incredulous news of the disaster by exclaiming his principal point of disbelief and confusion, "On the ground! On the ground!"¹ With American airpower crippled, the hapless U.S. garrisons in the Philippines fought a doomed retrograde defensive, ultimately capitulating to the Japanese five months later.

Given the importance of the FEAF to the Philippines Campaign of 1941–1942, historians have hotly debated the events of 8 December. Largely due to the controversial commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, the historiography of the disaster is overwhelmingly complemented by attribution of blame to one individual or another. MacArthur and his air commander, Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton, cast a distracting shadow over the strategic and logistical context of the FEAF. Even well-researched accounts of the defeat and the subsequent campaign fall victim to taking sides and casting blame. Although historians have analyzed both the strategic and logistical foundations of U.S. planning for the Philippines' defense, historical studies placing the two side-by-side and highlighting their incongruence are sparse. Rather than reinforcing particular and well-known arguments from the historiography, it is more

beneficial to look at the root cause of the 8 December debacle.


Throughout the summer of 1941, increasing faith in a grandiose aerial strategy for the Philippines rapidly displaced decades of strategic neglect toward the islands. The feasibility of this approach, debatable from the onset, was shattered on the first day of the war due to the poor correlation between strategy and logistics—specifically, the illogical linkage of the grand aerial offensive strategy conceptualized by Washington planners in the summer of 1941 with the destitute condition of American military infrastructure and supply in the Philippines. Inadequate airfields, substandard aerial warning and communication systems, scarce anti-aircraft equipment, and poor logistics degraded the feasibility of the War Department's ambitious planning for the Philippines' defense. As a result, the operational capability of MacArthur's forces was dramatically reduced. The unequal relationship



General Brereton

between strategy and logistics was inherent to the United States' military appraisal of the Philippines. When the complex deterrent policy in the Pacific was instituted and the rapid buildup of American airpower in the Philippines began in 1941, the abrupt change highlighted the logistical deficiencies that had been present for decades in the archipelago's defense planning.

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States emerged from the Spanish-American War with possession of the Philippine Islands. The archipelago presented War Department planners with significant strategic problems. The Philippines were a unique American outpost, separated from the continent by the Pacific Ocean. American Army garrisons were rudimentary military installations predominantly on the northernmost island of Luzon. For the Navy, harbor installations were established in Manila and Subic Bays. Manila Bay in particular was an exceptional harbor due to the base's natural strategic position



Members of the Joint Army-Navy Board, 1923

near the capital city of Manila, the Bataan peninsula to the west, the island of Corregidor to the southwest, and Army installations on Luzon. Although both the Army and Navy established joint areas of control in the Philippines, supply and maintenance of the garrisons depended on maritime shipment. Therefore, a viable defense of the islands demanded close strategic cooperation between the two services. Organized in 1903, the Joint Army-Navy Board, the early war-planning apparatus responsible for outlining a Philippines defense policy, sought to draw consensus between the two. Although the board was technically responsible for drafting an effective defense for the Philippines, planners of the early twentieth century rarely gave the subject much attention. It was not until Japan's offensive against Russia in 1904 that the joint panel was given impetus to devise an efficient American defense policy for the Far East.² The result of the board's strategic deliberations in the early twentieth century was the "color plans," a series of strategic policies for military action against probable enemies, the foremost being Japan, color-coded Orange.

From the end of the Spanish-American War to the conclusion of World War I, the fundamental principles of War Plan ORANGE remained generally consistent. In the

Philippines, the most likely target of a Japanese attack, the plan called for American garrisons to organize a delaying holding defense while the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific. Maintaining lines of communications and logistics, U.S. Navy forces would steam across the ocean to relieve the Army garrisons in the Philippines. The proposed timetable for this rescue operation was three to four months.³ Plan ORANGE, inherently beset with tactical shortcomings of a purely military nature, including the viability of resident garrisons successfully holding the Japanese at bay for four months, also fostered problematic questions related to U.S. trade and national policy toward the Philippines.

Throughout the interwar years, American military planners struggled to devise strategic solutions to these fundamental problems in Plan ORANGE. In this period, the important principles related to the Philippines in the plan fluctuated with changing American leadership, economic priorities, and military objectives. It was the influence of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, the governor-general of the Philippines and former Army chief of staff, that solidified the Joint Army-Navy Board's commitment to providing resources for an effective Philippines defense in its 1924 revision to Plan ORANGE. However, this version introduced a basic pattern of hindrances to the plan

characterized by a scarcity of human and materiel military resources. Due to this disparity between policy and practical availability of resources, the 1924 “plan was really more a statement of hopes than a realistic appraisal of what could be done.”⁴ These deficiencies slowly and consistently crippled optimism for a Philippines defense under Plan ORANGE. “[P]lanners of the twenties and thirties never had much confidence” in the plan, and particularly, “felt little hope that the garrison of the Philippine Islands could hold out.”⁵

Pessimism over ORANGE planning was temporarily lifted by the appointment of General MacArthur as Army chief of staff and president of the Joint Army-Navy Board in 1930. MacArthur’s appointment “brought a man to power to whom the defense of the Philippines and the nation’s military policy in the Pacific were virtually identical.”⁶ During this time, MacArthur’s optimism complemented a revival of imperialist obligations toward the Philippines in the ranks of the Joint Army-Navy Board, and positive evaluation of the archipelago as a profitable American commercial center in the Far East. MacArthur’s chief source of pride and optimism was his faith in the recruitment of an efficient native Filipino defense force. At the same time, his idealistic vision for an effective Philippines defense policy was dampened by the same lingering roadblocks of available funds, personnel, and resources. Frustrated by War Department budget cuts, growing American isolationism, and mistrust of military institutions, MacArthur was forced to forbid defensive construction projects in the Philippines unless they were financially conservative. These barriers effectively crippled the chief of staff’s dream for reinforcing the Philippines with motorized equipment, weaponry, and suitable airfields.⁷ Increased economic and military limitations accompanied political obligations and matters of American national policy in the last half-decade prior to World War II.

Additionally, the prospect of eventual Philippine independence, the United


States’ Europe-first orientation in strategic planning, and a political responsibility to economically aid its European allies put further stress on the nation’s commitment to the Philippines’ defense. The political and military situation in the Philippines grew even more complicated with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934. This law formally created a nominal Philippine Commonwealth Government to transition the archipelago nation to full independence by 1946. Furthermore, the act eliminated the requirement for permanent bases in the Philippines, drawing a divide in American strategic thought between abandoning the archipelago entirely and retaining present garrisons with minimal strength.⁸ The defense of the Philippines remained greatly distanced from the forefront of War Department strategies, whose top planners fiercely studied policy for a Europe-first effort in the next conflict. The 1936 Army War College class, whose graduates were now in many positions of authority, remained wedded to a Europe-first alignment, concluding that the Philippines “will have to struggle along with what they have.”⁹ This Philippines defense policy, amplified in the late 1930s by President Roosevelt’s economic commitment to Great Britain and France, persisted. The 1938 and 1940 revisions to War Plan ORANGE reflected these strategic concerns and the Navy’s preference for an Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defensive

perimeter in the Pacific. The Navy’s faith in the defense of Hawaii further displaced the Philippines from the forefront of the ORANGE plan. In the plan’s 1940 version, the U.S. Army Philippine Department’s mission was to defend only the northernmost island of Luzon with forces “augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.”¹⁰ During this time, the department struggled to maintain resident garrison strength. Its commanding general was tasked primarily with developing training for the Philippine Commonwealth Army and was told that “when sufficiency of supplies allowed, Washington would also ship antiaircraft and other guns.”¹¹ Materiel and human reinforcement for the Philippines, further negated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act guaranteeing future Philippine independence, was hazardedly deficient throughout late 1940. In this strategic context, American military leaders plunged into the tense and tumultuous political and military situation of 1941.

With the German offensive against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 and the increasing prospect of a Japanese advance in the southwest Pacific, some outspoken American planners argued for a feasible deterrent strategy in the Philippines. These military strategists prepared contingency scenarios to counter the dominant Europe-first orientation of Washington. Throughout the 1930s, prospects for a Philippines defense,



A meeting of the Joint Army-Navy Board, November 1941



already hamstrung by War Department budget cuts, an isolationist American society, and a depressed economy, were further dimmed by the Europe-first strategy and financial commitments to Great Britain and France. The Philippines defense plan in 1940 and 1941 was considered “a wistful thought rather than a serious possibility.”¹² Nevertheless, with Japan’s increasing political belligerence and military aggression in the southwest Pacific, American strategists worked to devise a deterrence policy.

In 1940, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark encapsulated the dominant ORANGE policy view in his Plan Dog memorandum, a significantly influential document grounded in an Atlantic and Europe-first strategy and de-escalation of American forces in the Far East. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding the

Philippines dated 11 February 1941, Stark argued that “sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan” but, “would be exposing our force without compensating results.”¹³

Against this dominant grain, some military strategists were opposed to the established War Plan ORANGE provisions for the Philippines and American interests in the Far East. The reasons for the renewal and altogether reversal of American military policy and strategy toward the islands “are nowhere explicitly stated.”¹⁴ However, the major reorientation of the Philippines’ strategic importance was promoted some years prior to America’s entry into World War II, and a series of major military events in the Pacific helped nurture impetus to enact it in 1941. This reversal in Philippine defense strategy was to be “the bar to the door” that enabled the United States



President Roosevelt speaks with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark (center) and Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison (right), 28 August 1939.



to both prevent Japan from launching an attack on the western flank of the Soviet Union and inexpensively provide aid to the British, Dutch, and Chinese in the Far East without dramatic provocation.¹⁵ In April 1939, the Army Air Corps (AAC) planning chief, Lt. Col. Carl Spaatz, requested that Capt. Hoyt Vandenberg help prioritize and calculate the AACs' expansion effort. While at the Army War College, Vandenberg had written extensively to advocate the expansion of airpower in the Pacific, and he presented Spaatz with a memorandum on Far East air strategy calling for a 900-plane deterrent force consisting of 3 medium and 8 heavy bomb groups, complete with 3 groups of interceptor fighters to be stationed in the Philippines.¹⁶ In the memorandum, Vandenberg stated "such a striking force could establish an air defense zone about the Island of Luzon and prevent its seizure by Japan by interdiction of its overseas expedition."¹⁷ Although only a handful of cautious AAC enthusiasts were receptive to Vandenberg's lavish plan in 1939, the subsequent success of strategic airpower elsewhere in the world drew American strategists toward a closer examination of its potential in the Far East two years later.

Moreover, with the increasingly uncertain future of the Western

Allies in the summer of 1941, growing tension with Japan in the Pacific, and the success of Great Britain's use of the B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bomber against Germany, the strategic value of the four-engine aircraft became a critical component of a new defensive strategy and reinforcement effort for the Philippines. In June 1941, after already subjugating France and pressuring Great Britain, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin strictly refused American access to air bases in its eastern territory, U.S. military planners remained troubled by a potential Japanese southward movement to sever American supply lines in the Pacific. President Roosevelt expressed concern at the possibility of Japan taking a defensive Pacific posture and turning against the Soviet Union "with a resulting need for the United States to tie down the Japanese by attacks while developing new supply routes to the Soviet Union."¹⁸ Even before Japan's eventual offensive into Indochina on 25 July 1941, a move reciprocating significant American economic sanctions, the strategic imperative to both prevent Japan from striking southward for oil or northward to attack the Soviet Union amplified the importance of the Philippines.



General Gerow (center) meets with members of his War Plans Division in his office at the War Department, November 1941.

On 16 July 1941, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall wrote to the chief of the AAC, Maj. Gen. Henry Arnold, that because of Japan's known agenda to move farther south, "the Philippines become of great strategic importance."¹⁹ Central to allowing the United States to sufficiently strengthen its increasing strategic responsibilities across the globe was airpower, specifically heavy bombers. The results of the chaotic air warfare between Germany and Great Britain in 1939 through 1940 reinforced this perspective. Only heavy bombers maintained the required radius of operation and devastating offensive capability to deter potential enemy aggression from great distances. These concerns and capabilities prompted President Roosevelt to invest significant attention to the buildup of bomber strength in preparing the United States for possible global war. On 4 May 1941, Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson that "the effective defense of this country and the vital defense of other democratic nations requires that there be a substantial increase in heavy bomber production."²⁰ The complex strategic disadvantages affecting earlier American military policy in the Philippines, distance and resources,

presented a ripe strategic opportunity when coupled with this new airpower. As a result, the strategy envisaged in 1941 to both deter Japanese aggression and overcome past weaknesses in Philippines defense planning was built on airpower.

Consequently, in July 1941, FEAF was established in the Philippines, and the newly appointed commander, then-

Lt. Gen. MacArthur, was given a new Philippines defense strategy heavily reliant on airpower. MacArthur, effectively retired following his term as Army chief of staff, had since 1935 resided in the archipelago as a Philippine field marshal and senior adviser to Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. MacArthur's reinstatement on active duty represented one clear step toward renewal of Philippine defensive policy amid the increasing political turmoil of the Far East. The next step was the substance of the military strategy given the newly appointed commander by War Department strategists and military leaders in Washington. In front of the Pearl Harbor Congressional Committee in 1945, General Marshall remarked that "we felt that we could block the Japanese advance and block their entry into the war by fear of what would happen if they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers on that island."²¹

Although MacArthur had spent the last six years progressively building a native Filipino defense force that President Roosevelt federalized in July of 1941, the real impetus behind the grand reversal in Philippines defense strategy hinged on the B-17



General MacArthur (left) congratulates a member of the Philippine Air Force after awarding him the Distinguished Service Cross, 22 December 1941.

bomber, the most advanced craft of that type in mid-1941. “[T]he radical reversal in U.S. policy became possible for the United States only because of the availability of the Flying Fortress.”²²

It was apparent to American leaders in 1941, notably Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold, that past deficiencies in ORANGE planning for the Philippines were displaceable by the new strategy of the heavy bomber. Historians Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell argued that the mid-1941 notion that the Philippines was capable of being defended “in spite of all the considerations that led planners so often to reject the idea” drew strength specifically from “a new approach to the problem of operations in the western Pacific,” reliance on the long-range bomber.²³ Having previously served as a colonel in World War I and a three-year term as governor-general of the Philippines prior to his appointment as secretary of war, Stimson was familiar with the strategic deficiencies in ORANGE planning.

Nevertheless, on 12 September 1941, some months after the Philippine reinforcement effort began, Stimson wrote in his diary that “the creation of the five-engine [*sic*] bomber . . . has completely changed the strategy of the Pacific and lets American power get back into the Islands in a way which it has not been able to do for 20 years.”²⁴ Army policy researchers in the War Plans Division posited perspectives and supporting evidence upholding these views. In October 1941, War Plans Division chief Brig. Gen. Leonard Gerow considered it “a hazardous military operation” for the Japanese to both attempt a bypass of the Philippines and assault it directly in their projected southward movement if opposed by “Philippine-based bomber and naval forces.”²⁵

Belief in the potential of airpower in the Philippines was not held solely by high-ranking U.S. military strategists. MacArthur, consistently an optimist toward Philippines defense policy throughout his Army career, espoused faith in his growing airpower. His argument for the Philippines’ defensibility was founded in his belief in the rapidly expanding


airpower along with his prized native Filipino army.²⁶ In a memorandum for President Roosevelt in September 1941, Marshall relayed MacArthur’s confidence in the new strategy and ongoing aerial reinforcement generating “a momentous affect [*sic*] throughout the Far East,” and changing “a feeling of defeatism to the highest state of morale I have ever seen.”²⁷ Both the strength behind MacArthur’s new optimism and the result of the War Department and Washington’s renewed Philippines defense policy were a significant effort to reinforce the Islands from July through December of 1941.

Airplanes and pilots, the core of the 1941 Philippines defense strategy, poured into MacArthur’s command from July through December. In July, American strategists considered potential reinforcement for a series of key Pacific border outposts, including the Panama Canal, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. American military planners weighed the priority of these outposts to receive the limited industrial output of pursuit and bomber aircraft, while simultaneously ensuring an adequate continental defense. General Arnold reported that both American industry and the AAC struggled to meet President Roosevelt’s goal of 50,000 manufactured planes per year following the fall of France in June 1940.²⁸ Only a year after the president issued this fantastic manufacturing quota, modest aircraft production finally permitted the nominal reinforcement of the United States’ Pacific outposts. General Marshall wrote, “in July, 1941, the development of quantity production made it possible for the first time to assign modern material in sizeable lots to the Philippines.”²⁹


Beginning in July and throughout the summer of 1941, the Philippines took precedence over the other U.S. Pacific outposts. This priority reflected the growing sense of inevitability of U.S. involvement in the war, beginning with Japan’s seizure of bases in Indochina in late July 1941. In a memorandum for the deputy chief of staff in November 1941, War Plans



chief General Gerow stated that the “Philippine movement should have priority over movements to Hawaii,” and urged leaders to presently defer all aerial reinforcement to Hawaii.³⁰ In addition to Pacific outposts, U.S. political and military leaders had to rationalize the pressing needs of Great Britain, China, and Russia. In July 1941, President Roosevelt contemplated sending a token heavy bomber force to the Soviet Union even against the latter’s steady refusal of American access to home airfields. In the same month, Marshall wrote to Arnold that he was “unalterably opposed” to delivering any type of planes to Soviet Russia “until we have first established units of these types in the Philippines.”³¹ Given the Philippines’ priority in the 1941 airpower buildup, the majority of planes marked for production were slotted for the FEAF. Of the latest pursuit aircraft, the P-40E and the P-40B, seventy-eight were allocated for shipment to the Philippines in September. During the same



Crews prepare to load 100- and 500-pound bombs aboard a B-17D of the 19th Bombardment Group at Del Monte Field, c. 1941.



month, the 14th Bombardment Group, commanded by Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, successfully ferried nine B-17 bombers on the 7,000-mile trip across the Pacific to Clark Field on Luzon. This first trans-Pacific reinforcement flight earned "universal praise" and a Distinguished Flying Cross for each of O'Donnell's seventy-five crew members.³² In the following month, the 19th Bombardment Group, considered an elite Air Corps outfit, ferried an additional twenty-six B-17D and B-17C models to the Philippines. Although the number of modern aircraft delivered to the Philippines in these critical months seem marginal, they represented the majority of U.S. industrial production in 1941. "[O]ut of an anticipated production in the United States of 220 heavy bombers by the end of February 1942, no less than 165 of the planes had been scheduled for delivery to the Philippines."³³ The date of February coincided with both the War Department's and MacArthur's belief, prior to November 1941, that Japan would not be ready to initiate hostilities against the United States before April 1942. MacArthur "floated upon a supreme cloud of confidence," manifesting in a verdict the Japanese not would be ready to attack until April, by which time his own forces would be prepared for it.³⁴

On this calculated basis, the FEAF in the Philippines was designated for substantial reinforcement. General Gerow wrote the adjutant general in November that "it is planned to augment Philippine air units as rapidly as airplanes and units become available," including fifty-two A-24 dive bombers during late November and early December 1941.³⁵ As diplomatic negotiations with Japan gradually deteriorated, particularly in the summer months following President Roosevelt's July oil and steel embargoes, the Philippines steadily became the focus of Pacific reinforcement. On 1 December 1941, General Arnold replied to the Hawaiian Air Force commander's protest against transferring his heavy bombers to the Philippines that "under the circumstances, it was unavoidable



Courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial

A map shown by General Marshall to Associated Press reporters during a briefing on 15 November 1941, highlighting the potential range of B-17s (red) and B-24s (blue) based in the Far East.

as we must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible.”³⁶ Particularly, the reinforcement of the Philippines with B-17s had a profound effect on American military strategists. Not only was the past four decades of tactical weaknesses in Philippines defense perceived

with a new optimism, but the heavy bomber fundamentally altered the strategy altogether. The operational reach of the B-17 flying from bases in the Philippines not only presented a seemingly effective deterrence, but also an offensive arm in the American Far East arsenal.

In November 1941, following the reversal of Philippines defense strategy and the resulting massive reinforcement effort, a new offensive clause was established in General MacArthur’s assigned RAINBOW 5 war plan for the Philippines. Reminiscent of Captain Vandenberg’s 1939 study of

the potential of a strong Philippines-based air force, the concept of an American offensive in the Far East developed out of the inadequacies of the earlier, purely defensive Philippines strategy. This emphasis on the offensive came from the top tiers of American military leadership.

On 12 September 1941, General Marshall notified Admiral Stark of a probable November shipment of a B-24 Liberator squadron capable of reaching “Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load” of bombs.³⁷ MacArthur’s air force in the Philippines was substantially stronger by November 1941, with roughly three dozen B-17 bombers of various types and more than one hundred first-line P-40 pursuit aircraft.

On 5 November 1941, MacArthur received a secret memorandum dated 18 October from General Brereton detailing his new strategic mission in the Far East, pending approval by the Joint Army-Navy Board. The contents of this memorandum authorized MacArthur to conduct “air raids against Japanese forces and installations within the tactical operating radius of available bases.”³⁸ The distance between Clark Field in the Philippines, the principal base for housing heavy bombers, and Tokyo is well over 1,500 miles. Calculating enough fuel for the return trip, the maximum radius of the B-17s present in the Philippines in 1941 was 850 and 1,050 miles, at full and half bomb loads, respectively.³⁹ In the summer of 1941, Formosa was the specific Japanese installation well within the operating radius of the heavy bombardment squadrons in the Philippines.

When the new intelligence chief of the FEAF, Lt. Col. Allison Ind, arrived in the Philippines in May 1941, one of his principal responsibilities was the gathering of intelligence regarding Japanese aerial and naval installations on Formosa. Ind recalled that “the start of our accumulation of data” began one June day when “I sharpened a dozen pencils and with one of them wrote upon a sheet of virgin white paper, ‘Objective Folder No. 1.’”⁴⁰

Despite the intelligence handicap to an American aerial offensive launched



Allison Ind, shown here as a colonel, c. 1960

from a Philippines-based bombing force, the subject of the offensive persisted into the late November revision of the RAINBOW 5 war plan. The proposal was essentially a synthesis of the War Plans Division and Army War College-produced color plans unified under a two-ocean war concept for the United States. In acknowledgement of the increasingly desperate temperament of and diplomatic breakdown with Japan, Army and Navy planners, in coordination with British military representatives, worked out a new revision to the RAINBOW 5 framework for the Far East. “[A]ugmentation of the Army air garrison in the Philippines had now modified” the purely defensive concept of Philippines strategy, resulting in the 21 November revision to RAINBOW 5 providing “for offensive air operations in furtherance of the strategic defensive.”⁴¹ The heavy offensive orientation of the revision did not pass through the various channels of American strategists and war planners without doubt or criticism. The main line of argument against the offensive clause in the plan was based on the statistics of airplanes in and

presently en route to the Philippines. Three days after the approval and dissemination of RAINBOW 5, Gerow informed Marshall of his criticisms.

While recognizing the propriety of altering the conception of Philippines strategy from purely defensive to offensive air action, Gerow stated, “I believe we are going too far on the offensive side.”⁴² Despite the limited number of bomber and pursuit aircraft operating in the Philippines by late November 1941, top military and political leaders in Washington pushed foolish miscalculations to reinforce the showy conception of airpower in the archipelago. In a 15 November memorandum compiled by reporters of the Associated Press from a secret conference with Marshall, the American media touted the exaggerated details of American air strength in the Philippines. The press reporters proclaimed that “we are preparing for an offensive war against Japan, whereas the Japs believe we are preparing only to defend the Philippines.” Importantly, this report was calculatingly released to permit leaks to covert Japanese intelligence agents. The reporters maintained that if war becomes inevitable, “we’ll fight mercilessly . . . Flying Fortresses will be dispatched immediately to set the paper cities of Japan on fire.”⁴³


Moreover, this ambitious aerial strategy for the Philippines devised by military leaders in Washington was not equally supported by an effort to fund, organize, and supply MacArthur’s forces with sufficient defensive infrastructure and equipment. As the American airpower plan in the Pacific came to fruition, military events across the globe exerted pressure on the Roosevelt Administration to send critical American materiel elsewhere.

In the summer of 1941, Washington was pressured to send military supplies, ammunition, planes and raw materials to provision both the Soviets against the German offensive and Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese nationalists in their defense against Japan. In the same hand, President Roosevelt’s lend-lease policy with Great Britain continued to funnel critical materials across the Atlantic.⁴⁴

Pacific bases in the Far East operated by Great Britain and the Netherlands equally required American logistics. Lastly, in planning to ship adequate war supplies to both U.S. allies and overseas garrisons, logistics planners had to consider the weakening effect on continental defense. The logistical weaknesses of the United States in 1941 resulted from the gulf between the increasing lethal urgency of the global situation and time required to transform appropriated funds into war munitions. Accordingly, Marshall felt that it was not until “Flying Fortresses, fighter planes, tanks, guns and small arms ammunition began to come off assembly lines on a partial quantity production basis in the late summer of 1941” that sufficient reinforcement for “our most distant outpost could be provided without jeopardy to the continental United States.”⁴⁵

On the home front, American public attention was overwhelmingly on the conflict in Europe. The attention was synonymous with the primary strategic focus of RAINBOW 5, which emphasized a Europe-first orientation. In general, the availability and will to reinforce the Philippines with equipment commensurate with the imposing 1941 aerial strategy reflected the general trend of the interwar ORANGE plan. While on paper the Philippines outpost represented an outstanding center from which to exert American influence in the Far East, the strategic potential of the American presence was undercut by the islands’ poor defensibility. The aforementioned weaknesses in War Plan ORANGE for over four decades remained generally static, resulting in insufficient equipment and defensive infrastructure to accommodate the delivery of advanced bomber and pursuit aircraft in 1941.

Central to the problem of providing the Philippines with sufficient defensive infrastructure was funding frustrated by Congressional deadlock. In 1941, the Philippines was still a territory of the United States, and the construction of defensive infrastructure in the archipelago was dependent on the appropriation of funds by Congress. In June 1941, a



Courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial

Clark Field, c. September 1941

Philippine defense finance program granting the Commonwealth some \$52 million from the allowance of sugar excise tax and money devaluation funds was approved by the president and pertinent heads of the various federal departments. Passage of this program was significantly slow. A report from the 77th Congress in October 1941 emphasized the urgency of the program’s passage, arguing that “preliminary steps . . . be initiated without awaiting congressional action and the appropriation of necessary funds” to . . . “strengthen materially the defense of the Philippines.”⁴⁶ The proposed sugar excise tax fund amendment ultimately failed in Congress. General Marshall recollected that a final Philippines defense funding act, the Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act totaling some \$269 million, was also stalled in Congressional deadlock, with approval coming on 17 December 1941.⁴⁷ Without these funds, the Philippine Commonwealth was unable to approve and fund construction projects to strengthen existing military infrastructure. The new air strategy in the Philippines

required the construction of sufficient airfields, hangars, communication centers, aerial warning field sites, and barracks to house assigned personnel. Brereton wrote, “to the best of my knowledge, there was available less than \$250,000 for this purpose at the time of my arrival, all of which had been obligated for purposes connected with upkeep and maintenance.”⁴⁸ Without sufficient funding, the ability to properly house, support, and defend the airplanes rapidly being sent to the Philippines was severely hampered. Essential military technologies such as aerial warning systems and communication equipment were required. In similar fashion, sufficient airfields allowing the safe dispersal and maintenance of aircraft were a necessity. Headquarters and airfield operation centers needed communication equipment to ensure the proper transmission of orders and maintain unity of command.

Ammunition, spare parts, and operating materials such as gasoline and coolant were essential not only to maintain existing aircraft, but to provide training opportunities for newly arrived personnel.

Severe shortages in all these logistical areas did not originate solely from lacking congressional funding. Failure to provide sufficient equipment developed naturally from the pattern of disparity between Philippines defensive strategy and supply that slowly and statically evolved over four decades. As a result, the 1941 aerial reinforcement that MacArthur insisted was changing “the whole complexion of Philippine strategy from defense to offense” was crippled from the start.⁴⁹ First and foremost, the FEAF was handcuffed by the poor shape of its airfields.

The number and condition of airdromes in the Philippines, and the established communication system to unite the various air commands, were completely inadequate to feasibly house and maintain the planes central to Washington’s new Pacific strategy. Even before arriving in the Philippines to take command of the FEAF, General Brereton was aware of these deficiencies, particularly the lack of airfields, antiaircraft defenses to protect them, and aerial warning services.

Brereton, a supply and air service officer with some combat experience in World War I, had served in a handful of training instructor command positions at various Army aviation schools throughout the interwar period. His selection for command of the FEAF was predicated upon his ability to organize and prepare personnel and facilities. On 5 October 1941, during a briefing of his new command responsibilities in Washington, Brereton protested to Arnold about the emplacement of heavy bombers. He “told General Arnold [he] considered it extremely hazardous to place bomber forces in any sensitive area without first having provided the necessary fighter cover and air warning service.”⁵⁰ Brereton was particularly concerned with the small number of developed airfields to house a large heavy bomber force and the lack of aerial warning services and trained personnel to operate them.


On 7 October, he again protested heavy bomber reinforcement without sufficient defensive infrastructure to both Marshall and Arnold. According

to Brereton, both men considered the rushed reinforcement a “calculated risk,” however, “their decision was to build up the heavy bomber strength as quickly as possible and reinforce it as soon as the fighters and air warning services were available.”⁵¹

In the summer of 1941, only two airfields in the Philippines were capable of housing the B-17. Clark Field, on the northernmost island of Luzon, was the principal air base, adjoining the old U.S. cavalry post Fort Stotsenberg. Clark maintained modestly capable hangars, runways, and living facilities. Various pursuit aircraft bases existed throughout the northern island of Luzon that were incapable of accommodating B-17s on their small, dirt runways let alone permanently housing the planes. The other base was Del Monte Field, an expansion of an American-owned pineapple plantation on the southernmost island of Mindanao. Del Monte was destitute of all services, defenses, and facilities, and “there were no facilities at all—no hangars, no barracks, no supplies, no nothing.”⁵² Del Monte did provide the FEAF with a secluded position far from the capital island of Luzon, wherein Japanese reconnaissance and espionage agents were unable to gather every small detail of operations. However, the base had no antiaircraft artillery

whatsoever and no supporting ground troops. In a 1970 interview, Major O’Donnell, the 14th Bombardment Group commander, stated, “Del Monte, it turned out, was just a turf field, a plantation, no runway or anything . . . Del Monte to me was the name on a can of peaches.”⁵³

While Clark Field had substantially more efficient facilities, the field’s lone hard-packed sod runway was the only narrow strip of land capable of accommodating the B-17. “[T]he land surrounding the airstrip was too soft to bear the weight of a B-17 so the planes had to be parked alongside the runway itself.”⁵⁴ The problematic result of having only two operational airfields in the Philippines was dispersal. Without enough open space and solid ground to emplace parked B-17s and P-40s, the airplanes remained extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. After reviewing the neatly parked planes on Clark from the air on his return to the base from a trip to Australia in late November, Brereton blasted his lieutenants for failing to disperse their assigned aircraft. The air commander fumed that, fortunately, he was not an enemy bombing fleet, for “if I had been, I could have blasted the entire heavy bomber strength of the Philippines off the map in one smash.”⁵⁵ Airfield construction was a priority of the FEAF



Nichols Field, c. 1940

and General MacArthur's division of Army engineers. Their efforts were frustrated by a number of factors, including funding, the competitive bidding of local construction firms, and even the weather. In the Pearl Harbor hearings, General Marshall posited that the airfield construction effort was substantially hindered by the rainy summer season. "We were just coming out of the wet season and the difficulties of building airstrips capable of supporting a 4-engine bomber were very great during the rainy season."⁵⁶

Along with airfields, the communication system linking the various commands of the FEAF was supplied with inadequate equipment. The communication centers at Clark, Iba, and Nichols Fields were not supplied with radio sets capable of using the frequency bands required to transmit across large distances and high altitudes. The table of basic allowances allotted by the War Department for the Philippines in October 1941 did not supply the FEAF with these high frequency radios. In a memo to the chief of staff in October 1941, Army Air Corps Plans Chief Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz criticized the existing table of basic allowances for not authorizing "any of the fixed long-range radio transmitters required in the Philippines for transmitting



U.S. Army

P-36s conduct a mock attack on infantry during a training mission in the Philippines, c. early 1941.

messages between the information center and the long-range detectors which will in some cases be located several hundred miles away."⁵⁷ Often, radio transmissions between airborne planes and the communication centers were lost entirely at critical moments. This problem affected training and severely degraded the combat readiness of the interceptor squadrons of the FEAF. During an intercept exercise in the first week of December 1941, 1st Lt. Henry Thorne

of the 20th Pursuit Squadron failed to intercept unknown aircraft due to the insufficient strength of the radio tower at Iba Field's radar station. According to then-Capt. Joseph Moore, the squadron's commanding officer, "the interception was not successful because the power of the radio was so low Lieutenant Thorne quickly lost contact."⁵⁸ The poor condition of airfields and the inadequate supply of communication equipment severely curtailed the security and combat effectiveness of the FEAF.

Equally important, anti-aircraft defenses for the handful of operational air bases were understrength and had antiquated equipment and insufficient ammunition. Only Clark Field had any semblance of anti-aircraft defenses. The 200th Coast Artillery arrived in the Philippines in October 1941 and took up positions ringing Clark Field with two dozen 37-mm. and .50-caliber guns and a dozen 3-inch guns.⁵⁹ The majority of these weapons were significantly outdated and most lacked the adequate range to present a threat to high-flying bombers. Col. William Braly, responsible for the 60th Coast Artillery plans and operations division at Manila Bay in 1941, wrote that "all heavy seacoast and anti-aircraft armament was of pre-World War I type and had been emplaced prior to the



Library of Congress

Carl Spaatz, shown here as a major, c. 1935



U.S. Air Force

Henry Thorne, shown here as a major general, c. 1959



Gun crew with a 3-inch anti-aircraft gun in the Philippines, c. early 1942

present-day concept of air warfare.”⁶⁰ The remainder of the major pursuit airfields in the Philippines had no anti-aircraft protection whatsoever. The main installation for pursuit aircraft on Luzon was Nichols Field. Colonel Ind performed a preliminary inspection of Luzon’s airfields upon his arrival in the Philippines in May 1941 and was shocked at the absence of anti-aircraft artillery at Nichols Field. There “was not one vestige of anti-aircraft protection for our second most important, and in some respects, our most important airfield in the Islands.”⁶¹

Passive air defense measures existed in November 1941 in the form of consistent air attack warning drills,

camouflage of planes, and limited dispersal efforts. In response to the increased number of B-17s scheduled to arrive in the Philippines in early December 1941, Brereton ordered half of his current heavy bomber strength moved to Del Monte Field to provide greater dispersal. The relocation to Del Monte was “the most effective air defense” measure Brereton ordered prior to the start of hostilities, but the move itself was risky.⁶² In addition to having no living facilities, hangars, or running water, the base had no anti-aircraft artillery. The heavily secluded field in the interior of Mindanao did not even have the antique World War I-era artillery pieces

that surrounded Clark Field and Subic and Manila Bays. What anti-aircraft artillery and heavy weaponry was available on the pursuit aircraft fields lacked ammunition—the scarcity of which was hard felt throughout the entire archipelago, and in general was a serious deficiency acknowledged by U.S. strategic leaders.

In September 1941, MacArthur refused Marshall’s proposition to send a trained National Guard infantry division, stating that “equipment and supply of existing forces are the prime essential instead of reinforcements.” From his assumption of command, MacArthur considered the FEAF his weakest arm, and instead of requesting personnel, he asked for more planes and equipment to defend them.⁶³

Although the sanguine MacArthur did not always acknowledge it, the large numbers of personnel in his air force were deprived of critical training time due to shortages of essential equipment. With regard to Air Force personnel, MacArthur received a large and steady stream of new pilots throughout the summer of 1941. By the same token, rookie pilots on their first tour of duty out of flight school in the FEAF rarely received the necessary combat training time. Lt. Col. Kirtley Gregg, once the temporary commander of the 4th Composite Group and later the assistant G-4 supply division commander for the FEAF, wrote at length about the problems of training new men. In a letter to his wife in late June 1941, Gregg wrote “last October there were 31 Air Corps officers in the



B-18s during practice maneuvers in the Philippines, c. early 1941

Philippine Islands . . . this week, with no warning, I received 64 green pilots . . . and only 16 with over one year's commissioned flying experience."⁶⁴

These pilots, a result of the Army Air Forces' renewed recruitment initiative and expansion program, had only recently graduated basic training and short individual specialist training, or flight school.⁶⁵ These training programs were not intended to provide rigorous, practical exercises with advanced equipment. It was expected that the majority of practical training would take place at the newly commissioned air officer's first duty station. The critical lack of ammunition degraded combat training of tactical pursuit and bombing squadrons. The powerful .50-caliber guns on many of the P-40s recently manufactured and shipped to the Philippines remained unfired and untested. "[T]here was only enough 50 Cal. Ammo in the islands to load our guns in the P-40s just two times . . . that prevented us from doing any live firing practices."⁶⁶

A shortage of gasoline and spare parts also frustrated the efforts of tactical air commanders to train their pilots, test their equipment, and bring their units to a fully operational status. Pilots, ground crews, and replacement squadron mechanics had to improvise, often using unconventional methods to repair vital broken parts and maintain aircraft in operational condition. Pvt. Joseph Sanchez of the 24th Pursuit Squadron, a mechanic based at Clark Field, stated "there were practically no replacement parts . . . P-40s were new, some had only 8 hours flying time," some "with holes in vital parts of the ship patched with fusion tape, with .50-caliber drums tied in the fuselage tanks."⁶⁷ In several instances, pilots were restricted from running their engines due to the scarcity of gasoline. At the impoverished Del Monte Field, one officer with the 93d Bombardment Squadron remarked "we had to conserve hours on our engines because there were no more [engines] in the Philippines," forcing commanders to consolidate many training missions into a single flight.⁶⁸

The net result of these deficiencies was poor defense and preparation.

Although planes and pilots were rapidly dispatched across the Pacific to strengthen the FEAF and present a deterrent to Japan, both men and materiel were new, untested, and unable to train. The lack of experienced pilots and the inability to train resulted in numerous flight accidents. Lt. Col. Clinton Pierce, the commanding officer of the elite 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts), witnessed one such mishap. In early November he wrote his wife, "I saw one during anti-aircraft night practice—a big bomber—not a fortress, blinded by searchlights, just dived into the area south of Clark Field and exploded."⁶⁹ Planes fresh off the boats continuously arriving in the Philippines that

summer were uncrated and assembled only to sit in the glaring sun, unable to run. Colonel Ind, already surprised at the nonexistence of anti-aircraft defenses at Nichols Field, was further disturbed by the inability of fresh pursuit planes to fly training missions because of an engine coolant shortage. He recalled Nichols Field mechanic Maj. W. N. "Pinkie" Aims' words, "we can erect 'em, but we can't run 'em."⁷⁰ Untested, many planes would prove to malfunction at critical times in the coming months. Deprived of training time, the expanding FEAF was unable to conduct exercises pertinent to unifying the various bomb, pursuit, aerial warning, and communication elements.



Clinton Pierce (left), shown here as a brigadier general, questions captured Japanese soldiers, c. early 1942.

U.S. Army



Courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial

Japanese bombers en route to the Philippines, 8 December 1941

The aerial warning system in the Philippines during the summer of 1941 consisted of a combination of an unconventional air watcher system and a single radar installation, an organization totally inadequate to support the FEAF in an area the size of the Philippines. The identification and tracking of unknown aircraft was largely dependent on the observers, a byproduct of MacArthur's strong emphasis on the development of native Filipinos into an effective fighting force. In this system, hundreds of native Filipinos scattered throughout Luzon and the other islands of the Philippines perched in assembled high points, scanned the skies, and relayed sightings over telephone and teletype communication lines to the FEAF interceptor command.⁷¹ The skill, commitment, and loyalty of these watchers was questionable. Ind remarked that there was no time for real instruction on the fine points of aircraft identification and that "all that could be done was to endeavor to impress upon their willing enough minds the necessity for prompt reporting of any airplane during an exercise."⁷² The commitment of American radar technology and trained aerial warning service personnel to the Philippines was inadequate. The allowance of the SCR-270 radar for the Philippines

aerial warning service, one of the U.S. Army's first radar sets crudely capable of determining aircraft altitude and compiling track data, was not approved until September 1941.

The lack of efficient aerial warning technology was known to strategic leadership in Washington. In the diary entry detailing his appointment as FEAF commander in a meeting with General Arnold in October, General Brereton wrote, "I strongly urged the necessity for providing air warning services . . . before sending bombers to a location that was exceedingly vulnerable to surprise attack."⁷³ Seemingly, it was Brereton's acknowledgement of the desperate state of the Philippines' aerial warning capability that prompted U.S. leaders to nominal action. On 7 November, Arnold wrote to the A-4 logistics division that "in view of the urgent necessity of building up our air strength in the Philippines . . . every effort must be taken to get detector equipment to the maximum extent required over to the Philippines as soon as possible."⁷⁴ Although seven of the radar sets were present in the Philippines in December 1941, only two were fully assembled, and only one, at Iba Field, was fully operational.⁷⁵ A third radar set, at the northwestern most point on Luzon Cape Bojeador, was still undergoing preoperational

maintenance in early December. Then-1st Lt. Robert Arnold, the aerial warning service commander at the Bojeador site, recollected witnessing formations of heavy Japanese bombers flying southward directly over his nonoperational site on the morning of 8 December.⁷⁶ Failure to properly assemble and operate the radar sets was due to critical shortages of trained aerial warning service personnel. In mid-November Spaatz wrote to the Army chief of staff that "the existing Philippine Aircraft Warning Company with an authorized strength of 194 enlisted men is entirely inadequate to provide a satisfactory aircraft warning service for the Philippine Islands."⁷⁷ Spaatz recommended the appropriation of funding to construct detector sites in the Philippines and the installation of radio sets capable of tracking and discerning altitude. The one operational radar at Iba Field was capable of tracking aerial targets over Lingayen Gulf to the north of Clark Field, however, the singular station did not provide sufficient coverage of Luzon, let alone the entire Philippines. The aerial watcher system, the number of radar sets, and aerial warning service personnel slotted for the Philippines was entirely inadequate to house and support the rapidly expanding FEAF.

As a result of the inadequacies in airfields, antiaircraft defenses, ammunition, spare parts, aerial warning systems, and communication equipment, General MacArthur's relatively small air force was tactically incapable of fulfilling an offensive strategy. The overreaching strategy for his air arm was shorthanded by one further element. On 27 November 1941, as diplomatic negotiations with Japan completely broke down, General Marshall notified MacArthur and his Hawaiian counterpart, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, of the immediate probability of hostilities. Marshall wrote "if hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."⁷⁸ MacArthur was encouraged to conduct appropriate reconnaissance, report

on progress, and ordered all units onto a war footing, and permitted interceptor aircraft aloft on night patrols. MacArthur wrote, “we were as ready as we possibly could be in our inadequate defenses.”⁷⁹ However, his freedom of action was significantly limited. As previously mentioned, the airpower strategy for MacArthur’s air force emphasized the offensive, and the rapid buildup of aerial firepower in the Philippines supported the War Department strategy of deterring Japan from a southward advance. However, on the eve of hostilities, the War Department notified all Pacific commands of the U.S. preference for Japan to commit the first hostile act.

The desperate Philippine situation was not logistically unique in the summer of 1941. Marshall reasoned that the entire force was shorthanded by stalled monetary appropriations and admitted that “our greatest problem during this period was the recognized urgency of the situation as opposed by the fact that we were just in the process of obtaining ammunition, arms and equipment.”⁸⁰ The unique Philippine amendment to the national crisis was that unlike other Pacific outposts such as Hawaii, the U.S. garrison in the Philippine Islands was kept in a state of consistent neglect and strategic doubt since the very day of annexation.

The desperate and uncertain logistical context of the War Department in 1941 only exacerbated the problematic archipelago’s condition. There simply was not enough reinforcement time allotted to compensate for “the years of sound sleeping Uncle Sam had done with his snoring head pillowed on a copy of the ‘treaty’ in which he had agreed to fortify the Pacific Islands.”⁸¹ Time was the first critical factor; despite controlling the Philippines for almost a decade, America’s strategic consensus in the ORANGE plans remained largely defeatist. The second important factor was money; one of Brereton’s operations deputies, Capt. Norman Llewellyn, complained “there has been no money spent by the army for the past four years and now we are expected to make up for all that in just a few months.”⁸² In the summer of 1941, both time and money were short.



These constrictions influenced the number of available and operational aircraft in the Philippines. At the unanticipated end of the Philippines air buildup, MacArthur’s FEAF had only 107 P-40s and 35 B-17Ds and Cs.⁸³ This meager force of heavy bombers was responsible for not

only the defense of the Philippines but also for presenting a foreboding deterrent to Japanese aggression in the southwest Pacific. General Gerow compared the strategy-to-plane ratio to the use of armor and submarines in World War I. In late November, he argued “if we endeavor to use this

relatively very small force in a major air offensive, we may be repeating the strategic blunders made when tanks and submarines were originally used in forces much too small to accomplish decisive results.”⁸⁴

Although some planners in the War Department such as Gerow acknowledged the undeniable logistical and statistical reality, confidence in the potential of the B-17 in the Pacific seemingly superseded all doubt. Encouraged by MacArthur’s virulent and contagious optimism, influential leaders such as Marshall and Stimson promoted faith in the B-17 to revitalize decades of Far East strategic neglect. However, Marshall had been “deceived . . . the new B-17, much improved as it was, still could not perform the major miracles that he expected of it.”⁸⁵

The airpower strategy and reinforcement organized for the FEAF in the summer of 1941 was not sufficiently supported by defensive infrastructure, adequate airfields, and essential equipment. The decision to hastily ship the United States’ most advanced heavy bomber to the Philippines was made by leaders in Washington, including Marshall, Stimson, and Arnold. Their belief in the B-17 was in turn supported by the optimistic reports of MacArthur in the Philippines. Tactical commanders with direct responsibility for the FEAF recognized the significant hazards on the ground and the strategic risks at stake, but their protests were largely ignored. The inability to adequately supply the Philippines with sufficient



U.S. Army

Wrecked P-35s at Nichols Field, 10 December 1941

defensive infrastructure and military equipment to make such an airpower strategy feasible was due to a variety of pressing factors in 1941. First, the U.S. strategic policy toward the Philippines presented military planners with a seemingly unsolvable conundrum from the beginning. The ORANGE plans, debated and revised throughout the interwar years by the Joint Army-Navy Board, never formulated a truly effective defensive strategy for the Philippines. Although some pro-Philippines U.S. military officers throughout the interwar years sought to overturn the acceptance of defeatism in the ORANGE plans, their efforts were frustrated by growing

isolationism, economic depression, budget cuts, and pressure for a Europe-first approach to future strategy. The passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act safeguarding the future independence of the Philippine Commonwealth put further distance between a viable strategy and the archipelago.

For these reasons, U.S. strategy and policymakers put more viable faith in an Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defensive perimeter in the Pacific. Defensive infrastructure in the Philippines remained frozen in time and the existing garrisons continued to operate with obsolete equipment. The Philippines garrison at this time was either a retirement or exile assignment



Courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial

A destroyed B-17 at Clark Field, 8-10 December 1941



Courtesy of the MacArthur Memorial

A B-17 at Clark Field destroyed by Japanese bombs, 8–10 December 1941

for American officers, and a graveyard for obsolete and outmoded aircraft. In the late 1930s, a few military planners conceptualized a feasible defense for the Philippines primarily based on airpower. However, statistically the sheer numbers required for an effective air arm to both defend the Philippines and deter Japanese aggression did not appease the attitude of U.S. strategic and political leaders in the late 1930s. During this period the General Staff was “dead set against” heavy bombers and “ruled out any more B-17s and anything bigger than B-17s on the grounds that they were obviously weapons of aggression, not defense.”⁸⁶

Global events were to quickly change the orientation of American strategists and military policymakers toward heavy bombers. Japan’s increasing brutality in their war with China and the pressing probability of a Japanese southward advance to secure vital resources in the southwest Pacific prompted military planners to action. The brutal fighting in western Russia during the early summer of 1941 looked like a quick German victory and American strategists were apprehensive for both a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union from the west and a possible Japanese move southward. In July 1941, MacArthur was recalled to active duty and given command of FEAF. This action and the investment of his assigned tasks in War Plan RAINBOW 5 with the

new clause of offensive airpower represented a 180-degree strategic reorientation toward the Philippines. The subsequent priority of the islands and the buildup of B-17 bombers during the late summer of 1941 was strategically perceived as remedying four decades of logistical neglect. Although some War Department planners rightly questioned the validity of an offensive strategy based on airpower in the Philippines, their views were negated. Preeminent faith was placed in the ability of the FEAF, with fewer than four dozen heavy bombers to coordinate with Allied installations in the Pacific to set the very cities of Japan ablaze. More importantly, this flamboyant strategy was not sufficiently supported by a substantive, committed effort to fund, organize, and supply the Philippines with defensive infrastructure, personnel, and equipment. The Philippine Islands never shook the perception of an inherently hopeless, graveyard outpost on the rim of the world to Congress, who frustratingly delayed passing of a critical amendment to fund their defense in 1941. Airfields usable by the FEAF were in terrible condition. Devoid of anti-aircraft defense, except for a nominal force of anti-aircraft coastal artillery at Clark Field, these bases lacked paved runways and free space to adequately disperse aircraft. In addition to dead-lining supply

and operational strength, the severe shortages of gasoline, ammunition, spare parts, and other critical materials in the Philippines deprived newly commissioned and arriving pilots of combat training. If the War Department did not supply the Philippines with sufficient equipment to employ pilots and operate new equipment, they also failed to supply the Philippines with an effective aerial warning service. There were not enough warning service personnel to operate the seven SCR-270 class radar sets delivered to the islands. The second-rate Philippine air watcher service devised by MacArthur to substitute these technological and personnel deficiencies was largely ineffective and inadequate.

In conclusion, the fiasco of 8 December 1941, although affected by decisions of the tactical commanders present, was more the result of a deficient correlation between proposed strategy and supply. The deplorable condition of American military infrastructure and defensive equipment in the Philippines deprived MacArthur’s FEAF of the capability to operate.

The lofty strategy devised by Washington planners in the summer of 1941 was not a practical proposition due to the small number of planes envisaged and the islands’ logistical defects. Inflated confidence in the feasibility of this strategy was dramatically shattered on America’s first day as a

combatant nation in World War II. The disaster was not, as the majority of historians argue, primarily caused by poor decision making by either MacArthur or Brereton. Even some very well-researched accounts such as William Bartsch's *December 8th, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor* and Walter Edmonds' *They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, 1941–1942* (Boston, 1951) devote considerable pages to debating the confused and contradictory evidence of that morning's events in order to weigh who bears greater blame.

Although many historical accounts of the disaster analyze the logistical deficiencies suffered by the FEAF, little work has been devoted to clarifying the obvious gap that existed between the grand aerial strategy and the pathetically poor condition of American efforts to supply and maintain it. Logistically, the state of the FEAF was desperate. In February 1942, Brereton challenged Arnold's conclusion that aircraft losses on 8 December resulted from the failure to properly handle and disperse the aircraft. Brereton argued that although the number of airfields hampered effective dispersal, the real cause of the disaster was "the failure to provide combat commanders with [the] properly balanced components of an air force with which to wage war against a well-led enemy of superior strength." These areas consisted of anti-aircraft defenses, air warning service equipment, artillery, and personnel.⁸⁷ Although these deficiencies were felt severely by the FEAF in 1941, it was certainly not a new problem in Philippine-American military history. The supply-strategy gap remained a primary flaw of American strategic policy toward the Philippines since the archipelago's annexation in the closing years of the nineteenth century.

The rapid attempt to patch decades of military neglect with a powerfully assumptive airpower policy and materiel reinforcement failed to resolve all the critical logistics areas essential to housing and maintaining both a capable air force and feasible strategy.

The transition, constricted by available time and the increasingly disturbing character of world events, was simply too rapid and resulted in disaster.



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U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

A NEW HELMET FOR A NEW ARMY THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN HELMET DURING WORLD WAR I

BY **CARRIE GABARÉE**

On the American entry into World War I, the Army set out to select a helmet for its soldiers. Military officials felt that the war's horrifically high casualty rate necessitated a reintroduction of individual troop armor, or at least metal helmets. A committee was created and considered several existing foreign models, highlighting the positive and negative characteristics of each. Germany had produced a helmet earlier in the war that met all the desired characteristics—being easily and affordably mass produced and providing maximum protection, while remaining lightweight and comfortable. The United States chose the British helmet as a stopgap solution to outfit the troops, but all the while it continued to look for a superior option that would be as good as the German design, but have a uniquely American appearance for better battlefield identification and for political and patriotic motives. Though the British helmet tested well ballistically and was easy to make, it was considered too heavy and did not provide enough cranial coverage. The British Army Quartermaster Department reserved 400,000 helmets in England for American use, and those helmets were then sent to France throughout 1917.¹

Under the direction of the Armor Committee of the American Council of National Research, the Ordnance Department worked on several developmental helmets. The chairman of this committee was Bashford Dean, a leading American student of armor and metallurgy and the curator of arms and armor at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. Dean used his vast knowledge of armor from the Renaissance through the early twentieth century to create prototypes appropriate for trench warfare. To fully assist in the effort, the museum lent its armor workshop and rich research collection to the government for the duration of the war.²

AMERICAN HELMET No. 5 (A)

This helmet was essentially an improvement upon an earlier model to increase interior head space and coverage, and to simplify the method of manufacture. However, it was still not as easy to produce as the temporarily selected British helmet. A woven chin strap was chosen for this design, as it could be quickly manipulated when attaching a gas mask. This model was ultimately rejected because it too closely resembled the German helmet, was not distinct enough from the British model, and was still not easy enough to manufacture.³

AMERICAN HELMET No. 7 — SENTINEL'S HELMET (B)

This helmet's heavy design (three weight varieties: eleven, fifteen, or eighteen pounds) was meant to protect observers or machine gunners as it was not practical for more mobile infantry soldiers. Testing found the helmet would help protect the user from rifle fire, even at 150 yards. It was reminiscent of heavy siege helmets worn extensively throughout Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁴

AMERICAN HELMET No. 8 (C)

Model 8 was based on Model 5, but with an added visor. The visor was designed with a slit at eye level. While providing a decent and level field of vision, the soldier's downward view was obstructed. As the wearer could not see his feet, officials reasoned that an advancing soldier would not want his sight hampered and would therefore need to lift the visor for that purpose. Like Model 5, it offered good protection, but its extra coverage weighed seventeen and a half ounces more, ten ounces alone being the visor.⁵

LIBERTY BELL HELMET (D)

An improvement from an earlier model, the Liberty Bell helmet became the recommended U.S. standard helmet just before the war's conclusion, despite many issues. It did not balance well on the head or provide sufficient coverage. Additional space on top caused extra weight and it was difficult to manufacture. Its design caused the sides to be very thin and its lining exerted too much pressure on the head. Nevertheless, it was unique to other helmets and could be adjusted to the wearer's needs.⁶ With the war's end in November 1918, the new design became unnecessary and it was ultimately not produced. However, this helmet gradually changed to more resemble the general shape of the German World War I helmet, evolving into the modern helmet worn by our soldiers today.

Carrie Gabarée serves as a museum curator at the Museum Support Center on Fort Belvoir, Virginia.





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ART IN THE FIELD FEATURE

THE 126TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT HOSTS ARMY ARTIST

By Lt. Col. Mike Allain

The 126th Military History Detachment (MHD) from the Massachusetts Army National Guard hosted the Center of Military History's (CMH) artist in residence, Sfc. Juan C. Muñoz, in Kuwait and Iraq. The 126th MHD (composed of its commander, Col. Walter Connery, and deputy commander, Lt. Col. Mike Allain) was recently deployed to the Middle East in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR). The purpose of Sergeant Muñoz's two-week deployment to this theater was to photograph U.S. soldiers in support of the Coalition's effort to advise and assist Iraqi forces fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The high-resolution images taken by Sergeant Muñoz serve as his primary sources to draw or paint renditions of his experience in the Coalition Joint Operations Area (CJOA).

The highlights of Sergeant Muñoz's travels throughout Kuwait and Iraq included time at Camp Taji, Iraq, observing U.S. and British engineers training Iraqis to deploy floating bridge systems and taking photos of soldiers keeping up their physical fitness by playing a game of softball. He also watched 101st Airborne Division soldiers performing security perimeter checks at Forward Operating Base Union III in Baghdad, spent time with an air ambulance company operating out of Camp Buehring, Kuwait, and accompanied an Army heavy boat company in action at Kuwait Naval Base.

Travel throughout the CJOA was restricted to evening hours and was conducted 100 percent by air. This presented a host of logistical issues, particularly with the frequency of sandstorms. It was a whirlwind two weeks but Sergeant Muñoz's professionalism and positive attitude made for a successful mission. Colonel Connery noted that many CJTF-OIR senior leaders and junior soldiers alike were intrigued to learn what an Army artist's job entailed. In the end they came away with a greater appreciation for the artist's role and CMH's mission as a whole.



- A. A UH–60M Black Hawk helicopter and crew from the 1st Battalion, 111th Aviation Regiment
- B. Sergeant Muñoz photographing Army engineers training at Camp Taji, Iraq
- C. 101st Airborne Division military policeman securing the perimeter at Union III, Baghdad, Iraq



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lt. Col. Stephen T. Messenger is a United States Army Reserve logistics officer and a recent graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program at the School of Advanced Military Studies in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has completed three deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait to include transportation operations in Arifjan during the surge into Iraq from 2006 to 2007. He holds a bachelor's degree in aeronautical science from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, a master's of administration from Central Michigan University, and a master's of military arts and science from the Command and General Staff College. His current assignment is as a joint transportation planner at United States Transportation Command.



Loading transport ships in Tampa, Florida, bound for Santiago, Cuba

THE TRAINS STOP AT TAMPA



PORT MOBILIZATION DURING THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS

BY STEPHEN T. MESSENGER

The American entry into World War I presented its military logistical planners with what must have seemed like an insurmountable problem. The scale and scope of World War I logistics operations was unfathomable at the time. The United States was eventually able to mobilize massive numbers of troops and materiel throughout the war, which contributed tremendously to the Allied victory. However, two decades earlier, another American expeditionary force met with very little success in deploying overseas. In the Spanish-American War, the United States mobilized soldiers destined for Cuba from a seldom-used and little-known port in Florida called Tampa. The unsuccessful efforts at mobilizing a mere 25,000 troops highlighted a broken system that, following logistical evolution and improved methodology, led to successful World War I deployments

less than twenty years later. The knowledge gained during the Tampa mobilization created the foundation of current Army deployment doctrine.

The U.S. Army and Navy staged men and equipment in Tampa to prepare for the 1898 invasion of Cuba. The services conducted what planners today call the “deployment process.” This small-scale mobilization was the first foreign expeditionary operation conducted by the Army since the Mexican-American War in 1847. Critical to the Tampa operation was the application of establishing basing, maintaining tempo, and extending what the Army now calls operational reach, “the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.”¹

The evolution of the Army deployment process demonstrates the significance of the lessons learned from the force’s time in Tampa. The experience gained during the

preparations for the invasion of Cuba in 1898 improved future operations and equipped the United States to move troops and materiel quickly and efficiently. The skills developed in Tampa enlightened mobilization planners and enabled them to establish processes to receive, stage, and deploy units and equipment in a more efficient manner using the principles of unity of command, synchronization, unit integrity, and balance.²

HISTORY OF THE SANTIAGO EXPEDITION

Cuba had been a Spanish colony since Christopher Columbus claimed it in the names of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1492. By the late nineteenth century, however, Cuban independence was on the minds of many of the island’s inhabitants. The Cuban insurrection against its Spanish colonial master began on 28 February 1895, although there had been indicators of an impending

insurgency as early as the 1850s. Numerous nonviolent efforts by the Cubans to gain independence from Spanish authority had repeatedly failed. However, political efforts drew in private American support for the rebels.³ The Spanish reacted by using military force to establish reconcentration camps for 300,000 Cubans beginning in 1896. With the insurgency growing larger, Spain attempted to solve the problem by agreeing to limited political autonomy in November 1897, but the revolutionaries declined the offer and sought complete independence. The United States, concerned with trade disruption, protested through diplomatic channels. American officials cited human rights violations, but the Cuban people received no respite from Spanish aggression and retributions.⁴

On 12 January 1898, a large riot broke out on the streets of Havana that finally brought about American intervention. The instability of the situation concerned President William McKinley because of the threat to thousands of Americans living on the island and the millions of dollars invested in the Cuban economy. The riot compelled the president to send the armored cruiser USS *Maine* to

Havana Harbor to project American power and protect American interests. The ship arrived in Havana on 25 January 1898. On 15 February, after three uneventful weeks, the *Maine* suddenly exploded, killing 260 sailors and marines.⁵ The investigation never linked Spanish action with the explosion, but the *Maine* incident quickly became the catalyst that sent the United States hurtling toward war with Spain.

President McKinley attempted to stem the public furor to go to war, but to no avail. After much consternation, he requested a \$50 million appropriation, dubbed the “Fifty Million Bill,” for the purposes of national defense. The House of Representatives and the Senate unanimously passed the bill in early March, with \$16 million earmarked for the Army and coastal defense.⁶ McKinley negotiated with Spain, which agreed to multiple demands for resolving the conflict, with the exception of evacuating Cuba. Political pressure for war was fierce. U.S. Sen. John Thurston, a Republican from Nebraska, visited Cuba and reported 210,000 Cubans dying after Spain’s soldiers had driven them from


their homes. Both houses of Congress encouraged intervention as Spanish forces and insurrectionists reached a stalemate: Spain could not stop the revolution and the Cubans could not drive Spanish rule from the island. The people of the United States pressed the government for action.⁷

The American preparations for war quickly escalated when, on 22 April, Congress gave the president the authority to call for volunteers to increase the size of the Regular Army from its current strength of 26,000. The following day, the president called for 125,000 volunteers. Congress declared war on 25 April and passed a bill the next day to double the size of existing Regular Army regiments.⁸ War planners decided that Tampa would serve as the embarkation point for the Cuban campaign, but the port lacked the infrastructure to execute the mission. Nevertheless, war had begun in bungling earnest. Second Lt. Merch Stewart described the mobilization as:

out of seeming chaos, brigades and divisions began to take form and substance. Gradually, also, regiments began to migrate Tampa-



President McKinley, c. 1898



Senator Thurston, c. 1899



Lieutenant Stewart, c. 1898

ward in preparation for we knew not what. Incidentally, we began to receive recruits whom we had no time to train, various articles of winter clothing, for which we had no use, and other impedimenta which were chiefly impedimenta.⁹

Time was of the essence, with men and equipment headed to Florida for the invasion of Cuba.


Tampa was a sleepy town on the Florida Gulf Coast with a population of 10,000 residents. Cigar making was the main industry. The town consisted of three banks, one movie theater, a transportation network consisting of gravel and planked roads, a handful of general stores, and one telegraph office. The main attraction was the Tampa Bay Hotel that rested on six acres with a silver dome covering a small casino. Henry B. Plant owned the property, along with the small one-track railroad leading nine miles from Tampa to the Port of Tampa.¹⁰ Plant had built the Port of Tampa to facilitate the flow of sea traffic from Key West and Cuba. In the port itself, a narrow channel allowed steamers access.¹¹

The channel's twenty-one foot depth was adequate for large ships, and the wharf allowed thirteen vessels to dock simultaneously.¹²

The War Department had selected Tampa and the adjacent bay for

their strategic advantages. Tampa Bay's geography was ideal to prevent Spanish cruisers from engaging transport ships during the loading process because the port was far enough inland to discourage enemy ships from entering and risk being trapped.¹³ The location also possessed the minimum estimated railroad and shipping facilities for transportation support and was the closest port to Cuba with adequate naval capacity.¹⁴ With these considerations in mind, planners chose Tampa "almost by administrative gravitation," and the Army began assembling on 15 April 1898.¹⁵ In retrospect, had the planners known the size to which the assembled force would grow, they likely would not have chosen the Port of Tampa as the embarkation point.¹⁶

At the start of the mobilization, Secretary of War Russell Alger ordered 5,000 Regular Army troops to prepare for quick movement into Cuba.¹⁷ Upon arrival in Florida, units camped in the sandy terrain and waited for their imminent movement overseas. The staging process at Tampa captured the essence of the Army's modern-day deployment doctrine designed



State Archives of Florida

Henry B. Plant



Library of Congress

The Tampa Bay Hotel, c. 1898

to combine troops, equipment, and supplies into one cohesive fighting force.¹⁸ In effect, Tampa was both a port of embarkation and debarkation. This was in contrast to New York City during World War I, where New York was a port of embarkation for thousands of soldiers brought there by railroads and planners executed only the movement phase of deployment operations. Three factors during the planning process dictated the reasoning behind Tampa as the site of deployment: establishing basing, maintaining tempo, and extending operational reach. Planners selected this site to receive units, integrate them with their equipment, and quickly facilitate movement into Cuba via ocean vessels.

Tempo was critical to the deployment through Tampa.¹⁹ The U.S. Navy had sent a force to blockade the Port of Havana with additional orders to destroy the Spanish fleet and set conditions for an Army landing


force. Tampa had to be able to quickly receive, stage, and move soldiers to Cuba following any naval action. Therefore, maintaining a consistent pace in the Cuban campaign was essential to preserving the initiative gained by the destruction of the Spanish fleet. The Army needed to provide soldiers and supplies quickly in support of the Cuban insurrection. Additionally, the War Department believed that the rapid arrival of American ground forces would demoralize Spanish forces and boost the morale of Cuban rebels.

Operational reach is the ability of a military force to project combat power and sustain mission effectiveness through supply lines. It relies on basing to deploy forces and sets the initial tempo of the operation.²⁰ Deployment sites form the foundation of projecting an army's ability to fight any campaign. As military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, the larger an army becomes, the more dependent it is on the base, thus the flow of men and materiel to the field of battle from the base becomes more restricted as the size of the army grows.²¹ Military planners assumed a large degree of risk when they anticipated that the Army could build enough infrastructure capacity at Tampa to mobilize and deploy armed forces to retain the initiative.

Beginning in early May 1898, mustered volunteers began pouring into Chickamauga Park, Georgia, for initial assembly, training, and follow-on movement.²² From assembly points like this, enlistees typically moved to one of four sites: Camp Thomas, Tennessee; Tampa, Florida; Camp Alger, Virginia; and the Presidio of San Francisco, California.²³ By the end of May, 163,626 soldiers had enlisted.²⁴ While the government met the goal of increasing the fighting force, the Army's organizational and institutional culture could only support a small, constabulary force. The Army's entire logistics system consisted of a mere 22 commissary officers, 179 medical officers, and 57 quartermaster officers.²⁵ This was simply not enough staff to support the increasing size of the Army. Still, there

was no time to lose, and the desire to maintain the pace of deployment overruled logistics support. The original plan called for 5,000 soldiers to muster in Tampa. Sailing south, they would land in Cuba, conduct a reconnaissance-in-force, gain valuable intelligence, and aid the insurgents in whatever way they could.²⁶ On 29 April 1898, an order from the adjutant general of the War Department directed Brig. Gen. William R. Shafter to "assume command of all the troops assembled there (Tampa)."²⁷

Shafter was born in rural Michigan and had enlisted in the Army before the Civil War. He earned the Medal of Honor for his conduct during the Battle of Fair Oaks, Virginia, on 31 May 1862, and continued his career across the plains in the Indian Wars throughout the 1870s. In 1897, Shafter received a promotion to brigadier general and assumed command of the Department of California. When the war with Spain began, Secretary



Secretary Alger, c. 1900



General Shafter

of War Alger, Army Adjutant General Col. Henry Corbin, and Commanding General of the Army Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles unanimously chose Shafter as the expeditionary commander. Shafter was a large, stout man who weighed over 250 pounds following his years of sedentary garrison command. His chief commissary officer, Col. John F. Weston, stated Shafter “couldn’t walk two miles in an hour, [and was] just beastly obese.”²⁸ Despite his weight, his peers described him as a brave soldier who contemplated decisions and did not make impulsive choices.²⁹ Shafter’s one major shortcoming was his limited experience in the administration of large units. In Tampa, he failed to bring order to the port of embarkation, delegate command authority, or focus on the important details of unit departures.³⁰ While senior leaders had chosen a seasoned commander to conduct combat operations in Cuba, they did not get an officer with the experience necessary to manage the vast sustainment challenges inherent with deploying the force from Tampa.

THE RECEPTION PROCESS

The original call for the stationing of 5,000 troops at Tampa occurred one week before the official declaration of war on 25 April 1898.³¹ General Shafter arrived in Tampa on 30 April and received directions from the War Department. His orders were to maintain the pace of operations and sail at the earliest date possible with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer forces. The American expeditionary force would land on the southern coast of Cuba to establish contact with General Maximo Gomez, the commander in chief of the insurgent army. The expedition would provide the rebels with supplies, arms, and ammunition. Shafter, though, was to avoid becoming decisively engaged, his main effort was to improve insurgent morale. However, Shafter soon received conflicting orders to delay any movement because there were Spanish warships spotted near Cuba. Preparations for deployment were to continue, and the expedition was to wait for further instructions.³²



The plan for rapidly deploying the small contingent of 5,000 soldiers evolved into an unwieldy and lethargic force waiting for orders in the Florida heat. Moreover, in accordance with War Department directives, the number of troops began to increase—first to 12,000, and then to 25,000.³³ The War Department did not anticipate the logistics needed to support this increase, and no one prepared Tampa for the challenges to come. On 10 May, Lt. Col. Charles F. Humphrey assumed command of the quartermaster department at Tampa. His command included ocean transportation and oversight of the depot quartermaster and chief quartermaster.³⁴ Working with his assistant, Capt. James McKay, Humphrey focused his efforts on preparing the staging and movement process from Port Tampa to Cuba.³⁵ Shafter, promoted to major general of volunteers in early May, delegated the logistical management of the docks, but failed to establish a concept of reception for the thousands of troops about to arrive in Tampa.

The modern-day reception process begins with receiving inbound units at transportation nodes and transitioning them to the next station. This process includes welcoming and providing guidance upon arrival,



Charles F. Humphrey, shown here as a major general, c. 1907

unloading equipment, marshalling troops into assigned areas, and providing sustenance and shelter for a temporary stay within the base.³⁶ This orderly process coordinates incoming personnel and equipment while managing the flow of transitioning units. Tampa had no plan in place to manage this process effectively.

For 6 weeks the Regular army had been assembled at Tampa, enjoying a scene rather curiously combining aspects of a professional men's reunion, a county fair, and, as the volunteer regiments began to arrive to augment the force, a major disaster.³⁷

Planners had given very little thought to Tampa's limited capabilities to transport and house men and materiel. The War Department continued to push troops and supplies into the area without assigning a commander to organize this complicated logistics effort. Additionally, Shafter did not assign a leader to coordinate the process from reception to embarkation.³⁸ The result was general confusion for arriving troops. As one reporter wrote,

The United States troops who arrive in Tampa . . . are dumped

out on a railway siding like so many emigrants. No staff officer prepares anything in advance for them. Regiments go off in any direction that suits them, looking for the nearest place where they may cook their pork and beans.³⁹

Pvt. Charles Post of the 71st New York Volunteer Infantry arrived by train at nearby Ybor City, where he proceeded to walk three miles to the Tampa camp in the Florida heat. After his regiment suffered numerous heat stroke casualties on its march, the men settled in a wide-open area and dug latrines near the camp.⁴⁰ The intended plan was for units to arrive and report to the headquarters in the Tampa Bay Hotel and receive their billeting locations.⁴¹ However, General Shafter and his command gave few instructions to units upon arrival.

When Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt, with the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, reached Tampa, he described the conditions as "a perfect welter of confusion." When the train arrived and disembarked the soldiers, there was no central authority to receive his "Rough Riders," no guidance on where to camp, and no food for the first twenty-four hours. The future president stated that, "everything

connected with both military and railroad matters was in an almost inextricable tangle."⁴² Roosevelt's commander, Col. Leonard Wood, was in total agreement when he stated,


Confusion, confusion, confusion. War! Why it is an advertisement to foreigners of our absolutely unprepared condition. We are dumped into a grove of short stumpy ground in the dark and our animals on an adjoining place filled with 2100 loose animals.⁴³

Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler arrived in Tampa on 13 May to assume command of the cavalry division in V Corps. After reporting to Maj. Gen. James Wade, Wheeler received no instructions for three days while waiting for orders from the command.⁴⁴

The War Department failed to plan for supply requirements as troops arrived in Tampa. Many of the units required four days of travel from their mobilization camps, but the supply system provided only two days of rations. The lucky ones received food from local residents and churches on arrival in the region.⁴⁵ The incoming troops found limited camping grounds and an insufficient water supply.⁴⁶ Three to five regiments arrived in



Staff of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry in Tampa, c. 1898. From left: Taylor MacDonald, Maj. Alexander Oswald Brodie, General Wheeler, unidentified officer, Colonel Wood, and Colonel Roosevelt



General Wade



Tampa every day. By 25 May, the expanding soldier population of now 17,000 troops began to overcrowd the Florida port. Due to increased congestion and lack of facilities, Shafter made the decision to open up additional camps in Lakeland and Jacksonville to alleviate the burden on the Tampa infrastructure.⁴⁷ The reception process was a failure due to the lack of unity of command and because no one was in charge to synchronize unit arrivals with land allocation, supplies, or leadership. There was never any plan to support this influx of personnel, and there was no published timeline of unit arrivals. However, as bad as the troop reception was, the receiving of equipment was worse.

In accordance with the time-honored Army tradition of “hurry up and wait,” the incoming soldiers’ rush to Tampa was followed by weeks of waiting. Meanwhile, quartermaster and commissary officers worked on the chaotic tasks of organizing the thousands of tons of arriving supplies.⁴⁸ The two main issues faced were the lack of railroad infrastructure and the privatized commercial transportation options, which were monopolized by Henry Plant. There were only two railroad lines leading to the City of

Tampa. From there, one line proceeded nine miles to the Port of Tampa. Plant independently operated this line and refused to allow other rail companies to use it.⁴⁹ Complicating matters, Plant ran sightseeing trains on his line to allow citizens the opportunity to observe the military activities. He also allowed train and boat services to continue in the harbor.⁵⁰ The backlog these two factors

created was tremendous as equipment relentlessly poured into the small town.

By 18 May, there were more than 1,000 freight cars ready to be unloaded with a processing rate of only three per day. Trains were waiting as far north as Columbia, South Carolina, due to the backlogs. Train cars that did make it to Tampa remained loaded because of the lack of warehousing






Soldiers of the 71st New York Volunteer Infantry wait with their gear at the port of Tampa.

and on site transportation.⁵¹ Only five government wagons and twelve hired civilian wagons were on hand to facilitate loading and unloading.⁵² Incoming railroad companies feuded with both the government and Plant. The local developer refused to let competitors use his rail line and ordered his employees to transfer freight solely with Plant equipment. This only stopped when the Army threatened to take over the Plant

line.⁵³ The War Department shipped supplies with such haste that it neglected to label the railroad cars and in some instances, the bills of lading were weeks behind and each container had to be hand inspected.

Units attempting to find the equipment they had shipped often took whatever supplies they came across first, leading to further confusion.⁵⁴ With very limited warehousing, the troops unloaded

the cars slowly to preserve precious storage space, but failed to organize the cargo with any semblance of logic.⁵⁵ The reception process was a total failure and backlogs mounted. The loading parties could not keep up with the influx of equipment, delaying the expedition's readiness to sail. In contrast, Shafter required his expeditionary force staged and ready to react to a short-notice order to deploy to Cuba.



Horses corralled near Tampa waiting for shipment to Cuba

STAGING PROCESS

The staging process organizes personnel and supplies into combat formations, ready to deploy as a cohesive fighting force. It joins soldiers to their equipment, and places them in arranged locations to deploy, in accordance with a planned timeline and provides logistics support for units flowing through.⁵⁶ The conditions established at Tampa failed to lay the groundwork for successful staging operations.

The water supply was short; machinery broke down; siege guns had to be carried bodily for miles; supply trains were stalled; mules and horses that should have arrived had been left behind in some unknown locality; troops coming in from a dozen different camps in a dozen different stages of unpreparedness—such were the few of the tangles, drawbacks and difficulties that had to be met, unraveled, and conquered before the great transport fleet could get on her way.⁵⁷

Yet, in anticipation of the Navy destroying the Spanish fleet, the War Department expected the expeditionary force to load transports at a moment's notice and move quickly to Cuba. The expedition simply was not ready to embark due to the lack of preparations.

Providing logistical support to incoming units was problematic. The lack of water and sanitary facilities forced units to encamp in small towns several miles from Tampa. The small post office could not identify packages destined for staged soldiers due to the lack of mailing labels. Units received supply and organizational equipment in an untimely manner or not at all, and materiel shortages contributed to insufficient and incomplete training.⁵⁸ Animals, including cavalry horses and mules to haul wagons, required more fodder than was available.⁵⁹ Ammunition was not in adequate supply and the War Department could not accurately predict when sufficient quantities would arrive.⁶⁰

The artillery force faced a unique problem with its field pieces, a condition that lasted through arrival in Santiago. Manufacturers shipped artillery components piecemeal in separate freight cars from different factories. Artillery batteries had to seek out separate shipments of caissons, carriages, field pieces, and ammunition to assemble and ready their guns.⁶¹ Many components remained on unidentified boxcars twenty-five miles outside of Tampa through the end of May.⁶² The original plans had called for transitioning the artillery batteries to a war footing and creating larger six-gun batteries, but the supply issues were overwhelming.⁶³

The preparation of the transports was the final staging action necessary. When the United States declared war, the Army owned no shipping vessels. It managed to obtain four by the end of April and thirty by the end

of May; however, none possessed the proper ventilation systems or facilities necessary for transporting large numbers of men. The government purchased these ships from privatized freightliners in the Gulf of Mexico.⁶⁴ The War Department invested a huge amount of manpower and resources to turn these freighters into troopships with bunks, water storage tanks, and proper ventilation.⁶⁵ In total, the War Department purchased thirty-nine vessels at a cost of \$7 million, a sum not included in the allocated “Fifty Million Bill.” When completed, the transports could sail for thirty straight hours but only provided minimal comfort for the troops.⁶⁶ The men would have to take turns sleeping on bunks, and, in the worst case for one vessel, engineers only had enough room to install twelve toilets for a compliment of 1,200 soldiers.⁶⁷ Workers converted the *Miami* and



Sketch by William Glackens showing soldiers in their berths and bathing aboard a transport bound for Cuba, c. 1898



Troops of the 3d Nebraska Volunteer Infantry march along Pablo Beach near Jacksonville, Florida, c. 1898.

San Marcos from a cattle boat and a freighter, respectively, into transport ships. However, as one soldier from the 6th Infantry Regiment stated, “It was a misnomer to call these ships transports.”⁶⁸ The quartermaster general originally estimated the new transport fleet’s overall carrying capacity at 25,000 soldiers, but this was quickly lowered to 17,000 due to space limitations.⁶⁹

Most soldiers spent much of May in the hot Florida sun focused on preparing for war and entertaining themselves. General Miles issued orders on 30 May for officers to “labor diligently and zealously to perfect himself and his subordinates in military drill, instruction, [and] discipline.”⁷⁰ Soldiers considered drill commonplace during staging, but the commanders wanted additional training. New volunteers with little to no combat experience arrived daily along with officers and noncommissioned officers largely unfamiliar with conducting training. In the 28 May edition of *Harpers Weekly*, correspondent Poultney Bigelow pointed out that units were training, but “the senior commanders had never seen their commands.”⁷¹ The oppressive heat shortened many drills due to soldier exhaustion, with the lack of water compounding the misery. Units completed drills early in the mornings and late evenings in order to avoid the heat. In addition, the limited space to

maneuver supported only small-scale training exercises.⁷² Shafter considered this a liability and even contemplated moving a portion of the command northeast to Jacksonville, but the force never relocated and drills continued in the limited training space.⁷³

Like the quartermasters, the commissary supply system was also inadequate at Tampa. The embarkation point experienced problems such as receiving rotten meat from the food contractors. Even when arriving on refrigerated train cars, soldiers opened food shipments that were often spoiled. The Department of Agriculture investigated and could find no evidence of tampering or wrongdoing.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, unloading parties wore handkerchiefs around their faces as they transferred the putrid meat into ditches for quick burial. The troops dubbed the shipments “Alger’s Embalmed Beef” to assign blame to the secretary of war and his perceived lack of support for the Tampa expedition.⁷⁵ The soldiers received their main supply of food from rations, which arrived via the Subsistence Department’s short notice purchases. Depot commissaries purchased and shipped sixty days of supply to Tampa, and Regular Army units en route to the embarkation point received thirty days of rations. This system, once it caught up to the number of soldiers in Florida, eventually stockpiled a ninety-day supply at Tampa for 70,000 men.⁷⁶

The spoiled meat issue added to the overall concerns of the poor health of the camp. While there were no deaths in Tampa, there was a constant threat of dysentery and one outbreak of typhoid fever. The overcrowding, lack of supplies, animal waste, kitchen refuse, and rotten meat contributed to unsanitary conditions. However, the short stay in Tampa, compared to other camps, prevented unnecessary deaths from disease. The chief surgeon of the 5th Cavalry Division reported to General Wheeler the satisfactory Tampa camp conditions and health of the troops, with each unit possessing three to four weeks of medical supplies.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, hundreds of soldiers died at various camps across the United States, including 425 who perished at Camp Thomas, Tennessee.⁷⁸

Most of the volunteer units arrived without proper equipment. Planners designed supply stations at Tampa to equip newly enlisted soldiers with the needed gear during staging. However, lack of warehousing facilities coupled with shipping backlogs prevented an adequate on-hand supply. The availability of equipment determined distribution. At the quartermaster warehouse, a supply sergeant would guess the sizes of each soldier for uniforms, shoes, and hats. If incorrect, the exchange process could take as many as three days.⁷⁹ The 28 May edition of *Harpers Weekly* mused that

Congress declared war thirty days ago but,

not one regiment is yet equipped with uniforms suitable for hot weather. The Cuban Patriots and cigar-makers look happy in their big Panama hats and loose linen trousers, but the U.S. troops sit day and night in their cowhide boots, thick flannel shirts, and winter trousers.⁸⁰

Most soldiers received only one set of clothing to replace their cold weather uniforms. The weapons situation was even more abysmal, with the depot commander refusing weapons requisitions for the units until they arrived at camp.⁸¹ This delay further exacerbated the supply problem.


The problems of inadequate supply and poor training led to an inordinate amount of idle time for the troops. Naturally, soldiers found plenty to do in Tampa to keep busy. Unfortunately, this also meant violating the second part of Miles' orders to "maintain the highest character, to foster and stimulate that truly soldierly spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize an effective army."⁸² Officers issued passes for the men to explore the local area, and the enlisted soldiers took advantage of this privilege. Some chose to walk peacefully around the Tampa Bay Hotel or visit the nearby towns. Others found ways to get into trouble, like Pvt. Frank Brito, who discovered an opium den in Ybor City.⁸³ Unscrupulous entrepreneurs took advantage of the young population, as "there were plenty of locations for alcohol, good times, gambling, and prostitution."⁸⁴ A private with less than one month's service received \$10.35 in pay and could find plenty of ways to enjoy his paycheck. One night, Pvt. Charles Post assisted in retrieving unruly troops from Tampa; he observed hundreds of detained soldiers from his 1st Infantry Regiment.⁸⁵

The waiting in Tampa continued through the last week of May. While the enlisted men occupied their time in the towns, the officers lounged in the Tampa Bay Hotel, reuniting and

sharing war stories with old colleagues.⁸⁶ Colonel Roosevelt noted general officers milling about the hotel with their staffs, women in pretty dresses, newspaper correspondents, and foreign onlookers from Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and Japan.⁸⁷ Other notables seen around the hotel were Clara Barton, founder of the Red Cross; evangelist Ira Sankey; the adviser to the Cuban rebels, Capt. Andrew Rowan; Kaiser Wilhelm II's observer, Count Gustav Adolf von Goetzen; and Roosevelt's wife, Edith Carow Roosevelt.⁸⁸ Maj. Gen. Shafter set up his headquarters in the hotel and continued to wait for word of the Spanish fleet's destruction as the days ticked by.

ONWARD MOVEMENT PROCESS

Onward movement is the forward progress of units transitioning from staging areas to follow-on destinations and applies to personnel and equipment.⁸⁹ In Tampa, the changing nature of the strategic situation prevented Shafter from understanding how best to achieve the original goals of the McKinley administration, much less onward movement. While Shafter continued through all of May to prepare for a quick mission to provide moral and physical support



Military History Institute

Colonel Miley

to insurgents, the guidance from the president suddenly changed.

Lt. Col. John Miley, the aide-de-camp to Shafter, stated that on 26 May, the general received an order via telegram to prepare 25,000 soldiers for departure from Tampa. The War Department had issued the warning of a changing mission: the expeditionary force would now directly engage Spanish soldiers,



Library of Congress

U.S. troops arrive aboard railcars in Tampa, c. 1898.

but Shafter had no definitive details with which to plan.⁹⁰ The following day, correspondence from Secretary of the Navy John Long shed some light on matters by emphasizing the Navy Department's urgent pleas to mobilize soldiers to invade Cuba.⁹¹ Finally, on 30 May, General Miles issued orders to Shafter clarifying the exact mission of the expedition:

Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing the harbor and fleet. . . . Have your command embark as rapidly as possible and telegraph when your expedition will be ready to sail.⁹²

This order expedited Shafter's tempo of operations in loading supplies on the transports.

The force made all efforts to load the ships from 30 May through 6 June. Working well into the night, troops traveled forward from outlying camps. Supplies from warehouses in Tampa started movement toward the port, further congesting the single-track line. On 31 May, deck hands filled coal and water on the ships, and men began loading rations. The new orders called for 25,000 men to be supported for six months. This directive was subsequently lowered to two months along with an additional 100,000 rations scattered throughout the ships in




Supplies being loaded aboard ships at the port of Tampa, c. 1898

the event of separation. The work of loading artillery wagons, guns, and caissons began on 1 June. Artillerymen now sensed the urgency of finding disparate components and linking them to form complete gun systems. The men spent considerable time consolidating commissary rations that shipped in separate railcars.⁹³ The single-track line created and exacerbated delays in moving materiel to the port.

Simultaneous activities at the harbor caused a bottleneck. Once

equipment finally arrived at the dock, contracted stevedores became the driving force to load the ships. This was no easy task, as the goal was to maintain unit integrity with equipment as they assigned units to vessels. With limited berths, the ships continuously rotated within the narrow port to align with arriving railroad shipments, which caused further delays.⁹⁴ The stevedores mostly loaded equipment from the railcars by hand across fifty feet of sandy terrain and then up steep ramps to the vessels. Once their shifts were over, many of these men fell asleep on the spot where they last stopped working due to exhaustion.⁹⁵ All these difficulties notwithstanding, the contractors loaded over 10,000,000 pounds of materiel. The ration trains moved from one ship to the next to unload their cargoes before attempting to exit the single lane track. Soldiers assembled each artillery piece on the docks prior to loading. This practice ensured that the breech mechanisms, fuses, projectiles, and guns were present and facilitated the final and complete assembly of each gun. To add to the confusion, Plant kept the rail line open for civilian sightseers.⁹⁶ Congestion had reached its peak.



Two trains stopped on a trestle near the port of Tampa, c. 1898



Troops prepare to board transport ships at the port of Tampa, 1898.

Under continuous pressure from Secretary Alger to maintain the pace and load the ships, Shafter relayed in his message on 4 June that he had encountered unforeseen delays due to units arriving late, track congestion, and a lack of facilities. He expressed his frustration at the small throughput capacity in Tampa and reaffirmed his efforts

to sail as “early as practical.”⁹⁷ Finally, the stevedores completed loading equipment at 1100 on 6 June and Shafter ordered that soldier embarkation begin at 1200.⁹⁸

Both Colonel Humphrey and his assistant, Captain McKay, recalled the loading of the ships as a smooth, coordinated process. Humphrey claimed that it was “carried on

speedily and systematically, and continued to completion without regard to hours or fatigue.”⁹⁹ McKay also recollected the process as orderly and proceeding with no issues.¹⁰⁰ However, soldiers’ accounts of the process were vastly different from those in charge at the port. The plan called for an orderly procession of units called forward. Trains were to arrive with troops and baggage together, and soldiers would report to Humphrey for their assigned ship. This process would maintain unit integrity and place the assigned units on the proper ships in accordance with manifests.¹⁰¹ In reality, however, the loading operation was much different. While the initial movement began in an orderly manner, it quickly deteriorated.

Soldiers initiated movement throughout the night of 6 June. Shafter reported his hopes to sail by 8 June.¹⁰² On the night of 7 June, Shafter received a telegram that the Navy had engaged the forts of Santiago and


If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.¹⁰³



U.S. soldiers in Tampa await the order to board their assigned ships before sailing for Cuba, June 1898.




Members of the 71st New York Volunteer Infantry gather on the dock in Tampa before sailing for Cuba, June 1898.



Military History Institute

Paul Malone, pictured here as a brigadier general, c. 1918



Library of Congress

Colonel Roosevelt's "Rough Riders" arrive at the port of Tampa in June 1898.

With that telegram, Shafter's staff notified the regimental commanders that those units not on ships by morning would remain behind. This order set off a frenzied rush to the ports. The headquarters staff evacuated the Tampa Bay Hotel to its train and found the rail lines congested and immobile.¹⁰⁴

British war correspondent John Atkins heard the frantic order that "Those who are not aboard by daybreak will be left behind. Leave your tents standing." He noted the contrast between the long wait in Tampa and the frenzied rush to the docks. Many units abandoned wagons and equipment that were never loaded.¹⁰⁵ In the rush, units competed with one another by stealing the abandoned wagons, commandeering train cars, and even hijacking trains.¹⁰⁶ One account from 2d Lt. Paul Malone of the 13th U.S. Infantry recounts his unit finding cattle cars with an attached train engine. After finding and rousting the train engineer, they traveled to the port.¹⁰⁷

The 9th Infantry seized abandoned wagons and unoccupied freight trains. They interpreted the order as "you fight in Cuba only if you can get to the port and find a ship."¹⁰⁸

A soldier with the 71st New York Volunteer Infantry noted "that no one knew what boat you were going on, what time the boats would come to the pier, or anything else which a little system and some management might have provided."¹⁰⁹

Perhaps the most famous story came from Colonel Roosevelt when he described the eventful night as a "scramble." The Rough Riders followed Shafter's orders to proceed to the train station at midnight. When no train came for six hours, they seized an engine and some coal cars and backed down the track. Upon arrival to the port, the train dropped them off and the unit sought out Colonel Humphrey for vessel assignment.¹¹⁰ When they finally found him, Humphrey haphazardly assigned them to the *Yucatan*, previously allocated to the 2d Infantry Division, V Corps and the 71st New York. Roosevelt rushed his men on board faster than the other units and was confronted by Capt. Anthony Bleecker of the 71st New York.¹¹¹ When asked to surrender the ship, Roosevelt reportedly replied, "Since we have the ship, I think we'll keep it—much as I would like to oblige you."¹¹² The 71st spent the next two nights without a vessel, but Humphrey eventually assigned the unit to the *Valencia*, a

newer and more comfortable ship.¹¹³ War correspondent George Musgrave noted,

With the capacity of each transport, and the roster of each regiment before him, the youngest officer could have made effective assignment and saved such dire confusion, which



Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society

Captain Bleecker at the Creedmoor Rifle Range, Queens, New York, 24 May 1902

took two days to untangle, and entailed much sun exposure and hardship on the soldiers.¹¹⁴

The chaos in the port was influencing the war's strategic objectives. The confusion caused delays in the timeline of departure, and the War Department felt they were missing their opportunity to win the war quickly and decisively. Shafter found out just prior to loading that there was not enough room for all of his 25,000 soldiers and their equipment.¹¹⁵ The newly converted freighters could not hold the anticipated capacity, even after exceeding the ships' original capabilities. For example, the *Cherokee* was equipped for 570 men but carried 1,040.¹¹⁶ Supplies remained on the docks in unopened freight cars. The Gatling gun detachment did not sail due to the limited space.¹¹⁷ Upon assessing the capacity of the ships, Col. Wood received orders he could only take two of his three cavalry squadrons but no horses.¹¹⁸ Not only did the lack of basing facilities slow the tempo of operations, but also the lack of supplies and horses would limit the operational reach of the expedition. All of this notwithstanding, by 1400 on 8 June, most vessels departed the dock and were in position to leave the next morning.

Many authors have written about the Army's failure to synchronize its movement in the mad dash to the port. This was a failure of command and organization. No one officer was in charge of calling forward troops or of the port's synchronization. A single leader needed to arrange actions in time, space, and purpose to facilitate the continuous movement and maintain order at the port. The lack of personnel and resources dedicated strictly to deployment management prevented a timely flow of troops and equipment. The single-track line to the Port of Tampa exacerbated the situation by the Army's reliance on the transportation provided by the Plant Company. The continuous flow of supplies to Tampa City from the rest of the country congested the rail line and disrupted the flow of resources. Logistics planners still had

not solved this problem forty days into the operation. The poor transportation infrastructure affected the tempo of the operation creating a culmination point before the expedition was underway.

In the postwar investigation, Humphrey testified that he did not know if the train congestion problem was ever unraveled. He also faulted the lack of loading order for the supplies and troops. Humphrey ordered units to load on a first-come, first-served basis, disrupting unit integrity of troops and equipment.¹¹⁹ The process in which Shafter himself telephoned or telegraphed the departing unit from Tampa on their way to the port was a reactive, unplanned process. Shafter simply failed to plan for the movement of 25,000 soldiers down a single rail line.

Once the expedition was loaded, Shafter collapsed in exhaustion aboard his ship, the *Seguranca*, around 1400 on 8 June after having been awake for forty straight hours.¹²⁰ Responding to the sudden timeline acceleration, he managed to get the bulk of his forces onto ships in a twenty-four hour period. However, an important message arrived from the secretary of war around 1400 stating, "Wait until you get further orders before you sail."¹²¹ Shafter's aide awakened the commander, who groggily stated that he would fix it in the morning. After Col. Edward McClernand awakened the general a second time to ask for compliance with the order, Shafter roused himself out of his sleep and stated, "God, I should say so," and he recalled the vessels anchored in the harbor back to the port.¹²² The cause for the delay was the sighting of a Spanish armored cruiser and torpedo-boat destroyer reported near Nicolas Channel, a straight off the northwest coast of Cuba.¹²³ Shafter immediately ensured all his ships were in the safety of the port under the watchful eye of supporting field guns and escort vessels at the bay's entrance.¹²⁴ The expeditionary force returned to its staging posture until further notice.

Shafter decided to house his men aboard the ships in their hot,

unventilated compartments to maintain readiness in preparation for the orders to depart. However, construction teams did not build sufficient living facilities onboard the ships to support more than a short journey to Cuba, and the nearest place to camp was back in Tampa, nine miles away. The units unloaded the animals and issued limited passes to the soldiers to disembark the vessels. The soldiers were required to be aboard ship no later than 2100 every night. They also had the option of bathing in the bay.¹²⁵

From Private Post's perspective, the conditions were less than ideal. The beds contained only twenty-four inches width of sleeping space. The food on his ship, the *Valencia*, consisted of corned beef with hardtack cooked on a steam pipe from the engine room. The drinking water was "sluggish fluid mixed with particles of charcoal for health's sake. It looked like muddy glycerine and tasted like bilgewater." Aboard the vessels, the men were completely without purpose. Units conducted some landing drills on empty beaches, but even these turned into an excuse to swim. Very few soldiers ventured into town for fear of missing the expedition. This kept




General Shafter observes the unloading of railcars in Tampa.



University of South Florida

The expedition flagship *Seguranca* at the pier in Tampa before departing for Cuba



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Grenville Dodge, c. 1900



Library of Congress

Edward McClernand, pictured here as a brigadier general, c. 1912

alcohol consumption to a minimum for most of the troops, an unintended benefit. The temporary hold, however, created two advantages. The long awaited medical supplies finally arrived, and stevedores loaded them aboard the ships. More importantly, the expedition was actually ready to sail at a moment's notice.¹²⁶

On 12 June, after three days of waiting, the War Department issued orders to sail the following day. This time there was no transportation nightmare in loading the ships. The logistics party refueled the ships with coal and water, hoisted the animals on board, and continued loading supplies as the ships individually departed.¹²⁷ On 13 June, two months after the first units had arrived in Tampa, the ships steamed out of the bay heading for Cuba.

After the Spanish-American War's conclusion, public criticism erupted over the lack of medical support during the conflict. The press directed its outrage at what it deemed criminal neglect in camps, hospitals, and during transit. President McKinley, sensing political pressure, appointed retired major general Grenville Dodge to chair a commission that would come to bear his name. The Dodge Commission conducted its investigation between 26 September 1898 and 9 February 1899.¹²⁸ The report produced by the commission, which included interviews with eyewitnesses and firsthand accounts, provided valuable insight into the logistical process and problems encountered at Tampa.

Conclusions from the report noted four major deficiencies related to the deployment operation. First, the Army effectively staffed the quartermaster department to support an army of peacetime proportions, not a force exceeding 25,000. Second, the congestion at Tampa was due to the lack of administrative oversight in the quartermaster and railroad sections. Third, there was a total failure of planning for ship transport capacity that decreased the fighting force by 8,000 soldiers and its ambulance carrying capability. Finally, there needed to be a division of labor between the quartermaster and transportation departments instead of both working similar issues simultaneously.¹²⁹

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD WAR I OPERATIONS

The lessons learned from the failures of this deployment impacted future operations. The Army had failed to establish adequate basing, its operational reach was hampered by logistical and transport problems, and its tempo was disrupted by a lack of command oversight on the docks, as well as by conflicting and confusing orders—all of which were detrimental to the

mobilization process. These deficiencies were corrected and the deployment process improved at debarkation points in New York City, and elsewhere, during World War I.

Base selection is critical to support contemporary deployments. The War Department chose Tampa because of its proximity to Cuba and because it met the minimum logistical requirements, including two railroad tracks entering the town, a port that could hold a small number of ships, and a projected water supply for the soldiers. Even though Tampa had met these minimum requirements, there was not enough additional planning for the needs of 25,000 incoming troops. World War I planners understood the limitations of a port like Tampa and chose the Port of New York as the embarkation facility. The port in New York was one of the largest in the world and possessed more than ample facilities—railroads, docks, housing, food and water supplies—to mobilize millions of soldiers. The port could expand as needed to meet increased requirements, unlike Tampa's inability to grow effectively.

Unity of command is a principle critical to managing throughput of basing operations. A single commander for the logistics aspect of deployment allows solitary focus on controlling and operating port deployments. This commander has the ability to adjust resources as necessary, control movements in the deployment area, and arrange support for units in transition.¹³⁰ In Tampa, there was no single commander for the deployment operation. General Shafter was responsible for the overall operation, but at no time over the forty-day period did he take control of the process to relieve the congestion. Colonel Humphrey was responsible for the staging and loading of supplies along with the arrangement of soldiers on transports once called forward. However, his responsibility was limited to the port area. Then-2d Infantry Division commander and future Brig. Gen. Arthur Wagner stated in his memoirs that the

expedition commander should have granted authority to a single officer and charged him with the loading process.¹³¹ At no time was there a single point of contact for the deployment process to task and shift resources for alleviating congestion.

The Port of New York in World War I was vastly different. Unity of command was assigned to ports, ensuring that resources could be adequately allocated. Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell commanded the New York port of embarkation and managed all movement through the port.¹³² American planners understood that “adequate and clear lines of communications were critical to organizing and sustaining large-unit operations.”¹³³ Bell used his command authority and robust staff to manage port flow. This unity of command stands in contrast to Shafter's leadership—he lacked the institutional knowledge to assign a deployment commander with a large enough staff to manage port operations.

Military planners traditionally associate the tempo of operations to combat-related activities. However, efficient and effective mobilization of units requires a steady pace and rhythm to bring soldiers into combat at their optimal performance. Tampa demonstrated tempo with varying peaks and valleys. Initially, the War Department sent 5,000 soldiers to Cuba to support the insurgency, followed by a forty-day lull while troops mustered in Florida. Shafter ordered a mad dash to the transports only to wait for three days in miserable conditions aboard hot, cramped vessels. This entire process contributed to a degraded fighting force. The deployment process at Tampa diminished combat preparedness, and the force did not arrive in Cuba in an optimal state of readiness.

The pace of deployment is maintained through the Army adage, “slow is smooth, and smooth is fast.” This momentum can be facilitated using synchronization, which manages the timing of supply in the correct order and coordinates with supporting activities “to ensure the tempo of



deployment is uninterrupted.”¹³⁴ Soldiers at the Port of New York performed synchronization activities admirably after recognizing a train congestion issue that clogged the ports. The decentralized system of railroad transportation created a backlog of railcars leading into New York.¹³⁵ However, the government established the Shipping Control Committee in February 1918, which organized a single system to coordinate the flow from unit mobilization stations to the Port of New York, to transport overseas, and finally onto the French ports. The Operations Division in Washington performed synchronization oversight coordinating with the Railroad Administration, the Port of New York, the U.S. Navy, and the British Ministry of Shipping. The detailed planning synchronized the flow of movement in direct contrast to the activities in Tampa. New York was not without its difficulties and failings, as machinery breakdowns, labor disputes, and fuel shortages often delayed sailings and disrupted the massive mobilization. However, the New York operation managed to move almost one hundred times the number of men as the Army did in Tampa, and with far fewer issues.¹³⁶

Operational reach and tempo are mutually supportive and stem from establishing proper basing at the beginning of operations. Basing establishes the operational reach for follow-on missions. Planners originally designated Tampa as a temporary port facility established for the rapid deployment of soldiers to Cuba. However, the mission evolved, and 25,000 troops mobilized and reported to Tampa without the required sustainment resources on-site. This created two single points of failure: rail capacity and sea transportation. The lack of rail capacity disrupted momentum in loading the vessels. Congestion led to confusion with assembling rations and field guns for eventual deployment. The shortage of vessels created a storage capacity problem and reduced the number of soldiers able to depart on the expedition. These shortfalls resulted in the inability to transport all combat power, leaving 8,000 soldiers and important supplies, such as ambulances and cavalry horses, on the docks. These two assets were crucial to maintaining momentum.

Unit integrity is the movement of soldiers and associated equipment together on a common platform to simplify the deployment process, leverage the chain of command, and increase training opportunities. While the intent in Tampa was to keep units together, they arrived at the ports with directions to board ships assigned to other units. The lack of understanding of vessel capacity and capability unnecessarily separated units from their equipment. Most notably, the cavalry sailed to Cuba without its horses and fought as infantrymen, and the medical soldiers sailed on different vessels than did their ambulances. In World War I, the Army solved unit integrity issues during the troop movement phase by issuing soldiers equipment in New York and having them carry it directly aboard the ships. This eliminated the task of loading gear at home station and tracking it throughout the process. Supply activities consisted of 138 warehouses with ample supply of materiel to issue transitioning soldiers.¹³⁷

Balance ensures the correct support system is in place to process deploying units, thereby extending operational reach.¹³⁸ An excess of sustainers creates confusion while a shortage creates backlogs in the system. Colonel Humphrey was not only in charge of the quartermaster department at Tampa, but assigned as the chief quartermaster of the expedition. In his testimony, Humphrey stated, "I did not see how I could perform the duties, as I was there on other business."¹³⁹ There was no dedicated staff, other than the hired stevedores, to facilitate onward movement and extend operational reach. The result was that Tampa became a port of ineffectiveness once the ships sailed. The remaining supplies, food stocks, horses, and ambulances did not rejoin the expedition. The second compounding factor was that the privatized railroad eliminated all balance from military mobilization. Without control and synchronization of the railroads, the expedition relied on the Plant Company to transport freight and passengers the final nine miles to the port, an arrangement that was detrimental to the mobilization effort.

In 1918, the Army solved these problems by dedicating support infrastructure solely to the deployment process. The Port of New York had more than 2,500 officers assigned whose mission was to facilitate the movement of forces.¹⁴⁰ The federal government mitigated rail congestion by seizing the railroad infrastructure under the National Defense Act of 1916 along with taking over the North-German Lloyd and Hamburg-American Steamship companies.¹⁴¹ Federalized control of transportation assets eliminated friction between civilian and government agencies.

CONCLUSION

The Spanish-American War required an immediate mobilization of men and equipment. The original plan of sending 5,000 troops through Tampa escalated quickly to 25,000 men as strategic objectives shifted from supporting insurgents to fighting a full-fledged war against the Spanish

in Cuba. Clausewitz states that an army "remains dependent on its sources of supply and replenishment," that bases "constitute the basis of its existence and survival," and that the "army and base must be conceived as a single whole."¹⁴² Operations in Tampa failed to connect the strategic with the tactical actions of sustainment in three areas: basing, tempo, and operational reach.

Clausewitz posits, "No one starts a war . . . without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective." This principle establishes the course of the war in "scale of means and effort" that influences an operation "down to the smallest operational detail."¹⁴³ Clausewitz argued for clear war plans, a reasoning that permeates into the logistics of supplying and transporting an army into theater to meet political objectives by linking tactical actions. He asserts that maintenance and supply are critical to sustaining an army. He contends that subsistence by means of depots is one of four ways to provide for a force, and the base of operations is critical to its survival.¹⁴⁴ This is a holistic approach to sustaining the operational reach and tempo. The flow of men and equipment to the field of battle is paramount, and "one must never forget that it is among those that take the time to produce a decisive effect."¹⁴⁵ Clausewitz understood the importance of sustainment as laying the foundation for the political and military end state.

The failure to link strategic and tactical goals, the changing guidance from the War Department, and insufficient resources to maintain deployment momentum created unnecessary disruptions to operational capabilities. By 1918, the evolution of planning and executing mobilizations saw great gains in synchronizing and integrating unit flow from home station to France. This was due to having a single commander in New York and supporting forces with the sole mission of deploying units through the port. The War Department learned to oversee holistic transportation plans

through rail, port, and sea, resulting in massive numbers of soldiers, along with all supporting materiel, being successfully moved around the country and deployed overseas.¹⁴⁶

The movement of troops and equipment from countless locations within the country to a central port of embarkation was required for follow-on movement to the war zone. New York City was the primary hub for overseas transit to France. Created in 1917, the Embarkation Service was the central organization tasked with overseeing all ports of departure in the United States. The New York port of embarkation employed 2,500 officers working in various roles at piers, staging camps, and hospitals. New York Harbor and its supports deployed 1,798,000 soldiers by the war's end—with a peak of 51,000 troops dispatched overseas in one day—which exceeded all previous single-port records.¹⁴⁷

Commanded by General Bell, the New York Port of Embarkation controlled movement operations as

a single system, flowing a total of 5,130,000 tons of equipment through Armistice Day.¹⁴⁸ In comparison to deployment operations in Tampa, the ports of New York were a model of efficiency and control during World War I.



AUTHOR'S NOTE

The author would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Ricardo Herrera, who was instrumental during the writing process and encouraged the author to submit this article for publication.

NOTES

1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 discusses ten elements of operational art. Basing, tempo, and operational reach are all critical to pursuing “strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”

ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012), pp. 4-1-4-3.

2. Field Manual (FM) 3-35 states that reception, staging, onward movement, and integration “is designed to rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the combatant commander.” Moreover, four principles underpin the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process: unity of command, synchronization, unit integrity, and balance. FM 3-35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010), pp. 4-1-4-2.

3. Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit: A Study of Our War with Spain* (Boston, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1931), pp. 1-31. See John Lawrence Tone, *War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008) on the Spanish policy of reconcentration and prosecution of the war against Cuban insurgents.

4. G. J. A. O'Toole, *The Spanish American War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), p. 20.

5. O'Toole, *The Spanish American War*, pp. 20-21.




Charles Johnson Post, *Embarking for Cuba, Port Tampa, Florida, June 1898*

6. Millis, *The Martial Spirit*, pp. 116–17.
7. John M. Thurston, “Senate Speech March 24, 1898,” in *Patriotic Eloquence Relating to the Spanish-American War and Its Issues*, ed. Robert Fulton and Thomas Trueblood (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), pp. 304–08.
8. Richard Titherington, *A History of the Spanish American War of 1898* (New York: D. Appleton, 1900), p. 105.
9. Frank Freidel, *The Splendid Little War* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 38.
10. A. C. M. Azoy, *CHARGE! The Story of the Battle of San Juan Hill* (New York: Longman’s, Green and Company, 1961), p. 38.
11. Freidel, *The Splendid Little War*, p. 60.
12. Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 187.
13. Edward J. McClelland, “The Santiago Campaign,” in *The Santiago Campaign*, ed. Joseph T. Dickman (Richmond, Va.: Williams Printing Company, 1927), p. 3.
14. Kenneth E. Hendrickson, *The Spanish-American War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2003), p. 10.
15. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 187.
16. Russell A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), p. 65.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
18. FM 3–35 states reception, staging, and onward movement are designed “to rapidly combine and integrate arriving elements of personnel, equipment, and materiel into combat power that can be employed by the combatant commander.” FM 3–35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, p. 4-1.
19. ADRP 3–0 defines tempo as “the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.” ADRP 3–0, *Unified Land Operations*, pp. 4–7.
20. ADRP 3–0 defines operational reach as “the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.” This element of operational art relates to the ability to “create, protect, and sustain a force. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
21. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 343–44.
22. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 126.
23. Hendrickson, *The Spanish-American War*, p. 28.
24. Herbert H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1907), p. 108.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
27. *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 9.
28. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 194.
29. Wayne H. Morgan, *America’s Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion* (1965; repr., New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 71.
30. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 194.
31. James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997), p. 280.
32. John D. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899), pp. 1–4.
33. Huston, *The Sinews of War*, p. 280.
34. *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department with Spain*, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, S. Doc. 221, vol. 7, p. 3638.
35. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, pp. 9–10.
36. FM 3–35 defines the reception process as “unloading personnel and equipment from strategic transport assets, managing port marshalling areas, transporting personnel, equipment, and materiel to staging areas, and providing logistics support services to units transiting the port of debarkation.” FM 3–35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, p. 4-1.
37. Millis, *The Martial Spirit*, p. 241.
38. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 195.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 170–71.
40. Charles Johnson Post, *The Little War of Private Post* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 68–69.
41. Dale L. Walker, *The Boys of ‘98: Theodore Roosevelt and the Rough Riders* (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 1998), p. 143.
42. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (1899; repr., Williamstown, Mass.: Corner House, 1979), pp. 53–54.
43. David F. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 184.
44. Joseph Wheeler, *The Santiago Campaign 1898* (Boston, Mass.: Rockwell and Church, 1898), pp. 5–6.
45. Charles H. Brown, *Correspondents’ War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), p. 212.
46. Miley, *In Cuba with Shafter*, p. 11.
47. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, pp. 130–31.
48. Huston, *The Sinews of War*, p. 280.
49. Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, p. 65.
50. Freidel, *The Splendid Little War*, p. 60.
51. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 195.
52. Huston, *The Sinews of War*, p. 281.
53. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, p. 195.
54. David Rutenberg and Jane Allen, eds., *The Logistics of Waging War: American Logistics 1774–1985, Emphasizing the Development of Airpower* (Gunter Air Force Station, Ala.: Air Force Logistics Management Center, 1985), p. 49.
55. Huston, *The Sinews of War*, p. 281.
56. FM 3–35 defines the staging process as “organizing personnel, equipment, and basic loads into movement units; preparing the units for onward movement; and providing logistics support for units transiting the staging area.” FM 3–35, *Army Deployment and Redeployment*, p. 4-1.
57. Thomas J. Vivian, *The Fall of Santiago* (New York: R. F. Fenno, 1898), p. 74.
58. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, pp. 112–23.
59. Morgan, *America’s Road to Empire*, p. 70.
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BOOKREVIEWS

Manassas: A Battlefield Guide



By Ethan S. Rafuse
University of Nebraska Press, 2014
Pp. xvii, 253. \$21.95

Review by Nathan A. Marzoli

Although a visit to a historic battlefield can be exciting for the student, enthusiast, or casual tourist, it can also prove daunting and overwhelming. Altered landscapes and even imposing modern roads and structures may complicate the modern study of an already confusing Civil War battle; hence the introduction of numerous “guides,” pioneered by historians Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson in the *U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles* nearly thirty years ago, to assist visitors to the ever popular American Civil War battlefields. Ethan S. Rafuse, a professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, is no stranger to this genre. He has led countless staff rides and tours of historic battlefields for both military and civilian groups, and is the author of the acclaimed *Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide* (University of Nebraska Press, 2008). Rafuse has built upon the success of his Antietam battlefield guide with a new volume in the series about the battles of

First and Second Manassas (Bull Run). In *Manassas: A Battlefield Guide*, Rafuse provides visitors with a clear, concise, and user-friendly book that covers the sites associated with both battles.

Rafuse designed this guide to make users entirely self-sufficient, enabling all visitors and students of the battle to “simply pick up [the book] and immediately head out to the field for the main tour” (xiii). Therefore, the reader does not require any assistance from outside sources when visiting the battlefield. The main tour is divided chronologically into fourteen major stops, allowing the reader to potentially investigate both battles in one day. Each stop is designed to last approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes, for an estimated total completion time of eight hours.

Each stop and substop are broken down into five categories: Directions, Orientation, What Happened, Analysis, and Vignette. These categories are self-explanatory, and are simple yet effective ways to comprehend the events at each stop on the tour. This reviewer personally took *Manassas: A Battlefield Guide* to the field, and can attest to its accuracy, simplicity, ease of use, and effectiveness. The Directions and Orientation sections for each stop are clear and easy to follow, while the accompanying maps provide even the serious enthusiast with a satisfying number of detailed troop positions. Each stop’s description of events is succinct, yet still contains the necessary amount of information, while the analysis and vignette for each stop also provide insightful facts. Perhaps the biggest strength of Rafuse’s book is that the text in all sections is not as lengthy as that in comparable books, such as the *U.S. Army War College Guides to Civil War Battles* or the field guides for Gettysburg and Antietam written by Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler. This is a strong attribute, because most visitors

to Civil War battlefields are there to appreciate the terrain over which the fighting took place, rather than to spend the entire time studying a book.

Another benefit of this compact guide is that the user can utilize as much or as little of the information as they would like on their tour of the battlefield. The completion of the tour of both sites in the minimum eight hours only scratches the surface of the amount of information provided by Rafuse’s guide; the author also gives the option of exploring longer substops, such as an exploration of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s position on Henry Hill at First Manassas, or the entirety of his line along the Unfinished Railroad at Second Manassas a year later. Rafuse has also indicated the presence of longer hiking trails at each stop that the visitor may wish to utilize for recreation.

The battles at Manassas were also the culminations of more extensive campaigns, and therefore offer a great deal of study outside the traditional battleground owned by the National Park Service. To cover this, Rafuse has included both a First and Second Manassas Campaign Excursion. The First Manassas excursion covers the federal advance and the Battle of Blackburn’s Ford on 18 July 1861, while the Second Manassas excursion includes stops related to the Battles of Cedar Mountain, Kettle Run, Thoroughfare Gap, and Chantilly, as well as the movements that both armies took to their meeting at Manassas. Although this excursion covers a vast geographical area, serious students of the Second Manassas Campaign will appreciate the added information.


Overall, Rafuse has written an excellent battlefield guide for the study of the two Manassas campaigns. The book successfully balances the delicate line of clarity and simplicity for the general public, while also including

detailed information for the expert. Paired with the National Park Service's existing interpretations at the battle sites, *Manassas: A Battlefield Guide* is a must-have companion for serious students of the Civil War and casual battlefield tourists alike.

Nathan A. Marzoli is a historian in the Force Structure and Unit History Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. A U.S. Air Force veteran, he completed a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in history and museum studies at the University of New Hampshire. Marzoli's primary researching and writing interests focus on his home state of New Hampshire and the Civil War, as well as public history. He is the author of "'Their Loss Was Necessarily Severe': The 12th New Hampshire at Chancellorsville," which appeared in the Fall 2016 issue of *Army History*.



Appomattox: Victory, Defeat, and Freedom at the End of the Civil War



By Elizabeth R. Varon
Oxford University Press, 2014
Pp. x, 305. \$27.95

Review by Gregory J. W. Urwin

On Palm Sunday, 9 April 1865, General Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Although more than a century and a half has passed, the name of the isolated rural village

where those two great commanders came face-to-face—Appomattox Court House, Virginia—still serves as a synonym for the collapse of the Confederacy and the close of the American Civil War. The official visitor's guide for the modern town of Appomattox advertises it as the spot "Where Our Nation Reunited." That slogan reflects the conventional wisdom that the magnanimous peace terms Grant offered Lee's men enabled them, beaten but unbowed, to accept defeat with good grace and retake their proper place as citizens of the United States. In *Appomattox: Victory, Defeat, and Freedom at the End of the Civil War*, however, Elizabeth R. Varon, the Langbourne M. Williams Professor of American History at the University of Virginia, presents a much more complicated picture of what occurred when Grant met Lee, as well as how millions of Americans—who remained very much divided in their minds and hearts—perceived that event.

Varon's Appomattox aspires to be two books in one. It opens as a military history, with three chapters devoted to the Appomattox Campaign. The author provides a concise account of Lee's furtive attempt to abandon his lines around Petersburg and Richmond and slip south—only to come to grief in six days under the pounding of his relentless Union pursuers. The book's remaining six chapters belong to the genre of "history and memory," with Varon wrestling with what Appomattox signified to the Civil War generation and their progeny.

Varon is not a trained military historian, and she stumbles repeatedly in describing the final clashes between Grant's legions and their fleeing prey. It is clear that she did not research this side of her story sufficiently to understand the organization of Civil War armies, their rank structures, and how they operated. For example, one of Varon's chief supporting players is Maj. Gen. George Armstrong Custer, and she gets his age wrong, puts him in charge of a brigade rather than the Army of the Potomac's 3d Cavalry Division, and has him wearing the same field uniform he

discarded soon after he ascended to division command nearly half a year prior to Appomattox. Similar errors crop up throughout Varon's text. More importantly, her account of the crushing Confederate defeat at Sayler's Creek on 6 April 1865 consists of a series of disconnected vignettes.

Varon finds herself on firmer ground when she addresses the symbolic importance of Appomattox. With vivid prose and skillfully marshaled evidence, she proceeds to deconstruct the long-cherished and simplistic myths that wrap Appomattox in the comforting mist of reconciliation. In truth, the significance of what happened at Appomattox would be contested by the two leading protagonists, the men they commanded, and the rest of the American population.

Both Grant and Lee thought they occupied the moral high ground when they signed the surrender articles inside Wilmer McLean's parlor. For Grant, his triumph meant the end of an unjustified rebellion and slavery, the vindication of majority rule, and the repudiation of the North's pro-Confederate Copperheads. Lee tried to turn Appomattox into a moral victory by issuing a farewell address to his troops that asserted they had not lost a fair fight but had been swamped by insurmountable odds. Varon goes so far as to imply that Lee deliberately minimized the size of his army to support this overwhelming numbers myth. Grant intended his decision to allow Lee's troops to return home on parole with their horses and mules as a noble gesture that would discredit Confederate ideology and establish the North's moral authority. Unwilling to concede that the "Lost Cause" was a bad one, Lee viewed Grant's generous terms as necessary concessions to convince Confederates to lay down their arms.

As news of Lee's surrender spread, different constituencies across the United States attached their own meanings to Appomattox. Grant's soldiers saw the surrender as an appropriate culmination of their battlefield courage and the righteousness of their cause. Members of the U.S. Colored Troops

who helped bring Lee to bay hoped that their efforts would pave the way to racial equality—a dream shared by abolitionists and black civilians. President Abraham Lincoln thought Lee’s surrender would facilitate the quick introduction of Reconstruction, but he also expressed his support for black suffrage. Moderate Republicans celebrated Appomattox for preserving the Union, while expressing markedly less enthusiasm for emancipation.


Confederate soldiers and civilians reacted to Appomattox with shock, humiliation, and bitterness. They seized on the overwhelming numbers myth to argue that their armies had achieved a glorious defeat. They hoped that Grant’s conciliatory posture heralded the inauguration of a soft peace—one that would leave white supremacy intact throughout the South. Ex-Confederates also revealed a propensity for resorting to force to keep black Southerners in subordination. At the same time, Lee played a disingenuous game, speaking to his followers in code as he denigrated Grant’s victory and encouraged resistance to the imposition of a new social order on the South.

Varon concludes her study by tracing the contested meaning of Appomattox into the twenty-first century, but her analysis suffers from a major omission. She neglects to explain why the veterans of the Army of the Potomac made Gettysburg their chief memorial, strewing that battlefield with numerous regimental monuments, while leaving Appomattox unmarked. Gettysburg may have been the biggest and bloodiest battle ever waged on American soil, but it turned out to be somewhat indecisive. Appomattox, on the other hand, resulted in the destruction of the Confederacy’s largest and best field army. Could it be that Lee’s view of Appomattox infected the minds of his opponents and they came to see Gettysburg as a victory worthier of celebration? By ignoring that question, Varon has left other historians the opportunity to complete a full exploration of Appomattox’s significance.

Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin is a professor of history at Temple University, a past president of the Society for Military History, and author of several works on the U.S. Civil War, including *Custer Victorious: The Civil War Battles of General George Armstrong Custer* (Lincoln, Neb., 1990). He is now at work on a social history of the 1781 British invasions of Virginia.



Work for Giants: The Campaign and Battle of Tupelo/Harrisburg, Mississippi, June–July 1864



By Thomas E. Parson
Kent State University Press, 2014
Pp. xix, 362. \$34.95

Review by Harold Allen Skinner Jr.

In *Work for Giants: The Campaign and Battle of Tupelo/Harrisburg, Mississippi, June–July 1864*, author Thomas Parson delivers a superb, albeit slightly flawed, book that will serve as the definitive history of the operations leading to the Battle of Tupelo (Harrisburg), Mississippi, on 14 July 1864. Parson is uniquely qualified to write on the subject due to his decade of experience as an interpretive park ranger at the Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center, work which includes the publication of numerous Civil War-related articles known as “Parson’s Ponderings.” Parson’s work is certain to draw the ire of “Lost Cause” adherents, as he soundly refutes the notion that Confederate Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford

Forrest was never defeated in battle: “There is no question that Forrest was the best at what he did; North or South, he had no peers . . . [However] He was not Mars on the field of battle. He made errors during the Tupelo campaign, and he and [Lt. Gen. Stephen Dill Lee] suffered a major defeat—a defeat neither he nor many of his followers could or would admit” (p. 300).

More than just a fresh reinterpretation of the battle, Parson’s work places the outcome of the Tupelo campaign in the larger strategic context of the Civil War. In the summer of 1864, Union Army Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s army group was on the march toward Atlanta as part of the Union strategy of simultaneous offensives to overwhelm the Confederacy. Hoping to keep Confederate raiders—Forrest in particular—from interfering with his vulnerable communications in middle Tennessee, Sherman ordered diversionary raids into northern Mississippi. After Forrest’s corps soundly defeated Federal raiding columns at Okolona (under Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith) and Brice’s Crossroads (Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis), Sherman was compelled to send a third expedition, this time led by Brig. Gen. Andrew Jackson “A. J.” Smith. Although the A. J. Smith expedition is the central focus of the book, Parson also provides a thoughtful analysis of the Sooy Smith and Sturgis raids vis-à-vis Sherman’s strategic vision.

After setting the strategic and operational context in the opening chapter, Parson devotes the bulk of his work to a chronological analysis of the events surrounding Smith’s raid. From the outset, both sides expected a hard fight: “it was apparent that Forrest knew he now had a general to fight, of whom, he must be, to say the least, very wary . . . it was admitted that in General A. J. Smith, they had an antagonist worthy of their own commander” (p. 66). Smith was indeed an opponent worthy of Forrest; the Union general was an experienced Regular Army officer with a track record of success in numerous Indian campaigns before the war and in many Civil War battles. Victory as a division commander at Vicksburg earned the trust of Sherman and Lt. Gen.

Ulysses S. Grant, who provided Smith with an independent field command of two veteran infantry divisions. Before setting out for Tupelo, Smith carefully studied the after action reports from Brice's Crossroads and drew upon his frontier campaign experiences to do what no other Federal commander had ever done—beat Forrest in battle.

Besides displaying superb tactical acumen, Smith exercised good operational security, which left Forrest and Confederate department commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Dill Lee unclear as to Yankee intentions and dispositions. Furthermore, Forrest underestimated his opponent by using tactics similar to that employed at Okolona; as Parson clearly illustrates, Smith refused to dance to Forrest's tune. First, Smith effectively used his cavalry to keep Forrest off-balance and guessing as to Federal intentions. Secondly, Smith carefully paced his troops, keeping the Federal columns in close supporting distance while minimizing the impact of the torrid Mississippi heat. Smith's disciplined tactical movements left no gap open to Rebel cavalry exploitation, while skillful Federal rearguards repeatedly caught Forrest's men in hasty ambushes. Confronted with Forrest's fortified position near Pinson's Hill, Smith unexpectedly broke contact and marched toward undefended Tupelo. By seizing and maintaining the initiative, Smith had time to deploy his infantry and artillery atop key defensive terrain near Harrisburg, thus preventing Forrest's interference as the Federal cavalry fulfilled a secondary tactical mission, the destruction of the railroad at nearby Tupelo. In the end, Smith's skillful dispositions left Lee and Forrest, both with tired and disorganized troops, little choice but to attack robust Federal defenses, leaving the final result a foregone conclusion. As a Confederate brigade historian described: "I am forced to conclude the movement of the Confederates was a medley of blunders" (p. 182).

After presenting a detailed yet easy-to-follow campaign narrative, Parson concludes with a brilliant exposition of the "ten most frequently disputed" points about the Harrisburg campaign; afterward, he presents the reasonable

conclusion that the Tupelo raid was a resounding Union tactical and strategic victory. Then, Parson carefully compares pertinent portions of *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, D.C., 1880) and eyewitness accounts with later reports of the battle in order to convincingly discredit unintentional and deliberate historiographical errors. For example, Parson refutes one such error by simply placing the pertinent telegraph messages between Grant and Sherman in correct chronological order. Parson carefully probes the breakdown in the command relationship between Lee and Forrest, and how their individual leadership failures contributed to the overall result. Lastly, Parson soundly refutes postwar claims that Smith cravenly withdrew after the battle out of fear of Forrest. Parson dismisses such notions by connecting Smith's objectives to his accomplishments: "Such claims ring hollow once it is understood that Smith never intended to move into the Black Prairie region or occupy the country he traversed. . . . Sherman's supply line remained intact and the Confederates in Mississippi had been dealt a harsh defeat. . . . The combat effectiveness of Forrest's corps was destroyed in the period of July 13–15 [1864] . . . never again would his corps be able to stand and fight Union infantry" (p. 274).

Unfortunately, Parson's engaging writing style is intermittently marred by needless errors in syntax and word choice that, at times, left the reviewer confused about critical battlefield details. The worst error crops up in a description of Lee and Forrest's conduct before the failed Rebel attack at Harrisburg. The author's poor pronoun usage leaves the reader unclear as to which "general was making a few final troop adjustments when things began to go terribly wrong" (p. 181).


Parson supports his conclusions with thirty-two pages of end notes that detail his research in thirty-four manuscript collections, twenty-four contemporary periodical collections, and more than 225 secondary sources. Moreover, Parson appropriately complements his narrative with quality maps and descriptions of the terrain that aid in the visualization

of the battlefield. Modern leaders can find much to learn by studying Smith's skillful execution of a raid across hostile territory, as well as how the dysfunctional Confederate leadership contributed to a humiliating defeat. Another lesson is found in studying how Smith's inexcusable neglect of logistical matters—particularly rations and ammunition—nearly led to the undoing of the entire expedition. Parson's book, despite some occasional editorial missteps, is a must-read for both the casual reader and serious scholar of the American Civil War.

Harold Allen Skinner Jr., a retired Army National Guard major and military historian, is the command historian for the 81st Regional Support Command, U.S. Army Reserve. He has authored several published articles and book reviews, including many in *Army History*. Current projects include the history of the National Army during the Great War and Revolutionary War staff ride guides.



Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation



By Caroline E. Janney
University of North Carolina Press,
2013
Pp. xii, 451. \$35

Review by Jonathan Newell

Modern discussions on the meaning of the Civil War often resemble the Indian fable of blind

men attempting to understand an elephant—each one grasps a part of the whole but none form a comprehensive picture. Previous examinations of Civil War memory have often fallen into this trap of allowing the parts to stand for the whole, with explanations centering on race or the “Lost Cause” and excluding important contributions of other themes. *Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation* brings some much needed clarity to the debate, exploring the origins of the conflict’s many interpretations and providing an insightful narrative context that encompasses the story, not of the war itself, but how we remember the war.

In this fresh, compelling study, author Caroline Janney, an associate professor of history at Purdue University, convincingly demonstrates that Civil War memory is a highly matrixed phenomenon. Memories of the war were shaped by numerous factors that prevented any comprehensive national memory resembling the recent “Greatest Generation” understanding of World War II. Instead, one’s memory of the Civil War depended on whether the person was Union or Confederate, male or female, black or white, native or immigrant, veteran or civilian. The endless combination of characteristics resulted in a Civil War memory that was often fragmented and highly partisan.

Central to Janney’s discussion is the distinction between reunion and reconciliation. Although popular culture conflates the two ideas, suggesting that photos of old grizzled veterans shaking hands on their former battlefields show a nation at peace with itself, Janney makes the crucial observation that reunion, the process of reintegrating Southern states into the Union, was a political reality. However, reunion does not equate to reconciliation, a more personal and emotional idea that required agreement on the war’s moral meaning. Even though reunion succeeded, the two sides never achieved full reconciliation, and even today,

sectional understandings, not a national memory, still lay claim to being the true understanding of the conflict. By making this crucial distinction between reunion and reconciliation, Janney provides a clear pathway for studying how citizens of a reunited nation could also be unreconciled and bitter opponents for the war’s meaning.

Janney develops her thesis in a chronological framework, covering the period from 1861 to 1939. As particular themes came to dominate the various eras, she provides an in-depth treatment of each one. Topics include battlefield monuments, the experiences of prisoners of war, veterans groups such as the Grand Army of the Republic, the development of the Lost Cause historiography, and the role of Hollywood through films such as *Birth of a Nation* (1915) and *Gone with the Wind* (1939). Her examination of major figures such as Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee is balanced and insightful, stripping away the layers of historical memory to show both men as true human figures instead of the mythical legends others made them out to be. This narrative style helps keep the story moving while giving the insight one expects from a more analytical approach.

The work’s strongest contributions come in the exploration of how gender and race shaped Civil War memory. Incorporating insights from her previous book, *Burying the Dead but Not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2008), Janney shows the dominant role Southern women played in forming the region’s remembrance of the war and keeping sectional animosities alive long after many of the war’s participants had moved on. Since Confederate soldiers and politicians had to tread carefully and avoid displays of defiance in the years immediately after the surrender, the women took over the role, incorporating unreconciled sentiment into early efforts to tend Confederate graves and other more “domestic” functions.

Southern women had also endured hardships on the home front, unlike their Northern counterparts, but lacked the closure and camaraderie that many Southern veterans felt. As a result, they developed a strident message that strove to uphold the honor of Southern men, enshrine the South’s leading officers and politicians, and remove moral credibility from the Union effort. By the turn of the century, the efforts of groups such as the Ladies Memorial Association and the United Daughters of the Confederacy had triumphed—the Confederate dead had an imposing memorial in Arlington Cemetery, and even the Union’s archenemy Capt. Henry Wirz, the commandant of Camp Sumter military prison in Georgia, was memorialized as a paragon of Southern virtue.

Union memories of the war proved controversial also, particularly regarding the role of emancipation. Initially, many Northern veterans stated they only fought to save the Union, but emancipation was one of many tools used to weaken the Confederacy. White soldiers were not fighting from any sense of racial benevolence, but when Union troops did encounter slavery, they tended to see abolitionism as a noble cause and added it to their motivation to preserve the nation. In later years, as Southern Lost Cause proponents sought to take the moral high ground, Union veterans elevated the role of emancipation as a way of establishing their position as the inherently virtuous one. However, events such as a segregated dedication ceremony for the Lincoln Memorial showed that memories of the war and emancipation did not translate into automatic gains in civil rights and that preserving the Union still remained the dominant theme in Northern memory.

Janney also explores how the Lost Cause narrative came to direct the overall tone of Civil War memory. Driven by the desire to preserve a regional identity, distraught over the perceived depredations of Reconstruction, resentful of


change in the racial social order, and fueled by the smoldering rage of unreconciled women's groups, Southern leaders strove to present an understanding of the South and its war that would be timeless. While Appomattox symbolized the end of military efforts, Southern culture was praised as superior, its leaders transformed into virtuous demigods, slavery whitewashed from the record, and the nobility of the cause upheld. As a result, generations of Southerners came to find their identity with that point in time. This interpretation gained ascendancy because the success of the Union cause made retaining its memory inherently more challenging. With the Union preserved, the nation continued to move forward into the Gilded Age, followed by colonial expansion and then World War I. As the Union understanding of the war diffused into the broader national story, the Lost Cause narrative stood out in greater contrast, allowing it to become the prevailing interpretation associated with the war.

Janney's work represents an immense contribution to the field of Civil War and historical memory studies. Her ideas challenge many accepted understandings of how the nation remembers the conflict but also advances the discussion in a constructive, nonpartisan manner. Her evenhanded analysis, mastery of detail, and cohesive, encompassing narrative framework make the book a thought-provoking read and it provides a wealth of material that encourages future study.

While *Remembering the Civil War* will be of most interest to Civil War scholars, students from many disciplines will benefit from reading it. Janney provides insights that go beyond the conflict and get to the very heart of how the nation understands itself more than a century and a half after its most traumatic war. Since the book's publication in 2013, the events of the Black Lives Matter movement, the Mother Emanuel Church shooting in Charleston, and the subsequent

reassessment of Confederate monuments continue to show how bitterly divided the country's understanding of race, slavery, and the war remain. The author's interpretation of the difference between reunion and reconciliation has immense explanatory power for understanding this fractious debate and provides a much needed clarification of why, after having observed the 150th anniversary of the war, our country has still not arrived at either a national or a unifying understanding of it.

Jonathan Newell is a former U.S. Army Reserve officer and an independent scholar. He has contributed numerous reviews and reference articles to publications such as *Army History*, *Military Review*, the *Journal of Military Ethics*, and the *Encyclopedia of the Veteran in America*.



Review by Thomas W. Crecca

When the 6th U.S. Army Group linked up with Lt. Gen. George Patton's Third Army at Dijon, France, on 15 September 1944, three army groups—the 6th, 12th, and 21st—

formed a broad front of Allied forces arrayed from the English Channel to the Swiss Alps. Of those three army groups that battled the German Army in the European Theater of Operations during World War II, the 6th has received by far the least attention from scholars. The impact and achievements made by the 6th Army Group in the defeat of Nazi Germany is the subject of Nathan N. Prefer's book, *Eisenhower's Thorn on the Rhine: The Battles for the Colmar Pocket, 1944-45*. Prefer is a former Marine Corps reservist who has written extensively on the American military experience in both the European and Pacific theaters in World War II. In this book, his objective is telling the story of the "forgotten Army group" in the Battles of the Colmar Pocket (pp. 19-20).

The Colmar Pocket formed when the 6th Army Group liberated portions of northern and southern Alsace, France, along with eastern Lorraine. However, central Alsace remained in possession of the German Nineteenth Army from November 1944 to February 1945. This German salient extended from the west bank of the Rhine approximately forty miles long and thirty miles deep, centered on the town of Colmar.

Prefer provides a compelling and lucid account of the combat operations of the 6th Army Group. The narrative covers 295 pages divided into fourteen chapters. In the first chapter, Prefer discusses the American and French commanders and units that composed the 6th Army Group led by U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers. He covers the general background of Operation DRAGOON from the amphibious landing in southern France (15 August 1944) to the linkup with Patton's Third Army as the rightmost element of General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group one month later. Chapters 2-6 illustrate the movement of both the French First and U.S. Seventh Armies' respective October offensives and the late November halt along the Rhine River. The author clearly delineates the frustration experienced by Devers when General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the halt of the 6th Army Group at the Rhine.

Chapters 7 and 8 cover the shift of the group's momentum as Devers moved his forces from an eastward attack to a northward extension in support of Patton's Third Army. With Patton attacking toward the Saarland/Palatinate region, Devers' successful directional transition northward facilitated Patton's ninety-degree turn toward Bastogne in relief of the American units surrounded during the Battle of the Bulge.

Chapters 8–14 focus on the aftermath of the Ardennes Campaign, the last German offensive—Operation *NORDWIND*, and the author's conclusion. In the wake of Adolf Hitler's failed December offensive, the author underscores that plenty of fight remained in the German Army as its First and Nineteenth Armies put up a tenacious defense against American and French forces in the Colmar Pocket.

Prefer does a superb job examining the challenges of command Devers experienced, whether it was working with General Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces; or his subordinates in the 6th Army Group, Lt. Gen. Alexander "Sandy" Patch (U.S. Seventh Army) and General Jean-Marie De Lattre De Tassigny (French First Army). The author consistently maintains this analysis throughout the book, illuminating a distinct portrait of the individual character for each commander. Specifically, Prefer illustrates Eisenhower's personal feelings toward and noticeable dislike of Devers. The tenuous nature that permeated the pair's relationship came to a crescendo when the 6th Army Group was ordered to halt and not cross the Rhine in November 1944. The author reflects on the consequences of this tumultuous decision and the commanders' personality differences by considering what impact the crossing would have had on the German offensive in the Ardennes the following month. Subsequently, Prefer notes that Devers stayed on and avoided being removed from command of the 6th Army Group because of support from General of the Army George C. Marshall.

The appendices are very helpful. Appendix A provides a detailed

Allied Order of Battle for the 6th Army Group, and Appendix B illustrates the organization and composition of German military units for the following: German Infantry Division (Type 1944), German Volks Grenadier Division, German Panzer Grenadier Division (Type 1944), and Panzer Brigade.

The bibliography has an extensive listing of secondary sources with many prominent titles ranging from biographies to unit and official histories. Prefer's archival references focus primarily on the papers of General Devers at the York County, Pennsylvania, Historical Society and several record groups and studies at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

There are a few notable weakness in this book. There are numerous typos throughout the text, including misspellings and incorrect dates, such as referencing November 1945 instead of November 1944 when discussing the operations of 6th Army Group. The work also has a limited number of maps, which makes it difficult to visualize the narrative and follow the author's presentation of unit movements.

Overall, Prefer provides a welcome addition to the history of the Allied campaign in Western Europe. This book is highly recommended because it fills a gap in the historiography of the Allied effort in the European theater and provides long overdue recognition to the noteworthy combat record of the 6th Army Group.

Thomas W. Crecca is a historian in the International and Field Programs Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is a retired U.S. Marine Corps Reserve lieutenant colonel. He deployed to Southwest Asia in 1991, Somalia in 1993–1994, and Operation *IRAQI FREEDOM* in 2007. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from Wittenberg University and a master's in military history from the University of Leeds.



Spare Not the Brave: The Special Activities Group in Korea



By Richard L. Kiper
Kent State University Press, 2014
Pp. xxi, 337. \$45

Review by Frank Kalesnik

Spare Not the Brave: The Special Activities Group in Korea is an interesting and informative study of a special operations unit hastily formed at the beginning of the Korean War. Author Richard L. Kiper makes excellent use of primary sources and interviews to describe the organization's formation, training, and combat operations in great detail. He also does a capable job of placing events in their historical and strategic context, enabling the reader to understand how the Special Activities Group (SAG) fit into the "big picture." While these soldiers' stories are adventurous ones, this book is not just another special operations thriller—it is a serious and scholarly analysis.

The origin of the SAG can be traced to the planning phase of the Inchon landing, specifically the desire to create a diversion in the vicinity of Kunsan. Army volunteers from the Far East Command's Headquarters and Service Group provided the manpower and a Marine Corps mobile training team served as the training cadre. In addition to U.S. Army Raiders, the force included Royal Marine Commandos and a Royal Navy Volunteer Group. A planned company of U.S. Marines failed to materialize because the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,

Maj. Gen. O. P. Smith, considered the designated SAG commander, Col. Louis B. Ely, to be “eccentric and impractical” (p. 51). Kiper quotes one SAG veteran, James C. Olson, as wondering “whether he [Ely] had all his marbles” (p. 68).

When the Kunsan diversion was executed on 12 September 1950, Ely accidentally shot and killed two Raiders, thinking he had “killed two ‘gooks’”; a survivor of the operation noted that the “hostility directed toward Col. Ely was palpable” (p. 68). Kiper notes that, “Preparation for the reconnaissance or raid left a great deal to be desired” (p. 70). Royal Marine Col. D. B. Drysdale stated that “troops undertaking this type of operation must have reached a high state of training. . . . Even this requirement was not met” (p. 71). X Corps commander Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond sent Ely back to Japan.

Both the Raiders and Commandos, together initially designated as the Special Operations Company, subsequently served ashore with the 1st Marine Division in operations that led to the capture of Seoul. According to Kiper, “Suddenly the Raiders were no longer raiders, but light infantry. Although they were in excellent physical condition and had basic infantry skills, they had not trained to perform as an infantry company. Nevertheless, that was how they were used” (p. 81). As United Nations forces advanced into North Korea, the Royal Marines were detached from the SAG, and South Koreans added. Eventually the unit included a Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, three Raider companies, and a Special Attack Battalion (SAB).

The new commander, Lt. Col. Wallace M. Hanes, proved as able as Ely had been inept. Assigned flank security and counterguerrilla missions, the American and South Korean soldiers conducted numerous patrols and manned roadblocks established to intercept Communist infiltrators. Working with agents of the South Korean Higher Intelligence Department, they provided invaluable service in a challenging environment, operating throughout the severe winter of 1950–1951. Their moment of glory

came with their successful defense of the village of Chang-to, where the SAB and 1st Raider Company held off numerically superior North Korean forces for two days in freezing weather (12–14 January 1951) until relieved and extricated by the 2d Raider Company.

On 20 March 1951, the Eighth Army Headquarters deactivated the Special Activities Group Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, the 8245th Army Unit (formerly the 1st Raider Company), and the 2d Raider Company, while the Korean SAB and 3d Ranger Company remained in service. Some of the men went back to headquarters jobs in Japan, while others went to infantry units. An unauthorized unit patch depicting a skull and cross bones was produced but never issued. A red tab with the word “RAIDER” in white letters was approved and issued to some unit members, though its wear was restricted to the Far East Command.

In his final chapter, the author explores the rationale behind the SAG’s deactivation. He believes “those reasons must be deduced from the controversy surrounding similar special organizations, such as U.S. Army Ranger units” (p. 232). On 22 September 1950, Army Chief of Staff General Joseph L. Collins requested the establishment of Ranger units to seize objectives behind enemy lines, a request General Douglas MacArthur fully supported, positively referencing the SAG in his response to Collins. In December 1950, Ranger Training Center commandant Col. John Van Houten visited Army division commanders in Korea. Although they praised the Ranger companies assigned to them, Van Houten warned that they were “not intended nor are they equipped or designed for the normal combat missions assigned to infantry companies.” Kiper also cites 2d Infantry Division commander Maj. Gen. Clark Ruffner, who claimed, “If it [the 1st Ranger Company] becomes another rifle company, then it loses its reason for having been created” (pp. 232–33). These arguments applied to the SAG as well.

Ultimately, Army leaders did not believe that Raider and Ranger

units were cost effective. A Far East Command memorandum stated that “by their very nature, ranger units attract personnel that are high in leadership potentiality and battlefield efficiency. Such personnel could be better used if spread throughout conventional infantry units” (p. 235). The counter to this argument is that special operations units are highly effective when properly employed; wastage results when commanders misuse them in conventional roles. Kiper explained, “During most of their time in Korea, the Raiders were used in missions for which they had not been trained. The missions assigned were beyond their control; therefore, the reason for such mal-assignments is a doctrinal issue” (p. 238).

In conclusion, *Spare Not the Brave* is an excellent examination of an understudied aspect of an overlooked war. Thoroughly researched, well written, and thoughtfully analytical, it is highly recommended to students of both the Korean conflict and special operations. Military professionals and civilian policymakers can also profit from the questions it raises about the organization, training, and employment of elite military units. There is often a gray area between conventional and special forces, their roles and missions. This book helps to clarify these distinctions, and is highly recommended to those wishing to understand them.

Dr. Frank Kalesnik earned his bachelor’s degree in history at the Virginia Military Institute (1983), and his master’s degree (1989) and Ph.D. (1992) in American history at the Florida State University. He has taught at the Virginia Military Institute and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and served as a command historian for both the Air Force and Marine Corps. Kalesnik also served for twenty-two years as a Reserve officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is currently the command historian for Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.



In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army



By Andrew B. Godefroy
University of British Columbia
Press, 2014
Pp. xiv, 275. \$ 35.95

Review by Nicholas M. Sambaluk

Andrew B. Godefroy's study of the Canadian Army in the early Cold War era seeks to demonstrate that innovation and effective strategic thought are not the monopolized preserve of superpowers. The work focuses mostly on the period between the end of World War II in 1945 and the unification of the Canadian armed forces two decades later. For American readers, one of the most valuable messages of the book is the reminder that other countries faced distinct, but sometimes similar, challenges and requirements when seeking to maintain relevance and utility in the midst of technological upheaval in the Cold War.

During the early post-World War II period, Canadian innovation was embodied by projects pursued by the new Defense Research Board, the establishment of postwar organizations and other boards, and the closing of wartime entities that had struggled to test and produce weapons that could be fielded in time for use during the war. Godefroy identifies this process of reforming the technological directorates as "catalysts for the maturation of the whole postwar combat development process" (p. 67). One entity that would prove vital to Canadian adaptation to new security challenges was the Canadian Operational Research Establishment

(CAORE), which was located at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario.

With the advent of a Soviet nuclear weapon in August 1949, the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and the ongoing Soviet armed presence on the doorstep of Canada's North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, the country's policymakers steadily increased the army's budget, resulting in a sixfold proportional increase relative to Canada's economy in as many years (p. 76). The prospect of Soviet nuclear air attack prompted Canadian planners to identify vulnerable "vital points" for defense, and to import a new generation of U.S. antiaircraft technology (p. 82). Simultaneously, an extensive series of army exercises tested Canadian mobility and effectiveness in arctic and other environments, and CAORE studies examined arctic fighting through the lens of historical Soviet winter combat (pp. 87–89). However, CAORE efforts at innovation were stymied by an inability to expand its studies of Soviet fighting. Although the organization sent a research team to the battle zone in Korea, an institutional system for transforming studies into lessons learned and change was still lacking, and the Canadian team ultimately served mostly as a clearing house of operational research data for U.S. and British scientists who were on temporary tasking in Korea (pp. 89–98).

Canadian planners worked extensively to develop a means by which to prepare for the anticipated battlefield of the 1950s, which involved a mix of both conventional and nuclear weapons on both sides. One of the most memorable Canadian efforts toward this end was code-named GOLD RUSH, which the author identifies as "a form of systems-based approach to problem solving" (p. 150). Low-yield nuclear weapons promised to enormously revise the ways in which battles could be fought. Massing forces, for example, seemed transformed from being a principle of war into being a risky liability representing "a very lucrative target for atomic attack" (p. 126). Readers more familiar with the U.S. armed forces will note parallels with the development of the pentomic division and interest in the helicopter's potential for operational mobility on a nuclear battlefield. Canada's senior commander, Lt. Gen. Howard Graham,

directed researchers to study even further into the future potential battlefield, and a new design for zones of defense was undertaken under his tenure (pp. 133–37).

Defense budgets declined dramatically under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's administration. This coincided with the administration's adoption of U.S. weapons technologies, including the MGR-1 Honest John nuclear-capable rocket, and experimentation with Canada's own Bobcat armored personnel carrier. Increasingly intricate war games, designed by CAORE, were used to test the utility of these systems and to more adequately understand the impact of nuclear weapons on the battlefield during the late 1950s. The findings startled planners, whose simulations showed that notional Canadian and Soviet forces had rapidly destroyed one another, despite having used only half of their nuclear arsenals (pp. 156–64).

One of the factors then facing Canada, and one that militaries continually confront in the modern era, is the problem of preparing for future security needs while addressing contemporary ones. Cold War pressures throughout the period caused portions of Canada's small army to be deployed in peacekeeping-type efforts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. By the early 1960s, these commitments absorbed much of the army's resources, but did not receive much attention from planners, who were more interested in honing their ability to anticipate the conventional-nuclear battlefield that seemed so much more dangerous, despite being less imminent (p. 174).


The book closes with a study of the integration of the command structures and unification of the three armed services in the mid-1960s. While Paul Hellyer, who served as defense minister in Prime Minister Lester Pearson's Liberal Party government, promoted this process, the progress made toward this policy invalidated the army's existing doctrine. Afterward, the administration left officers of the new Mobile Command (formerly all land forces officers) to determine how to reconcile security needs with policy initiatives. This did not prevent the administration from ordering reductions that "left military

planners wondering if their masters were simply shameless or truly ignorant” about defense issues. Hellyer’s unilateral decision to adopt an American export variant of the underequipped Northrop F–5 Freedom Fighter jet, a plane that the Royal Canadian Air Force had disdained and which “Hellyer himself once described as ‘little more than a trainer with guns hung on it,’” illustrate Godefroy’s characterization that “Paul Hellyer . . . imposed an arbitrary force structure” without reference to defense implications (pp. 207–10).

Godefroy provides a valuable background section designed to enlighten readers unfamiliar with the Canadian Army’s institutional history up to 1945, and the appendices provide useful data sets identifying CAORE personnel, CAORE war games and methodology, and information on nuclear combat as it was described to Canadian soldiers in the 1950s. The thesis of the work, “the fact that the Canadian Army was not a dominant influence in Cold War allied strategic or operational objectives fails to prove that it did not itself innovate” (p. 13), dovetails with the concluding chapter’s theme of the army’s research and even the service itself being swept away by policy change ordered by Hellyer and the Pearson administration as a whole.

Godefroy offers the conclusion that “investment in . . . organizational vision” (p. 215), supported by innovation and adaptation, is crucial to the success of a modern army. In that regard, Godefroy’s book stands as a valuable and well-written work that follows in the footsteps of classics such as Stephen Rosen’s *Winning the Next War* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991) and addresses the issues of innovation in a less often studied army.

Dr. Nicholas M. Sambaluk is an associate professor at the Air University eSchool of Graduate Professional Military Education at Maxwell Air Force Base. He is the author of *The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security* (Annapolis, Md., 2015).



Review by Andrew J. Forney

As the war in Afghanistan, for all intents and purposes, has begun to wind down, the books written about it have proliferated. Many publications take a negative view of the war, their authors focusing on the inability of the U.S.-led coalition to conduct proper counterinsurgency, the intractability of the country and its people, or the futility of American policy. These characterizations of the war often take on a “lost opportunity” feel; if only the United States had maintained its focus in Afghanistan; if only it had deployed the proper number of soldiers; if only it had taken a tougher stance against Pakistan; if any of these measures had been taken, the pending results might have been different.

Simply by titling his book *The Good War: Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan*, Jack Fairweather shows that his work will follow in this same mold. Having previously written about the moral ambiguity and the strategic quandary of Iraq in *A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003–9* (London, 2011), Fairweather’s title immediately sets the war in Afghanistan apart from its younger and equally truculent sibling. Toward the book’s end, policymakers who bristled at the Iraq War would label the war in Afghanistan “the good war.” So explicitly tied to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and so

widely regarded as a noble venture, the war in Afghanistan should have eschewed the divisiveness of the Iraq War. With such a clearly moral justification, the United States should have found victory easily attainable, if not quick and painless.

It did not. After almost sixteen years, the war still drags on, only now with fewer troops and less of a national commitment. Fairweather, charting the conflict from its opening stages, shows how politics—be it in the halls of Congress, the back rooms of European parliaments, or dusty Afghan district centers—derailed a war that should have relied on a unanimity of effort. America’s aversion to nation-building early in the war, an explicit campaign position stated by the Bush administration during its 2000 presidential run, left the nation ill-situated to follow up on its initial victories against the Taliban. The United States and NATO’s ham-handed response toward development and national governance in Afghanistan left the country fractured and unable to meet its stated goals. Diligent men and women, Afghans and Westerners alike, attempted to navigate the vagaries of international aid and development planning, but found outmoded and top-down nation-building schemes too entrenched to overcome. A deluge of money bypassed Afghan government agencies in a stated attempt to get aid to exactly where it was needed. Instead, such moves weakened the Karzai government, enabled widespread corruption (in which Karzai played a role), and destabilized local politics by unmooring it from its traditional tribal foundation.

Herein lies the war’s greatest failure, Fairweather believes: the incomprehension of local and tribal politics left the U.S.-led coalition ill-prepared to defeat the Taliban and combat its resurgence. Too often, NATO forces and leaders viewed everyone shooting at them as the Taliban, not paying attention to the nature of local politics or power plays. And, by viewing the threats in Afghanistan as a monolithic Taliban enemy, coalition forces missed

numerous opportunities to leverage anti-Taliban tribal leaders against the building Taliban insurgency. Because of this, the NATO coalition lost its influence and its friends in Afghanistan very quickly.

Political considerations outside of Afghanistan also doomed the war, Fairweather claims. Of all the books currently written on the war, *The Good War* best portrays the thinking and planning of the non-U.S. coalition members. In a reversal of commonly held U.S. assumptions, Fairweather shows how many NATO members, hungry to prove their national might and ameliorate past embarrassments, readily jumped at the opportunity to support the NATO mission. Thus, the United Kingdom, hoping to exhibit its national prowess, and the Dutch, hoping to paint over its performance at Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s, both volunteered to deploy troops to the southern Afghan home of the Taliban. Once there, coalition forces found themselves trapped by a political momentum at home that forbade failure, creating a spiral that saw individual platoons in a meat grinder of internecine tribal warfare in strategically nonessential villages like Sangin and Musa Qala. Now fighting against these notionally pro-Taliban (but more often simply antioccupation) forces, NATO leaders lacked the ability to visualize an end state, creating an amplifying cycle of violence that provided no real pathway toward progress.

Fairweather's narrative does have its heroes, however. A mix of NATO, European, United Nations, and American diplomats, often operating at the district level, plainly saw the

"futility of force," as Fairweather terms it, and attempted to chart a path that eased the tensions within the districts while also bringing traditional tribal leaders into the fold. These hardworking civil servants found their progress repeatedly frustrated by NATO military leaders (Fairweather focuses predominantly on the British) that either favored kinetic action or failed to see the nuance and the diversity in the anticoalition forces. These same leaders stymied efforts to shear off those Afghans undecided about the Taliban while also quashing initiatives designed to reconcile former Taliban fighters with the Afghan government.

The fraudulent Afghan election in 2009 and the United States' almost comic effort to remove Karzai serve as Fairweather's climax. Although the "surge" in Afghanistan and the heavy fighting it entailed followed afterward, Fairweather claims that the political damage created by these events was almost insurmountable. The application of more troops only exacerbated the ongoing political anarchy slowly taking over the country.

Readers versed in military history will notice some minor inaccuracies in Fairweather's writing. At times, he mislabels a handful of units and finds odd nomenclature for weapons, but does no worse than other journalists have done in the past. Fairweather does a fair job of portraying military leaders and soldiers alike; although focusing on politics and diplomacy, he does not forego treatment of combat and operational planning. The actions of military and political actors are balanced throughout his narrative, and, if anything, Fairweather trains

a sterner eye on the civilians in his story, seemingly expecting them to have known better.

The Good War proves a nice panacea to the ostensibly constant military critiques of the Afghan war. Fairweather's focus on politics at the international and local level helps answer those befuddled about how the overwhelming application of force did not lead to the hoped-for end state. The truly international treatment that he gives the conflict also raises some interesting issues at the heart of the existing global order. What role does NATO play in global security? How important is domestic politics in international affairs? Unfortunately for the Afghans, attempts to answer these questions played out in their villages and farm fields. Fairweather does claim that the end is not yet written in Afghanistan; policymakers can still work to bring the "good" back into a confusing war by aligning their goals with the political reality on the ground. Whether this will be accomplished in the face of general disengagement remains to be seen.

Maj. Andrew J. Forney is currently a strategist in the Maneuver, Aviation, and Soldier Division of the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). He holds a master's degree and a Ph.D. in history from Texas Christian University and was previously an assistant professor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy.



CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

JON T. HOFFMAN

THE GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANT PROGRAM



In my first Footnote, I observed that the Center of Military History (CMH) was embarking on a wide array of initiatives to improve how it does business and accomplishes its missions. One of those new endeavors is now coming to fruition. After an open solicitation, CMH has signed contracts with Ohio State University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and University of Southern Mississippi to provide graduate research assistants. When funds become available from the final FY2017 budget, we plan to add Texas Tech University. All four have well-established doctorate-level military history programs. Under the contract, each university agrees to provide one Ph.D. student who is in his or her dissertation phase to work full-time for one year at CMH, with the hourly pay and benefits normally provided to a student working as a teaching or research assistant at the university. Students will be selected in the near future and will report to CMH on 1 August. Option years in the contracts will supply a new round of students each August through 2021.

The program provides benefits to all concerned. CMH acquires the services of soon-to-be Ph.Ds. at a relatively low cost, and over time establishes a pool of freshly minted historians who are familiar with the work of the Center. Successful research assistants are natural future candidates for postgraduate intern programs, civil service openings, and contract positions. The formal relationships with leading military history graduate programs will also encourage greater interest in Army history among faculty and students.

The graduate research assistants will acquire a secret security clearance and a year of work experience in a federal history program, both of which provide them with very valuable additions to their resume when they begin looking for permanent employment. The time in Washington, D.C., also gives them the opportunity to conduct research for their dissertations while they are close to the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and other major sources of primary records. The university history departments are able to offer prospective and current students the chance to gain a security clearance and real world work experience in the field of public history, an often-overlooked option beyond the usual realm of academic employment. The latter is especially significant given the ongoing

oversupply of history graduates in comparison to the academic job market.

The graduate research assistants will perform a wide range of tasks, depending on the section to which they are assigned within CMH. Those in the writing divisions of the Histories Directorate will generally serve as dedicated research assistants to authors in the first year or two of new book projects, and also assist in tasks related to the production phase, such as gathering and captioning illustrations and helping to finalize footnotes. That will assist the Center in achieving its strategic goal of producing books more rapidly and at lower cost. In the Studies and Support Division, the student might research and write information papers, a history of one of the staff elements, or a section of an annual Department of the Army Historical Summary. They also will assist in the preparation of oral history interviews with current and former officials by researching primary and secondary sources to develop appropriate questions, and then subsequently formatting, editing, and revising the resulting transcripts. In the Force Structure and Unit History Division, they will assist in the preparation of unit histories and lineage and honors, as well as answering official inquiries from the Army regarding these issues. Students might also work with the National Museum of the United States Army or Museums Directorate, conducting research and writing in support of exhibits or the artifact collections. Finally, all graduate research assistants will participate in general tasks such as answering official and unofficial historical inquiries, developing content for the CMH Web site and social media platforms, researching and writing articles for *Army History* magazine, or providing support to commemorative efforts for the one hundredth anniversary of World War I and the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War.

These contracts are modeled on a successful system that has operated at the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office for several years. Based on that experience, we are confident that CMH's graduate research assistant program will achieve its goals and provide value not only to the Army history program and to participating universities and students, but to taxpayers as well.



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