

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

ARMY HISTORY

FALL 2022

PB20-22-4 No. 125

WASHINGTON, D.C.

BARTON ON UTAH BEACH

HIS BEST DAY IN COMBAT

BY STEPHEN A. BOURQUE

"NOT THE SOLDIERS WE NEED"

NEW RECRUITS AND NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENTS AT
POINT LOOKOUT, MARYLAND, JULY 1863—MAY 1864

BY NATHAN A. MARZOLI



ARMY HISTORY

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:


MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2233304

GARY A. BRITO
General, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command

Chief of Military History
Charles R. Bowery Jr.

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
Deborah A. Stultz

Layout and Design
Gene Snyder

Cartographer
Matthew T. Boan

The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by email to usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil.

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Front and back cover: *UTAH Beach* by Joseph Gary Sheahan, 1944
(U.S. Army Art Collection)

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In this Fall 2022 issue of *Army History*, we are proud to share two new articles, an excellent crop of book reviews, an interesting Artifact Spotlight, and a look inside the Military Police Museum.

The first article, by Stephen A. Bourque, examines the actions of Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton on 6 June 1944 as his 4th Infantry Division landed on UTAH Beach. As the author points out, there has been much written about D-Day, but very little about the activities of the American division commanders from the time of the landings to the end of the day. Utilizing Barton's recently discovered and unpublished war diary, Bourque is able to reconstruct that fateful day from just before the channel crossing to the close of fighting on the first day. Employing a bevy of other primary and secondary sources, the author brings Barton's movements and decisions into focus and provides a rarely seen perspective of the D-Day landings and the thrust inland.

The second article, by Nathan A. Marzoli, a frequent *Army History* contributor, looks at three New Hampshire regiments stationed at the Point Lookout, Maryland, Confederate prisoner-of-war camp from July 1863 to May 1864. Using a large number of primary sources, such as official reports, letters home, and diaries, Marzoli paints a picture of veteran regiments saddled with guard duty and an influx of green and undisciplined recruits. Filled with interesting anecdotes that bring these troops and location to life, the author emphasizes that "Point Lookout presents an opportunity to not only study the meaning and memory of the integration of new recruits into Union regiments, but also the service of guards at a Civil War prisoner-of-war camp."

As most of our readers know, we suspended temporarily our call for submissions a few months ago. We are currently looking at reinstating the call in the spring of 2023. With this in mind, I would like to encourage contributors to consider the upcoming 250th anniversary of the start of the American Revolution. The Center of Military History (CMH) currently is working on a series of campaign pamphlets to chronicle this conflict, but *Army History* is interested in supplementing this effort with engaging Revolutionary War content. Authors should submit articles in Microsoft Word format by email to: usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil. Submissions should conform to our style and not exceed 12,000 words. A copy of the new CMH Style Guide is available as a free PDF download at the following web site: <https://history.army.mil/about.html>. All aspects of Revolutionary land-based warfare will be considered.

Once again, I thank *Army History* readers for their patience as we strive against paper supply-chain issues. The small staff here is well aware that the last few issues have been a little late hitting the streets, but we are working hard to continue to bring you engaging content.

BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH
MANAGING EDITOR



FALL 2022

ARMYHISTORY

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THE CHIEF'S CORNER

CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

USING THE PAST TO RECRUIT TOMORROW'S SOLDIERS

For a number of reasons, fiscal year 2022 was the most difficult in recent memory for Army recruiting efforts. A combination of the continued effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic turbulence, extreme national competition for workers in all industries, and an uncertain international situation have all played a part. Therefore, it is worth considering how the Army's historical and museum programs support Army recruiting. In short, we believe that knowledge of the U.S. Army's history and an awareness of the incredible diversity of its people, missions, and specialties can and should inspire young people to join their Army. The Army's historians and museum professionals have an obligation to mobilize this long history in ways that connect with America's youth, showing them that through time, American soldiers have been products of any era's society. Just like a person in the Colonial era, in the nineteenth century, or in more modern times, Americans of the twenty-first century can sign up, meet the Army's standards, and serve a cause greater than themselves. In this spirit, CMH recently published *Army History and Heritage*, a digest of sorts containing short pieces about the Army in armed conflict, its people, weapons, and equipment, and stories of its interesting and inspiring past.


As you read this issue of *Army History*, all graduates of Basic Combat Training are receiving a copy of this book, complete with a section for them to record their own significant dates and moments during their Army service. *Army History and Heritage* is also available for free download on our website, www.history.army.mil. The Army museums at initial entry training centers are redoubling their efforts to upgrade and refresh the historical images, references, and materials that already form a central part of new soldier training. Finally, the National Army Museum remains open as the "Army's Front Porch." Although recruiting does not take place on the museum campus, the museum staff takes seriously their responsibility to educate visitors and their families about the Army profession. Much of the museum's programming is virtual and useful to Army recruiters around the country.

It is not overselling the importance of these efforts to say that engaging, informative, honest historical products can make a

significant impact on American citizens' propensity to serve in the Army. The Army's historians and museum professionals continue to apply expertise, passion, and agility to this essential part of their mission.



NEWSNOTES



New Publication from AUSA

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is proud to announce the release of its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series: *Medal of Honor: Gary Gordon and Randy Shughart*. Gary I. Gordon and Randall D. Shughart were part of a special operations sniper team with Task Force RANGER in Mogadishu, Somalia. During the assault made famous by the book (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999) and the movie (2001) *Black Hawk Down*, they volunteered to be inserted at a helicopter crash site to protect the pilots and crew. They jumped into a firefight knowing that their own chances of survival were slim. Gordon and Shughart ultimately gave their lives to save others. Information and links to all of the graphic novels are available on AUSA's Medal of Honor series page at www.ausa.org/medal-honor-graphic-novels.



Dr. Lynn L. "Bo" Sims, 1937–2022

Bo Simms, 85, of Mechanicsville, Virginia, passed away peacefully in his sleep on 25 September 2022. He was born 23 September 1937 in Washington, D.C., the only child of Lynn Boyd and Audrey Jacobs Sims, and was married to Sharon Obitts of Wheat Ridge, Colorado. Bo served in the Army Reserve, retiring as a lieutenant colonel in 1997. He was a graduate of Wheaton College, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the National Defense University, and was the first Army Reserve officer to graduate from the Naval War College. He was also the first civilian professor to teach at CGSC at Fort Leavenworth in 1974. Bo attended graduate school at Kansas State University, Columbia University, and earned a masters and PhD from New York University in U.S. Military History. In 1980, he became the command historian at Fort Lee's Logistical Center from which he retired in 1998. He is survived by his loving wife of sixty-two years, four children, thirteen grandchildren, and seven great-grandchildren. He is buried in the Virginia Veterans Cemetery in Amelia, Virginia.




SMH 2023 Annual Meeting

The Society for Military History (SMH) 2023 Annual Meeting will be held 23–26 March in San Diego, California, at the Hilton San Diego Bayfront. For more information, including hotel information and registration, please visit the SMH Annual Meeting website at <https://www.smh-hq.org/annual-meeting/index.html>.



Barton on UTAH Beach

His Best Day in Combat



Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division move ashore at UTAH Beach.
(National Archives)

By Stephen A. Bourque

I, Bill York (Aide), and Jas. K. Richards (Driver) landed, dry footed, by “Snowbuggy” from the LCT [Landing Craft, Tank]. Some artillery fire (hostile), one half-track burning, and Co. A, 1st Amphibious Engineers digging in against sea wall instead of doing their job of helping my troops across the beach. I rooted them out and onto the job with my pistol and cusswords. I learned later from York and Richards, who returned to the beach, that they went right back under the seawall as soon as I left.¹



Raymond O. Barton, shown here as a West Point cadet, ca. 1912.

(U.S. Military Academy)

Despite the massive amount of literature describing every aspect of American performance in Normandy on 6 June 1944, historians have told us little as to what the commanders of the three American divisions (1st, 4th, and 29th Infantry) were doing after General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered “the great and noble undertaking” of that fateful day. However, thanks to the discovery of Raymond O. Barton’s unpublished war diary, supplemented by other manuscripts and interviews, we better understand how the 4th Infantry Division commander spent the period immediately before boarding ships, crossing the English Channel, and during the battle on 6 June.²

By the time he arrived on UTAH Beach, Barton had already spent thirty-two years in active service. He was Ada, Oklahoma’s 1908 high school valedictorian and a 1912 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. While at West Point, he earned the nickname “Tubby,” because of the solid build he developed on the wrestling mat and football field.³ It was a nickname he loved and he used it among, and when writing to, his friends. His first assignment was with the 30th Infantry Regiment, serving in Alaska, San Francisco, the Plattsburgh New York training camps, and the Mexican Border. His World War I service was in the United States, primarily in New York and Georgia, training officers on machine

gun use and employment. Joining the 8th Infantry Regiment in Coblenz, Germany, in 1919, he served as part of the American occupation force at the end of the war. The Army commander, Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, acknowledged his performance and potential when he selected the young major to lead General John J. Pershing’s honor guard during his Congressional Medal of Honor presentation to the French and British Unknown Soldiers in Paris and London in 1921. His last act as commander of the 8th Regiment’s 1st Battalion was to supervise lowering the national flag over the Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in 1923, signifying the end of American participation in the First World War.⁴

Returning to the United States, he traveled to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and attended the Command and General Staff School, turning down a teaching assignment at West Point. The War Department then assigned the new graduate as G-3 of the Seventh Corps Area in Omaha, Nebraska. In addition to his training responsibilities, he supervised corps relief operations during the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. In 1928, he returned to the Command and General Staff School as an instructor of the two-year course, educating some of this nation’s most senior future commanders. He and his family then moved to Washington, D.C., first for attendance at the Army War College class of 1932 and then, until 1935, as professor of military science at Georgetown University. His subsequent assignments were in Georgia, first as a military liaison to the Civilian Conservation

Corps (CCC) and then as commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment on Tybee Island. In 1940, he became the first chief of staff of the recently reactivated 4th Infantry Division, the “Ivy Division,” at Fort Benning and chief of staff, IV Army Corps, where he was assigned when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. During these last two assignments, he participated in the great series of prewar maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas, serving with Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, who would go on to command the XIV Corps in the Pacific. After a short period in early 1942, as assistant division commander for the 85th Infantry Division, Barton assumed command of the 4th Motorized Division at Fort Gordon, Georgia, the post he had helped to design while the division’s chief of staff. After an extensive training period, the War Department directed Barton to convert the Ivy Division back to a standard infantry division organization.⁵ In February, he led the division to England and continued training until D-Day. Unfortunately, part of his command suffered casualties during the German torpedo boat attack at Slapton Sands in April, before the invasion.⁶

Most division commanders operated in a whirlwind of activity and danger. It is not surprising that few had the time to publish accounts of their combat experience, as did senior commanders such as Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, and J. Lawton Collins. Fortunately, historians have been able to piece together the 4th Infantry Division’s operations, using daily operations journals and detailed division after action reports to



Colonel Rodwell and General Barton

(National Archives)



The 4th Infantry Division's headquarters staff at Portsmouth, England

(National Archives)

provide a relatively accurate and complete narrative of the division's actions. Each evening, Col. James S. Rodwell, the 4th Infantry Division chief of staff, and his deputies summarized the regimental reports and forwarded this document to the VII Corps headquarters. There, Col. Richard G. McKee, the VII Corps chief of staff, and his team prepared a corps-wide summary with these reports for Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the corps commander. He extracted appropriate portions and sent them on to First Army headquarters. At the end of each month, the division staff compiled its reports, including information on personnel, intelligence, logistics, and operations, and sent this monthly history, through the corps headquarters, to the adjutant general in Washington. Historians also have copies of the orders and instructions Barton issued to his subordinates. Although this material has been available for years, seldom mentioned is the extended letter Barton wrote to Cornelius Ryan when the latter was writing *The Longest Day* (Simon & Schuster, 1959). Composed ten years after the event, it identified most of Barton's actions that critical day, along with the occasional personal confession or vignette.⁷ Finally, Barton's recently discovered war diary, maintained by his aide Capt. William B. York, and other

personal letters and documents, augment and elaborate on the information that has been available since the 1950s. As a result, we now have a relatively accurate picture of how he spent this historic day and the following weeks.⁸

Ted Roosevelt

An aspect that needs to be addressed is the relationship between Barton and Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Darryl F. Zanuck's movie *The Longest Day* (1962) distorted what little the post-World War II generation knew about Tubby Barton and events surrounding this famous political and military personality.

In March 1944, Collins visited the division to watch Barton's regiments training.⁹ Such visits were not unusual, as they happened at least once a week. However, this time, Collins had another issue: what to do about Ted Roosevelt? Roosevelt, son of the former president, had a distinguished record in the First World War, after which, he helped to organize the American Legion. When the war began, this politically connected officer rejoined the active forces as a brigadier general.¹⁰ He became the 1st Infantry Division's deputy commander and served with Maj. Gen. Terry D. Allen in North Africa and Sicily. An aggressive unit

on the battlefield, Eisenhower and Bradley believed it was an ill-disciplined mob behind the front lines. As a result, Bradley replaced the division's chain of command once the Sicilian fighting ended.¹¹ After his relief, Roosevelt traveled to England, where doctors forced him to check into a hospital to treat his pneumonia. Roosevelt was not happy on the sidelines, however, and lobbied with everyone he knew to get back into the field. So, Collins came down to 4th Division headquarters to tell Barton that Bradley had decided that Ted was now his and to use him as he saw fit.¹²

Barton was not excited to get a possibly pretentious and arrogant president's son as one of his subordinates, but he had little choice. He already had an assistant division commander in Brig. Gen. Henry A. Barber Jr., who had been with him for several months. Also in the command group was Brig. Gen. Harold W. "Hal" Blakeley commanding the artillery. Therefore, he




General Allen

(National Archives)

did not need an extra general officer in his command without a defined role. Nevertheless, on 25 March, Roosevelt and his aide, Lt. Marcus O. Stevenson, reported for duty. It turned out Barton's assessment was wrong, and his diary notes that the two became good friends within a very short time.¹³ Roosevelt had more combat experience than almost any general officer in the European Theater of Operations. By the time he reported to the Ivy Division, his awards included a Distinguished Service Cross with a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster, a Silver Star with three Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters, a Distinguished Service Medal for World War I courage, and a Legion of Merit.¹⁴ Because Barber was already his assistant, Roosevelt became an extra general on the division staff. In this role, he visited units daily and reported his observations back to Barton at the end of the day. The division commander came to depend on the advice and mentorship this veteran could give him, and these nightly



General Barber
(National Archives)



James Van Fleet, shown here as a lieutenant general
(National Archives)

meetings became a standard occurrence in the months ahead.

From the time the VII Corps staff briefed its plan, Roosevelt pleaded with Barton to land on UTAH Beach with the first wave. Finally, on May 26, not on the USS *Bayfield* as the movie depicts, but in Portsmouth after Montgomery's commanders' conference, he wrote Barton a formal request. In his letter, Roosevelt, a veteran of previous landings, laid out five reasons for going in with the first landing craft. He concluded with, "I believe I can contribute materially to all of the above by going with the assault companies. Furthermore, I know personally both officers and men of these advance units and believe that it will steady them to know I am with them."¹⁵

Barton had good reasons, none of them mentioned in the movie, not to allow "Rough Rider," as Roosevelt often was called, to land at the beginning of the assault. From a prac-

tical standpoint, Col. James Van Fleet was Barton's most experienced and competent regimental commander and would be in charge during the assault. He did not require a general standing next to him when he made decisions and gave his battalion and company commanders orders. Generals did not land with the first wave for an important reason; they had to stay out of the way while their subordinates did their jobs.

Tubby also knew that Ted's son Quentin was landing at the same time on OMAHA Beach and did not relish the prospect of the father and son perishing during the invasion on the same day. It had nothing to do with *The Longest Day's* insinuation that Barton wanted to keep him from harm because he was President Roosevelt's son. He passed that danger threshold much earlier.¹⁶ If the letter had gone forward, there is little doubt that Collins, Bradley, and even Eisenhower would have supported the division



The USS Bayfield off UTAH Beach

(Naval History and Heritage Command)

commander. So, the letter, for the time being, went nowhere other than Barton's desk, and he let Roosevelt go ashore.

Always good-natured about these things, Roosevelt respected his boss and knew Barton was trying to do the right thing. Writing to his wife on 3 June, Roosevelt noted: "Most generals are afraid to battle for what they believe with superiors who hold the power over their advancement. One of the reasons I'm so fond of Tubby Barton is that he is not. He will never, wittingly, let his men down."¹⁷ The following week, as he watched Roosevelt get into his landing craft, Barton "never thought he would see him again alive."¹⁸

In the Channel

The division continued to load during the first three days of June, and Barton spent much time visiting his units, watching them load onto their LSTs (Landing Ship, Tanks) and other vessels. After a 2 June meeting at corps headquarters, he drove that evening to South Brent, England, his rear detachment headquarters. The war correspondents who were traveling with the division to France had gathered. It gave him a chance to meet personally the journalists accredited to the division, who would connect his soldiers with their families back home. Henry T. Gorrell, the distinguished


war correspondent for the United Press, would file the first report on Normandy's invasion and later convey detailed accounts of the division's progress across France.¹⁹ From CBS, Larry E. LeSueur would be with Barton and become an honorary member of the division.²⁰ Kenneth G. Crawford, from Newsweek, would go ashore with Company C, 8th Infantry, and be in the heat of the fight from the beginning.²¹ Lastly, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Ira Wolfert, reporting for Reader's Digest, would cross the channel with Barton.²² Tubby's days in Omaha and with the CCC had prepared him well for working with the press. After the gathering, he then returned to the USS *Bayfield* for the evening.²³

The following day, Barton continued visiting the various loading areas and talking to the soldiers and their leaders. He started on Portsmouth's west side, at the Tamar docks, and then drove two hours east to Dartmouth, where he spoke to naval officers about the loading process. From there, he motored for an hour north to Torquay, where soldiers from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, were boarding one of the transports. Already on board and crowding around the rails were soldiers from Company I. Riding with Barton and York was the former commander of that unit. When Barton arrived at the

dock, he got out and moved toward the transport. However, when the soldiers on the ship saw their former commander, they all began booing and hissing. As he later told Cornelius Ryan, he was "almost sick at this unexpected and bitter greeting. He was so hurt that he did not know what to say or do." It was not until much later that he learned the booing was for the captain, whom the soldiers disliked.²⁴

After this painful incident, he boarded a motor launch and spent the rest of the day riding the boat among the ships that carried his soldiers: the USS *Dickman*, the USS *Barnett*, and the HMS *Gauntlet*, the largest. He was now feeling much better, and at each stop, he gave a little speech and wished them all luck. He then sailed over to Col. Hervey A. Tribolet's LST and spent some time with him and his staff. Finally, he returned to land, linked up with his driver and his sedan, drove to Victoria Wharf at Queen Anne's Battery, and turned the vehicle over to his quartermaster. He then boarded the USS *Bayfield* for the last time.²⁵

Because of the weather, Eisenhower and his commanders needed to delay the assault by one day, so the 4th Infantry Division spent the day onboard their ships.²⁶ On 5 June, the USS *Bayfield* hoisted anchor at 0930, moved out of Plymouth,



and joined its convoy heading for France. The scale of this undertaking is difficult to imagine. Each of Barton's regimental combat teams required thirteen Landing Craft, Infantry, six LCTs, and five LSTs. Each vessel towed a barrage balloon to deter air attacks. Cruisers and destroyers protected the flanks of the moving convoy. Somewhere in the channel, an Allied fighter shot down a German plane as it approached the convoy. The *Bayfield's* crew heard the report and used the public address system to let everyone onboard know that the shooting had begun. The convoy was Task Force 125, and its crossing was not without incident. The vessel carrying a battery from the 29th Field Artillery Battalion hit a mine as it approached the shore, causing its entire complement of guns and prime movers to sink to the bottom of the channel.²⁷ It is doubtful that Barton noticed a young gunner's mate, Peter Berra, performing his crew duties. After the war, "Yogi" Berra would become one of the greatest ball-


players of all time and remain a staunch supporter of service members for the rest of his life.²⁸

Although Barton would spend almost 165 days in combat, it was the first one that, in many ways, was the most important. By now, Barton had nearly two full years of training and leading the division—more than that when including his time as chief of staff and 8th Infantry commander. He had supervised its preparation for combat in extensive exercises in the Carolinas and in amphibious training in Florida and England. He knew all of the division's senior officers and most of the company commanders personally. Few American units would be as prepared for its first day of battle as the Ivy Division.²⁹ Yet, after thirty-two years in uniform, this was his first taste of actual combat. Barton told Cornelius Ryan that he constantly fretted about becoming so afraid that he would freeze and fail as a combat leader. On 6 June, he would discover which was more robust: his natural human fear, or char-

acter developed in decades of preparing for this day.³⁰

Like almost all commanders, there was little Barton could do that night or morning. Colonel Van Fleet's 8th Infantry Regiment would lead the assault. A football player and coach and aggressive by nature, he was the right leader to drive his troops forward to link-up with the 101st Airborne Division that landed the previous evening. Next in was Colonel Tribolet's 22d Infantry. A caring and methodological commander, Barton thought he would do well rolling up the German fortifications on the coast. Finally, the newest commander and another football coach and player, Col. Russell P. "Red" Reeder, would lead the 12th Infantry through the gap between the other two regiments to expand the bridgehead.³¹

Barton got little sleep that night and spent most of it in the operations room aboard the USS *Bayfield*, looking at maps and charts. The VII Corps staff was onboard, but none of the other principals, such as Collins or McKee, mentioned any discussions or



meetings that night. As dawn broke, Tubby observed the Ninth Air Force's bombardment of the beach targets. He walked around the ship and gave the troops a little motivational speech.³² Then he watched as

his troops left the *Bayfield*, dropped into their Higgins boats waiting below, and headed for the coast.³³ Journalist Wolfert stood next to the division commander as he watched the action. He asked: "How do you

think it will go, general?" Barton replied, "It has to go—there's no place for those lads of mine to come back to."³⁴

After Van Fleet's troops headed to the beach, Barton watched as the 22d and



An aerial view of UTAH Beach. Exit 2 is on the left.

(National Archives)

12th Infantry formed up and headed to shore. Colonel Reeder later remembered the radio call before climbing into his landing craft: "Cactus to Cargo, come in." Reeder responded to Barton: "Come in Cactus." Then: "Good luck, Red."³⁵ General Barber was moving slower than planned that morning and pulled up alongside the *Bayfield* at 0625, asking Barton if the assault waves had moved on time. The commander's short reply was yes, and his deputy headed off to shore. Barber would join up with Tribolet's 22d Infantry on the right flank, moving north and through the German coastal defenses.³⁶

Four companies from the 8th Infantry Regiment, hit the beach precisely at 0630.

Roosevelt went in with Company B on the right and began coordinating the advance of its two assault battalions: Lt. Col. Conrad C. Simmons's 1st Battalion and Lt. Col. Carlton O. MacNeely's 2d Battalion.³⁷ Within a few minutes on the beach, the two battalion commanders began telling Roosevelt that the actual beach terrain bore little resemblance to the sand tables and maps they had been pouring over for months.³⁸ While the battalion leaders got their troops productively engaged in battle and moving forward, the brigadier had time to survey the battle area. The veteran of previous assaults realized they were in the wrong place. He got his bearings, located

where they should be, and moved from one commander to another, orienting them on their actual locations. He instructed MacNeely and Simmons to clear German troops from the strong points to their front and then head toward their original objectives. At 0915, Van Fleet arrived with the 3d Battalion, and Roosevelt updated him on the situation and his decisions. The regimental commander concurred and the follow-on units received instructions to follow the 8th onto the modified landing site.³⁹ Both Van Fleet and MacNeely emphasized in their reports that Roosevelt was under machine gun and artillery fire during the entire period he was moving across the



Generals Roosevelt and Barton examine maps on UTAH Beach.

(National Archives)

beach. They were impressed with his poise under fire and effectiveness as a leader. As the veteran among the group, he was the one that decided on the preferred course of action.⁴⁰ Soldiers remember Roosevelt walking around the beach, poking soldiers with his cane and yelling “Get out of here! If we’re going to get killed, we’re going to get killed inland.”⁴¹ Unfortunately, Simmons would die in action on 24 June so we have

no report from him on what he observed during the landing.

The Landing

As a lieutenant with the 22d Infantry, Bob Walk served as a liaison officer between his regiment and division headquarters. He was on the LCT that served as the vessel for the liaison and radio jeeps and other vehicles from the headquarters command group. This cramped boat also served as Barton’s command post as the fight began. Bouncing alongside the *Bayfield*, Barton used the hood of Walk’s jeep as the table for his situation map. There, he listened to the reports from shore and monitored the action. According to the G-3 Journal, communications between Barton and his key leaders appeared to be excellent. Walk remembered Van Fleet’s reporting that everything was under control, and in fact the two leaders spoke at 0635 and again at 0650. Interestingly, there are no entries in the operations journal indicating that the landing location had changed early that morning. The June after action report also says nothing about changing the location. Most likely, this veteran organization just took this friction in stride and continued to operate.⁴²

By 0904, the 22d Infantry was ashore. Barton now had three regimental commanders, two deputy commanders, and his artillery commander on the way or on the beach. He could wait no longer. Bob

Walk remembers Tribolet, his regimental commander, calling in and reporting that everything was going according to plan. After that report, he heard Barton say: “That’s enough for me, let’s go.” At 0900, he left the *Bayfield* for the beach.⁴³

At 0934, he reported his arrival on the beach. As quoted at the beginning of the text, he, Jason K. Richards, his driver, and Capt. William B. York, his aide-de-camp, arrived on the shore in their M29 Cargo Carrier—he referred to it as the “snow buggy,” but soldiers called it the Weasel. It did not go far, as his driver mired it in the sand with a broken track. Barton jumped off the vehicle and moved to shore on foot. Bill York directed Pvt. John Sears, driving another M29, to go back to the beach and gather Barton’s gear and maps and bring them to the general, which he did. Sears was supposed to be General Barber’s driver, but because he was late and did not land with the early waves, he had a utility role that morning.⁴⁴

Barton later admitted he was terrified, as the sounds of weapons fire were all around him. A German artillery shell exploding nearby only increased his concern. He encountered the engineers behind the seawall, noted at the beginning of this article, and continued moving inland. He did not go far, but found a house with a high, brick-walled courtyard on the dunes. Most likely, this was just south of the postwar UTAH Beach Museum. Meanwhile, the



General Barton on the phone at his field headquarters

(National Archives)



James Wharton, shown here as a brigadier general

(National Archives)



Troops take shelter behind the seawall on UTAH Beach.

(National Archives)

German artillery was increasing its fire rate, and anyone on the beach was a potential casualty, so the house gave some protection. By radio, he contacted his deputies and regimental commanders; all reported things were on track. At 1025, one of the deputies, probably Roosevelt, reported that they had landed “5100 yards from the main objective.” This was the first note in the division reports acknowledging the change.⁴⁵ Barton is quite open that there was little he could do at this point. His regimental commanders had a plan, and Roosevelt and Barber were on the ground making the needed adjustments. He had a reasonably good understanding of the landing’s progress and saw no need to make any changes.⁴⁶

Barton sent out liaison officers and others to find out the situation around him. Lt.

Joseph Owen remembered that at about 1100, Barton sent him toward Sainte-Mère-Église to find the exact location of the 8th Infantry Regiment. On his way, he remembered running into Roosevelt, who slowed down his jeep to yell out, “Hey Boy, they’re shooting up there,” followed by a big “Haw Haw.” One constant among 4th Infantry Division soldiers that morning was Roosevelt’s ubiquitousness. He ranged across the entire beach area without any fixed responsibilities, advising, coordinating, and keeping things moving. Owen found Van Fleet, and the colonel instructed one of his officers to mark the battle map for delivery back to Barton.⁴⁷

By noon, his battle staff and those who landed to assist during the early hours of the invasion began to join him. One of the first

was Lt. Col. Dee W. Stone, the G-5 (Civil Affairs and Military Government), who had found Maj. Philip A. Hart, one of his temporary staff officers, severely wounded at the water’s edge.⁴⁸ The amphibious engineers present (under the sea wall’s shelter) refused to help Stone rescue Hart from the advancing tide, but he was able to move the wounded officer to safety.⁴⁹ Then Lt. Col. Richard S. “Dick” Marr, the G-4, and Capt. Parks Hunt, his headquarters commandant, arrived, reported, and began moving toward the planned headquarters site. Subsequently reporting in was Col. James E. Wharton, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade commander and the senior commander for the soldiers Barton encountered at the sea wall. As Barton notes in his letter to Cornelius Ryan: “The colonel took the trouble to inform me



Orlando Troxel, shown here as a major general
(U.S. Army)

that his men were not the only ones quitting their missions at the seawall but that some of mine had done the same—in the beginning that was true but Ted Roosevelt cured that.⁵⁰ One suspects the division commander let him know how he felt.

While at the beach house, Barton says he had little idea as to what was going on: “I was in a semi fog. No contact nor communications with anyone but those present. . . . About a mile off our planned landing point. No idea of where nor how my assault battalions were, except that I did know they had taken their beach and gone on inland.” This is not exactly true, as the G-3 Journal clearly indicates he had reasonable communications and was in contact with his leaders. It might not have been to his standard, but he was not out of the fight. His most important contribution that morning was when commanders of the attached units found him and asked if he had any instructions. In every case, he said: “No; just go ahead on your job per plan.”⁵¹

Around 1300, Barber’s aide found Barton and guided him to the temporary command post.⁵² This impromptu collection of vehicles and staff officers was just south of Causeway 2, directly opposite the modern UTAH Beach Museum and across from Marker #1 on the Voie de la Liberté. There, Lt. Col. Orlando C. Troxel (G-3) and Lt. Col. Harry F. Hansen (G-2) and their small staffs were at work monitoring the combat team’s progress. Now, by early afternoon, Barton was beginning to gain control or at least good situational awareness of how the regiments were doing. Dick Marr reported that the infantry had crossed the low ground

the Germans had flooded and were making good progress inland. All reports indicated that everything was generally going according to plan. There was little Barton could do; he had to let the commanders do their jobs. However, he noticed that many of the following units were backing up on the causeways and having trouble moving inland. Tubby could see that Causeway #2 (U5) was bumper-to-bumper with vehicles and not moving. Without intending to, GIs performing their assigned local duties made it difficult to get the division’s combat power forward into the fight. Engineers improving the route, antiaircraft guns, and wire teams were all making movement difficult. Therefore, Barton and Marr went to the traffic jam, looked at the situation, and ordered everything nonessential off the road. Some vehicles also had broken down, blocking the road. Barton had soldiers move anything in the way off the trail and into the swamp. Once traffic across the causeway was flowing, troops would spend the rest of the night pulling the unfortunate broken-down vehicles out of the mire.⁵³

Troxel received reports that the division had captured Causeway #3 (T7) just to the north, and it was open for use. Nearby, Lt. Col. C. G. Hupfer’s 746th Tank Battalion was still near the landing area. Barton wanted it off the beach and to its next position near Audouville-la-Hubert. Because of the congestion in front of him, he began devel-



General Barton
(Courtesy of the Barton Family)



Colonel Hansen
(U.S. Army)

oping an alternate route for the armor, using the reportedly open road. In the middle of all that confusion, around 1500, Roosevelt arrived at the temporary command post. They joyfully embraced each other. Then, of course, Teddy wanted to talk. Barton later noted: “He was bursting with information (which I sorely needed).—but wouldn’t let him talk.” He was under pressure to get the tank battalion into the fight. He later noted: “Try some day to keep a Ted Roosevelt from sounding off if he wants to—but I did.”⁵⁴

In the middle of all of this, his aide Bill York interrupted the proceedings and notified his boss that some Associated Press photographers wanted pictures of the division commander. “Reluctantly and irritably,” he consented. It broke his chain of thought and the photographers took their time in taking the photos. Barton was “mad as hell” because the only thing he wanted to do was get the tanks on the road and talk to Ted. Finally, the photographers departed, and Barton later cherished the photographs. Hupfer got his orders and returned to his command, and now Barton and Roosevelt could catch up.⁵⁵

Ted had been on the ground for over eight hours and had been decisively engaged in leading and making decisions the whole time. While they were comparing notes, they noticed problems at the nearby crossroads as the 746th Tank Battalion attempted to move through the congestion. So, the two generals walked to the crossroads, one on each corner, and began directing traffic, just like military police officers. Barton later remembered how little personal control he had that day. His officers had the plan and knew what to do. All he could do until he could get his



U.S. Troops under German artillery fire on UTAH Beach

(National Archives)

command post up and running was monitor what he could see. He also could act as a rallying point for officers needing directions and performing tasks that, to paraphrase his comments, any second lieutenant could do. As the tanks departed, Hal Blakeley's aide-de-camp arrived to lead Barton to the division artillery's command that was fully operational. This was at Audouville-la-Hubert and next to the division headquarters, which was being assembled.⁵⁶

The Night

It was around 1900 when Barton arrived at Blakeley's headquarters. For the first time since leaving the *Bayfield*, he had good communications and could contact his regimental commanders by radio. Nearby, Capt. Parks Huntt began to establish the division's operations center. Barton went over to see how things were going. Huntt, who was always proper in his military bearing, came over to the general, raised his arm to render a salute, and immediately tumbled to the ground. He got to his feet,

again tried to salute, and fell again. Barton, who had been extremely tense and fearful of his first combat experience for the last two weeks, broke into laughter as artillery shells exploded around them. Apparently, one nearby explosion temporarily affected his headquarters commandant's equilibrium and raising his arm had the effect of knocking him off his feet. Barton helped him up and said: "Forgive me Parks but you looked so damn silly wheeling around that I couldn't help laughing, why don't you lie down for a bit." Barton reported to Ryan that his fear of battle never affected him again.⁵⁷

He walked over to the intersection and found Van Fleet (Combat Team 8), watching some of his troops load a soldier into an ambulance. Barton was anxious to get on with his tasks but came over to talk with his commander. Just then, a tall, distinguished-looking Frenchman, in coat and knickers, came up to them waving a marked map and excitedly trying to tell them something. Van Fleet had to leave, and Barton remained with the civilian, whom he could not

understand but turned out to be a retired army colonel. He was trying to convince Barton that a German artillery battery was close by, but Tubby had recently walked by that location and saw nothing. After politely saying goodbye, he walked over to Rodwell, who had recently joined the command post group. Just then, a report arrived confirming the French colonel's warning. He told his chief "to run out to the road, grab the first combat outfit he found and have it go take the hostile battery." Rodwell found an element of an antitank battalion going into bivouac and grabbed some of its infantrymen. He was back soon with the report, "mission accomplished with ease."⁵⁸

Around 2100, it was still light in this northern part of the world in June. There was still little Barton and Blakeley could do to influence the battle until the command posts were operational and the staff began processing the unit reports. The infantry was settling into its evening positions, and the artillery batteries were repositioning to best support them. Therefore, Barton and Blakeley



Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division wade through swamps as they move inland from UTAH Beach.

(National Archives)

decided to inspect the piece of France that now belonged to the 4th Infantry Division. With Sergeant Richards still driving the M29 Weasel, he and York headed out to visit a captured German artillery battery nearby at Saint-Martin-de-Varreville. The Ninth Air Force had done a good job taking it out, as it was in a position to have hurt Barton's assault battalions. Unlike the Eighth Air Force's heavy bombers that failed to destroy the German fortifications on OMAHA and the other beaches, the medium bombers of the Ninth were precise. Their accurate air attacks had prevented enemy gunners from interfering with the landings and inflicting casualties on the American troops.⁵⁹ They drove around looking at some of the other positions, and near Causeway 4 (S9), the farthest north, Barton's vehicle threw a track around 2330 as it was getting dark. Not able to repair it on the spot and located

right along the front lines, Barton and York climbed into Blakely's vehicle. The general assured Richards that they would send help. According to Barton, Richards did not say a word, but after the war told him, "he never felt so lonely, nor scared."⁶⁰

Sometime after 2330, Barton and Blakely arrived at the headquarters at Audouville-la-Hubert, where Rodwell had the staff operating. He gave Barton an overview of his division's status. From the beginning, the landing had gone well. Frankly, it is incorrect to say that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. An operation plan is nothing more than a scripted series of events that provide leaders with the direction for the opening phase of an operation. In this case, the nature of the region's currents and the loss of one of the naval control vessels caused the first wave to land south of the intended landing area.

It turned out to be a brilliant stroke of luck as the German defenses were weaker than the original sector. Once ashore, the leaders went about their business as if on another practice exercise. Everything that happened in those first few hours reflected on the division cadre's high level of preparation.⁶¹

Generally forgotten in most narratives is the division staff's role in ensuring that the regiments were as prepared as possible to handle the friction of battle. Rodwell and his crew monitored the enemy situation and the infantry battalions' progress while working behind the scenes away from photographers and journalists. They established the command post late in the afternoon and early evening and established radio contact with subordinate units. Now they could verify their situation and, if required, supply them with what they needed. First on the ground, and then by radio, they connected

with the 82d and 101st Divisions and began planning to organize the beachhead. Finally, they maintained contact with Colonel McKee and the VII Corps staff, still afloat, keeping him apprised of the division's situation and requirements. When the division commander returned to the headquarters that night, Rodwell could give him the update he needed to make decisions, get his guidance, and start preparing orders to guide the fight over the next few days. Writers generally ignore the chief of staff's role in most historical accounts, but he is as vital as any regimental commander, just not as noticeable. Barton was satisfied with how things went that day. He told Rodwell that night, "things are good; I think we made it." By nightfall on D-Day they "were ashore, well inland, an intact operational division—and now proven veterans."⁶²

Final Thoughts

Barton's last act of 6 June was to gather his regimental commanders outside his command post. Someone had liberated a few bottles of champagne, and the commander shared them with Rodwell, Blakeley, Barber, Roosevelt, Tribolet, Van Fleet, and Reeder, so they could "drink to the health of the best division in the army."⁶³ He began the day after his commanders had arrived and by the end of the day had regained control of his division. Barton's fears of falling in battle had not materialized.⁶⁴ However, using a football analogy, it was only the first series of downs and it would be a long game. Over the next three weeks, the division would claw its way north, fighting intense but generally forgotten battles at Crisbecq, Montebourg, Bois du Coudray, La Glacerie, and the eastern side of Cherbourg.

By the end of June, Barton's division had been in continuous combat for over three weeks and would have little rest before it headed south back into the bocage near Carentan. During this intense three-weeks of combat, the division lost 5,400 soldiers killed, wounded, or captured; almost 40 percent of its authorized strength. Most of these losses took place in the three line regiments.⁶⁵ Only five of the rifle company commanders who had made the D-Day landing were with the division three weeks later. Fortunately, many officers and newly promoted noncommissioned officers remained to steady the 4,400 replacements who partially refilled the division's ranks.⁶⁶

Among those missing at the end of June were some of the division's key leaders.

Barton's deputy, Henry Barber, had worn himself out and would soon be on his way back to England. Barton lost all three of his regimental commanders. Although a great trainer, Hervey Tribolet, failed the test of battlefield leadership, and was simply too close to his soldiers. Collins and Barton had to relieve him and, send him to army headquarters. James Van Fleet received a well-deserved promotion to brigadier and a new assignment, with Jim Rodwell taking his place. Probably the most heartbreaking for Barton was Red Reeder's wounding and evacuation after only a few days of combat. The intense fighting killed four battalion commanders: Dominick P. Montalbano (2d Battalion, 22d Infantry), Thaddeus R. Dulin (3d Battalion, 12th Infantry), John W. Merrill (1st Battalion, 12th Infantry), and Conrad C. Simmons (1st Battalion, 8th Infantry). Seven out of his twelve frontline infantry combat commanders were gone. At the same time as Rodwell's departure to the 8th Infantry, Collins took his G-3 Orlando Troxell and moved him to the same role at corps headquarters. After only three weeks of combat, Barton lamented: "We no longer have the division we brought ashore."⁶⁷ Ted Roosevelt would continue to mentor him for the next five weeks before suffering a heart attack. By then, Barton was a veteran commander and would continue to lead the division until his health gave out at the end of December. For Barton, D-Day was probably one of his best days in combat.

Dr. Stephen A. Bourque retired from the U.S. Army after twenty years of enlisted and commissioned service in 1992. He earned a PhD at Georgia State University in 1996 and has taught at several civilian and military colleges. He retired as professor emeritus from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies in 2017. His most recent publications include *D-Day 1944: The Deadly Failure of Allied Heavy Bombing on June 6* (Osprey, 2022) and *Beyond the Beach: The Allied War Against France* (Naval Institute Press, 2018). The French edition, *Au-delà des plages: La guerre des Alliés contre la France* (Humensis, 2019), received the Grand Prize in Literature from the l'Aéroclub de France in 2020. He is completing a biography of Maj. Gen. Raymond O. "Tubby" Barton.

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U.S. ARMY MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENTAL MUSEUM

By Kathy West and Amanda Webb

“OF THE TROOPS, AND FOR THE TROOPS!”

The Military Police Corps Regimental Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, tells the history of the military police (MP) soldier through a collection of 5,400 artifacts. Tracing the roots of the branch from the Maréchaussée of the American Revolution to today's MP, the museum highlights disciplines of the regiment, including police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support. The mission of the museum is to collect and preserve the material history of the U.S. Army's Military Police from 1775 to present. The museum also promotes the heritage and traditions of the MP branch and the values of the U.S. Army to soldiers and civilians through public exhibits, educational programs, and branch training support.

The museum got its start at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in 1957 where the Military Police School (then known as the Provost Marshal General Center) was located. The Office of the Chief of Military History formally registered the Military Police Corps Museum in June 1963. The museum followed the MP School to Fort McClellan, Alabama, in 1975. On 26 September 1986, Department of the Army orders formalized the creation the MP Corps Regiment, and the MP Museum's official name changed to the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regimental Museum. The museum moved again in 1999 when it followed the MP School to its present location at Fort Leonard Wood. On 1 December 2014, the museum officially opened a Regimental Room addition. The room is used for classroom training, graduations, official social events, various ceremonies, and meetings.

In the museum's Heritage and Traditions exhibit, visitors explore the history of badges, the Harpers Ferry Crossed Pistols, and



the iconic MP brassard. The Corrections and Detention exhibit features artifacts that reflect the responsibilities of Corrections and Detention Specialists who work in a confinement facility or who safeguard detainees and prisoners of war. Another exhibit showcases artifacts from the career of Maj. Gen. Harry H. Bandholtz, the Father of the Military Police Corps.

A new display focuses on the history of Criminal Investigations, featuring field agents and laboratory support. Further in the gallery, an immersive diorama takes visitors to the decisive action at the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, Germany, during World War II. Continuing through the gallery, another diorama shows visitors the attack of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive. This battle led to the official recognition of the combat support provided by MPs. In another section, visitors learn how the MP uniform has evolved from World War II to present-day.

Throughout the museum, soldier-made artwork, period photographs, and stories of MP heroism underscore that the history of the regiment is in the men and women who serve. This backdrop allows the staff to train current and future MPs, educate the public, and retain this important history for future generations.

Kathy West is the director of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regimental Museum.

Amanda Webb is a curatorial contractor.





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SCHLAICKER 1942



THE CORPS OF
MILITARY POLICE
UNITED STATES ARMY



Of the Troops and For the Troops, by Jes Wilhelm Schlaikjer, 1942 (U.S. Army Art Collection)



The focal point of this case is Jes Wilhelm Schlaikjer's iconic *Of the Troops and For the Troops*, painted in 1942. The painting continues to resonate with MP soldiers for both its imagery and motto.



Designated MPC 0001 and MPC 0002, these pistols were the first items cataloged by the museum in 1962. The Institute of Heraldry approved the MP Branch insignia of crossed Harpers Ferry pistols in 1922.



As Corrections/Detention Specialists, MP soldiers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations in a military correctional facility or detention facility. This exhibit features artifacts which represent this duty at different facilities over several time periods.



This exhibit highlights a World War I soldier performing as a Military Police Officer. With no approved branch insignia during this time, the red tabs and red hat band identify an MP. The number of soldiers serving as Military Police at the height of the war emphasized the need for a permanent branch.



The Evolution of the Military Police Uniform Exhibit represents the law-and-order function of the Military Police Corps Regiment. The uniform and equipment worn by MPs varied over the years based on uniform regulation changes and needs dictated by geographical location, type of duty, and local command guidance. This exhibit highlights only some of the uniforms worn by MPs since the Military Police Corps formation in 1941.




The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) Exhibit explores the history of the lab from formation to present day. Mirroring the lab during the mid-twentieth century, a small sample of tools and technology highlight how USACIL personnel support Military Police and Criminal Investigation Division investigations.





In this World War II exhibit, the 9th Infantry Division MP (right) directs traffic at the north end of the Ludendorff bridge as the 9th Armored Division MP (left) supervises a German prisoner of war on his way to the rear area across the bridge. Both MP units received the Presidential Unit Citation for their service at the bridge.



Piece of the Ludendorff Bridge

[illegible]



Viet Cong sappers blew a hole in the wall to gain entry to the U.S. Embassy compound as depicted by the facade of this case. The Distinguished Service Cross on display was awarded to Pfc. Paul Healey for his heroic actions at the embassy.



LARRY COSENS, SFC, US ARMY
MP and K-9 team on guard duty, 1971
oil on canvas, 18" x 24"
signed and dated
donated by the artist to the
Army Center of Military History
in 2007

Soldier artwork provides a unique opportunity to capture military life from the perspective of soldiers. Pfc. Larry A. Cosens served in Vietnam as an MP and combat artist, and depicted MPs, as seen here, with an MP and K-9 team on guard duty in South Vietnam.



In the battle for Saigon during the Communist Tet Offensive beginning 31 January 1968, Military Police responded to several attacks throughout the city. Depicted in this diorama is the response team of Pfc. Paul Healey and Sgt. John Shook ramming open the gate to the U.S. Embassy, which was under attack.

U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT



Maj. George S. Patton Jr. in full cavalry officer pack order, ca. 1921. Note the distinctive nape of the helmet liner in the back. The side profile of the major rank device on the front of the helmet is just barely visible when viewing the original photograph.

THE HELMETS OF GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON PART 1

MAJ. GEORGE S. PATTON JR.'S WORLD WAR I MARK I STEEL HELMET

By Ian D. Richardson

Although best known for his exploits in World War II, George S. Patton Jr. had a distinguished combat record beginning as early as the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916. However, it was the First World War and his time in France that truly shaped his relationship with twentieth-century warfare. Then a captain, Patton was one of the first U.S. troops to arrive in Europe as part of General John J. Pershing's staff in June 1917. Temporarily promoted to colonel, Patton made several visits to the front in May 1918 and saw combat as a tank brigade commander in September 1918.

Unprepared for war, the American Expeditionary Forces initially received many key pieces of personal equipment from French and British stocks to fill the gap. One such item provided to Americans upon landing in Europe were British helmets. The British "Brodie" helmet (named for designer John Leopold Brodie) is one of the iconic artifacts of the First World War. Although the French would emerge first on the scene with their "Adrian" helmet design in



George S. Patton Jr.'s British-issue Mark I Steel "Brodie" Helmet, ca.1917. Although the major rank device is currently affixed to it, it was his service helmet through World War I and remained with him afterward as Major of Cavalry at Fort Myer, Virginia, in the 1920s.

1915, the British followed quickly thereafter with their infamous Mark I Brodie or "soup bowl" helmet which would see widespread issue in early 1916. By mid-1917 production was in full swing as the steel helmet had quickly become an indispensable piece of modern personal equipment on the battlefields of the World War I.


The American Expeditionary Forces began to arrive in 1917, and received British Mark I helmets as U.S. production of a domestic copy (creatively dubbed the "M1917") was begun. The Mark I is easily distinguished from its American M1917 counterpart by its thin wire chinstrap bales and split-pins that attach them to the shell on the underside of the helmet skirt (The M1917 used stamped rivets after failures with split-pins were observed). The drawstring-adjustable oilcloth liner in Mark Is also had a small rubber ring at the crown for cushioning, which the M1917 omitted.

Patton's Mark I has several features unique to it. The issued helmet liner has been replaced with a tailor-made variant of much

higher quality. After World War I and the dissolution of the Tank Corps, Patton reverted back to a major of cavalry at Fort Myer, Virginia, which is most likely when he attached the rank device to the front of the helmet shell. At some point during his life, he also pasted a typed label describing the helmet and his service record with it. This is a common feature on dozens of items collected by Patton throughout his career that are now part of the General George S. Patton Museum collection.

Ian D. Richardson is the collections manager at the General George S. Patton Museum, Fort Knox, Kentucky.





A close up of the typewritten label pasted to the front of the helmet. There are several items in the General George Patton Museum collection with such tags on them. They generally speak to the provenance of each item and Patton's fondness of recording in detail everything he did—a true blessing for museum curators. Patton's son, George S. Patton III continued this tradition with many typewritten labels attached to items he captured or collected during his service in Vietnam.





The liner (*left*) of Patton's Mark I helmet is what sets it most apart from others. It has reinforced stitching around the entirety of the adjustable liner made of higher quality cotton than normal oilcloth liners. It also has a much smaller rubber "donut" crown cushion than normal Mark I liners. Also of note is the distinctive low dip of the rear of the liner, which covers the back of the head, much lower than a standard liner. The interior crown padding is of a finer quality white wool than normal liners.

Another view (*above*) of the distinct extension of the rear liner mentioned previously. Note that the exterior of the liner body is made of khaki corduroy. This would make for a far more secure and comfortable liner than those of standard-issue helmets, however ventilation would be minimal. The clear plastic surrounding the chinstrap is a conservatory effort to keep the chinstrap in place given that it has broken from the helmet bale on the left side.



Detail of Patton's Mark I helmet liner chinstrap. The chinstrap in Mark I/ M1917 helmets is typically integral to the liner assembly and is peened into the helmet and liner by way of a central top rivet. In this example, the private purchase liner chinstrap is replaceable and both sides have steel studs. Also note the distinctive thin wire bales of the British Mark I helmet that make it easy to determine its origin from that of an American-produced M1917.



Detail of Patton's Mark I helmet shell production stamping. Alphanumeric codes stamped into the rear of the helmet skirts were used on both British and American helmets in World War I to determine maker and steel batch in the event of major faults in production. This code, according to research, indicates manufacture by Hadfield Ltd. of Sheffield, England, which was one of the primary steel sources and manufacturers of helmets for Britain during World War I. Interestingly, most consider the seam of the helmet edge to be the rear of the helmet when worn. In Patton's case this is oriented to the front.

“NOT THE SOLDIERS WE NEED”



NEW RECRUITS AND NEW HAMPSHIRE REGIMENTS AT POINT LOOKOUT, MARYLAND, JULY 1863–MAY 1864

BY NATHAN A. MARZOLI

Early on a Monday morning in May 1864, the officers of the 5th Regiment, New Hampshire Infantry, stationed at the Confederate prisoner-of-war camp at Point Lookout, Maryland, marched the soldiers of their regiment to an open field and formed them into three sides of a hollow square. In the center was Pvt. Henry Burnham, a new recruit from the regiment who was to be executed. He had deserted the 5th New Hampshire earlier in the winter and had returned home to enlist and collect another recruitment bounty; unfortunately for Burnham, he was shipped back to the 2d New Hampshire, another regiment from the Granite State then at Point Lookout. Before officers gave the order to fire, they allowed Burnham to give a final speech, the crashing of waves from the Chesapeake shore nearby providing a gentle cadence to his delivery.¹

The only version of Burnham's words to survive is a lengthy account originally printed in *The Hammond Gazette*, a soldier-run newspaper at Point Lookout. "Beloved friends—I can address you as friends, for you have acted as such to me . . . I admit that I am a sinner," the *Gazette* version began. "I have not acted manly to the government that I have defrauded, not only once, or twice, but many times, and I now feel that I have done a serious wrong." Burnham advised the veterans to "do your duty to your country,

faithfully and well. Be true to the oath which you have taken, and you will feel better in your own heart. . . . The only source of happiness in this world springs from doing your duty to your country and your God, and unless you serve them faithfully you cannot experience true enjoyment of mind." After admitting that he was repenting to God in his final moments, Burnham got to the real heart of the matter. "Every man of you who has common sense must know that the state of things which has existed here, must be stopped," he said. "This rebellion must be put down, the country must be defended and the law upheld; and how is this to be done if desertion is not checked and discipline preserved in our army?" With his speech concluded, Burnham "behaved with great coolness & composure, [and] refused to be blindfolded," because "he wanted to 'look death square in the face,'" according to Lt. George Gove. The officers gave the order. "One groan alone, told that his troubles in this world were at an end," reported the *Gazette*, "but two or three throes of the body, and all was still."²

The execution left a lasting impression on the New Hampshire soldiers. "We shot a man belonging to this Reg yesterday, for desertion," Cpl. Miles Peabody told his father. "He had taken 4 bounties, but the last one was one to many for him," Peabody continued. "He was the first one that was ever shot in this Regt



Camp Cross, the encampment of the 5th New Hampshire at Point Lookout from 1863–1864

(A History of the Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the American Civil War 1861–1864)

for punishment and it is the last one that I ever want to see, for it was the most solemn scene that I ever saw in my life.” Lieutenant Gove similarly told his sister, Julia, that “it was the first execution I ever seen,” and that he was “not particularly anxious to see another.” The New Hampshire veterans spread the *Hammond Gazette*’s version of the speech—despite its questionable authenticity—far and wide. Lieutenant Gove sent a copy home to Julia, and Assistant Surgeon



2d Lt. George Gove

(U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center)

William Child included the speech in his regimental history of the 5th New Hampshire. Sgt. Richard Musgrove of the 12th New Hampshire, who had already departed Point Lookout for Virginia with his regiment and was therefore not even present at the execution, even included a copy of the speech in his postwar memoirs. Henry Burnham’s “words” mattered to these men; they used the account of his speech to explain their true feelings to those at home about the costs of desertion, and the detriment to their efforts to put down the rebellion.³

Beginning in November 1863, hundreds of soldiers such as Henry Burnham, brought into the Army through the draft, came to the 2d, 5th, and 12th New Hampshire Regiments stationed at the Confederate prisoner of war camp at Point Lookout, Maryland. Historians have generally only acknowledged the poor quality of these recruits, substitutes, and draftees, and the burden they placed on an exemplary and patriotic group of veterans—an interpretation straight from the pens of the original volunteers themselves.⁴ A closer reading of the contemporary and postwar writings of both veteran officers and enlisted soldiers, however, proves that their perceptions of these new soldiers were far more complex. Although veterans dealt with the many challenges that these recruits brought to their regiments, these New Hampshire soldiers processed and understood their arrival in many different ways. Just as they employed the execution of Henry Burnham to tell

those at home—and posterity—their true feelings about the costs of desertion, these soldiers also used the recruits to demonstrate their leadership skills, score political points at home, and ultimately to alter the nature of their entire service at the Maryland prisoner-of-war camp in postwar memory. Point Lookout presents an opportunity to not only study the meaning and memory of the integration of new recruits into Union regiments, but also the service of guards at a Civil War prisoner-of-war camp. The geographical meeting of the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay is a perfect backdrop for a study of the convergence of the old and new.⁵

POINT LOOKOUT

Washed by the waves of the Chesapeake Bay on one side and separated from the Virginia shoreline by the vast mouth of the Potomac on the other, Point Lookout is a mile-long marshy spit of sand—one New Hampshire soldier claimed it had “no rocks larger than an egg”—located at the extreme southern tip of St. Mary’s County, Maryland. The irregular peninsula varies in width, from only a few yards at the southern tip, to nearly a third of a mile at its northern limit. At the northern end, a tidal basin several acres in size separated the point from mainland Maryland. Point Lookout was a popular summer resort in 1861 and frequented by many pleasure-seekers who traveled to the hotel and cottages to escape from the insalubrious conditions of Baltimore and



An 1864 drawing of Point Lookout. The hospital is the structure at the end of the point that looks like the spokes of a wheel. The camps of the 2d and 12th New Hampshire are located at the top of the map on the left (Potomac) shore. The prison camp is on the opposite (Chesapeake) shore. The 5th New Hampshire's camp is located just above (north) the prison camp.
 (Library of Congress)

Washington, D.C. On the extreme end of the point was a lighthouse, as well as some fifty cottage houses and outbuildings. A grove of several acres of tall pines occupied the Chesapeake side of these cottages; opposite this stand of trees on the Potomac side was a single wharf, the only landing place on the entire point.⁶

When visitation to the point's resort declined with the outbreak of the war, the property owner offered it to the U.S. government as a location for a prospective military hospital. The Army completed construction of Hammond General Hospital at the very tip of Point Lookout (named in honor of Army Surgeon General William A. Hammond) in August 1862. The following summer, acknowledging that the Federal prison camp system could not handle the additional prisoners taken at Gettysburg, Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs ordered the construction of a large

prisoner-of-war depot, capable of holding up to 10,000 prisoners, at Point Lookout. The War Department detached St. Mary's County, Maryland, from the Middle Department and designated it as a new, separate district, under the command of Brig. Gen. Gilman Marston, the former commander of the 2d New Hampshire. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck directed Marston to remove about 300 troops from the Army of the Potomac to act as guards at the new camp, and specifically suggested the 2d, 5th, and 12th New Hampshire for that purpose. The battles at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg had decimated these regiments, and Halleck probably thought they could use the rest.⁷

At 1800 on 30 July 1863, the 2d and 12th New Hampshire embarked from the 7th Street wharf in Washington, D.C., aboard the steamer *John Brooks*, bound for the new prison camp. They arrived there the next day,

and after bathing in the river and receiving new uniforms to replace their tattered rags stained with perspiration from forced marches and the heat of battle, they began setting up their new homes. The soldiers discarded their old shelter tents and were issued new "A" tents. The officers drew wall tents. The troops set these up in well laid out regimental camps on the banks of the Potomac, on the opposite side of the point from the prison camp on the Chesapeake shore. Steamers soon began docking at the point's single wharf loaded with large shipments of incarcerated Confederates; by the end of August, there were already nearly 2,000 prisoners for the New Hampshire soldiers to guard.⁸


NEW RECRUITS

The 5th New Hampshire, meanwhile, was sent home to bolster its ranks and help recruit soldiers under the new draft. The

U.S. Army was starved for manpower by the beginning of 1863. The bloody campaigns of the war's first two years had inflicted unsustainable casualties. The enlistments of soldiers in 38 two-year regiments originally raised in 1861, and 92 nine-month regiments organized in 1862, were expiring in the spring and summer of 1863. These troops were not easily replaceable. Those who had likely enlisted for patriotic reasons, adventure seeking, or peer pressure had already joined the Army months ago, and general war weariness discouraged volunteering.⁹

Congress acted to solve this problem. On 3 March 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Enrollment Act into law and established the first national conscription in the United States.¹⁰ The law created a Provost Marshals Bureau to enforce and administer the draft on a national level, and allowed for the establishment of an enrollment board within each congressional district—headed by a district provost marshal—whose main task was to enroll every male citizen between age twenty and forty-five. This tally became the basis for each district's quota in Lincoln's four subsequent calls for troops from 1863 until the end of the war. Each congressional district theoretically had fifty days to fill its quota with volunteers following a draft call; if this number was not met by the deadline, the district would hold a lottery draft to fill any shortfalls.¹¹


The Enrollment Act provided a drafted man with a number of escape valves if he



did not want to serve in the Army, however. Enrollment Board surgeons disqualified thousands almost immediately due to a variety of ailments (whether real or feigned) during medical examinations. Congress,

in order to make the law more palatable to the public, also included two basic ways for draftees to evade service legally. First, any man could “commute” his service with \$300 (this did not preclude him from being drafted during subsequent draft calls, however). Much maligned, public outcry eventually forced Congress to repeal commutation in July 1864. However, legislators had designed it to control the prices of their second service loophole: the hiring of another man to serve in the draftee's place, known as substitution. If a draftee hired a substitute, who himself had to be ineligible for the draft, the former would no longer be eligible for any ensuing draft. It was therefore the most desirable option for a draftee to evade service.¹²

Because of these legal loopholes, very few drafted men actually ended up in uniform. Out of the 10,806 men drawn in New Hampshire throughout the final two years of the war, only 210 entered the Army (1.9%). The vast majority either were exempted medically from service, paid the commutation fee, or furnished substitutes. The reality was that Congress never designed the Enrollment Act to force men into service. Congress and the Lincoln administration



An engraving from *Harper's Weekly* depicting the draft in New York's Sixth District

(Library of Congress)



Modern photo of the lighthouse at the tip of Point Lookout
(Author's Collection)

instead intended to use the threat of a draft to stimulate volunteering.¹³

The draft did stimulate volunteering, but at a price. Although states had employed bounties since the early days of the war to encourage enlistments, a massive bidding war for soldiers broke out between districts so that they did not have to suffer the indignity of a draft. The resulting astronomical bounties attracted a substantial number of men who enlisted, pocketed the money, and deserted at the earliest possible chance just to repeat the process again in another district or state. This practice was so common that it became known as “bounty jumping.” Many towns and cities, including those in New Hampshire, also hired men to find recruits in faraway places in order to meet quotas. These substitute brokers cared little about the composition of the men they brought in for enlistment, and specifically targeted vulnerable populations such as recent immigrants (who spoke little or no English), alcoholics, criminals, and vagabonds.¹⁴

The soldiers of the 5th New Hampshire frequently recorded their initial impressions of these new recruits as they filtered into their camp just outside of Concord, New Hampshire. The recently commissioned 2d Lt. George Gove complained in a letter home that many of the “squads of new conscripts” who came to their regiment routinely “tried to get away.” Surgeon William Child similarly lamented to his wife,

Carrie, how some of the recruits escaped by stealing the coats of civilian workers within the camp to blend in with the laborers when they departed for the day. “They are a hard set I assure you,” he wrote, “the very ‘scum’ of New York and Boston . . . they are not the

soldiers we need.” Some of the veterans also had a glimmer of hope for the new soldiers, however. Cpl. Miles Peabody, for example, optimistically told his father that “to day I have a squad of them out to drill, [and] they do very well as part of them have been soldiers before.” Lieutenant Gove himself commented how they received a new batch of troops who were “a very intelligent orderly set of fellows, superior to the general run of substitutes,” whom he surmised would make fine soldiers.¹⁵

The soldiers of the 2d and 12th New Hampshire expressed a similar lack of confidence in the new recruits’ abilities when the 5th arrived at Point Lookout in November. Lt. Col. James Carr noted in his diary that the new soldiers had no weapons because the state was “afraid to trust them with [rifles] until they get at some point when they can control them.” Cpl. Alvah Manson, meanwhile, told his friend Abbie that “from the appearance of many of them, I should judge that it would require a large amount of drilling to make soldiers of them,” and that although he thought the few conscripts would perhaps do well in the Army, “the subs are decidedly the worst looking soldiers I have ever seen.” Pvt. Martin A. Haynes asserted that “there are a few good men among them, but they are mighty few,” and that “many of them are just watching for an opportunity to desert.” Haynes’ company



William Child of the 5th New Hampshire, years after the war
(*History of the Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers*)



Modern photo of the Potomac shore of Point Lookout, looking north toward the location of the 2d and 12th New Hampshire camps
(Author's Collection)

commander Capt. George W. Gordon was even more emphatic in his disdain. "The 5th N.H. arrived here last night and went into camp . . . with their conscripts and such a set d-d them," he wrote. "Oh! If I had a company of those fellows I

would want to kill some of the devils. I expect that we shall be filled up with such s[c]ulch on this new [draft] call, [and] if we are God help them."¹⁶

Much to their chagrin, these two regiments would soon receive their own share of new soldiers. "One hundred and sixty-nine new recruits for our regiment arrived here last Monday and we are sick of them already," Corporal Manson of the 2d New Hampshire complained to his friend Abbie in early December. Another soldier from Manson's regiment grumbled in a late December letter to his brother that although his company finally again had its full complement, "most of the men are from New York a hard set of men as you ever saw they are running away most every day some ought to be shot and will be if caught." On 17 December, an additional one hundred recruits, slated for the 12th, arrived at Point Lookout. Sgt. John H. Prescott heard a strange voice outside his tent, calling roll that morning. There he saw the 12th's first "subs," whom he claimed were some of the roughest men he had seen, and "represented all nations, France, Germany, Sweden, Scotland, Portugal, Ireland, Gibraltar, Russia, Denmark, England, Nova Scotia & Canada [and] America."¹⁷

political advantage. The *Laconia Democrat*, a Democratic newspaper critical of the war and the Lincoln administration, published a letter allegedly written by a soldier from the 12th New Hampshire soon after the first batch of recruits arrived at Point Lookout.



Colonel Carr of the 2d New Hampshire
(A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion)

Some of these troops saw potential in the arrival of the new recruits, however. One soldier, for example, leveraged his disdain for the arrival of the new recruits into a



Private Haynes, of the 2d New Hampshire
(A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion)



Modern reconstruction of a portion of the Confederate prison camp. Tides have washed away most of the site of the original camp.

(Author's Collection)

"But about two hundred of the original members of the noble 5th [New Hampshire] are left, [and] the rest are the roughest set of men I ever met," the soldier-correspondent complained. He called them "the off-scourings of society; men who came here, not for the good of their country, but for the bounty they received, intending to desert the first opportunity." Nor did the author have kind words for the 2d New Hampshire's new men, calling them "mostly 'roughs' from New York City, men whose lives, if we may judge from their conduct since they came here, have been entirely devoted to stealing and other unlawful pursuits." The soldier saved the true reasons behind his rants for the end of the letter. Taking a rather transparent political swing at the Republican administration of the draft, the author blamed the authorities at home "for sending such men here to become comrades of New Hampshire's noble sons," and that "the men who conduct the recruiting, ought to understand that we deserve better treatment than to be obliged to associate with robbers and even murder[er]s."¹⁸

Other soldiers were more optimistic, however. When the 2d and 12th New Hampshire first arrived at Point Lookout, they did not have enough soldiers to guard the Confederate prison camp; this task became more challenging with the arrival of additional prisoners and the expansion

of the camp. "The 12th NH Regt. is here with us and we take turns doing guard duty, our regiment furnishing the guard one week and they the next," Corporal Manson wrote home, "but as our regiment is rather



Captain Gordon, of the 2d New Hampshire

(A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion)

small, we have to go on every other day during our week." The new recruits could alleviate this workload; Sergeant Prescott recognized this even before their arrival. "Genl. Marston has sent a requisition to Gov. Gillmore for five hundred conscripts and we need them much," he jotted in his diary in August. A week later, he noted that two soldiers in his regiment received furloughs home, and that he thought "there may be more chances after the conscripts come out." Private Haynes voiced a similar opinion. A "crying need is for more men to do guard duty," he wrote home in early September. Haynes got his wish a few months later. Although he claimed to detest the new recruits, Haynes still admitted it did "seem good to turn in every night for an unbroken rest" when they performed guard duty in his stead.¹⁹

Some officers and noncommissioned officers welcomed the arrival of the new recruits because it provided an opportunity for promotion. "As soon as there are 800 men in the regt I shall get my commission as Lieut," wrote Sergeant Gove as he anticipated more and more recruits. By the end of December, the 12th New Hampshire was close to that mark. "In the morning 152 recruits come for our regt, [and in the evening] 81 more, making in all I believe 811," wrote Sergeant Prescott in his diary. "We have got enough for 2d Lieuts now and



Modern photo of the remains of Union earthworks that defended Point Lookout on the Potomac River side during the war

(Author's Collection)

I hope we shall get them right away that they may not have to wait 8 months as I have," he lamented. Some enlisted soldiers, however, such as Private Haynes, conversely blamed this ambition for the arrival of the recruits. "The fact that our regiment, with its reduced rolls, is not entitled to anything higher than a major in command, and no company has men enough to give it a second lieutenant," bemoaned Haynes, "has impressed our officers with a settled conviction that the regiment should be filled up with conscripts." Haynes could appreciate the arrival of the recruits for his own selfish reasons, but did not reciprocate that sentiment for his officers.²⁰

Officers and noncommissioned officers also viewed the arrival of the new troops as an opportunity to prove themselves as effective leaders. They saw the new recruits as a blank slate, and were proud of the opportunity to mold and train them into effective soldiers. During the journey down to Point Lookout, Lieutenant Gove had been in sole charge of his troops due to the illness of his company commander. "You see I have had my hands full," Gove boasted to his sister, Julia, "[because] my 48 substitutes have to be looked after all the time." When another eighteen came into his company months later, he confidently reported home that he "had some more greenhorns to drill." Sgt. Theron Farr,

also of the 5th New Hampshire, similarly boasted to his sister that "I have got som[e] new men to drill for awhile" when a new batch of recruits arrived for his company.²¹

Captain Gordon, of the 2d New Hampshire, particularly relished the opportunity to prove his leadership skills and transform the new recruits into capable soldiers. Gordon was confident in his skills as a leader from the start. He bragged to his wife, Angeline, in October 1863 that "I think my men will do more for me than any one else for some reason or other hardly know what except I feed them better which I guess we do." He was not happy with his prospects when he first received a batch of new recruits in December, however. "Well I have got a lot of recruits 20 and such devils," he reported to Angeline, complaining, "we have lost the name of N.H. now for certain for not one of them were born in N.H." Gordon began to regain some of his confidence, however. "Well I shall make them soldiers or give them a ticket for somewhere but not heaven," he wrote. Gordon was optimistic that he could return home by January if he could "get [his] dutchmen [a reference to the many German recruits] so that they can go it well." He spent hours drilling these new soldiers, and enjoyed the challenge. "It seems like some work [compared] to what we have done when you were [visiting] here," he told Angeline,

"but I rather like it for a change." Gordon was so confident of his abilities that he even promoted one of his new recruits to corporal.²²

Gordon's hubris, however, could not make up for a soldier's determination to desert. "I had four of my new men desert the other night, one I had made a Corporal," he glumly reported to his wife in February 1864. The new corporal took the opportunity of being in charge of guard at the wharf to flee in a boat with several other men. Their escape was not successful. Gordon reported that a gunboat picked them up; one had perished from the cold, and another was near death. The incident was the final straw for the officer. "I guess my men have had a chance to try cold weather," he sarcastically quipped, "and I hope that they are all frozen to death." His confidence in the new recruits, and perhaps his own leadership skills, was shaken. "I hope that they will draft and not buy these d-d scallawags that they sent to us," he told his wife in the same letter, "for they are not worth what they pay for them by long odds." Gordon was killed at Cold Harbor, Virginia, later that year and would unfortunately not have the opportunity, unlike some of his fellow New Hampshire officers, to reassert his leadership skills in the years following the war.²³

Some former officers continued to use the arrival of the new recruits to prove

Headquarters, 12th New Hampshire Infantry,
Chapin's Farm, near Fort Harrison, Virginia.
Winter of 1864.



A. W. Jewell, E. W. Mickett, G. E. Mearns, J. P. Lane, J. M. Seaborn, A. S. Smith, J. L. Seaborn, R. E. Gale, T. E. Barker, H. Q. Sergeant, A. M. Heth, J. H. Prescott, D. W. Seaborn, M. C. Baldwin, N. L. Calhoun, N. Stackford
1st Lieut. Captain 1st Lieut. 1st Lieut. Captain Captain Captain Adj. Lt. Col. Captain Captain Captain Captain 1st Lieut. Major

Members of the 12th New Hampshire at Chapin's Farm, near Fort Harrison, Virginia, in the winter of 1864. John Prescott is third from the right.

(U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center)

their leadership capabilities long after the war had ended. One of these was Capt. Thomas L. Livermore of the 5th New Hampshire. Livermore, who eventually rose to the rank of colonel and commanded the 18th Regiment, New Hampshire Infantry, wrote a personal memoir of his wartime experiences, *Days and Events*, only a few years after returning home. His children

published the account, with substantial revisions, after his death. A key theme of the memoir was Livermore using his wartime service to prove his masculinity. The former officer therefore portrayed himself as a strict disciplinarian to the new recruits. He asserted it was his duty to transform these soldiers, “who had for the most part . . . sold themselves without patriotism or a

desire to do their duty as soldiers,” into proper fighters. Livermore imparted a strict drill regimen and insisted on the personal cleanliness of the troops and their quarters. When someone acted out, he inflicted harsh discipline. The former officer boasted of a time that he had two deserters shackled together by both hand and foot. He sentenced them to pace twelve hours a



Captain Livermore of the 5th New Hampshire

(Library of Congress)

day, for thirty days straight, in front of the guardhouse, all while carrying a knapsack loaded with thirty pounds of beach stones. “This punishment would seem cruel to one who had not seen what these rascals could endure with indifference,” he wrote, “but in fact it was calculated to have no evil effect on them and to be sufficiently severe from its monotony and wearisomeness to deter them from ever risking its infliction again.” Although Livermore was disappointed when his regimental commander forced him to end the punishment before the full thirty days, he was still boastful of the results. He was “rather proud of the fact” that this was the only soldier under his command that he claimed deserted, “and he, after being captured and suffering the punishment I imposed upon him, never attempted desertion again.” Livermore also claimed that when he left his company to take command of the 18th New Hampshire, it was one of the best—if not the best—drilled companies in the entire 5th New Hampshire.²⁴

Although Sergeant Musgrove of the 12th New Hampshire eschewed the bombastic tone of Livermore, he used the arrival of the new recruits also to prove his leadership skills within the pages of his postwar memoirs. Musgrove, who eventually received a commission in the



A Confederate prisoner at Point Lookout, ca. 1864

(Library of Congress)

1st U.S. Volunteer Infantry Regiment (a unit recruited from Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout who signed an oath of allegiance to the United States), used his encounters with the new recruits to demonstrate that he was a benevolent, but capable leader. Musgrove recounted an incident at Point Lookout when Capt. Joab N. Patterson, the Assistant Provost Marshal and a member of the 2d New Hampshire, received a tip that a recruit

was going to steal a boat and desert that night. Patterson requested that Musgrove, then detailed as a sergeant of the provost guard at brigade headquarters, take two headquarters clerks and stand guard over the boat. He ordered them to fire on the soldier without challenge if he appeared. When he indeed tried to steal the vessel that night, Musgrove and his two companions arrested the recruit instead of killing him as ordered. Patterson, furious that the soldier

was still breathing, instructed Musgrove to tie him up by the wrists. When the sergeant did not tie the rope tight enough to satisfy the enmity of the assistant provost marshal, Patterson took a shovel and removed some of the dirt below the recruit's feet so he was dangling by the wrists. "Hour after hour passed and the agony of the victim became terrible," Musgrove wrote, and he "begged me to shoot him or kill him in any way rather than let him suffer longer." Musgrove took pity on the prisoner. He "took the shovel, and crowded some earth under his feet to relieve him in part, despite the remarks of onlookers that [he] would catch Hell for doing it." Another episode that allowed Musgrove to demonstrate his benevolence toward the recruits occurred when an alarm at Point Lookout called all the New Hampshire soldiers into line. The officers gave the order to load weapons. "In response to this command," Musgrove wrote, "one of the recruits, said to be a Catholic priest, being unable to get a Minie ball into his musket without removing the paper, put it into his pocket." The veteran Musgrove, again acting the role of savior, "detected the movement and caused the ball to be placed in its proper place." Musgrove used the arrival of recruits at Point Lookout to foreshadow his success as an officer of the similarly disadvantaged men within the 1st U.S. Volunteer Infantry, many of whom had been unwilling conscripts into the Confederate army themselves.²⁵

Musgrove and Livermore were not the only veterans who would use the recruits as tools in their postwar writings. When the New Hampshire veterans first arrived at Point Lookout, they described it as a place of bliss, rest, and relaxation to the people at home. However, duty at the prisoner-of-war camp did not remain as perfect as they had hoped. The arrival of the new recruits, with their well-documented troubles, provided the veterans with a way to reconcile this reality with their original expectations of Point Lookout as a wartime utopia and to redefine the nature of service at the prisoner-of-war camp in their postwar memoirs.

PARADISE LOST AT POINT LOOKOUT

Point Lookout did seem a paradise at first to veteran soldiers who had seen months of hard soldiering. Only a few days after arriving at the point, Corporal Manson, of the 2d New Hampshire, wrote home that he had "a very pleasant camp," the duty was



Centre Lawrence of the 2d New Hampshire

(Library of Congress)

not difficult, and that he hoped "we may be allowed to remain here for the remainder of our time [in the service]." Lt. Col. James Carr, also with the 2d, similarly found their new camp "a very pleasant place," and believed that "if all things work well," they "shall have a fine time." One soldier from the 12th New Hampshire told a friend that he liked Point Lookout "very much" and that it was "a very pleasant place" because of the "very pleasant weather all the time." Another in the 2d New Hampshire claimed he had a

"splendid time" because there was "plenty of bathing, fishing, oystering, sailing . . . [and] the weather [was] very fine . . . with nice sea breezes." 2d New Hampshire Adjutant Centre H. Lawrence told a friend that "Point Lookout Md is one of the most beautiful spots that the sunny South affords."²⁶

Some of the soldiers probably at first felt that Point Lookout was as close to home as they could get while in the Army. "I have been sitting here in my tent reeding some papers the chaplain gave me which are

very interesting,” Pvt. William P. Mason, of the 12th New Hampshire, wrote to his parents, “& have been listening to the song of the cricket & the hot bug which makes it seem like home . . . & seems just like Sunday.” Mason also told them that “we are very comfortable, [and] have a good time,” because all they had to do was stand guard. Perhaps 12th New Hampshire commissary sergeant John H. Prescott described the initial mood of the camp best as “very congenial,” because the troops were beginning to revive from their “lethargic states” stemming from the recent hardships.²⁷

The veterans could not possibly have sustained their personal perceptions of Point Lookout as a “military paradise” for long, however. The climate there was often one of extremes, and made for uncomfortable living. The days could be hot and stifling in the late summer and early fall of 1863, even with the sea breezes. The point’s exposed location also made the camp vulnerable to inclement weather. “We had a very severe shower last night with wind almost in a hurricane,” Sergeant Prescott noted in a 13 August diary entry. “Most of the field and line officer’s tents fell before the blast.” Sgt. Maj. Asa W. Bartlett similarly noted the destructive power of the storm, writing in his own diary “the officers were seen this morning walking about wet as drowned rats.” The fall and winter months, although much milder than New Hampshire, could still be cold; one officer claimed that Point Lookout “beats all places for bleakness I ever saw.” The changing seasons also brought strong gales and high tides that frequently flooded the lower ground of the camps. “It seemed as tho all the watter of the Bay was coming onto us yesterday,” Maj. James E. Larkin of the 5th New Hampshire told his wife Jenny and children about a springtime storm, writing that “it washed away ten feet of the bank.” Corporal Manson was similarly astonished at that same storm, telling his friend Abbie that Point Lookout had “been nearly overflowed,” and that “we were afraid it would be entirely.”²⁸

Disease was another environmental factor that plagued the troops stationed at Point Lookout. Crowded and unsanitary conditions among the incarcerated caused Civil War prison camps to become hotbeds of disease and death, and Point Lookout was no exception.²⁹ *The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion* reported 3,369 disease deaths among Confederate prisoners, with over half attributed to



Major Larkin of the 5th New Hampshire

(Library of Congress)

diarrhea or dysentery, followed to a lesser extent by pneumonia and smallpox. Nor were the New Hampshire soldiers guarding these prisoners immune from the spread of disease. The most notable death came 24 August, when Dr. Charles W. Hunt, a 30-year-old surgeon in the 12th New Hampshire, succumbed to typhoid fever. Hunt’s death hit the 12th particularly hard; the regiment accompanied Hunt’s body to the wharf, where it was loaded onto a boat for the long trip back to New Hampshire.³⁰

Vices, such as drinking and gambling, became problems, most likely because of boredom and ample free time. General Marston seems to have tried to keep liquor out of camp. Colonel Carr noted in his diary that Marston once halted the arrival of illicit alcohol at the wharf, and scolded the camp sutler for selling liquor. The efforts of Point Lookout’s commanding officer were often in vain, however. “The night after you left about twenty officers from the [gun]boats and Regts made me a call to bother me,” Capt. George Gordon told his wife, Angeline, in an October 1863 letter, “so I got some champaign and we had a merry night of it.” Only a week later, Gordon again wrote his wife about alcohol use among the officers. “Well we had a very fine time take it all in

all,” he wrote about a trip to a local tavern, “and came home in a fine state of feelings somewhat exuberant from wine.” Although Gordon seemed to enjoy his intemperance, alcohol could naturally cause problems. Colonel Carr noted in his diary that a Lt. Cooper—most likely regimental Adjutant John D. Cooper—once came back to camp “to drunk to be seen at night.” Private Haynes reported an episode in which one of his officers showed up at guard mount so “gloriously drunk that he could not walk straight,” and ruined the entire ceremony. In January 1864, Sergeant Major Bartlett recorded in his diary that “there was a drunken row and spree among the officers, especially of the 2d regt.” Sergeant Prescott admitted in his diary that he was not surprised so many officers were “drunkards,” “for it is nothing to do [at Point Lookout] but play games . . . and drink.” Although he admitted that his own regiment, the 12th, partook in gambling and games, Prescott was much more concerned about the drinking in the 2d New Hampshire. “This one [gambling] is a wasted time,” he noted in his diary, “the other of intellect.”³¹

Some soldiers struggled to resist the temptation of these vices. “Oh, Carrie, there are a thousand temptations in army life,” 5th New Hampshire Assistant Surgeon William Child wrote to his wife only days after arriving at the Maryland prisoner-of-war camp. “If I have yielded to some of them in the past, I will endeavor to do better in the future,” Child continued, admitting that he felt his wife had “a great good influence” over him, and that she should write him often in order to help distract him from these evils of camp life.³²

It was not all fun and games, however, as Point Lookout was a place of violence, even far removed from the battlefield. There is ample evidence that guards frequently fired their weapons at Confederate prisoners. In early October, Captain Gordon told his wife of an incident where guards shot two of five escaping prisoners. Colonel Carr documented another episode on 1 November where guards again shot and wounded two of six prisoners who had tried to escape by digging under the fence. Only two weeks later, Private Haynes wrote about an incident where the 5th New Hampshire’s drum corps began playing Dixie, causing the prisoners to get excited and crowd up against the fence. When the demonstration “became riotous and threatening,” the soldier on guard from the 12th New Hampshire fired into



Commissary-General of Prisoners Col. William Hoffman, standing on the steps on the right

(Library of Congress)

the crowd, striking two prisoners. The 2d New Hampshire private also chronicled an episode a few weeks later where a group of the prisoners, “led by their sergeants, made an organized assault on one of their cook houses,” for reasons unknown to Haynes at the time. The guards killed one prisoner and wounded several others during the fracas. At the end of November, Sergeant Major Bartlett noted in his diary that a sentinel from his regiment shot a prisoner; one Confederate in the camp claimed that the sentinel shot the prisoner in the head and he died soon thereafter. A member of the U.S. Sanitary Commission who inspected Point Lookout in November brought these incidents to the attention of Commissary-General of Prisoners Col. William Hoffman. General Marston denied they occurred.³³

The violence did not cease with the Sanitary Commission inspector’s report. In December, Confederate Bartlett Yancey Malone recorded how a “Yankey Captain shot his Pistol among our men and wounded 5 of them; sence one has died.” The captain, most likely commandant of the prison camp George E. Sides, shot the prisoners for “crowding arond the gate.” In another instance, Malone claimed a guard shot and wounded one of the prisoners for “peepen threw the cracks” of the fence. The

most noted instance of violence against a Confederate prisoner was that of Sgt. Edwin Young of the 2d New Hampshire, who was court martialed by a board of officers for killing a Confederate prisoner in March 1864. Witnesses agreed that Young shot and killed the Confederate because the prisoner had used “profane and insulting language and violent gestures” toward the Union sergeant (the prisoner had apparently told Young that he was as fit for guard duty as the U.S. Colored Troop soldiers also then at Point Lookout, to which Young took extreme offense). The board of officers, General Marston, and even Colonel Hoffman, found Young’s actions justifiable.³⁴

Point Lookout clearly did not remain the wartime utopia that troops had encountered immediately upon their arrival; despite their hopes to the contrary, war and Army life followed the veterans there. To help reconcile their hopes of paradise with reality, veterans began to claim that it was the draftees, money-grubbing recruits, and substitutes who destroyed everything that was good at Point Lookout, thus inextricably linking these new soldiers with guard duty at the prisoner of war camp. By forever associating the recruits’ arrival with service at Point Lookout, veterans could omit or discount many of their own faults—such

as drinking, violence, and discord—from their postwar writings.

This interpretation, like many in postwar memory, had a kernel of truth. It emerged when the first recruits arrived at Point Lookout. Cpl. Alvah Manson complained in a letter that although before they had “the liberty of going any where inside of our pickets,” the recruits’ arrival “caused a guard to be posted around our camp,” for the first time since the veterans had come to Point Lookout. “As you may judge,” he wrote, “this causes considerable hard feeling against the new recruits by all the old soldiers.” Manson also implied that the others in his regiment had not abused alcohol until the arrival of the new soldiers. He wrote that a recruit “obtained liquor in some manner and of course got drunk and while in that condition got into a dispute with one of our old members.” The new soldier “cut him in the arm with a desk knife which will disable him for some time.” Private Haynes similarly bemoaned that they had never had a guard around camp, “but now it is to be a fixture . . . The old men are terribly disgruntled.” The authors of the postwar regimental histories and memoirs would take this sentiment and make it a key theme of their writings on Point Lookout.³⁵

These authors first heavily underscored Point Lookout’s reputation as a paradise before the arrival of the new recruits, as a literary juxtaposition of what would come next. “To troops that had seen so much of the dark, rough side of a soldier’s life,” wrote Bartlett in his history of the 12th New Hampshire, “it was a military paradise, where they could find and enjoy, in quiet safety, the rest and relaxation that their nerves and muscles so greatly needed, and which the mind did not fail to appreciate.” Bartlett fondly recalled the Point’s “nice picnic cluster of pine trees” that “sweeten[ed] the air and shade[d] the ground, and the “mild climate and healthy location” that was “washed by the waves” of the Chesapeake. “Could the many loved comrades, left buried behind, have been there to enjoy it with them,” he continued, “their cups would have lacked only the sweet pleasure of home to have overflowed with joy and gladness.” Former Private Haynes, the author of the 2d New Hampshire’s official history, also believed that the soldiers “enjoyed to the utmost” their duty at the point, which allowed them to bathe in the waters of the Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River, fish and gather oysters and crabs, and take joyful boat

rides whenever they pleased. The 12th New Hampshire's Sgt. Richard Musgrove went so far as to inform readers of his memoirs that Point Lookout was "almost a fairy land."³⁶

To these soldier-authors, the recruits became the de facto reason for the destruction of that paradise, and therefore forever linked their arrival with service at Point Lookout. Before they showed up, "all the soldiers had enjoyed the greatest liberty consistent with their duties," Sergeant Musgrove wrote in his memoirs. Whereas the men had been able to boat and fish to their hearts' content, or "could stroll into the country as far as inclination prompted and duty allowed," everything changed "when these fellows came," he wrote. "A strong guard was placed across the Point," Musgrove continued, "and no one was allowed to go into the country, or use a boat, without a written pass, and finally nearly all boats were destroyed." Musgrove asserted that only the arrival of the recruits "was the beginning of trouble for the veterans." Private Haynes asserted, "the old men of the Second, the true New Hampshire boys, who for more than two years had faced death fearlessly to make a record which should be the pride of their state for ages, keenly felt the change which had come." The former 2d New Hampshire soldier even went so far as to claim that it was the new recruits' arrival that drove many of the veterans not to reenlist the following summer. The 12th New Hampshire's regimental historian made perhaps the most absurd claims. Asa Bartlett asserted that before the arrival of "the all-perverting" recruits, "there existed the most perfect confidence and friendship" between the officers and troops, and "punishment was uncalled for, as disobedience, demanding it, was unknown; and camp guard had long been a thing of the past." Everything changed when the "all-perverting 'sub'" arrived, Bartlett claimed. "No pleasure or privilege for the boys in camp any more," he continued, "for the hard lines and severe discipline of military necessity apply with a rigidity never before required."³⁷

Some veterans did not entirely omit their own flaws in postwar writings, but instead attributed them to the recruits. Despite the prevalence of alcohol among the officers at Point Lookout, Richard Musgrove only mentioned its consumption by the new recruits in his memoirs, claiming that they "were known to pay as high as twenty dollars for a canteen of whisky." The former

sergeant also recalled an episode in which a new member of his company got drunk on guard and was forced to sit all afternoon on the ridgepole of a tent bearing a placard around his neck that confessed his crime. Asa Bartlett similarly only attributed gambling at Point Lookout to the recruits, and never brought up the vice among his fellow veterans. The only time the 12th's regimental historian explicitly mentioned it, he called out a recruit known by the name of "Curley" for swindling "his comrades out of several thousand dollars." By attributing their own vices and forever linking Point Lookout to the recruits, the veterans were able to leave out many of their own problems at the camp—vice, violence, and death—from their postwar memoirs with a clear conscience. Point Lookout could forever remain their own soldier's paradise.³⁸

CONCLUSION: THE RECRUITS PUSH BACK

Unfortunately, the recruits did not leave a substantial written record to defend themselves. Many either did not speak English or did not desire to document their service for a cause they may not have necessarily supported. Their pension files, however, demonstrate how the recruits pushed back against the veteran narrative by insisting that their own experiences were not so different. Joseph Hildreth, for example, a recruit in Company H of the 12th New Hampshire, tried to get an increase on his pension in 1899 by claiming that he participated in his fair share of duty at Point Lookout while standing guard during the winter of 1863 to 1864, and freezing his right big toe in the process. Columbus Morgan, who enlisted in the same regiment under the false name of John Tucker, claimed that while at Point Lookout he "contracted the typhoid fever which resulted in disease of heart and respiratory organs and constipation caused from exposure to inclement weather." In 1883, James Collins claimed that he suffered from a "rupture of [his] right side caused by a kick at the snow ball battle at Point Lookout Maryland March 24, 1864," an affair between the 2d and the 12th New Hampshire that the veterans included in the regimental histories and memoirs. It must be noted, of course, that these soldiers submitted these requests with the goal of securing a pension, and therefore, additional money for themselves and family members. Attempting to write themselves into the veteran narrative, regardless of motive, pushed back on the notion

that they alone had destroyed the paradise at Point Lookout.³⁹

These attempts to "veteranize" were not usually successful, however. When the former recruits contacted their wartime officers and fellow soldiers to request affidavits, they usually only received statements in return claiming ignorance of their existence. One example is the statement of veteran William Lamprey, who testified that "while we were at Point Lookout Maryland winter of 1863 or 4 we had a large number of substitutes come to us—I did not associate with them—and knew but few if any of them." The recruits were misguided also in their efforts to secure pensions. The veterans wanted to remember Point Lookout as a blissful place; there was no room in their memory for injuries, illnesses, or ailments incurred from the inclement weather or strenuous duty while on guard duty there. The pension files were also, by their nature, confined to the halls of the Pension Bureau, and never seen by the eyes of the public. Without the power of publication, and with no widespread support from the original volunteers themselves, the former recruits were never able to integrate their own words into the stories of the New Hampshire regiments. They left the narrative to the veterans, and it is the one we still know today.⁴⁰

Nathan A. Marzoli is a staff historian for the Air National Guard History Office, located at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. A U.S. Air Force veteran, he completed a bachelor's degree in history and a master's degree in history and museum studies at the University of New Hampshire. His primary research and writing interests focus on the implementation and enforcement of the U.S. Enrollment Act of 1863 (draft) during the Civil War. He is the author of several articles in journals, such as *Civil War History* and *Army History*, as well as numerous blog posts for the *Journal of the Civil War Era*, *Emerging Civil War*, and the National Museum of Civil War Medicine. He currently works remotely from a small town in southwest Virginia.

EDITOR'S NOTE

Original spelling and punctuation in all source material has been maintained throughout.

NOTES

1. Ltr, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 12 May 1864, Parsons Family Papers, Special Collections, University of New Hampshire Library (UNHL), Durham, N.H.; Headquarters, St. Mary's District, GO 15, 7 May 1864, James Larkin Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society (NHHS), Concord, N.H.; William Child, *A History of the Fifth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers* (Bristol, NH: R. W. Musgrove, 1893), 242–45; Richard W. Musgrove, *Autobiography* (privately published: Mary D. Musgrove, 1921), 119–23.

2. Library of Congress, “About *Hammond Gazette*, (Point Lookout, Md.) 1862–1864” n.d., <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82002197/>. The newspaper was originally published for patients and staff of Hammond General Hospital, but enjoyed a wide readership among the New Hampshire soldiers once the prisoner-of-war camp was established at Point Lookout. Charley Greer founded the paper, but Capt. George Everett, of the 38th United States Colored Troops, was the publisher for most of its wartime run. Child, *A History of the Fifth Regiment*, 242–45; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 119–23; Ltr, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 12 May 1864, UNHL.

3. Ltr, Miles Peabody to John Peabody, 10 May 1864, Mike Pride Civil War Collection, 1775–1927, NHHS; Ltr, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 12 May 1864, UNHL; Child, *A History of the Fifth Regiment*, 242–45; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 119–23.

4. Lorien Foote's *The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Manhood, Honor, and Violence in the Union Army* (New York: New York University Press, 2010) is one of the few exceptions. Foote's book studies the arrival of new recruits through the lens of manhood and masculinity. Kenneth Noe's *Reluctant Rebels: The Confederates who Joined the Army after 1861* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) is a good study of conscripts in the Confederate army. For an excellent recent historiographical essay on the “Civil War soldier,” see Gerald Prokopowicz, “The Common Soldier of the Civil War: His Rise and Fall,” *Journal of the Civil War Era* 11, no. 4 (Dec 2021): 539–62. Note that there was a difference between substitutes, recruits, and draftees during the Civil War. What made it more confusing was that veterans often interchangeably referred to them as “subs” or recruits. Even though “recruit” had a very specific meaning—men who volunteered to avoid the draft—as opposed to a substitute or draftee, this study uses it in the more general term. Therefore, any man who replaced losses in veteran units, whether that be a draftee,

substitute, or volunteer, is referred to as recruit for the sake of simplicity. In later wars, such as World War II, these soldiers were known as “replacements.”

5. For studies on Civil War memory, see David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Barbara Gannon, *The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); M. Keith Harris, *Across the Bloody Chasm: The Culture of Commemoration among Civil War Veterans* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014); Caroline Janney, *Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), and *The Ends of War: The Unfinished Fight of Lee's Army after Appomattox* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021); Brian Matthew Jordan, *Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War* (New York: Liveright, 2014); Kevin M. Levin, *Remembering the Battle of the Crater: War as Murder* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012); Carol Reardon, *Pickett's Charge in History and Memory* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and Elizabeth Varon, *Victory, Defeat, and Freedom at the End of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

6. Ltr, Alvah Manson to Abbie Rowell, 9 Sep 1863, Brewster Family Papers, 1800–1864, NHHS; Martin A. Haynes, *A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion* (Lakeport, NH: privately published, 1896), 199; American Battlefield Trust, “Point Lookout State Park and Civil War Museum,” <https://www.battlefields.org/visit/heritage-sites/point-lookout-state-park-and-civil-war-museum>; Edwin Beitzell, *Point Lookout Prison Camp for Confederates* (Abell, MD: Genealogy from the Heartland, 1983), 1–3; “Washington Correspondence,” *Laconia Democrat*, 30 Oct 1863.

7. Haynes, *A History of the Second Regiment*, 199; American Battlefield Trust, “Point Lookout State Park and Civil War Museum,” Beitzell, *Point Lookout Prison Camp*, 19–20; “Washington Correspondence,” *Laconia Democrat*, 30 Oct 1863; U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 2, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), 132–33, 140–42 (hereinafter cited as *OR*). Most of the area where the hospital was located during the war is now under the waters of the Chesapeake Bay.

8. Asa W. Bartlett, *History of the Twelfth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War*

of the Rebellion (Concord, NH: Ira C. Evans, 1897), 145–46; Haynes, *A History of the Second Regiment*, 199–200; Diary, John H. Prescott, 31 Jul–1 Aug 1863, NHHS; Child, *A History of the Fifth Regiment*, 237; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 105–6; *OR* ser. 2, vol. 6, 183, 206, 214, 243; Ltr, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 15 Aug 1863, Captain George W. Gordon Papers, 1860–1864, NHHS.

9. James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 600.

10. There are still relatively few extensive studies of the Enrollment Act and the draft. See Eugene Murdock, *Patriotism Limited, 1862–1865: The Civil War Draft and the Bounty System* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1967) and *One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); James Geary, *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991) and “Civil War Conscription in the North: A Historiographical Review,” *Civil War History* 32, no. 3 (Sep 1986): 208–28; Grace Palladino, “The Poor Man's Fight: Draft Resistance and Labor Organization in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, 1860–1865,” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1983); Hugh C. Earning, “Commutation: Democratic or Undemocratic?” *Civil War History* 12, no. 2 (Jun 1966): 132–42; Peter Levine, “Draft Evasion in the North during the Civil War, 1863–1865,” *Journal of American History*, 67, no. 4 (Mar 1981), 816–34; Matthew Gallman, *Defining Duty in the Civil War: Personal Choice, Popular Culture, and the Union Home Front* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); and William Marvel, *Lincoln's Mercenaries: Economic Motivation Among Union Soldiers During the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2018). For an excellent study of conscription in the Confederate states, see Kenneth Noe, *Reluctant Rebels: The Confederates who Joined the Army after 1861* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

11. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 600–1; Geary, *We Need Men*, 65–66; Eugene C. Murdock, *One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 8–15.

12. Geary, *We Need Men*, 66–68; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 601; Murdock, *One Million Men*, 6–7.

13. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 605; Murdock, *One Million Men*, 353.

14. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, 605–6; Murdock, *One Million Men*, 6–7, 218–304.

15. Ltrs, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 17 Sep 1863, 16 Oct 1863, and 23 Oct 1863, UNHL; William Child, *Letters From a Civil War Surgeon: Dr. William Child of the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers* (Solon, ME: Polar Bear & Company), 155, 195; Ltr, Miles Peabody to Father, 14 Oct 1863, NHHS.

16. Diary, James Carr, 13 Nov 1863, James W. Carr Diaries, 1863–1864, NHHS; Ltr, Alvah Manson to Abbie Rowell, 15 Nov 1863, NHHS; Martin Haynes, *A Minor War History Compiled From A Soldier Boy's Letters to "The Girl I Left Behind Me"* 1861–1864 (Lakeport, NH: Privately Printed, 1916), 140; Ltr, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 14 Nov 1863, NHHS.

17. Ltr, Alvah Manson to Abbie Rowell, 5 Dec 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Charles F.A. to Oliver Patch Whitcomb, 24 Dec 1863, Whitcomb, Chase, and Parker Family Papers, NHHS; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 17 Dec 1863, Asa W. Bartlett Diaries, 1862–1865, NHHS; Diary, John Prescott, 18 Dec 1863, NHHS.

18. "Letter from the 12th Regiment," *Laconia Democrat*, 18 Dec 1863. For discussions of the partisan press during the Civil War, see Harold Holzer, *Lincoln and the Power of the Press: The War for Public Opinion* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), xvi–xxii.

19. Ltr, Alvah Manson to Sir, 7 Aug 1863, NHHS; Diary, John Prescott, 19 and 28 August 1863, NHHS; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 125, 127, 130, 132, 140.

20. Ltr, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 16 Oct 1863, UNHL; Diary, John Prescott, 29 Dec 1863, NHHS; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 131, 135; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 124–25.

21. Ltrs, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, ca. Nov 1863, and 1 Jan 1864, UNHL; Ltr, Theron A. Farr to sister, 18 May 1864, Mike Pride Civil War Collection, 1775–1927, NHHS.

22. Ltrs, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 15 Aug, 3 Oct, and 2 Dec 1863, NHHS.

23. Ltr, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 6 Feb 1864, NHHS; Haynes, *A History of the Second Regiment*, 207; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 125; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 151–52; Diary, Asa Bartlett 1 and 3 Feb 1864, NHHS.

24. "Guide to the Thomas L. Livermore Diary 1860–1866," UNHL, n.d., <https://library.unh.edu/find/archives/collections/thomas-l-livermore-diary-1860-1866>; Thomas L. Livermore, *Days and Events 1860–1866* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), 313–14, 323–324; Diary, Thomas Livermore, Days and Events original copy, 368, 379–81, UNHL. Historian Lorien Foote asserts "Northern men, to a greater

extent than their southern counterparts, did not conform to a singular understanding of manhood or to a uniform ideal of what constituted manly behavior." However, "men sought to prove their manhood in a variety of ways: some through physical domination, some through the acquisition of an upright and self-controlled character, some through economic success, and some through a combination of attributes." Foote, *The Gentlemen and the Roughs*, 3–16. In his study *Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline in the Union Army* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 4–7, Steven J. Ramold writes that "the army struggled throughout the war to reach a point where they could accommodate the populist inclinations of its volunteers with the more stringent traditions of military law. The result was a flexible legal system that entirely satisfied neither the volunteers nor the professional soldiers." This suggests that the arrival of the new recruits did not signal a drastic change in the army's discipline, as Livermore implied.

25. Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 119, 126; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 15 Dec 1863, NHHS; Frederick H. Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Des Moines, IA: The Dyer Publishing Co., 1908), 1717; *OR* ser. II, vol. 6, 823, 1090.

26. Ltr, Alvah Manson to Unknown, 7 Aug 1863, Brewster Family Papers, 1800–1864, NHHS; Diary, James Carr, 31 Jul 1863, NHHS; Ltr, Louis Rowe to Abbie, 20 Sep 1863, Civil War Document Collection, U.S. Army History and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Ltr, George Sargent to Caroline W. Sargent, 6 Sep 1863, George Sargent Correspondence, 1861–1864, NHHS; Ltr, Centre Lawrence to my dear friend, 6 Aug 1863, Correspondence and Writings, NHHS.

27. Ltr, William Mason to Parents, 23 Aug 1863, William P. Mason Letters, 1862–1864, UNHL; Diary, John Prescott, 14 Sep 1863, NHHS.

28. Diary, John Prescott, 4, 10–11, 13, 20, 22 Aug 1863, 19 Sep 1863, 2 Oct 1863, 13 Nov 1863, 20, 23 Dec 1863, NHHS; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 13 Aug 1863, 19 Jan 1864, 2, 5 Apr 1864, NHHS; Ltr, John Godfrey to Horace Godfrey, 25 Mar 1864, Letters of John Godfrey, NHHS; Ltr, James Larkin to Darling Wife and Children, 3 Apr 1864, James Larkin Papers, NHHS; Ltrs, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 1 Jan 1864, 23 Mar 1864, UNHL; Ltrs, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 25 Oct 1863, 14 Nov 1863, NHHS; Ltrs, Alvah Manson to Abbie Rowell, 29 Sep 1863, 14 Oct 1863, 10 Jan 1864, 10 Apr 1864, NHHS; Diary, James Carr, 7–13 Aug 1863, 18–19 Sep 1863, 2–3, 24 Oct 1863, 7, 11, 30 Nov 1863; Musgrove, *Autobiography*,

106; Child, *Letters From a Civil War Surgeon*, 213, 227; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 121.

29. The "truth" of conditions in Civil War prisoner-of-war camps, both U.S. and Confederate, has been hotly debated by survivors and historians since the end of the war. For a sample of the historiography, see James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States*, vol. 5, 1865–1865 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1912), 483–509; Holland Thompson, ed., *The Photographic History of the Civil War*, vol. 4, *Soldier Life and Secret Service and Prisons and Hospitals* (n.p.: 1911; repr. Secaucus, NJ: The Blue and Grey Press, 1987), 14, 16–18, 48, 168; William Best Hesseltine, *Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930), and ed. *Civil War Prisons* (1962; repr. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1995); Phillip R. Shriver and Donald J. Breen, *Ohio's Military Prisons in the Civil War* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press for the Ohio Historical Society, 1964); George Levy, *To Die in Chicago: Confederate Prisoners at Camp Douglas 1862–1865* (Evanston, IL: Evanston Publishing, 1994); Beitzell, *Point Lookout Prison Camp*; Mauriel Joslyn, *Immortal Captives: The Story of the 600 Confederate Officers and the United States Prisoner of War Policy* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, Co., 1996); Lonnie Speer, *Portals to Hell: Military Prisons in the Civil War* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997); Michael P. Gray, *The Business of Captivity: Elmira and Its Civil War Prison* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001); Charles W. Sanders Jr., *While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); James Gillespie, *Andersonvilles of the North: The Myths and Realities of Northern Treatment of Civil War Confederate Prisoners* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2008); and Michael P. Gray, ed., *Crossing the Deadline: Civil War Prisons Reconsidered* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2018).

30. Gillespie, *Andersonvilles of the North*, 188–89; Diary, John Prescott, 11, 20 Aug 1863, 4, 29 Sep 1863, NHHS; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 24–25 Aug 1863, NHHS; Ltr, "Y" to Editor, *Belknap Gazette*, 23 Apr 1864; Diary, James Carr 9 Sep 1863, 16 Nov 1863, NHHS; *OR* ser. II, vol. 6, 422, 435, 489, 575–81, 585–86, 644–45, 705–6, 740–45, 753–54; Child, *A History of the 5th Regiment*, 240, 247; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 115; Child, *Letters From a Civil War Surgeon*, 183.

31. Ltr, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 11, 17, Oct 1863, NHHS; Diary, James Carr, 10, 29, 30 Oct 1863, NHHS; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 127–28; Diary, Asa Bartlett,

13 Jan 1864, NHHS; Diary, John Prescott, 9–10 Dec 1863, 6 Nov 1863, NHHS.

32. Child, *Letters from a Civil War Surgeon*, 183–185, 191, 195, 201. See W. J. Rorabaugh, *The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Mark Edward Lender and James Kirby Martin, *Drinking in America: A History, The Revised and Expanded Edition* (New York: Free Press, 1987).

33. Ltr, George Gordon to Angeline Streeter Gordon, 3 Oct 1863, NHHS; Diary, James Carr, 1 Nov 1863, NHHS; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 131, 137, and *A History of the 2d Regiment*, 201–2; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 113; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 30 Nov 1863, NHHS; William Whately Pierson Jr., ed., *The Diary of Bartlett Yancey Malone* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1919), 44; *OR* ser. II, vol. 6, 575–81, 585, 644–45.

34. Pierson, *Diary of Bartlett Yancey Malone*, 44, 47; Haynes, *A History of the 2d Regiment*, 200; *OR* ser. II, vol. 6, 1097–1104; Ltr, George Gove to Julia Gove Parsons, 23 Mar 1864,

UNHL; Diary of Charles W. Hutt, 22 Mar 1864, in Beitzell, *Point Lookout Prison Camp*, 70; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 114; Ltr, Joseph Bunker to Daniel Bunker 22 Mar 1864, Pension File, Civil War and Later Pension Files; Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Record Group (RG) 15, National Archives Building (NAB), Washington, D.C.; *OR* ser. II, vol. 7, 66–68, 179, 200, 382–85. Once the 36th U.S. Colored Troops took over primary guard duty responsibilities, there were instances of these men shooting prisoners as well. See *OR* ser. II, vol. 7, 163–67, 698.

35. Ltr, Alvah Manson to Abbie Rowell, 5 Dec 1863, NHHS; Haynes, *A Minor War History*, 140.

36. Bartlett, *History of the Twelfth Regiment*, 145; Haynes, *A History of the 2d Regiment*, 200; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 105–6.


37. Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 116; Haynes, *A History of the 2d Regiment*, 206–7; Bartlett, *A History of the Twelfth Regiment*, 155; Foote, *Gentlemen and the Roughs*, 173.

38. Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 116–17, 126; Bartlett, *A History of the Twelfth Regiment*, 156–57.

39. Pension File, Joseph Hildreth, Civil War and Later Pension Files; Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, NAB; Pension File, John Tucker, Civil War and Later Pension Files; Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, NAB; Pension File, James Collins, Civil War and Later Pension Files; Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, NAB; Bartlett, *A History of the Twelfth Regiment*, 160–61; Haynes, *A History of the 2d Regiment*, 212–13, and *A Minor War History*, 156; Musgrove, *Autobiography*, 130; Diary, Asa Bartlett, 24 Mar 1864, NHHS.

40. Pension File, Edward Robinson, Civil War and Later Pension Files; Records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, RG 15, NAB.

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
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BOOKREVIEWS



THE BATTLES OF CONNECTICUT FARMS AND SPRINGFIELD, 1780

BY EDWARD G. LENGEL

Westholme Publishing, 2020
Pp. xxiii, 104. \$26

REVIEW BY JOSHUA SHEPHERD

Recent years, thankfully, have seen a renewed interest in the military history of the American Revolution. After several decades during which niche social topics tended to predominate the historiography, an increasing number of researchers have turned their energies to producing solid battle histories of the Revolution's major engagements. Battles including Brandywine, Monmouth, Germantown, Guilford Courthouse, and Saratoga have all been the subject of well-researched monographs in recent years.

In a war that rarely witnessed engagements that pitted more than a few thousand troops against each other, smaller actions tended to characterize

the fighting. With the release of *The Battles of Connecticut Farms and Springfield, 1780*, author Edward Lengel has chronicled ably one of the most pivotal, but least known, campaigns of the Revolution.

By the spring of 1780, major operations had largely shifted to the southern colonies. After a month-long siege, Charleston, South Carolina, fell to Crown forces under the command of Sir Henry Clinton. The fall of the city ushered in a period of intense internecine warfare that would sweep across the Carolinas and Virginia over the subsequent two campaign seasons, culminating at Yorktown, Virginia, in the autumn of 1781. In the northern colonies, the fighting largely would be reduced to skirmishes and localized raids, rendering the countryside of New Jersey a perilous no-man's-land.

The last large-scale operation in the north was set in motion because of overly optimistic and woefully inaccurate intelligence that Loyalist agents provided and Tory political appointees promoted. During Clinton's absence from New York, overall command of Crown forces in the region fell to Lt. Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen, a career soldier who generally was considered an able field officer. Knyphausen, however, fell prey to a steady stream of faulty intelligence that indicated New Jersey's Loyalists simply needed a robust show of force in order to turn out en masse; more tantalizingly, Knyphausen believed, the poorly supplied Continental Army, then encamped at Morristown, neared collapse.

During the first week of June, the normally capable Knyphausen launched an ill-conceived and poorly executed thrust into New Jersey. For the ill-starred German general, the affair would degenerate into a fiasco on 7–8 June. Rather than carrying out an unopposed strike toward Morristown, Knyphausen stirred up a veritable hornet's nest of New

Jersey militia, and a resolute delaying action fought by veteran Continental troops stymied him. Stopped cold at Connecticut Farms, frustrated Crown forces set the small village ablaze, further antagonizing the civilian population. In a notable understatement, Clinton would later refer to Knyphausen's half-hearted and seemingly pointless expedition as "malapropos" (48). On his part, George Washington felt bemused and a little nervous regarding enemy intentions.

After Clinton resumed command in New York two weeks later, the British general opted to exploit the Continental Army's seemingly weakened condition by launching yet another, better coordinated expedition. By launching Knyphausen's forces against Hobart Gap through the Watchung Mountains, Clinton hoped to pry Washington out of Morristown and into the open where he could engage him in a pitched battle that would decidedly favor the British.

Planned and executed in uncharacteristic haste, Knyphausen's renewed offensive unraveled almost as soon as his troops pressed inland from the Jersey coast. While his troops advanced along two parallel thoroughfares, the Galloping Hill Road and the Vauxhall Road, swarms of outraged militia snapped at his flanks. When his troops approached the crossroads village of Springfield, they encountered fierce resistance from seasoned Continentals under the command of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene.


Long Washington's favored lieutenant, Greene paired a keen strategic intellect with a yeomanlike approach to battlefield command. Ill-inclined to engage in a costly pitched fight, Greene deployed his troops on good ground behind the Rahway River and its tributaries, ably defending the vital river crossings and throwing Knyphausen's advancing troops into confusion. Scorning the prospect of a sustained fight, Greene executed a brilliant delaying action,

eventually falling back to nearly impregnable positions on high ground guarding the approaches to Hobart Gap. Rather than subjecting his troops to the unenviable task of forcing passage of the gap, Knyphausen, frustrated in his second thrust into New Jersey, disengaged and withdrew for the coast.

To this day, precise British objectives during June of 1780 are mystifying. For his part, Washington was likewise confused, writing that “I am at a loss to determine what was the object of the enemy’s expedition” (74). The brief expedition remains a cautionary tale against the dangers of poor intelligence, overconfidence, and a lack of cohesive strategic thought. Writes Lengel, “Both Connecticut Farms and Springfield, in fact, may have had more to do with the competition of egos between Clinton and Knyphausen than with any clear conception of strategy” (74).

Author Edward Lengel, a distinguished historian of the American Revolution, was uniquely equipped to pen this volume. A seasoned author and editor-in-chief of the Papers of George Washington project at the University of Virginia, Lengel was familiar with much of the primary source material that forms the basis of this book’s background research. At just seventy-seven pages of text, Lengel’s *Battles of Connecticut Farms and Springfield* is nonetheless a worthy contribution to the historiography of the Revolutionary War, and will likely remain the standard volume on the perilous struggle for New Jersey during the spring and summer of 1780.

Joshua Shepherd is a sculptor and independent researcher whose work has appeared in publications including *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, *Military Heritage*, *Civil War Quarterly*, and *Journal of the American Revolution*.



THE NAPOLEONIC WARS: A GLOBAL HISTORY

BY ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE

Oxford University Press, 2020

Pp. xxiii, 936. \$39.95

REVIEW BY HARRISON HELMS

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars sit at the climactic crossroads of the globe’s transition from the early modern age to modernity, setting the tone for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Much of the historical literature on the subject writes of the bloodshed as merely transpiring within the airtight bubble of continental Europe. Alexander Mikaberidze’s extensive tome challenges this ancien régime of Napoleonic scholarship, seeking to place the conflict within its global context. Although Europe was the seedbed in which geopolitical and ideological tensions festered, the outbreak of war engulfed all corners of Europe’s international empires. Rather than viewing Europe as an isolated theater of war, Mikaberidze writes of the conflict that unfolded in the electric blue waters of Martinique and the cypress swamps of New Orleans, in the floral fynbos of the Cape Colony and the Saharan steppe of Egypt. His work thus contributes to our existing understanding of the Napoleonic era by leaning away from a Eurocentric perspective of the conflict

and elucidates the global ramifications of the power struggle.

The chronological span of Mikaberidze’s study is standard, beginning on the eve of the French Revolution in 1789 and roughly concluding with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Through his narration of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Mikaberidze illuminates the interconnectedness of the period’s seemingly independent events, such as the Louisiana Purchase’s relation to the imperial endeavors of European powers. He thus demonstrates how these European conflicts became motors of violence and change for the rest of the world. As strife on the continent preoccupied European governments, rulers seized opportunities to expand their influence internationally and fulfill their territorial ambitions, giving the war a global dimension. The conflict’s sobriquet originates in France’s infamous emperor and military leader, Napoleon Bonaparte, whose personality often dominates studies of the era. Mikaberidze’s work is thus a welcome recess from the Napoleon-centric histories of the literature. Writing neither a panegyric biography nor an iconoclastic polemic, Mikaberidze describes Bonaparte fondly without perpetually spotlighting him. He characterizes him as a product of the Enlightenment—an enlightened despot—whose military brilliance led to early success but whose pride resulted in his downfall.

Part of the significance of Mikaberidze’s history comes from both its questioning of orthodox narratives as well as its attempt to bridge perceived gaps in Napoleonic scholarship. His revisions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are numerous. He defends the Executive Directory that ruled France from 1795 to 1799, justifying an institution that historical literature traditionally has bashed. He reduces the usual significance given to the French invasion of Egypt, arguing that its inducement of Egyptian modernization was minimal. He shifts blame away from Napoleon for the dissolution of the Treaty of Amiens and subsequent outbreak of war in 1803, holding Great Britain equally responsible. He deemphasizes the magnitude of the British naval victory at Trafalgar, maintaining that the battle only moderately mitigated French success in the war. Lastly, Mikaberidze questions the roots of La Grand Armée’s failure in its invasion of Russia, asserting


that illness and desertion were greater tribulations than the harsh winter. Filling in what he believes to be notable holes in histories of the Napoleonic Wars, the author discusses France's financing of the conflict, the Anglo-Russian War (1807–1812), the struggle for hegemony in Spanish America, and the Treaty of Kalisz in 1813, among others. Thus, his study not only offers a new lens through which to view the conflict but also opens the floodgates for new debates and research into the wars.

Several themes thread through Mikaberidze's lengthy history, including the dominance of geopolitics over ideology as a guiding light for foreign policy and the opportunism of European imperialists transfiguring the European war into a global one. His narration of the conflict is clear and straightforward, never digressing into irrelevancy or obscurity. His archival research spans seven countries and published primary sources constitute pages and pages of the bibliography. He displays an astounding familiarity with both new and old literature in the field and navigates it nimbly. His quoting of existing scholarship is prudent, neither acting as a crutch nor watering down his prose, but rather buttressing his already-grounded arguments and conclusions. Despite being written by a relatively young academic, the book is well researched enough to be the omnibus of a senior scholar. Mikaberidze's attention to detail is sharp as illustrated by his addressing of minute gaps in Napoleonic scholarship. If criticism had to be given, his analysis at times reverts to broad platitudes and generalizations that detract from the book's significant contributions to the field. This vagueness distracts from the profound evidence-based conclusions that compose most of the volume. Nonetheless, the work stands as a chef-d'oeuvre in Napoleonic scholarship of the twenty-first century.

An all-encompassing military, social, economic, intellectual, political, and environmental history of the Napoleonic Wars, Mikaberidze's work is a trove of research into a cross section of modernity. Functional as both an introduction for the nonspecialist as well as a research resource for veteran historians, the book will certainly become a foundational text in the field of Napoleonic studies. It is not only a unique addition to the discipline's literature but offers new points of debate and new trails of research to follow. Mikaberidze writes with a seasoned pen and the text is a pleasant reprieve from the bland,

utilitarian prose that often characterizes military history. He organizes the study in a manner that is both digestible and logical for the reader, generally following the war's chronology but also working geographically and thematically when necessary. The volume is an invaluable contribution to the historical canon, challenging us to view a heavily studied conflict as a world war rather than a European one. Any Napoleonic scholar's library is incomplete without it.

Harrison Helms is a historian of Europe with primary interests in early modernity and the nineteenth century. He is from Greensboro, North Carolina, and is currently completing a bachelor's degree in European history at Emory University in Atlanta.



**THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG:
CLIMAX OF THE CAMPAIGN
TO OPEN THE MISSISSIPPI
RIVER, MAY 23–JULY 4, 1863**

BY TIMOTHY B. SMITH

University Press of Kansas, 2021
Pp. xxvii, 724 \$50

REVIEW BY ANTHONY J. CADE II

Within *The Siege of Vicksburg: Climax of the Campaign to Open the Mississippi River, May 23–July 4, 1863*, Timothy B. Smith argues the siege at the end of the Vicksburg, Mississippi, campaign was as brilliant and complex as

the entire campaign. Smith seeks to give a full account of the siege because—as he argues—too often historians have either skimmed over it or simply ignored the actual siege that helped to capture the Mississippi River for the Union Army in 1863 (xv). As the first traditional siege of the American Civil War, Vicksburg tested the effectiveness of the engineering and siege warfare taught at West Point. It also revealed the ingenuity of General Ulysses S. Grant, which influenced President Abraham Lincoln to give him the command of the Federal Army. The book concludes that the siege was instrumental in capturing the Mississippi River and damaging Southern morale, but the overall campaign did little to end a war that continued for two more years with many of the same soldiers fighting (534).

The Siege of Vicksburg shows that the defenses surrounding the city were strong, and that those who built them were capable. One of the West Point-trained officers charged with building up the defenses had nearly a year to prepare. In that time, he oversaw the construction of nine massive forts. That they held against direct assaults is what necessitated the siege (9, 56). However, the Union Army had many competent engineering officers leading the siege, with Grant and General William T. Sherman commanding them. One of the key subjects that Smith discusses is the education and training many of these officers received at West Point before the war, crediting the institution for instilling much of the foundation of their success. As for the enlisted soldiers, he shows that they faced near constant fire from sharpshooters and artillery for many weeks (141). Smith takes further strides in exploring the naval support given in securing Vicksburg and laying siege to the numerous forts protecting the city, an oft overlooked but crucial aspect of the campaign (92, 454). Smith's work also succeeds in correcting some of the historiography surrounding the battle by pointing out the common error in attributing the fall of the city because of a lack of food or resources as the commander actually had food in reserves (517). Instead, Smith blames General Joseph E. Johnston for taking too long to resupply and reinforce the city, but also credits the Union Army for both being adaptive and having a commander who was able to coordinate through all the chaos of the siege (451, 463). Ultimately, Smith agrees with the commander of the city's defenses

who attributed his surrender to his troops being outnumbered and exhausted (518).


Smith's work gives a detailed accounting of the siege around Vicksburg, but his limited scope causes him to miss many of the larger implications of the Union victory. Almost simultaneously there was a siege occurring at Port Hudson, Louisiana, further south on the Mississippi. Events there were a looming factor in many of the choices not to reinforce Vicksburg with troops and supplies. The fall of Vicksburg made Confederates at Port Hudson realize they would be tasked with holding the Mississippi alone once Grant's forces approached. This forced them to surrender as well, and although the author discusses the other siege briefly, *The Siege of Vicksburg* would have benefited from further analysis of the events at Port Hudson.

Additionally, Smith incorrectly implies that historians have not examined the siege of Vicksburg for its engineering brilliance or the ingenuity of the Union leaders there. This work seems to be on the heels of one of Smith's previous books titled *The Union Assaults at Vicksburg: Grant Attacks Pemberton, May 17–22, 1863* (University Press of Kansas, 2020) and Earl J. Hess's *Storming Vicksburg: Grant Pemberton, and the Battles of May 19–22, 1863* (University of North Carolina Press, 2020). However, Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., in *Vicksburg: The Bloody Siege that Turned the Tide of the Civil War* (Regnery, 2018), Justin S. Solonick in *Engineering Victory: The Union Siege of Vicksburg* (Southern Illinois University Press, 2015), Donald S. Frazier in *Blood on the Bayou: Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and the Trans-Mississippi* (Texas A&M University Press, 2015), and Donald L. Miller in *Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy* (Simon and Schuster, 2020) all examined the siege in some detail quite recently with a similar argument before Hess.

What *The Siege of Vicksburg* adds to the historiography is greater detail when compared with many other works. The depth of this monograph gives Smith the opportunity to explore the disposition of dozens of troops on both sides—many of whom historians often ignore because they are considered so minor when compared to Grant and Sherman. The monotony of camp life for the Union Army meant the men quickly developed a routine in regard to fighting, resting, and revelry (136). Even civilians have a place within this work, with Smith exploring the stories of women and children hiding in caves during the siege (118, 429). Thus, those with a cursory fascination with

military history or the events of Vicksburg will have little interest in this work. However, experts who are looking for an in-depth chronicle of the siege that closely engages with sources will benefit from reading this book.

Anthony J. Cade II is a retired U.S. marine, a PhD candidate at the George Washington University, and historian with the federal government. His research is focused on the subaltern groups of the American Civil War, specifically immigrants and African Americans. He is working currently on his dissertation which is focused on the first successful African American units constituted in New Orleans, Louisiana, and used during the American Civil War.



**THE HARDEST LOT OF MEN:
THE THIRD MINNESOTA
INFANTRY IN THE CIVIL WAR**

BY JOSEPH C. FITZHARRIS

University of Oklahoma Press, 2019
Pp. ix, 323. \$34.95

REVIEW BY CHRISTIAN GARNER

Although many state-raised regiments in the American Civil War gained immortality through their actions in memorable battles, many formations did their duty without fanfare or prominence in history books. A trip to Gettysburg is incomplete without a trip

to Cemetery Ridge and the monument to the 1st Minnesota, a fitting tribute to a regiment who sacrificed itself on 2 July 1863 to buy precious time for Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock to steady the Union II Corps lines that day. The history of the 3d Minnesota not only pales in comparison, but includes the politics, controversy, disgrace, and redemption more often found in the volunteer regiments that served in the Civil War. Joseph Fitzharris's *The Hardest Lot of Men: The Third Minnesota Infantry in the Civil War*—part of the Campaigns and Commanders series—brings to life the inner workings of the 3d Minnesota and exposes twenty-first century historians and readers to the realities of soldiering in the 1860s.

Covering the recruitment, training, and campaigning of the 3d Minnesota, Fitzharris blends both social and military history to convey the motivations of service and the stark realities that faced the soldiers of the regiment. Comprised of Swedish immigrants, frontiersmen, and townspeople from across the state, the soldiers of the unit truly represented the state of Minnesota in 1861. In addition to chronicling the troops that comprised the regiment, the author does an excellent job illustrating the political maturations as the regiment formed, highlighting the balance between political favors and military necessities as soldiers jockeyed for commissions and appointments.

Destined to serve in the Western Theater, the 3d Minnesota quickly gained prominence for its appearance, discipline, and precision drill. Others often mistook it for a regiment from the Regular Army. Tasked with guard duty in occupied Nashville and Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the regiment found its time consumed with a mix of picket duty, quelling Southern sympathizers, courts martial, and other administrative minutia to maintain the good order and discipline required of soldiers. While at Murfreesboro, the 3d Minnesota endured one of its defining moments, fighting and subsequently surrendering on 13 July 1862, to a Confederate force under the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Attempting to wade through the various conflicting after action reports of the battle, Fitzharris makes little attempt to hide his belief

that the men of the 3d Minnesota maintained their fighting capability throughout the battle, and that Union leadership outside of the regiment instead had betrayed the unit and it surrendered prematurely.

Broken by surrender and subsequent parole, the soldiers of the 3d Minnesota returned to their state, shunned by the very people they fought to protect. The author highlights this unique social juxtaposition, exacerbated by the Dakota Uprising during the winter of 1862, that forced the citizens of the state and the troops of the regiment to work together to rebuild the unit to provide security along the frontier. Although quickly reconstituted, Fitzharris makes it clear that this was not the same regiment that had marched south just a year before. However, the sense of purpose in providing security along its state's frontier did much to restore the morale and fighting spirit of the unit.

After its completion of frontier service in January of 1863, the 3d Minnesota once again found itself moving south to the Western Theater. The regiment spent the spring conducting antiguerrilla operations along the Mississippi River, and subsequently transitioned to supporting the siege and capture of Vicksburg. After a brief refit period, the unit transitioned to its final defining chapter: conducting operations in Arkansas, the location where it would spend the remainder of the war from the fall of 1863 to the spring of 1865. With a twofold mission to both destroy Confederate forces and to gain control of the state, the 3d Minnesota found itself as one of the foundational units in this forgotten theater of the Civil War. Participating in operations to secure locations both well known, such as Little Rock, and more obscure, such as DeValls Bluff, Pine Bluff, and Jacksonport, the regiment battled both conventional and unconventional Confederate forces. At the same time, it combated their most casualty-producing enemy, disease. Fitzharris paints a compelling picture of a unit operating far from not only its home state, but also from the majority of the Union Army, struggling to maintain power to not only conduct combat operations, but also to bury its soldiers killed by malaria and dysentery.


Fitzharris concludes his work much as he began it, by examining the soldiers

that comprised the 3d Minnesota, and studying their actions as they approached discharge and returned to civilian life. It is clear from the narrative that the officers and soldiers of the regiment held very strong feelings about their state upon return. They stopped at locations such as Red Wing that had supported the regiment and rejected a planned party from the citizens of Saint Paul because of newspaper columns criticizing the regiment's surrender in 1862. Although few in number by 1865, the surviving veterans of the 3d Minnesota maintained a long memory. In his epilogue, the author follows the postwar lives of many of the regiment's key figures and its subsequent association of veterans and relatives.

In *The Hardest Lot of Men*, Fitzharris paints a vivid, visceral picture of the 1860s realities associated with soldiering and the societies from which they were drawn. Serving as a useful microhistory of a Civil War regiment, this book will be a valuable addition to both undergraduate and graduate electives on the Civil War.

Synthesizing the unit's wartime service and the title of the book, the painting of the regiment in Minnesota's state capital best sums up the 3d Minnesota. Memorializing neither a famous battle nor victorious accomplishment like some of the other Minnesota regiments, the painting of the 3d Minnesota instead depicts dirty, weary soldiers entering a captured state capital, truly the "hardest lot of men."

Maj. Christian Garner is an active duty Army officer and currently serves as the Brigade S-2 for 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. A graduate of the Command and General Staff College, he is a former assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy and has had multiple combat deployments.



LOSS AND REDEMPTION AT ST. VITH: THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

BY GREGORY FONTENOT

Cambridge University Press, 2020
Pp. xxv, 290. \$39.99

REVIEW BY WESTIN E. ROBESON

In his 1936 sketch on generalship, John F. C. Fuller wrote, "The more mechanical become the weapons with which we fight, the less mechanical must be the spirit which controls them."¹ Retired colonel Gregory Fontenot has successfully crafted an exhaustive analysis of just such a courageous and adaptive spirit in *Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge*. The 7th Armored Division ("Lucky Seventh") was ordered to strengthen defenses around St. Vith, Belgium, where it would fight alongside elements of the 9th Armored Division, the 28th Infantry Division, and the 106th Infantry Division. Its determined six-day defense of the town denied the Germans a crucial route along their northern flank during the Ardennes Offensive, or the Battle of the Bulge. General Dwight D. Eisenhower asserted the division's "gallant" stand at St. Vith "badly upset the timetable of the German spearheads," adding that the holding of the town's crossroads had convinced him that "the

safety of our northern shoulder was practically a certainty.”² Such accolades invite an expansion and development of the existing historiography concerning the division’s role in helping thwart the German’s offensive. Gregory Fontenot answers the call, succeeding in his objective to deliver the complete “history of the 7th Armored Division’s fight from start to finish” (3).

Fontenot has an extensive pedigree. During Operation DESERT STORM, he commanded Task Force 2-34, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. After DESERT STORM, he commanded the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and later served as director of the School of Advanced Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Fontenot’s research in the 7th Armored Division dates back to 1985, when he completed his second master’s thesis, “The Lucky Seventh in the Bulge: A Case Study for the Airland Battle.” The culmination of his extensive research, *Loss and Redemption at St. Vith*, delivers a deft examination of the 7th Armored Division’s operations during the Battle of the Bulge. His insight and observations as a career officer provide a fresh and authoritative voice to the historiography.

Readers will be impressed with the extensive bibliography. This includes the expected after action reports, official correspondence, operational journals, unit histories, G-3 reports and the like. However, Fontenot has also used personal interviews with numerous participants who served within the 7th Armored Division and those who fought against it during the battle. Additionally, his personal dialogues with General Bruce C. Clarke (commander of Combat Command B) afforded him access to additional sources of recorded interviews, articles, and papers.

Loss and Redemption at St. Vith serves as an in-depth case study of American leadership and soldiering. The book aligns with scholarly works, such as Peter Mansoor’s *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions* (University Press of Kansas, 1999), which argues doctrine, training, and command paved the way to victory, rather than American industrial superiority. Although the United States’ industrial capacity gave it a distinct advantage, it could not leverage that advantage without the spirit and grit of

American soldiers. Fontenot maintains that the “plain old vanilla draftee divisions carried the load” (285). That is to say, it was units like the 7th Armored Division who displayed the “perseverance and adaptability” that led to American success on the battlefield (8).

Fontenot begins his narrative by examining the organization of armored and infantry divisions and summarizing armor doctrine. Although the narrative is more or less anchored to the divisional commander, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck, Fontenot’s lens hovers over St. Vith at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At each level, he introduces the reader to commanders boldly making decisions based on limited information, or failing to make decisions altogether. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commander of VIII Corps, failed to establish clear lines of command between the 106th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division in St. Vith. His divisional commanders found the friction of war compounded by his vague and even conflicting orders.

Fortunately, the story of the Lucky Seventh is primarily about good commanders, whether it was General Eisenhower, General Hasbrouck, or Lt. Joseph V. Whiteman, executive officer of B Company, 23d Armored Infantry Battalion. On 18 December, Whiteman had three half-tracks and two machine gun squads heading toward St. Vith when the Germans attacked his position. His bold reaction to commandeer, snag, and enlist everyone he could, resulted in an ad hoc task force that grew “to about 600 troops from ten different units” (130). Similarly, on the same day, Lt. Col. Robert O. Stone, commander of the 440th Anti-Aircraft Artillery, dug in to protect a vital intersection and ration dump. His ragtag force consisted of elements from the 89th Quartermaster Railhead Company, the 92d Ordnance Company, a handful of 7th Armored Division tanks, and stragglers from the 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions. Fontenot relates that the “7th Armored Division’s cobbled-together positions stuck like a bone in the throat of Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B” (137).

Loss and Redemption at St. Vith is primarily an operational history that centers on command initiative, innovation, and flexibility within chaotic and

fluid circumstances in the extreme. Readers will gain a fresh perspective of operational warfare during the war, in all its weather, traffic jams, spotty communications, and terrain.

Many readers, such as this reviewer, who are not familiar with the key players at St. Vith, may find it challenging to keep up with the units, persons, and locales in the text. For example, a single page refers to nearly two-dozen German and American units, in addition to numerous commanders and locations. With the volume of persons covered in the text, it is also sometimes tricky to gauge the relevance of some soldiers and officers. Consequently, the flow tends to suffer in some pockets of the text. However, these comments do not imply that the overall style is not effective.


This book is a valuable source for students and officers studying operational history, command, and the American and German fighting organizations during the Second World War. The quality and depth of research evident in *Loss and Redemption at St. Vith* assures its readers that Fontenot has produced the definitive work on the 7th Armored Division during the Battle of the Bulge. It demonstrates that the “largely underappreciated excellence of the U.S. Army’s average units” shouldered allied victory in World War II (286).

Westin E. Robeson is a social studies teacher and author. His primary research and writing interests focus on the history of American armor. He is the author of *Buttoned Up: American Armor and the 781st Tank Battalion in World War II* (Texas A&M University Press, 2018) and has organized and served on panels concerning American armor history. He holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a bachelor’s degree in secondary education from the University of Cincinnati.

NOTES

1. John F. C. Fuller, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936), 13.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 348.



ATTACK AT CHOSIN: THE CHINESE SECOND OFFENSIVE IN KOREA

BY XIAOBING LI

University of Oklahoma Press, 2020
Pp. xiv, 263. \$29.92

REVIEW BY BRYAN R. GIBBY

Over the past decade, American policy-makers and military strategists have been focused on a “rising China,” whose newly confident air and naval forces have been making their presence felt in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait. More recently, Chinese entertainment media have mined heavily an emerging Chinese nationalism with film features such as *Sacrifice* (2020) and *The Battle at Lake Changjin* (2021). This latter film depicts valiant Chinese soldiers confronting superior technology and horrendous weather conditions to win a victory over American military forces in Korea.

Professor Xiaobing Li, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) veteran and published expert on the modern Chinese military, Mao Zedong’s Cold War strategy, and the PLA’s operations in Korea, presents in this interesting and timely monograph the reality of China’s shoestring Korean War intervention in the late fall of 1950. Li is the author of *China’s Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive* (Indiana University Press, 2014). He once again brings his impressive command of Chinese sources, including memoirs, official

party documents, military orders and reports, and—most significantly—hundreds of personal interviews of soldiers, officers, and senior commanders, to tell a complete story of the PLA’s second offensive campaign in northeast Korea.

These interviews reveal what the official documents ignore: Chinese forces intervening in Korea were regular PLA troops (not “volunteers”). Mao early on (long before Inchon) had determined to intervene in Korea, and the initial intervention actions suffered from myriad challenges in logistics, firepower, mobility and transportation, medical services, and intelligence. The Chinese, it is true, won a great victory at “Chosin” (Changjin Reservoir), but it came at a high cost for the 9th Army Group—nearly one-third of its original strength was lost to combat and nonbattle injuries.

After a brief introduction that addresses Chinese military culture, strategy, and operations, Li follows the 9th Army Group from its bases in southeast China, where it was preparing for the invasion of Taiwan, to its notification for redeployment to Manchuria and eventual commitment to Korea. Li points out that these soldiers moved, in a matter of weeks, from a subtropical climate (average temperatures in the 70s) to an environment where subzero temperatures were the norm. They did not have the opportunity to acquire winter clothing and equipment, conduct training, or gather intelligence on the American forces or the terrain over which they would move and fight. Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) commanders such as Peng Dehau recognized these deficiencies, but the rapid advance of the U.S. Eighth Army in the west and the U.S. X Corps in the east permitted no delay. The 9th Army Group would go as is to assist Korea and resist the Americans.

The next three chapters are the meat of Li’s analysis, as the 9th Army Group attempted to close with, encircle, and destroy the U.S. 1st Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. Li’s narrative is both gripping and sober. He first catalogues the reasons for the 9th Army Group’s failure to destroy the marines on a lack of intelligence on enemy strength and disposition: especially artillery and reserves; inadequate supplies, which included ammunition, medicines, and above all winter clothing; and rudimentary tactics that produced massive casualties without inflicting commensurate losses on the Americans. Li notes, “Confrontation with a modern army possessing superior firepower

and air support took a horrendous toll on the lives of the Chinese soldiers” (73). It was common for attacking battalions to lose, in a matter of hours, up to 80 percent of their fighting strength to bullets, shells, napalm, and subzero chill.


Although the 9th Army Group enjoyed moderately greater success against the U.S. 31st Infantry Regiment (part of the 7th Infantry Division), the effort was once again disproportionate to the gain. One division of the Chinese 27th Army, reinforced with a fourth regiment, suffered fully 50 percent casualties in just two days. One regiment, possessing 3,600 soldiers in 8 companies at the start of its attack, was reduced to 6 companies, each boasting just 50 soldiers fit for action. It was a steep price to pay for the destruction of one infantry regiment (the only time the CPVF destroyed a U.S. infantry regiment).

Although the CPVF 9th Army Group failed to annihilate the U.S. X Corps, Li argues overall that the Second Offensive Campaign from 25 November to 24 December 1950, “was a major victory for the CPVF” (128). The Americans were forced out of North Korea and endured significant losses of manpower and material, and the Chinese demonstrated their ability to confront a technologically superior enemy. In the final two chapters, Li expands the narrative to detail how the 9th Army Group recovered, replenished, and assessed its combat performance. Commanders at all levels engaged in self-criticism that generated lessons for all CPVF units in Korea, which they put to good use in subsequent campaigns and operations. The author does a fine job identifying these lessons and showing how the CPVF absorbed and then operationalized the climactic offensive in April–May 1951. Unfortunately for the CPVF, the tactical conditions had evolved by springtime to favor the Americans. Consequently, the Fifth Offensive Campaign produced disappointing results, which ensured that a negotiated settlement would be the mechanism to end the war.

For Americans steeped on cultural references moored in the great victory of World War II or the tragic outcome of the Vietnam War, they can overlook easily, if not forget, Korea. Xiaobing Li makes plain, however, that the PLA has not forgotten the Korean War, and it is foundational to its identity. As China prepares for a theoretical conflict with the United States over Korea or, more likely, Taiwan, Korea is its only laboratory experience fighting Americans. The Korean

experience drove (and continues to drive) the PLA's modernization, education and training, defense policies, and strategic culture. If for no other reason than to understand a potential adversary's own perspective on battle experience, *Attack at Chosin* is an essential addition to the professional library.

Col. Bryan R. Gibby is the deputy head of the Department of History at West Point. He specializes in the Korean War, the World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Islamic military history. He holds a doctorate in history from the Ohio State University and a bachelor's degree in history from West Point. A former battalion commander, he served two combat deployments to Iraq.



BEYOND THE QUAGMIRE: NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR

EDITED BY GEOFFREY W. JENSEN AND
MATTHEW M. STITH

University of North Texas Press, 2019
Pp. viii, 425. \$29.95

REVIEW BY MICHAEL MATHENY

Vietnam War histories, much like the war itself, have languished in the quagmire narrative for some time now. Historians recount and debate the same old story of an unpopular, politically dubious war that

bitterly divided the United States as well as Vietnam. The same questions routinely emerge: Why did President Johnson escalate the war? Why did America lose? Did politicians and antiwar protestors betray veterans? Why is the war's memory so contested? Beyond rehashing these old debates, what is left for historians to explore?

Editors Geoffrey Jensen and Matthew Stith free us from these conventional approaches with a fresh take in their collected volume: *Beyond the Quagmire: New Interpretations of the Vietnam War*. Jensen and Stith assembled a quality team of diverse scholars who successfully break new ground as they explore the margins of the war's history. Comprised of thirteen essays across three broad categories, the book delivers on its promise of originality. The collection's strength lies in its diversity of topics. There is something for everyone, including scholars and a general audience. The book includes chapters addressing new perspectives in military history, international relations, political, social, gender, environmental, popular culture, and memory studies.

To those expecting a more traditional military history, they will be interested to read Martin G. Clemis's and Ron Milam's chapters. Clemis offers a geographic-themed essay analyzing what he dubs "Leopard Spots, Patchworks, and Crazy Quilts" (83). According to Clemis, geography shaped the war, particularly after 1969, when the war changed into a contest over a "patchwork" (a visual representation on a map) to control physical space and people. Subsequently, Vietnam veteran Ron Milam adds a reflective piece about the role of military advisers. Milam observes that an adviser's role was not static, but evolved overtime and often required engaging in direct combat.

For those interested in an international perspective on the war, they will find essays that discuss lesser-known aspects of foreign relations. Nengher N. Vang uncovers a story that very few scholars will be familiar with in his thoughtful essay on the Hmong ethnic group in Laos. The Hmong served as the foot soldiers in America's "Secret War in Laos" during the Vietnam War and continued fighting for the American cause well into the 1990s until America ultimately turned its back on them (48). For the Hmong, the war never ended, and their continued efforts

raise a host of new questions about the myriad legacies of America's foreign policy and the people it leaves behind. In a following chapter, Xiaobing Li shines light on China's enigmatic contribution to the war. China's extensive military assistance made North Vietnam's victory possible but also caused tensions that split the communist camp. This ironically culminated in the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

The book hits its stride with two social history essays that address the intersection of politics, war, race, gender, and society. Geoffrey W. Jensen's chapter, which reexamines Project 100,000 (the program that lowered military entrance standards to increase manpower) is unusual and provocative for offering an unprecedented and bold take on a highly controversial topic. Despite the program's well-known shortcomings, Jensen claims Project 100,000 was "not the absolute failure or moral atrocity that it has been made out to be" (168). Subsequently, Heather Marie Stur's essay opens a fresh discussion on women's roles in the war and challenges conventional gender norms. In the traditional Vietnam narrative, men did the fighting while women stayed safe in rear-echelon areas. Stur flips this notion, showing how women were frequently in harm's way and suffered physical and mental wounds just like their male counterparts. Simultaneously, many men enjoyed the "non-combat luxury war" that took advantage of Saigon's infamous vice trade and lavish entertainment scene, which stretches the conventional image of the Vietnam War beyond the jungle (195).

In one unique chapter, Matthew M. Stith argues that history has overlooked the natural environment as a vital factor in the war's prosecution. Vietnam possesses some of the world's most unique and obstructive "terrain, weather, flora, and fauna," all of which served as a vital ally to the North Vietnamese (268). Stith's essay is full of oral histories and anecdotes including tigers, poisonous snakes, and even giant pet centipedes on leashes that show how the environment itself was a ubiquitous and unavoidable factor in the war.

The volume culminates with essays addressing the theme of memory that push the envelope into relevant modern-day debates. Susan L. Eastman identifies the traditional historical consensus


regarding the war's memory as "guilt in the 1970s, revisionist refighting of the war in the 1980s, and 'kicking' the 'Vietnam Syndrome' in the 1990s" (301). Eastman then breaks this mold with her essay on *The 'Nam* comics which ran from 1986–1993. Eastman argues the comic book demonstrated intractable debates over authenticity, and that despite the author's efforts to portray the war as it really happened, readers still contested its accuracy, showing that a consensus over the war's memory may not be possible. Next, Sarah Thelen adds what readers may find to be the most politically charged essay in her analysis of Nixon's political strategy of manipulating the symbolism of the American flag. Thelen argues that President Nixon established the American flag as not just a patriotic symbol but made it into a symbol of uncritical loyalty to the current administration and polarized what it meant to be "American" (330). Thelen observes that Nixon's stratagem began a pattern of social polarization over the American flag's meaning that we still can observe today.

The book is not without its shortcomings. The most obvious deficiency is its organization. The collection is divided into three broad sections (The Politics of War, The Combatants and Their War, and Remembering Vietnam), but several of the essays appear misplaced and easily could be moved from one section to another or defy the larger categorization altogether. Secondly, although each essay stands alone and offers an original contribution to Vietnam War historiography, there is no single overarching thrust or collective argument made by the authors. Mostly, the essays are not in conversation with each other. Rather, they are like stand-alone episodes of a TV series, as opposed to one larger story arc. For better or worse, they do not address the same debates, but rather all aim to offer a unique contribution on the margins of Vietnam War history. Lastly, the chapters on *The 'Nam* comics and the Vietnam War memorials would be far more effective if the authors included more images to support their interpretations.

These minor criticisms aside, the book is undoubtedly a valuable work that is well worth serious attention from any student of the Vietnam War. Finally, we have some new light on a divisive war beyond conventional narratives. The collection reveals

potential avenues for eager researchers to explore highly relevant debates. The book appeals to both a general audience and scholars. For those seeking some fresh topics and an escape from the proverbial "quagmire," look no further.

Capt. Michael Matheny is an Adjutant General officer in the U.S. Army and currently an instructor at the United States Military Academy where he teaches in the American History Division. He holds a master's degree in history from the University of Maryland and a bachelor's degree in history from James Madison University.



THE HARDEST PLACE: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADRIFT IN AFGHANISTAN'S PECH VALLEY

BY WESLEY MORGAN

Random House, 2021

Pp. xxvi, 644. \$22

REVIEW BY ERIC B. SETZEKORN

The ignominious fall of Kabul in the summer of 2021 unmistakably demonstrated the strategic failure of the United States' two-decade project to build a stable, reliable government in Afghanistan. Wesley Morgan's new book, *The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan's Pech Valley*, examines the

challenges faced at the operational level from 2001 to 2020, and finds that the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army, made key errors that made political and economic development exceedingly difficult. In a thorough, patient, and nuanced account of two decades of warfare in eastern Afghanistan, Morgan demonstrates that, in spite of a heavy investment in lives and resources, U.S. military activity provided little progress toward achieving larger American national security goals.

Morgan centers his narrative on the Pech Valley, which runs through Kunar and Nuristan Provinces in eastern Afghanistan and the rugged, steep mountains that dominate it. Before 2001, the Taliban did not have a presence in the Pech Valley, or its tributary branches, the Korengal and Waygal Valleys. Despite being only 110 miles east of Kabul and 45 miles from Jalalabad, the harsh terrain had sheltered the region from broader political and social currents. Morgan divides his story of the Pech Valley into four parts, arranged chronologically. From 2002 through 2005, U.S. military forces, primarily Green Berets, and Central Intelligence Agency personnel had an extremely limited role in the Pech Valley, seeking information on critical terrorist targets, but without the resources or intent to maintain a widespread presence. In 2006, U.S. Army conventional infantry units began establishing a network of bases in the Pech Valley, and later pushed into the adjoining Korengal and Waygal Valleys. This effort led to intense fighting, and Taliban attacks on vulnerable outposts inflicted heavy casualties among U.S. forces. Part three examines the slow drawdown of U.S. forces from 2010–2013, with the security mission in the Pech Valley frantically handed off to Afghan forces. The last section, 2011–2017, covers what Morgan calls "the new counterterrorism," (411) approach based on a small U.S. special operations presence and frequent drone strikes on priority targets. A brief epilogue examines the period from 2018–2020, but the book was written before the summer 2021 Taliban offensive.

The key strength of the book is the deep knowledge and impartial approach that Morgan brings to the campaign in the Pech Valley. Through extended periods embedded with U.S. military forces and dozens of interviews, he is able to develop

a narrative that allows the reader to examine fully the often-difficult choices that military commanders must make. By focusing on the actions of field grade officers as they seek to use their battalions and brigades, the book highlights how high-level policy set in Kabul or Washington had to be adapted to the facts on the ground in Kunar Province. Although several battles related to the Pech Valley campaign or adjacent valleys have been previously studied or even made into movies, such as *Lone Survivor* (2013) and *The Outpost* (2020), Morgan's focus on the operational level provides unique insights into the thought process and goals of American military efforts.

Despite the clear rapport Morgan developed with military personnel and the deep respect he shows for their sacrifices, the flawed emphasis on combat operations by American military commanders is not overlooked. In particular, officers who over-promised what they could do and over committed their limited forces directed the decision of the 10th Mountain Division to establish a network of vulnerable outposts. Rather than collect intelligence and conduct aggressive patrols, these small, isolated outposts, surrounded by imposing mountains quickly attracted Taliban attacks. Moreover, these tiny installations relied heavily on helicopters for support and supplies, but aviation assets in Kunar Province were an expensive and limited resource. It not only made the outposts more vulnerable but also made them expensive to maintain. When in doubt about their operational decisions,

or eager to show results, the repeated tactic of U.S. military officers was to launch an aerial assault, in the hopes of flushing out Taliban fighters hidden in the mountains. The book does get a bit too bogged down in describing the seemingly endless operations and raids, which generally produced no lasting results. A few American officers recognized their one-sided approach, with one later admitting to Morgan that he had been "drinking my own Kool-Aid" (218) by overselling progress in military operations, but the majority of the American officers maintained a religious certitude in their dogmatic approach.

In civil affairs and support to the Afghan government, U.S. military leaders were often equally myopic in their focus on specific military goals rather than larger security policy, particularly in assessing economic interests. In one case, a U.S. Army unit occupied a sawmill because it was the most convenient place to park their vehicles, which meant that the mill, the major employer in the area, was now closed and the workers unemployed. In another case, a corrupt Afghan government official who extorted bribes from residents falsely reported that a recalcitrant local business was in fact a member of the Taliban, leading to a U.S. military raid on the hapless local resident. In effect, the Kabul-appointed officials used the U.S. military as de facto enforcers of what many residents saw as an unrepresentative government with unjust policies. Residents subsequently turned to the Taliban for weapons, financial support, and training, and in contrast to a virtu-

ally nonexistent Taliban presence in the Pech Valley in 2001, by 2010 the area was aligned firmly with the Taliban.


The highly detailed and insightful narrative developed by Morgan has broad appeal to readers interested in military affairs, history, political science, and international relations. The even-handed approach displayed throughout the book is especially important, and the reader can understand and, in many cases, sympathize with the decisions made by military leaders in the book, while still maintaining an objective view of the campaign. It is a difficult balancing act and a testament to Morgan's skills as a writer. *The Hardest Place* has received widespread praise from a range of renowned scholars and former military leaders, and it fully deserves to be recognized and occupy a prominent place in the growing literature on the two-decade Afghan conflict.

Eric B. Setzekorn is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History and an adjunct faculty member at George Mason University. He has published over two dozen academic articles in publications such as *Parameters*, the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, and *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. His book, *The Rise and Fall of an Officer Corps: The Republic of China Military, 1942–1955*, was published in 2018 by the University of Oklahoma Press.



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A HISTORY OF ARMY-CIVILIAN COLLABORATION IN **SCIENCE**



COMING SOON



Jon T. Hoffman

PERSONNEL UPDATE

The history side of the Center of Military History (CMH) has undergone a number of personnel changes in recent months. Three longtime, stalwart employees have retired. Edward N. “Ned” Bedessem started with the Center in 1986 and spent the last four years as head of the Force Structure and Unit History Division. He oversaw major projects such as the conversion to the brigade-based Modular Force in the mid-2000s. Jennifer A. Nichols, who has been with the Center in the Force Structure Division since 2002, has fleeted up to replace Ned. Donald A. Carter served fifteen years with the Army as a field artillery officer before coming to the Center in 1992. Since 2003, he has been in the Histories Directorate, coauthoring *The City Becomes a Symbol*, writing *Forging the Shield*, and recently wrapping up the manuscript for *The U. S. Army and National Security, 1953–1963*. Mark L. Bradley spent sixteen years with the Center, all in the Histories Directorate. He wrote *The Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877*, contributed heavily to *Army History and Heritage*, and coauthored the manuscript for *Logistics at War: The Buildup, 1962–1967* (to be published next year as part of the Vietnam series).

Our graduate research assistant (GRA) contracts expired this year and Shane Story, currently acting head of Histories Directorate, put in a lot of work the past several months to establish new five-year agreements with four of the leading schools in the military history field. The delay in funding that arose from the continuing resolution that opened fiscal year 2022 took the process down to the wire, but we had four new students report to the Center during August. Katherine (Hyun-Joo) Mooney, from the Ohio State University, has focused her studies on Africa and post-independence Zambia. She will bring her Cold War–era knowledge of that region to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Studies and Support Division. Ian McDowell comes out of Texas Tech with an emphasis in race and ethnicity, and is doing his dissertation on the role of the Mexican American community in the desegregation of the Dallas school district. He will provide research assistance to Mason Watson’s book project on Army operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Justin Major is from the University of Southern Mississippi and

is in the early stages of a dissertation on the South Vietnamese army. He is proficient in Vietnamese, and will be collecting research on the logistics effort supporting the South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia in 1970, which will undergird future work on the second logistics volume in the Vietnam series. John Lewis hails from Texas A&M University, where he is doing a dissertation on African American units in the Service of Supply in World War I. He will be working in the Force Structure and Unit History Division.

I like to think of our GRA program as our farm team, and that proved to be a significant factor in our recent hiring of four new civil service employees, three via the Army’s centrally funded Fellows program. Kendall Cosley spent two years as a GRA, working in both HQDA Studies and Support and General Histories divisions. From Texas A&M, she is in the final stages of her dissertation on the culture of Army soldiers during World War II, and will return to HQDA Studies and Support. Bradley Sommer received his PhD in 2021 from Carnegie Mellon University with an emphasis on the American labor movement. His several years of experience as an archivist and a leader in a national graduate student organization make him a good addition to HQDA Studies and Support. Shane D. Makowicki, another former GRA from Texas A&M, is wrapping up his dissertation on guerrilla warfare in North Carolina during the Civil War. As a GRA, he coauthored the Lincoln Assassination staff ride guide and the World War I monograph *Occupation and Demobilization, 1918–1923*. He steps into Histories Directorate and will finish a campaign monograph on the invasion of Iraq in 2003 before tackling the Tan Book volume on the same topic. Laurence Nelson, yet another Texas Aggie, has been a fellow with the Marine Corps Historical Division and a student intern for a year here at CMH, where he assisted Tan Book authors. He is in the final stages of a dissertation looking at the impact of culture on both sides in the Marine intervention in Nicaragua 1927–1933. He will begin work on the Tan Book covering the Army’s role in training and advising the Afghan army.





ARMYHISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Approved for public release

Distribution is unlimited—Distribution A

PIN : 214081-000

GARY Sheahan Chicago Tribune War Center