


THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

# ARMY HISTORY

SPRING 2024

PB20-24-2 No. 131

WASHINGTON, D.C.



## FROM NATIVE GUIDES TO COMMONWEALTH DEFENDERS

FILIPINO SOLDIERS UNDER U.S. COMMAND, 1899–1942

BY MARK J. REARDON

## "MAKING WAR UPON THE MAP"

THE U.S. ARMY'S FORGOTTEN MAP PROBLEM,  
MEADE'S GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, AND  
DEPICTING OPERATIONAL ART

BY THOMAS BRUSCINO AND MITCHELL G. KLINGENBERG

# ARMY HISTORY

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF ARMY HISTORY

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The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by email to [usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil](mailto:usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil).

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Front cover: S. Sgt. Roberto Sarmiento of the Philippines,  
ca. 1941  
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## EDITOR'S JOURNAL

In the Spring 2024 issue of *Army History*, we are excited to present two interesting articles, look at a unique selection of Army art, share a visit to the Harbor Defense Museum, and provide a diverse collection of book reviews.

The first article, by Mark Reardon, is a brief history of the service of Filipino soldiers under U.S. command from 1899 to 1942. After the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain in 1898 following the Spanish-American War, Filipinos began their long and distinguished tenure serving in and alongside U.S. forces. From the Philippine Insurrection through the end of World War II, Filipinos served gallantly in all manner of positions. Through their dedicated service, they forged what the author calls an “unbreakable bond” with their American allies.

In the second article, Thomas Bruscano and Mitchell Klingenberg argue that there is a current and historical deficiency in the way maps of military campaigns depict operational art. They detail the shortcomings in campaign mapping, providing a history of the Army's use and creation of maps that has led to this problem. They then propose what proper historical campaign maps should include, using Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's Gettysburg Campaign and their own corrected campaign maps as an example.

This issue's Army Art Spotlight highlights a few pieces of art from the Army's vast collection that look at the Army's response to natural disasters and its provision of humanitarian assistance. This selection shows the Army's commitment to aiding citizens of the United States in their time of need, from the 1992 efforts during Hurricane Andrew through Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017.

The Museum Feature takes us on a visit to the Harbor Defense Museum. Located in the Bay Ridge neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York, on the grounds of Fort Hamilton, this museum tells the history of New York City's coastal defenses from 1794 to 1950. It provides educational opportunities for visitors of all ages, both soldier and civilian.

As I have done in recent issues, I continue to encourage potential contributors to consider submitting articles on the Revolutionary War period. With the 250th anniversary of the war fast approaching, we are keenly interested in publishing engaging content dealing with this pivotal conflict. Instructions for submitting articles can be found in most issues in the Call for Submissions box. Any questions should be sent to the journal's email address at [usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil](mailto:usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@army.mil). I also strongly suggest that those who wish to contribute to *Army History* download and review our Center of Military History style guide, which can be found here: [https://history.army.mil/about/docs/CMH\\_Style\\_Guide\\_2023.pdf](https://history.army.mil/about/docs/CMH_Style_Guide_2023.pdf). Following this style guide will ensure that your submission is up to standard and will help us review and evaluate it more quickly.

Once again, I thank our readership for its dedication to this publication as the small team here strives to provide you with the best historical content available.

**BRYAN J. HOCKENSMITH**  
MANAGING EDITOR

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# THE CHIEF'S CORNER

WM. SHANE STORY

## CORRECTING THE RECORD: THE HOUSTON RIOT OF 1917

In November 2023, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records cleared the records of 110 soldiers who had been convicted on various charges arising from the Houston Riot of 1917, including 19 who had received death sentences and were executed. Besides changing their discharges from dishonorable to honorable, the decision was a reminder of the legacy of racism.

What happened in Houston in 1917 was a deadly confrontation between the city's almost exclusively White police department and soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment. Referred to at the time as a "colored" regiment, all its soldiers were Black. The clash was rooted in segregation, which was upheld through prejudice, the legal system, mob violence, and lynchings.<sup>1</sup> America's entry into World War I threatened segregation because the nation needed to mobilize men of all races and backgrounds to expand the Army, and African Americans expected military service to help them put an end to segregation. In Houston, the police enforced segregation, and Black soldiers opposed it.

For Mississippi senator James S. Vardaman, the thought of arming and training African Americans to fight was a nightmare. "One of the horrible problems which will grow out of this unfortunate war," he said on the Senate floor on 16 August 1917, "is the training as a soldier which the negro will receive. Impress the negro with the fact that he is defending the flag, inflate his untutored soul with military airs, teach him that it is his duty to keep the emblem of the nation flying triumphantly in the air—it is but a short step to the conclusion that his political rights must be respected." This, Vardaman argued, creates a "problem far-reaching and momentous in its character."<sup>2</sup>

That "problem" erupted a week later. The Army had stationed the 3d Battalion in Houston to guard a mobilization site. The city police were zealous about segregation and ensuring the battalion's soldiers did not inspire troublesome behavior among the city's minorities. Hence, 3d Battalion soldiers endured daily "insults from white streetcar operators and abuse from white police officers"; police habitually denigrated Black soldiers "as a prelude to a beating."<sup>3</sup>

The soldiers' resentment exploded on 23 August. It began late that morning when a police officer, reputedly one of the "meanest" on the force and known for abusing Black people, was searching for a Black teenager fleeing an illegal craps game and barged into a Black woman's home looking for the suspect. She took offense at the police officer's behavior and talked back to him, so he slapped her and pulled her into the street to send her to jail on charges of resisting arrest.<sup>4</sup> Seeing the officer being rough with the woman, a 3d Battalion soldier offered to pay her fine if the officer would release her, at which point the officer beat and arrested the soldier

for interfering with an arrest. When a second soldier intervened on behalf of the first soldier, he too was beaten and arrested. After a false rumor swept through the battalion that the second soldier had been beaten to death, other soldiers' pent-up frustration and fear turned to anger before escalating to rage. That evening, against orders, a sergeant led over a hundred armed soldiers out of camp to seek vengeance against the police. The resulting melee—a series of chaotic shootings in an urban area after dark—left nineteen dead, including four White police officers and four Black soldiers, but most were civilian bystanders.

In December, after lengthy investigations and the largest courts-martial in American history, the Army convicted fifty-eight 3d Battalion soldiers on charges of mutiny, assault, and murder. It condemned thirteen to death by hanging and executed them in secret the following day. The Army sentenced the rest to prison. Subsequent courts-martial convicted an additional fifty-two soldiers, six of whom were executed.

Controversy over the Army's handling of the mutiny would linger. Embarrassed by the hasty executions, the War Department issued a new general order, which stated that a soldier could not be executed until after the judge advocate general had reviewed the case. Over the next two decades, the Army gradually paroled the soldiers who had received prison sentences. More recently, the soldiers' families built a memorial for them in Houston and have spent years seeking pardons. Finally, in November 2023, the Army set the convictions aside because, as Secretary of Army Christine Wormouth stated, they had been "wrongly treated because of their race."<sup>5</sup>

History is always about correcting the record. Some things, however, can never be fixed, like the loss of men who killed, and were killed, because of racism.

### Notes

1. Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, *The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1974), 21.

2. Statement, James S. Vardaman, *Recent Disturbances in East St. Louis, Ill.*, 65th Cong., *Congressional Record* 55, pt. 6 (16 Aug 1917): S6063, cited in Chad L. Williams, *Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 32.

3. Robert V. Haynes, *A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 58, 200.

4. Haynes, *A Night of Violence*, 92–94.

5. U.S. Army Public Affairs, "Army Sets Aside Convictions of 110 Black Soldiers Convicted in 1917 Houston Riots," 13 Nov 2023, [https://www.army.mil/article/271614/army\\_sets\\_aside\\_convictions\\_of\\_110\\_black\\_soldiers\\_convicted\\_in\\_1917\\_houston\\_riots/](https://www.army.mil/article/271614/army_sets_aside_convictions_of_110_black_soldiers_convicted_in_1917_houston_riots/).

# NEWSNOTES

## New Publication from AUSA

On 5 September 2023, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) announced the release of its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series, *Medal of Honor: Alwyn Cashe*. Alwyn Cashe was a platoon sergeant on a nighttime patrol in Iraq in October 2005 when his Bradley fighting vehicle struck an improvised explosive device and burst into flames. He suffered terrible burns while extracting the driver but returned again and again to the vehicle to pull others to safety. Cashe then ensured all the wounded were evacuated before agreeing to leave. He succumbed to his injuries a few weeks later, asking about the welfare of his soldiers to the end. Information and links to all the graphic novels are available on AUSA's Medal of Honor series page at [www.ausa.org/moh](http://www.ausa.org/moh).


## Edgar Frank Raines Jr. (1944–2023)

On 26 October 2023, Edgar Raines, a U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) stalwart, passed on after a long illness. It is sad but somehow fitting that Ed left us only a day after the fortieth anniversary of Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of Grenada. Ed's *The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983* (CMH, 2010) likely will never be equaled for its depth of research and analysis on that late-Cold

War contingency operation. But that was only the beginning of Ed's contributions to the Army historical program and historical community. A native of Murphysboro, Illinois, he received his bachelor's degree in 1966 from Southern Illinois University, where he worked with the noted Grant scholar, John Y. Simon. After getting his master's degree from the same university in 1968, he earned his PhD in 1976 at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, under the supervision of Edward M. "Mac" Coffman. He served as an academic dean at Silver Lake College and as a historian with the Office of Air Force History before joining CMH in 1980. For the old Analysis Branch, he prepared a history titled *Evolution of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 1903–1991* (CMH, 1983) and coauthored the study *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942–1985* (CMH, 1986). An Army aviation enthusiast, he also wrote *The Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II* (CMH, 2000), which focused especially on liaison pilots who directed the field artillery that contributed so much to Allied victory. Ed composed several unpublished studies and numerous articles in military and social history; his article on Army aviation in Operation TORCH won an award from the Army Historical Foundation. During his thirty-one years in the Analysis Branch and Histories Division, Ed also served as the historian for various Army committees and task forces working on URGENT FURY, Goldwater-Nichols defense reform, post-Cold War roles and missions, and Headquarters, Department of the Army, reorganization.

Ed was a formidable historian, a trusted colleague, and a kind, generous friend. A noted bibliophile, he read widely beyond his initial interest in the early twentieth-century Army, which was the topic of his dissertation. Devotedly thorough, he dug into subjects with a tenacity rarely equaled and never surpassed. His office constantly was jammed with piles of papers, and he always kept in his breast pocket a robust collection of note cards and pens. He maintained contacts with CMH historians long after his retirement, following the example of his mentor Forrest C. Pogue in encouraging younger scholars. A fixture in the D.C. military history community, he served as president of the Military Classics Seminar. He was devoted to his wife, Becky, also a noted historian at CMH, and his son, Eddie; in retirement, they took trips to Europe and Australia, where Ed presented a paper to the Australian Army Historical Conference. A fervent Red Sox fan, Ed lived long enough to witness four World Series championships, though he never saw Fenway Park. Once Ed became your friend, he stood with you forever. He will be greatly missed.





# FROM **NATIVE GUIDES** TO COMMONWEALTH DEFENDERS

Filipino Soldiers Under U.S. Command, 1899–1942

**Filipino troops march in a military parade, ca. 1939.**

*Courtesy of the Associated Press*

**BY MARK J. REARDON**

The United States' acquisition of the Philippines following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898 marked the beginning of the U.S. Army's unique association with indigenous troops in the Pacific region. From 1899 to 1902, a revolutionary army of the Philippine Republic, under Emilio Aguinaldo, battled for independence against the American troops who had vanquished the Spanish garrison. This was the war of the Philippine Insurrection, which had begun after the United States had captured Manila on 4 February 1899. The conflict soon shifted from a conventional phase, in which Filipinos attempted to defeat U.S. troops in open battle, to a shadowy guerrilla war. The Americans experienced considerable delay and frustration as a result of that transition, prompting them to turn to Filipino allies as a means of preventing stalemate. That shift proved successful beyond

all expectations, leading to a martial pairing of Americans and Filipinos that flourished through the end of the Second World War.

## SECURING LOCAL ASSISTANCE DURING THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION

Facing an unconventional war, the Americans possessed some knowledge of irregular warfare in a tropical environment, but they had not practiced it for more than fifty years, since the Second Seminole War in 1835–1842. Unfamiliarity with the terrain, much of which remained unmapped, compounded their acute lack of knowledge about the environment. Following the example of U.S. Army commanders in making use of the services of friendly Native Americans during the Indian Wars, U.S. forces gradually employed Filipinos from various tribes as guides,

interpreters, boatmen, teamsters, and trackers. A letter from 1st Lt. Matthew A. Batson of the 4th U.S. Cavalry, dated 16 July 1899, provides the earliest official proposal to employ Filipinos as armed scouts. American soldiers, particularly mounted troops like Batson's unit in northern Luzon, regularly experienced delays because of the numerous streams in the region. Batson wanted to solve that problem by using Filipino boatmen to build portable bridges. In his proposal, Lieutenant Batson suggested arming the native boatmen so they could protect themselves while performing that task.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, commanding general of the VIII Corps' 1st Division, accepted Batson's proposition. In turn, Lawton requested War Department permission to form a company of one hundred armed Macabebe scouts. The Macabebe, whose prior service with the Spanish made them pariahs in the eyes of some Filipinos, were willing to serve under U.S. command.<sup>1</sup> On 10 September 1899, Lieutenant Batson organized the first company of these volunteers, followed eleven days later by a second company and then three more companies in October. For accounting purposes, the scouts were paid as civilian employees of the Quartermaster Department and officered by personnel detached from the U.S. Army.<sup>2</sup>

The Macabebe scout companies soon proved their worth in combat. As a result, the U.S. Army decided that mounted patrols accompanied by native cavalry troopers could operate more efficiently than units made up exclusively of Americans. The expanding Filipino presence within the American military establishment mirrored developments taking place in the political, civil, law enforcement, and economic spheres of the Philippines. Rather than attempt to force a military solution on the Filipinos, the U.S. Army had adopted a pacification strategy designed to showcase the benefits of American rule.<sup>3</sup>

On 3 April 1900, President William McKinley authorized the creation of a Filipino cavalry squadron. On 24 May 1900, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur Jr., VIII Corps' new commanding general and the Philippines' military governor, approved the formation of a cavalry battalion of four troops of 120 soldiers each, engaged to serve until 30 June 1901 unless sooner discharged. Additionally, between May and December 1900, the Army formed a company of Ilocano native scouts in northern Luzon,

spurring MacArthur to establish a fixed uniform rate of pay and allowances. He declared the scouts subject to military discipline, guaranteed them regular rations, and stipulated that pay and allowances would come from civil funds.<sup>4</sup>

MacArthur also supported sending native scouts to southern Luzon to fight insurgents. In late January 1901, he authorized an additional battalion of Macabebe native scouts, a battalion of Cagayan native scouts, and a second company of Ilocano native scouts. The Army Reorganization Act of 2 February 1901 retroactively recognized the native scout initiative in the Philippines.

In addition, the act promoted U.S. Army regular officers serving with scout units up to the rank of captain to the next highest grade and elevated sergeants to the rank of lieutenant. However, the act capped the number of Filipinos serving in the U.S. military at 12,000, which also counted toward the Army's total enlisted strength.<sup>5</sup>

The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, the overall architect of the insurgency, by native scouts in March 1901 led to a significant decrease in violence. As a result, U.S. volunteer regiments began departing the Philippines in July 1901, leaving regular U.S. forces to assume all security responsibilities

**Arthur MacArthur, shown here as a major general**  
*National Archives*



**Emilio Aguinaldo**  
*Library of Congress*



**General Lawton at his headquarters in Manila, 1899**  
*Library of Congress*



in the archipelago. Thoroughly convinced of the utility of indigenous troops, U.S. Army officials made up for the redeploying volunteers by retaining the services of a mounted scout battalion of four companies, ten companies of Lepanto native scouts, four companies of Cagayan native scouts, seven Macabebe companies, and seven Ilocano native scout companies. In addition, scout pay now came out of Regular Army funds and enlistment obligations were extended to three years.<sup>6</sup>

## WORLD WAR I

After the insurgency, the American garrison in the Philippines refocused on a new mission. Following the defeat of Czarist troops in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War (February 1904–September 1905), American military planners became convinced that Japan now posed the most dangerous threat to the Philippines.<sup>7</sup> Manila Bay, a splendid 30-square-mile harbor on the shores of which sat the capital city and a seaport with excellent commercial infrastructure, was the most valuable prize for any potential invader. In case of invasion, the Philippine garrison would defend Luzon until reinforcements arrived from the continental United States.<sup>8</sup>

In January 1905, the U.S. Army dropped ethnolinguistic identifiers from Filipino unit designations, adopting the generic term “Philippine scouts” instead. The name change, coupled with the decision to move widely dispersed companies that had been deployed in remote areas known for guerrilla activity to centrally located installations, marked the initial shift toward employing Filipino troops in conventional roles. The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 7th Battalions were organized in February 1905; followed by the 8th Battalion later that year; the 9th, 10th, and 11th Battalions in 1908; the 12th Battalion in 1909; and the 13th Battalion in 1914. The Philippine Constabulary, which took on the duties of an insular police force in October 1901, assumed primary responsibility for internal security in advance of this process.<sup>9</sup>

A select few scouts were groomed for noncommissioned leadership roles as part of this latest reorganization initiative. Almost a decade passed before commissioned Filipino officers were allowed to serve in scout units. The first Filipino student to attend West Point, Vicente P. Lim, entered the academy in 1910. Two years later, 24-year-old Lt. Esteban B. Dalao became the first Filipino

to be directly commissioned into the Philippine scouts. Over the next several years, Dalao was joined by fourteen more Filipinos, two of whom graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and six of whom, including Lim, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy.<sup>10</sup>

The American entry into World War I on 6 April 1917 accelerated the transformation of the scouts into a conventional force. Roughly 14,400 troops, of which 5,733 were Filipinos, were stationed in the archipelago when the United States joined the Allied powers. Within a few weeks, many continental soldiers were transferred from the Philippines to join units destined for service in France. By April 1918, the strength of the U.S. garrison in the Philippines fell to 9,300 soldiers. To offset the reduced number of U.S. personnel, President T. Woodrow Wilson authorized an additional four battalions and eighteen separate companies of Philippine scouts. The force structure increase resulted in the number of scouts growing to 314 (primarily U.S.) officers and 8,129 (predominately Filipino) enlisted personnel.<sup>11</sup>

Along with creating more scout units, the Army reorganized existing scout formations into four provisional infantry regiments, a field artillery regiment, a field signal battalion, and an engineer battalion. Twelve




**Governor-General Harrison**

*Library of Congress*

of the eighteen separate companies formed the headquarters, supply, and machine gun companies of the provisional infantry regiments. The remainder provided the headquarters and supply component for the artillery regiment and enlisted personnel for signal and engineer units.<sup>12</sup> The reorganization marked a major milestone as the scouts began their transformation from a light infantry force to an all-arms organization with organic artillery, machine gun, engineer, and signal units.

The Philippine legislature played a part in archipelago’s defense for the first time on 12 April 1917 by authorizing the mustering of a National Guard division. The new organization consisted of three infantry regiments, a cavalry troop, two field artillery batteries, and two coast artillery companies.<sup>13</sup> Within a few weeks, construction of training camps began as more than 25,000 Filipinos volunteered for military service. Not everyone was pleased with the initiative shown by politicians in Manila. When Governor-General Francis B. Harrison sought support for the project, the chief of the Militia Bureau in Washington, D.C., protested any reference to the unit as a National Guard organization because it was actually “a volunteer organization for war purposes.”<sup>14</sup> The pushback led to Harrison referring to the organization thereafter as “the division of Philippine National Guard Volunteers.”<sup>15</sup>



**Vicente P. Lim, shown here as a West Point cadet**

*U.S. Military Academy Library*

Despite lack of official sanction, officers from the garrison assisted the governor-general's efforts to organize the new unit. In addition to filling critical staff functions, American troops trained 200 Filipino officer candidates and 100 prospective Filipino noncommissioned officers at a camp near Manila during late July through mid-September 1917.<sup>16</sup> The lack of congressional approval prevented the U.S. Army from providing more assistance until the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a bill in late 1917 allowing Philippine volunteers to be federalized. The pace of training picked up as the division activated additional units in anticipation of movement orders that never came. Although the White House thereafter referred to the division as a National Guard formation, its administration remained the responsibility of the Philippine government rather than the Militia Bureau.

Nine days after hostilities ended in Europe on 11 November 1918, President Wilson called the Infantry Division, Philippine National Guard, into federal service for one month's training. On 29 November, the War Department provided additional details when it notified the governor-general that the division would be called into service at reduced strength. The cessation of hostilities had resulted in the inactivation of the 3d Philippine Infantry Regiment and a separate signal unit. Meanwhile, in accordance with the president's proclamation, the division of Philippine National Guard Volunteers already had begun assembling. Although the division mustered out on 19 December 1918, its members continued training for two more months before the unit formally disbanded.<sup>17</sup>

## REORGANIZING THE SCOUTS

The Army revisited the postwar status of the Philippine scouts while it prepared to dissolve the division of Philippine National Guard Volunteers. The War Department wanted the ability to expand rapidly in the event of a future conflict by mandating universal military training for all male U.S. citizens. That proposal gained little traction within legislative circles as evidenced by the National Defense Act of 4 June 1920. The act created the Army of the United States, consisting of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves, but it failed to mandate universal military training. It also set the peacetime end strength of the Regular Army between

170,000 and 280,000 and authorized 435,800 soldiers for the National Guard. However, legislators then appropriated sufficient funds for a Regular Army numbering 200,000 officers and enlisted soldiers with no further increase in sight. Indeed, a growing aversion to defense spending ensured that this figure fell by another 50,000 by 1921.<sup>18</sup>

The National Defense Act of 1920 posed a major administrative challenge because the scouts were not regulars, national guard soldiers, or reservists. As a result, the War Department settled on integrating them with the Regular Army by transferring the colors of four stateside infantry regiments that had been slated for inactivation to the scouts. At the time, a standard U.S. infantry division consisted of two brigades with two regiments apiece and an artillery brigade plus supporting troops. The colors of the 43d, 45th, 57th, and 62d U.S. Infantry Regiments were sent to the Philippines, accompanied by a cadre of officers from each unit.<sup>19</sup>

The officers and colors of the incoming units disembarked at Manila on 3 December 1920. With the stroke of a pen, the 1st Philippine Infantry Regiment (Provisional) became the 45th Infantry Regiment (Philippine Scouts [PS]), and the 2d Philippine Infantry Regiment (Provisional) transformed into the 57th Infantry Regiment (PS). In January 1921, the U.S. Philippine Department formed the 62d Infantry Regiment (PS) using personnel from the 4th Philippine Infantry Regiment (Provisional). Two months later, elements of the 2d, 8th, and 13th Battalions respectively became the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of the 43d Infantry Regiment (PS).<sup>20</sup>

Though the Philippine garrison now had a division-sized complement of infantry, it still lacked several artillery battalions, signal elements, and a medical unit. In May 1921, the War Department redesignated the 1st Philippine Field Artillery (Mountain) as the 25th Field Artillery (PS). That same month, the provisional Philippine engineer units were formed into the 1st Battalion, 14th Engineers (PS).<sup>21</sup> The Philippine Division, consisting of a mix of U.S. and scout units, was then activated at Fort William McKinley, Taguig City, Philippines, on 8 June 1921.<sup>22</sup> The Philippine Department added a Philippine scout brigade headquarters, the 23d Brigade (PS), to its table of organization in 1922, followed by a second brigade headquarters, the 24th Brigade (PS), in 1931.<sup>23</sup>

Postwar downsizing arrived in the Philippines with a vengeance once Congress

cut the Army's overall strength to 125,000 personnel. As a result, the strength of the Philippine garrison fell from 19,525 to 11,656 between 1921 and 1922.<sup>24</sup> Both the 43d and 62d Infantry Regiments (PS) were inactivated. The former retained a cadre in accordance with a War Department directive designating it as an "active associate" of the 45th Infantry.<sup>25</sup> The same orders authorized the formation of the 12th Ordnance Company (PS).<sup>26</sup> In addition, the 12th Medical Regiment, a Regular Army formation, re-formed as a Philippine scout unit several months before the inactivation of the infantry regiments.<sup>27</sup>

In September 1922, the War Department authorized the creation of the 26th Cavalry (PS) using 701 enlisted soldiers from the 25th Field Artillery (PS). The 26th Cavalry took over the animals and the equipment of the departing 9th U.S. Cavalry. Some of the continental officers from the 9th Cavalry, reassigned to the new regiment, also remained in the Philippines. Using personnel and equipment siphoned from coast artillery companies formed during World War I, the Philippine Department formed the 91st and 92d Coast Artillery Battalions (PS) on 30 June and 1 July 1924, respectively.<sup>28</sup>

The only incident marring the otherwise exemplary record of the Philippine scouts occurred in July 1924. On the evening of 27 June, a scout secretly had visited the quarters of the Fort McKinley provost marshal to inform him that his comrades were organizing a large-scale protest against their unequal pay and status in comparison to U.S. soldiers. A U.S. Army private, for example, received thirty dollars a month while a Philippine scout of the same rank earned only ten dollars.<sup>29</sup> A quick investigation disclosed that discontent among the scouts had grown to alarming proportions after units from outlying locations were congregated at Fort McKinley (near Manila) and at Fort Stotsenberg, located 55 miles north of the Philippine capital. The provost marshal acted on the tip a little more than a week later by arresting twenty-two scouts during a raid on a clandestine meeting.<sup>30</sup>

On 7 July, officers from Col. Douglas A. MacArthur's 23d Infantry Brigade (PS) were dismayed to find that 380 members of the 57th Infantry had refused to report for duty. On 8 July, more than 220 members of the 12th Medical Regiment (PS) followed suit. The mutiny collapsed later that day,

after the officers in both units confronted the insubordinate scouts. Almost 400 scouts returned to duty without further incident while the military police transported the remaining 200 to the stockade.<sup>31</sup>

The War Department allowed local military authorities to handle the matter as they saw fit. In late July and August 1924, 209 scouts were tried on charges of mutiny and unbecoming conduct. One-hundred-and-three scouts were found guilty of mutiny and ordered to be dishonorably discharged, forfeit all pay and allowances, and serve up to five years in prison. Six of the scouts were acquitted.<sup>32</sup> An appeals court halved the sentences, and with time off for good behavior, most of the prisoners were released within two years.<sup>33</sup> Afterward, the Philippine Department took the precaution of inserting undercover security agents into scout companies for the next several years.<sup>34</sup>

The mutiny fed lingering concerns among War Department officials about the loyalty of indigenous Filipino soldiers. Their unease resulted in some hesitation about upgrading small arms issued to Filipinos, and they tightened controls over larger weapons such as field artillery. On a positive note, the War Department motorized scout artillery units during the mid-1920s, seeking to improve the garrison's ability to respond to the threat of amphibious invasion.<sup>35</sup> The Philippine Division also enjoyed a major advantage over its stateside counterparts in that it conducted large-scale training maneuvers each year.<sup>36</sup>

Even though issues with pay and the desire for independence lingered beneath the surface following the 1924 mutiny, American officers still felt the scouts were well-trained, superb soldiers. Most enlisted scouts had served in their units for many years and knew their jobs thoroughly. Their living conditions and health benefits were better than those of the average civilian. Company first sergeants functioned as unit recruiting officers. They often selected new recruits from their own provinces or from other tribes who spoke the same dialect. It was not uncommon for the son of a scout to join his father as a member of the same unit.<sup>37</sup>

With the constabulary responsible for maintaining law and order, the Philippine scouts concentrated on honing their professional skills in anticipation of a possible confrontation with the invading forces of a hostile nation. However, combat readiness suffered because the understrength scout units could not conduct realistic training.

### Douglas MacArthur, shown here as a brigadier general

*Library of Congress*



Each of the infantry regiments lacked a third battalion as well as supporting units such as their antitank and cannon companies. The coast artillery units had only two battalions instead of three. Personnel shortfalls prevented scout units from training under simulated wartime conditions. The coast artillery battalions, for example, worked around personnel shortages by performing each task on a rotating basis.<sup>38</sup>

### BUILDING THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH ARMY

In March 1934, the U.S. Congress passed legislation setting the prerequisites for the archipelago's independence in 1946. On 24 March, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which granted full independence ten years after the Filipinos drafted a constitution, elected a representative government, and chose a national leader. The legislation allowed the United States to maintain its military presence in the Philippines during the transition period and also permitted the United States to call the armed forces of the Philippine Commonwealth into U.S. service before the archipelago gained its independence.<sup>39</sup> A group of Filipino lobbyists

who had been staying in Washington, D.C., conveyed the act to Manila, where the legislature approved it on 1 May 1934.

In accordance with the terms of the act, Filipinos elected delegates for a constitutional convention on 10 July. In the process of drafting the constitution, Filipino politicians seeking to solidify the archipelago's pending claim to sovereignty proposed the creation of a military force separate from the scouts and the constabulary. The ensuing debate over national defense questions proved to be a lengthy one, as many legislators, for a variety of economic and political reasons, long had opposed the forming of a Filipino military force.

While legislators wrangled over the proposed constitution, Philippine Senate leader Manuel L. Quezon traveled to Washington, D.C., to seek input on defense matters from several prominent Americans, including now Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur had risen in rank since leaving the Philippines and now served as the Army's chief of staff.<sup>40</sup> Quezon asked the general if he would be willing to oversee the creation of the Philippine military. With his tour as chief of staff due to end the following year, MacArthur agreed to Quezon's request, provided that President Roosevelt and Secretary of War George H. Dern approved.<sup>41</sup>

In anticipation of Roosevelt's and Dern's approval, MacArthur directed the Army War College to put together a plan for a Philippine Commonwealth military force on 1 November 1934. A select group, headed by Maj. James B. Ord, worked out a draft concept, which they forwarded to MacArthur's office. Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower, serving on MacArthur's staff, reviewed the draft, which had been prepared on the optimistic assumption that there would be no fiscal or personnel constraints. Before sharing the plan with MacArthur, Eisenhower and Ord reduced the project's annual budget to \$11 million. The revised version called for a large army of reserve divisions, formed around a core of 20,500 full-time Filipino regulars, along with smaller air and naval components. When MacArthur reviewed their work, he told Eisenhower and Ord to reduce the annual expenditures by another \$3 million. To meet this revised ceiling, they reduced the regular component to 7,930 personnel, downsized ammunition stockpiles, and authorized fewer heavy weapons, particularly artillery pieces.<sup>42</sup>

On 14 May 1935, Congress approved a bill adding the Philippines to the list of countries eligible to receive a U.S. military mission.<sup>43</sup> On that same day, the Philippine people approved their new constitution in a national referendum. Upon its ratification, the U.S. governor-general issued a proclamation calling for national elections that fall.<sup>44</sup> On 17 September 1935, Filipinos elected Manuel Quezon as their president and Sergio Osmeña as their vice president.<sup>45</sup> Foreign affairs, defense, and monetary matters remained under U.S. oversight until 1946, but Filipinos now handled all other political matters.<sup>46</sup>

On 18 September, Secretary Dern issued Special Orders No. 22, detailing General MacArthur to assist the commonwealth with military and naval matters. Although MacArthur remained on active duty after stepping down from the position of chief of staff, he reverted to his permanent rank of major general. Majors Eisenhower and Ord accompanied him as members of what had become known as the Philippine Military Mission.<sup>47</sup> Soon after arriving in Manila in late October, MacArthur presented Quezon with the plan developed by Ord and Eisenhower.

Acknowledging the impracticality of building a navy strong enough to interfere with an enemy invasion fleet or maintain interisland communications during wartime, the plan centered on deterring potential aggressors by deploying a sizable infantry force on each major island. Because the plan depended on the simultaneous mobilization of all ground forces while conceding control of the surrounding waters to an invader, it required a decentralized means of mobilizing, training, and sustaining Philippine defensive efforts. As a result, MacArthur proposed the creation of ten military districts, each responsible for raising three reserve infantry divisions of 10,000 soldiers each, that would encompass the entire archipelago. (See Map 1.)<sup>48</sup>

Divided into three equal phases, each lasting ten years, the plan would begin on 1 January 1937 and be completed on 1 January 1967. The initial phase called for fielding a small regular component, ten 10,000-person reserve infantry divisions, a composite aviation battalion, and four coastal navy flotillas with sixty motor torpedo boats. Ten additional reserve divisions were slated to be fielded during the second phase, which also focused on building up equipment



**Major Eisenhower, ca. 1929**  
*Eisenhower Presidential Library*

stockpiles. The final tranche of units required to reach the ultimate goal of thirty reserve divisions would be created during the third phase.<sup>49</sup>

Quezon publicly introduced MacArthur's plan to the Philippine legislature on 22 November 1935. A series of conferences preceded the announcement to allow legislators to work out the legal details required to implement it.<sup>50</sup> The Philippine Commonwealth Army formally came into being with the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 1 on 21 December 1935. The legislation created the General Staff Corps and established the Philippine military's medical, legal, finance, quartermaster, ordnance, and chaplain services. A military school, designated as the Philippine Military Academy, was established for selected candidates seeking permanent commissions in the Philippines' regular army. The act provided for a regular component consisting of infantry, artillery, cavalry, aviation, and naval branches. It also authorized the creation of a reserve force made up of "any number of Infantry Divisions" as well as additional aviation and naval elements.<sup>51</sup>



**President Quezon**  
*Library of Congress*

The Council of National Defense, consisting of Quezon, Osmeña, the head of each executive department, the Philippine Commonwealth Army's chief of staff, and six others designated by the Philippine president, stood at the pinnacle of the commonwealth's embryonic military hierarchy. The Philippine Commonwealth Army's chief of staff also served as the head of the Central General Staff. Modeled after its U.S. Army counterpart, the Central General Staff consisted of the chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff, and officers in the rank of third lieutenant or higher. The Central General Staff had the responsibility of preparing plans for national defense and mobilization, evaluating unit readiness, conducting inspections, ensuring training standards, and assisting the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches, as well as the Air Corps and Offshore Patrol (Navy) as needed.<sup>52</sup>

On 11 January 1936, President Quezon made the first appointments in the Philippine Commonwealth Army officer corps. As might be expected, Quezon preferred candidates with experience in the constabulary or Philippine scouts. He chose retired Brig. Gen. Jose de los Reyes, the senior member of the constabulary, as the chief of staff. Quezon then appointed Brig. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes, also of the constabulary, as the deputy chief of staff while Col. Guillermo B. Francisco became the assistant chief of staff.<sup>53</sup> However, de los Reyes soon ran afoul of Quezon when he began announcing officer appointments before clearing them with the president.<sup>54</sup> In addition to the growing gulf between

Quezon and de los Reyes, it soon emerged that many constabulary officers were professionally ill-prepared for the challenge of creating a thirty-division army, air corps, and offshore patrol from scratch.

These issues faded in May 1936 when the Central General Staff underwent a major reorganization that resulted in the reassignment of de los Reyes as provost marshal general. Constabulary Col. Paulino T. Santos received a promotion to major general when he stepped into de los Reyes's vacated slot as chief of staff. General Valdes was elevated to the same rank after being appointed as Santos's deputy. Colonel Francisco, newly promoted to brigadier general, took command of the sole regular division.<sup>55</sup> The assistant chief of staff's responsibilities were now divided amongst three billets:

Col. Vicente P. Lim became assistant chief of staff for war plans; Lt. Col. Fidel V. Segundo drew the assignment of assistant chief of staff for intelligence, operations, and training; and Col. Rafael L. Garcia assumed the post of assistant chief of staff for personnel and supply.<sup>56</sup>

## EQUIPPING THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH ARMY

The core tactical elements of the Philippine Commonwealth Army were designed as light infantry divisions with "equipment and armament suitable to the economy and terrain," consisting of 10,080 troops (compared to 15,200 in a U.S. Army infantry division).<sup>57</sup> Each division theoretically possessed three infantry regiments, a cavalry squadron, an engineer battalion, an artillery regiment, a transportation



**The 1st Division, Philippine Commonwealth Army, on parade at Camp Murphy, 13 November 1939**

*Courtesy of Dr. Ricardo Trota Jose*



**The Philippine Commonwealth Army's Central General Staff (left to right): Col. Rafael L. Garcia, Col. Charles E. Livingston, Brig. Gen. Vicente P. Lim, Maj. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes, Maj. Gen. Paulino T. Santos, Maj. Gen. Jose de los Reyes, Col. W. E. Dossler, Col. Fidel V. Segundo, and Lt. Col. Victoriano Luna, ca. 1939**

*Courtesy of the Presidential Museum and Library, Republic of the Philippines*

battalion, a communications company, and a division headquarters. In addition, each division possessed an organic reserve of 2,400 personnel. Rather than depend on replacements from outside the military district, Filipino division commanders could recoup battle losses using soldiers already assigned to their units.<sup>58</sup>

Philippine Commonwealth divisions were authorized eighteen 81-mm. and twenty-four 120-mm. Brandt mortars rather than the thirty-six 75-mm. cannons, eight 105-mm. howitzers, and eight 155-mm. howitzers allocated to U.S. divisional artillery contingents.<sup>59</sup> Lower per weapon cost, ease of operation, and smaller unit frontages provided the rationale for equipping Philippine divisions with mortars. A planned battalion of twelve .50-caliber machine guns, intended for Filipino artillery regiments, would provide divisions with antitank and anti-aircraft capabilities.<sup>60</sup> Other weapons allotted to Philippine reserve divisions included 6,900 rifles, 492 pistols, 431 Browning automatic rifles, and 54 .30-caliber water-cooled heavy machine guns.<sup>61</sup>


Concerns about cost overruns resulted in the Philippine regular army initially absorbing most of the constabulary rather than bringing on new recruits.<sup>62</sup> Although the constabulary already possessed rifles, submachine guns, and shotguns, it did not have any artillery or surplus small arms. Moreover, the mass transfer of personnel consumed most of the regular personnel spaces, leaving only 300 officers and 3,000 enlisted personnel available to fill the 2,490 authorizations in 1st Division, 900 army training billets, 419 air force positions, and 420 navy slots.<sup>63</sup>

The challenge of equipping the initial group of ten reserve divisions loomed large. Weapons acquisition had to account for the cost of both purchase and upkeep. Balking at the hefty eighty-five-dollar price of M1903 Springfield rifles, the United States' Philippine Military Mission sought to procure 360,000 M1917 Enfield rifles from U.S. stocks at nine dollars apiece. The Philippine Commonwealth Army also borrowed weapons, such as Browning automatic rifles and .30-caliber machine guns, from the U.S. Philippine Department for training purposes. Although the Philippine government did not have to pay for their use, it did have to purchase ammunition for them.<sup>64</sup> Compounding the equipment problems, U.S. depots did not contain any

Brandt mortars, which were essential to arming the Filipino artillery regiments.<sup>65</sup>

Other problems emerged when the outbreak of war in Spain and China drove up global arms prices. As a result, Eisenhower discarded plans to procure 120-mm. mortars in favor of obtaining surplus 75-mm. field guns from stateside U.S. Army depots. As a further cost savings, he also cut the number of .50-caliber machine

guns for each division.<sup>66</sup> Confronted with a mushrooming defense budget that threatened to make a mockery of the estimate provided to Quezon, General MacArthur asked the War Department to send obsolete Lewis machine guns, Stokes mortars, and 75-mm. field guns to the Philippines.<sup>67</sup> Although the War Department agreed to provide the surplus weapons, it did so only on the condition that American inspectors



Map 1


would have free access to commonwealth armories. Ammunition for the 75-mm. cannons had to be stored at U.S. Army depots on the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay.<sup>68</sup>

Although the procurement of weapons and ammunition remained a thorny issue, the nascent Commonwealth Army's development undertook a major step forward in 1937 when it formed ten military districts, each with a division headquarters assigned. Luzon, together with several outlying islands (Mindoro, Palawan, and Masbate), accounted for five military districts; Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago combined to constitute a sixth district; and the Visayas (Cebu and other centrally located islands) made up the other four districts. Each military district had responsibility for peacetime training, administration, the distribution of supplies, and maintenance of equipment. MacArthur planned for each district to raise one reserve division by 1940, with an ultimate goal of three divisions per district.<sup>69</sup>

### TRAINING THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH ARMY

In August 1937, Lt. Gen. Malin D. Craig, the U.S. Army chief of staff, sent a radiogram to the Philippine Military Mission directing General MacArthur to return to the United States in October. A surprised MacArthur applied for retirement rather than assume a final stateside posting. General Craig approved MacArthur's request, setting 31 December 1937 as his last day on active duty. From that date forward, requests from the Philippine government for additional personnel, materiel, or services would be transmitted to the War Department through the commanding general of the Philippine Department.<sup>70</sup> Although MacArthur no longer had direct access to the U.S. military decision-making apparatus, Quezon allowed him to continue serving as the commonwealth's chief military adviser.

With Japanese troops driving deeper into China, and Germany proclaiming its intentions to acquire Czechoslovakia and Austria, MacArthur finally convinced President Quezon of the need to increase annual military expenditures. The additional funds would be used to construct warehouses and mobilization centers and to make improvements to much of the existing infrastructure. Although the request met



Filipino soldiers training with an M1917 75-mm. field gun

National Archives

with legislative approval, the increase was confined to one budget session. Meanwhile, the looming possibility of a broader conflict in Asia led to increasingly strained relations between Quezon and MacArthur. Quezon had pressed ardently for independence earlier than 1946 until the threat of war convinced him that the Philippines would be better off remaining as a U.S. possession for the foreseeable future. He therefore

viewed MacArthur's continued presence as a costly detriment. Quezon covertly sought to obtain MacArthur's resignation by undercutting his authority and reducing defense expenditures.<sup>71</sup>

Although the Philippine Commonwealth Army made significant progress toward the initial goal of creating ten reserve divisions in little more than two years, the five and a half months of training for mobilized reservists often included nonmilitary subjects such as basic sanitation and learning how to read and write.<sup>72</sup> As a result, the reservists did not have time to master their military duties sufficiently enough to remember them when called back for refresher training. In addition, field maneuvers for reservists were impractical because the 120 mobilization and training centers, each hosting only 150 to 200 trainees, were scattered across more than twenty islands. This meant that Philippine Commonwealth Army officers rarely had the opportunity to lead more than a company of troops.

In January 1938, 20,000 Filipino reservists from the 2d, 3d, and 4th Military Districts joined 10,000 U.S. Army personnel for two weeks of military maneuvers. Although the combined maneuvers garnered much positive publicity, they revealed major problems within the Philippine Commonwealth Army's sole regular unit. Though the constabulary officers had considerable law enforcement experience, they knew little of basic military skills such as map reading and field fortifications. Classes were offered to senior officers, but many refused to learn from instructors with lesser rank. These developments, along with the discovery that police offi-



Malin Craig, shown here as a major general

Library of Congress



**A cadet poses with a rifle at the Philippine Military Academy, Baguio, Philippines, c. 1937**

*Courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Libraries*

cers did not always make good soldiers, contributed to the 23 June 1938 decision to restore the constabulary to a purely law enforcement role.<sup>73</sup> Efforts to reconstitute the sole Philippine Commonwealth Army regular division encountered predictable fiscal and staffing challenges, with the result that it rematerialized as a single, skeletonized, infantry regiment, lacking artillery and support troops.<sup>74</sup>

A Philippine Commonwealth Army board that had been created to evaluate the ongoing defense buildup subsequently recommended curtailing reserve training in favor of fielding two regular infantry divisions. The board advocated investing the money that would be saved by mobilizing fewer enlisted personnel each year in training more officers. Acting on advice proffered by Vicente Lim, now a general, Quezon approved the recommendation to train fewer reservists while devoting more effort to cultivating a professional officer corps.<sup>75</sup> Quezon later made his thoughts clear, when he asked Major Eisenhower, “[W]hy did we plunge into the mass training of enlisted reservists *before* we had the officers, at a time when we *knew* that we did not have them, to do the job with reasonable efficiency?”<sup>76</sup>

In his ongoing effort to reduce MacArthur’s influence, Quezon persuaded the National Assembly in May 1939 to establish the Department of National Defense, headed by

Teofilo Sison.<sup>77</sup> Sison immediately forbade the Philippine Commonwealth Army from ordering ammunition, negotiating construction contracts, or recruiting new personnel without seeking his department’s approval.<sup>78</sup> The military mission also began working through the Department of National Defense rather than directly interacting with Quezon’s office. The president began diverting funds from the Philippine Commonwealth Army to the constabulary in response to internal security issues created by severe labor unrest and political instability.<sup>79</sup> He then publicly questioned the need for a large Filipino military. In a speech at the Philippine Normal School, Quezon told attendees that he did not think the Philippines could be defended even if every Filipino was armed. Quezon repeated that statement a week later when addressing members of the University of the Philippines College of Law.<sup>80</sup>

In June 1940, the commonwealth’s Central General Staff underwent another reorganization that reflected the lessons learned during the past three years. Two of the three assistant chiefs of staff took on new responsibilities, with the first assistant chief of staff adding reserve unit employment to his oversight of war plans, and the third assistant chief of staff changing from personnel and supply to supply and industrial preparedness. Personnel matters, which had been under the purview of the third assistant chief of staff, transferred to the new position of fourth assistant chief of staff. A fifth assistant chief of staff was created to oversee fiscal matters. Colonels Lim, Segundo, and Garcia retained their positions as the first, second, and third chiefs of staff, respectively. Lt. Col. Irineo Buenconsejo became the fourth assistant chief of staff, and Capt. Amadeo Magtoto was the fifth assistant chief of staff.<sup>81</sup>

During this same period, the American military mission’s initial efforts to obtain more equipment and supplies from the United States met with scant success. The logjam broke in August 1939 when the War Department promised to send additional weapons from American depots to the Philippines. Planned to be spread across a three-year period, these shipments would consist of 110 3-inch mortars in 1940, followed by 54 more in both 1941 and 1942; 166 Browning automatic rifles in 1942, but none in 1940 or 1941; 60 .30-caliber machine guns in 1940, with 240 more in both 1941 and 1942; and 20 3-inch guns in 1940, followed by 24 more in 1941 and 1942.<sup>82</sup>

The additional weapons created a significant increase in firepower, but the majority of the indirect fire systems were obsolete and due to be replaced by newer models.

## WAR PLAN ORANGE

Promises of additional weapons coincided with increasing American interest in making use of commonwealth military forces. The prohibitive cost of maintaining a large garrison in the Philippines had always limited the options available for opposing a major Japanese invasion. Acknowledging that gaining a decisive victory in the opening stages of such a conflict would be impossible, the archipelago’s garrison had orders to retain control of key points on Luzon while awaiting the arrival of a relief force transported by the American Pacific fleet.

War Plan ORANGE, which stipulated U.S. military actions during a war with Japan, assigned top priority to denying the use of Manila Bay to Japanese naval vessels. The Philippine Department’s responsibilities, as defined by its commanding officer, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, involved “preventing enemy landings at Subic Bay and elsewhere; failing in this, to eject enemy at the beaches; failing in this, to delay to the utmost the advance of



**George Grunert, shown here as a lieutenant general**

*U.S. Army*

the enemy; to withdraw as a last resort the mobile forces to the Bataan peninsula and defend the entrance to Manila Bay.<sup>83</sup> As a result, Grunert did not assign troops for the defense of southern Luzon, the Visayas, or Mindanao.

War Plan ORANGE differed from MacArthur's fundamental rationale for creating a mass conscript army by focusing on Luzon rather than the entire archipelago.<sup>84</sup> Consequently, Grunert made no plans to employ half of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, and instead planned to use only one regiment apiece from the 81st and 91st Divisions. The Philippine Commonwealth Army leadership did not take well to that concept. Several Filipino officers were convinced the Americans felt no compunctions about sacrificing the entire Philippine Commonwealth Army on the altar of War Plan ORANGE.<sup>85</sup>

The Americans did anticipate making use of an estimated 65,000 trained Filipino reservists assigned to units on Luzon. The Philippine Department would support their induction by assigning teams—consisting of one U.S. officer, one U.S. enlisted soldier, and two Philippine scouts—to meet each incoming battalion at its respective mobilization center. With a few exceptions, the teams were made up of personnel holding similar specialties, for example, the 31st, 45th, and 57th Infantry supported Philippine infantry regiments, and the Coast Artillery Corps and scout artillery units mobilized Filipino artillery regiments. Upon completion of the Philippine Commonwealth Army's mobilization, these U.S. teams would remain with their supported units in advisory and command roles.<sup>86</sup>

The Philippine Department detailed how the combined Filipino and American force would defend Luzon in updated instructions entitled "Plan ORANGE (1940 Revision)." Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Philippine Division would position U.S. and Philippine scout mobile elements across a wide swath of Luzon. After the Filipinos mobilized their troops, the Americans planned to utilize the 21st Division in western Luzon, the 31st Division at Bataan, and the 41st Division south of Manila. After those divisions moved into position, U.S. troops that had been defending likely landing beaches would withdraw to create a mobile reserve, which also would include the 51st Philippine Division. The city of Manila would be secured by a token U.S. and scout


element along with the Philippine 1st and 81st Divisions.<sup>87</sup>

As 1940 drew to a close, President Roosevelt conceded that he could neither abandon nor evacuate the U.S. garrison in the Philippines. Because of this change of heart, Roosevelt gave the War Department executive approval to fulfill many of General Grunert's earlier requests. The scouts received not only M1 Garand semiautomatic rifles but also 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars. Adequate stocks of ammunition, however, did not accompany the latter weapons. The United States also transferred Marine and Army units from China to the Philippines, which increased the number of U.S. combat troops defending the archipelago. In addition, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall sent a coast artillery regiment, fifty pieces of self-propelled 75-mm. artillery, and two battalions of light tanks, along with modern P-40E Warhawk fighters, air warning radars, an aviation engineer battalion, and B-17 Flying Fortress strategic bombers. Additional U.S. reinforcements, including two infantry

regiments (161st and 34th), eight field artillery battalions, and fifty Army Air Force A-24 dive bombers, were enroute but were diverted to Hawaii or Australia after war broke out in December 1941.<sup>88</sup>

Roosevelt approved Army plans to increase the number of Philippine scouts from 6,382 to their full authorization of 12,000.<sup>89</sup> Rather than induct personnel with no military experience, Grunert persuaded Quezon to permit trained Filipino reservists to join the scouts.<sup>90</sup> By April 1941, the U.S. Army had selected 3,803 out of more than 5,000 Filipinos who had reported to Fort McKinley and had assigned most of them to the 45th and 57th Infantry Regiments (PS).<sup>91</sup> In addition to beefing up the scouts, the White House increased constabulary authorizations from 7,500 to 15,000, a move that permitted the creation of a second regular division.<sup>92</sup>

Grunert asked the War Department to approve the immediate mobilization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army reserve units on Luzon. The purpose of the call-up, according to the Philippine Department



Filipinos enlist in the U.S. Army at Fort McKinley in March 1941.

Author's Collection

commander, was to provide the Filipino units with two to four months of combat-oriented instruction under the “complete command, supervision, and control” of U.S. forces.<sup>93</sup> Grunert’s recommendation reflected a keen awareness that Philippine Division regulars and reserve divisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Army possessed profoundly different levels of proficiency. Although the increase of scouts gained White House approval, Roosevelt did not authorize an immediate call up of the Philippine Commonwealth Army.

### FILIPINO SERVICE IN U.S. ARMY FORCES FAR EAST

On 26 July 1941, President Roosevelt announced that the United States had frozen Japanese financial assets in retaliation for Tokyo’s occupation of Vichy French Indochina.<sup>94</sup> The announcement triggered Japanese plans to obtain needed resources by seizing Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese also intended to seize the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island to preempt an American counterattack against the eastern flank of their invasion force.<sup>95</sup> As the Japanese accelerated preparations for war, Roosevelt ordered the induction of all the commonwealth’s organized military forces into the armed forces of the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section II(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. He also recalled MacArthur to active duty with the rank of major general and placed him in command of U.S. Army Forces Far East (USAFFE).<sup>96</sup>

General MacArthur immediately realized that his status as commanding general opened up opportunities to acquire the modern weapons that the Philippine Commonwealth Army sorely needed. Rather than adopt the plans developed by Grunert, MacArthur assigned key tasks to all twelve Filipino regular and reserve divisions. Not waiting for formal permission from the War Department, MacArthur redrew existing operational boundaries to establish four new commands: North Luzon Force, South Luzon Force, Reserve Force, and the Visayas-Mindanao Force. The newly created 2d Division, composed of constabulary personnel, drew the assignment of securing Manila. The bulk of the U.S. personnel, with the exception of a small contingent of scout officers and U.S. adviser/instructors assigned to the Visayas-Mindanao Force, remained on Luzon. On 21 November 1940, General Marshall notified MacArthur that he had

approval to implement the revised defensive scheme.<sup>97</sup>

The new plan differed from prewar strategy focusing on defending Manila in that MacArthur made use of the remainder of the Philippine Commonwealth Army to defend the Visayas-Mindanao region while dedicating more troops to southern Luzon. He also decided to use Filipino units to defend potential landing beaches on Luzon. MacArthur’s newfound emphasis on defeating an invader at the water’s edge, rather than counterattacking the initial lodgment using the general reserve, received official confirmation after a USAFFE order, dated 3 December 1941, stipulated there would be “no withdrawal from the beaches.”<sup>98</sup> The changes convinced many American officers that MacArthur now would place little emphasis on conducting a delaying action into Bataan.<sup>99</sup>

MacArthur’s increased reliance on Philippine units resulted in Congress voting to send \$269 million in military aid to the archipelago.<sup>100</sup> MacArthur knew that when the new weapons arrived, Filipino soldiers would need to be taught how to operate them. Consequently, USAFFE announced that each of the reserve divisions would receive forty U.S. Army officers and twenty U.S. Army noncommissioned officers (including Philippine scouts) as adviser/instructors. The Philippine Division provided some of these individuals, and units in the continental United States contributed another 425 personnel.<sup>101</sup> In addition to transferring the American adviser/instructors, USAFFE reassigned 2,300 scouts to commonwealth

units in an effort to offset the lack of experienced noncommissioned officers.<sup>102</sup> The reequipping process would take time to implement, but the USAFFE commander did not believe the Japanese would invade before April 1942.<sup>103</sup>

Additional resources from the United States did not solve the problem of inadequate numbers of Filipino officers. To help overcome these shortages, USAFFE selected the most promising individuals of each reserve training class for an additional six months of training as noncommissioned officers, and the best of the latter were commissioned as third lieutenants in the Philippine Commonwealth Army. Other third lieutenants came from Reserve Officer Training Corps units established at universities and colleges.<sup>104</sup> Another measure involved promotions of lower-ranking officers to fill existing vacancies in higher grades. In early August 1941, for example, those promoted by the Philippine Commonwealth Army included three new colonels, nine lieutenant colonels, sixteen majors, and thirty-six captains.<sup>105</sup> The 1940 and 1941 graduating classes of the Philippine Military Academy were assigned en masse to the 1st Division, although the latter class would not report until mid-December.<sup>106</sup>

Recognizing that few Filipinos possessed high-level command experience, Grunert’s staff anticipated filling Philippine Commonwealth Army vacancies with American officers. The Philippine Department allocated twenty-eight infantry officers, six cavalry officers, five field artillery officers, and five coast artillery officers to command



at battalion level and above.<sup>107</sup> This number grew as more U.S. officers, both reservists and regulars, became available. Americans commanded twenty-four of the thirty Filipino reserve infantry regiments. Americans also led eight of the ten Philippine reserve artillery regiments.<sup>108</sup> Filipino officers—including Brig. Gen. Mateo M. Capinpin with the 21st Division, General Lim with the 41st Division, recently promoted Brig. Gen. Fidel Segundo of the 1st Division, and Guillermo Francisco, now a brigadier general, of the 2d Division—led four of the twelve Philippine divisions.<sup>109</sup>

With the exception of the constabulary units assigned to the 2d Division, which had assembled in Manila in mid-July 1941, the mobilization of ten reserve divisions began with the induction of one infantry regiment on 1 September.<sup>110</sup> Divisional officer cadres, selected noncommissioned officers, and several divisional engineer battalions began assembling in mid-September. The decision to mobilize the engineers sooner than originally planned stemmed from the need to build roads, depots, and cantonment areas. Some units, such as the 11th Engineer Battalion, also were tasked to establish schools for follow-on units.<sup>111</sup> In addition, several constabulary formations assigned to the 2d Division were unable to secure transport to Manila (*Figure 1*).<sup>112</sup>

The second regiment from each division mobilized on 1 November, followed a month later by the third regiment. Mobilization of the entire force, including both regular divisions, theoretically would have been completed by 15 December. However, both the second and third phases experienced significant delays. Full mobilization involved not only the assembly of troop units but also the construction of additional housing and training facilities. Although the mobilization centers could accommodate the initial intake, they were insufficient to support follow-on units. The Visayas-Mindanao Force met some equipment shortages by pilfering Reserve Officer Training Corps stocks, but Filipino reservists with the 72d, 82d, and 92d Infantry Regiments ultimately went to war armed only with bolo knives.<sup>113</sup>

The month of November also witnessed the mobilization of divisional artillery regiments, although this process proved to be a painful one. Competition for limited shipping assets also held up the movement of personnel and equipment. As a result, USAFFE organized some artillery units in Mindanao, Cebu, and the Visayas as

provisional infantry formations, pending the arrival of their field pieces. The emphasis on training infantry in the early years of the Commonwealth Army's existence had created a shortage of trained artillery soldiers. At a minimum, Filipino artillery reservists waited several weeks before they received weapons.<sup>114</sup> At least three field artillery regiments never received any cannons because the ships carrying the weapons from Luzon were sunk enroute or the onhand stocks were insufficient to meet their needs.<sup>115</sup>

The reorganization of the USAFFE chain of command encountered less severe obstacles. American officers exclusively occupied command positions above division level. MacArthur created the North and South Luzon Forces, each the equivalent of a corps headquarters, using personnel drawn from the Philippine Division and staffs of existing army installations. He also formed two less robust command and control elements for the Manila Bay and Visayas-Mindanao regions.<sup>116</sup> Brig. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright commanded the North Luzon Force while Brig. Gen. George M. Parker Jr. led the South Luzon Force. Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp received command of the Visayas-Mindanao Force while Brig. Gen. George F. Moore headed the Manila

Bay defenses.<sup>117</sup> American and Philippine scout strength in the Philippines, which had numbered 21,550 officers and enlisted personnel on 30 July, grew to 31,102 by the end of November.<sup>118</sup> In addition to the U.S. personnel, the Philippine Commonwealth Army numbered 90,000 by 15 December.<sup>119</sup>

Although the numbers seemed impressive, they paled in comparison to USAFFE's responsibilities. The 7,100 islands making up the Philippines had 22,000 miles of potential landing sites. General Wainwright's North Luzon Force was responsible for defending against an enemy landing on western and northern Luzon. In addition to the 26th Cavalry (PS), his command included the 11th Division, which mobilized in the Lingayen Gulf area; the 21st Division, mobilizing in north central Luzon near Tarlac; the 71st Division, assembling 25 miles northwest of Clark Field at Camp O'Donnell, and the 31st Division, forming on the coastal plain of Luzon, west of the Zambales Mountains. The 91st Division, then mobilizing northeast of Manila at Cabanatuan, was attached to Wainwright's command, although MacArthur designated it as his strategic reserve. USAFFE shipped the 71st and 91st Divisions to Luzon from Leyte and Samar, albeit minus their third regiments and divisional artilleries.<sup>120</sup>



DIVISION AND COMMANDING GENERAL	FIRST MOBILIZED REGIMENT AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDER	DIVISIONAL MOBILIZATION AREA	STRENGTH ON 31 OCTOBER 1941
11th Division Brig. Gen. William E. Brougher	11th Infantry Col. Glen R. Townsend	Abra, Ilocos, Cagayan, and Isabela Provinces	334 Officers 2,514 Enlisted
21st Division Brig. Gen. Mateo M. Capinpin	21st Infantry Lt. Col. Valentin Valesco	Pangasinan, La Union, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac Provinces	407 Officers 2,774 Enlisted
31st Division Brig. Gen. Clifford S. Bluemel	31st Infantry Col. John W. Irwin	Pampanga, Bulacan, Zambales, and Bataan Provinces	382 Officers 2,629 Enlisted
41st Division Brig. Gen. Vicente P. Lim	42d Infantry Lt. Col. Claro B. Lizardo	Laguna, Batangas, Manila, and Cavite	405 Officers 2,891 Enlisted
51st Division Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones	52d Infantry Col. Virgil N. Cordero	Albay, Camarines, and Sorsogon Provinces	373 Officers 2,831 Enlisted
61st Division Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth	61st Infantry Col. Eugene H. Mitchell	All three provinces on Panay Island and Romblon Province	397 Officers 2,625 Enlisted
71st Division Brig. Gen. Clyde A. Selleck	71st Infantry Lt. Col. Donald V. Bonnett	Camp O'Donnell (71st and 72d Infantry Regiments only), two provinces on Negros Island	395 Officers 2,705 Enlisted
81st Division Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort	81st Infantry Lt. Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon	Islands of Cebu and Bohol	387 Officers 2,379 Enlisted
91st Division Brig. Gen. Luther R. Stevens	91st Infantry Col. Edgar A. Keltner	Cabanatuan (91st and 92d Infantry Regiments only), Leyte and Samar Islands	287 Officers 2,681 Enlisted
101st Division Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Vachon	101st Infantry Col. Russell J. Nelson	Mindanao Province and Island of Sulu	303 Officers 2,000 Enlisted

Source: Memo, Ops Div, War Dept. Gen Staff, for unknown recipient, 3 Oct 1945, encl. 1, in Diary, Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones, 1-3, 370.2 HRC S. Luzon, Geog Philippines, CMH.

**Figure 1 — First Phase of Philippine Army Mobilization**

The South Luzon Force, responsible for defending against hostile amphibious landings south of the capital, consisted of two Philippine Commonwealth Army reserve divisions augmented by portions of the 1st Division. The Philippine and 91st Infantry Divisions protected the northeast shore of Manila Bay between Manila and San Fernando. General Sharp's Visayas-Mindanao Force, composed of

three Philippine Commonwealth Army reserve divisions, had the mission of preventing the enemy from establishing airfields on Panay, Negros, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, Mindanao, and southern Mindoro, rather than defending those islands against amphibious assaults (*Map 2*).<sup>121</sup>

MacArthur, who believed that he had enough time to prepare the Philippine Commonwealth Army before the Japanese

landed, modified the defensive plans developed by the Philippine Department (*Figure 2*). The U.S. soldiers originally allocated to defending the most likely landing beaches on Luzon were replaced by Filipino troops, despite the fact that American units possessed greater numbers and firepower, better training, and superior command and control. MacArthur wanted the Filipinos to defend the beaches because an enemy amphibious force is normally most vulnerable during the first moments of a landing. This factor would offset the Philippine Commonwealth Army's lack of firepower to a considerable degree, allowing Filipino reserve units to make significant contribution despite their shortcomings.

General Grunert disagreed with this scenario, stating, "The strength of the U.S. troops in the Philippines is so limited that if the bulk of the Philippine Division is held in reserve, the forces at the beaches will be so weak that they will be unable to prevent landings or inflict serious losses on the enemy when he is most vulnerable."<sup>122</sup> With only light opposition at the beaches, Grunert presciently noted, enemy forces would be able to push inland so rapidly from several landing points that it would be impossible to meet them effectively with the reserves. Such rapid action by the enemy would "prevent the mobilization of a large part of the Philippine [Commonwealth] Army and seriously jeopardize the supplies in the Manila area before they could be moved to Bataan."<sup>123</sup> For this reason, Grunert proposed to retain a substantial number of American troops in the beach defenses even after mobilizing the Philippine Commonwealth Army divisions. In response, MacArthur, who did not appreciate criticism of his operational plans, unceremoniously relegated Grunert to the sidelines.

The sequential mobilization of Philippine regiments resulted in a wide disparity of combat readiness within each division. Within the 31st Division, the 31st Philippine Infantry Regiment received almost three months of training, while the 32d and 33d Philippine Infantry Regiments had five and two weeks respectively. The personnel in some battalions had fired fifty rounds on the range, whereas other soldiers fired as many as twenty-five rounds and as few as zero.<sup>124</sup> The 41st Division's 41st Philippine Infantry Regiment received five weeks of training; the 42d Philippine Infantry Regiment had



Map 2

thirteen weeks; and the 43d Philippine Infantry Regiment virtually none. In the 51st Division, all of the soldiers of the 52d Philippine Infantry Regiment received three months of training. Within the 51st Philippine Infantry Regiment, officers and key noncommissioned officers received two months of training, while other noncommissioned officers and privates had one month. Whereas the officers and key noncommissioned officers of the 53d Philippine Infantry Regiment had three

months training, the bulk of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers received no training whatsoever before entering combat.<sup>125</sup>

The 11th Division provides a typical example of readiness within the supporting arms. Its field artillery regiment did not go into action until late December, and, even then, it had to make do with 60 percent personnel strength and eighteen of its twenty-four 3-inch cannons. USAFFE allotted only eight 75-mm. cannons to

the 51st Division, which meant that two batteries began training as field artillery units while the remainder drew rifles and began training as a provisional infantry unit.<sup>126</sup> To make matters worse, the artillery crews and fire direction personnel had not trained adequately, which greatly reduced their accuracy and responsiveness. There was also a severe shortage of spare parts, and much of the ammunition proved defective, having spent several decades in depots.<sup>127</sup>

PLAN ORANGE (1940 REVISION)	ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT
<b>BATAAN, NORTH AND WEST LUZON</b>	
11th, 21st, and 31st PA Divisions	11th, 21st, and 31st PA Divisions
26th Cavalry (PS)	26th Cavalry (PS)
57th Infantry (PS)	One battalion from 45th Infantry (PS)
45th Infantry (PS)	Three PS artillery batteries
11th, 21st, and 31st PA Divisions	71st PA Division (-) o/o
Three PS artillery battalions	
One separate PS artillery battery	
Two PS coast artillery batteries	
<b>SOUTH AND EAST OF MANILA</b>	
41st PA Division	1st (-), 41st, and 51st PA Divisions
31st Infantry Regiment	
Five artillery batteries (PS)	
One battalion from 1st PA Division	
<b>MANILA</b>	
<b>RESERVE FORCE</b>	
Philippine Division (-)	Philippine Division (minus one battalion)
51st PA Division	91st PA Division (-)
1st PA Division (-)	86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS)
32d PA Regiment	Far East Air Force
81st PA Regiment	2d PA Division (-)
Two companies from 57th Infantry (PS)	
F Troop, 26th Cavalry (PS)	
<b>VISAYAS-MINDANAO</b>	
<b>VISAYAS-MINDANAO FORCE</b>	
None	61st, 81st (-), and 101st PA Divisions
	2d PA Regiment
	93d PA Regiment
	3d PC Regiment

Source: Plan, Philippine Dept., 1 Apr 1941, "Plan-Orange (1940 Version), HPD WPO-3," Exhibit 2R, 1-5, 228.01 HRC, Geog S. Philippines - 381 War Plan Orange, CMH; Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II (1953; repr. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 70.

Key: PA = Philippine Commonwealth Army; PC = Philippine Constabulary; PS = Philippine Scouts; (-) = the entire division except for detached subordinate units; o/o = on order

**Figure 2—U.S. Army Far East Wartime Deployment (Plan ORANGE versus MACARTHUR Deployments)**

The lack of qualified personnel was most apparent when the senior American instructor with the 21st Artillery Regiment assigned 2d Lts. Melchior Acosta and Geraldo Mercado, both recent Philippine Military Academy graduates, to command field artillery battalions—a position normally held by a major or lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army.<sup>128</sup> Practically no higher-ranking Filipino officers were capable of functioning efficiently as staff officers, and it was necessary to replace them with American reservists before commonwealth units went into action.<sup>129</sup>

Although commonwealth soldiers were eager to learn the tradecraft of war, their enthusiasm proved to be a poor substitute for reliable weapons and intensive training. The U.S. Army official history, commenting on the late December 1941 Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf, noted, “Only the Scouts of the 26th Cavalry had offered any serious opposition to the successful completion of the Japanese plan. The untrained and poorly equipped Philippine Commonwealth Army troops had broken at the first appearance of the enemy and fled to the rear in a disorganized stream.”<sup>130</sup> The uneven performance of Philippine reserve divisions at the onset of the war surprised no one, with the possible exception of MacArthur.


## CONCLUSION

As the campaign wore on, the Philippine scouts and the 2d Division gained a number of tactical successes, providing ample evidence of how Filipinos could fight when well-led, adequately armed, and intensively trained. As one American tank battalion commander later noted, “Casualties in the Scouts were high, but their determination and bravery was unsurpassed. They never complained, accepting whatever fate might bring them.”<sup>131</sup> While Filipino reserve divisions suffered defeat in a number of early engagements, their personnel grew more confident and proficient as the campaign wore on. In fact, the Japanese had to halt the initial phase of their operation to transport additional troops to the Philippines to overcome unexpectedly fierce resistance. Even though the subsequent battles for Bataan and Corregidor dominate historical accounts of that period, Filipino troops on Mindanao held their attackers at bay until ordered to surrender by USAFFE in May 1942.<sup>132</sup>

The United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands committed significant numbers of native troops against Japanese invading forces that swept across Southeast Asia during the opening months of World War II in the Pacific. In sharp contrast to the American relationship with the Filipinos that had begun at the turn of the century, both Great Britain and the Netherlands employed native formations to maintain order in their respective Malayan and East Indies colonies for a century or more. The events that transpired after the Japanese conquered not only Malaya and the East Indies, but also the Philippines, are therefore even more noteworthy. Thousands of colonial troops who served with the British and Dutch switched sides after surrendering.<sup>133</sup> Events in the Philippines took a far different course as former scouts and constabulary soldiers joined forces with ordinary Filipinos to wage a relentless guerrilla war against their occupiers, paving the way for MacArthur’s return in 1944. The fighting that took place before and after the USAFFE capitulation serves

as a testament to the unbreakable bonds forged between Americans and Filipino soldiers.

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**2d Lt. Roberto Lim, son of Vicente Lim, shown here in March 1942**  
*Library of Congress*

## Notes

1. The Spanish pacified the Philippines between 1565 and 1600. The Macabebe originally were on the side of the rebels during the insurrection, but a dispute among top insurgent leaders that resulted in the death of a Macabebe senior officer may have convinced them to shift allegiances. Mario E. Orosa, "The Macabebes," Orosa Family Web Site, 10 Sep 2013, <http://orosa.org/TheMacabebes.pdf> (accessed 13 Oct 2023).

2. Charles H. Franklin, *History of the Philippine Scouts, 1899–1934* (Fort Humphreys, DC: Historical Section, Army War College, 1934), 5, Organizational History Branch Files (Companies, Battalions, Regiments, Brigades, and Divisions), Field Programs Division (hereinafter Org Hist Br Files), U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC (hereinafter CMH).

3. Maj. James R. Craig, "A Federal Volunteer Regiment in the Philippine Insurrection: The History of the 32nd Infantry (United States Volunteers) 1899–1901" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 72–75, p4013coll2\_575, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

4. Franklin, *History of the Philippine Scouts*, 9–10.

5. *The Statues at Large of the United States of America from December, 1899, to March, 1901, and Recent Treaties, Conventions, Executive Proclamations, and the Concurrent Resolutions of the Two Houses of Congress*, vol. 31 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 757–58, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/l1/l1sl/l1sl-c56/l1sl-c56.pdf> (accessed 12 Dec 2023).

6. Native scout companies were capped at fifty soldiers apiece for the Lepanto native scouts and one hundred for the other units. Franklin, *History of the Philippine Scouts*, 118–19.

7. The planners doubtless were unaware that the Japanese Empire had been making plans to invade the Philippines since the end of the sixteenth century. None of these plans came to fruition because the Japanese lacked the naval capacity for such an invasion. Stephen Turnbull, "Wars and Rumours of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637," *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 4 (Autumn 2016): 107–18.

8. Edward S. Miller, *War Plan ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 54.

9. The constabulary remained organized as separate companies, spread among five (later six) administrative districts until 1935, when they were reorganized into six regiments, each

consisting of two battalions (except for three battalions authorized for the Mindanao regiment). Lt. Col. Ambrosio P. Peña, *Bataan's Own* (Muñoz Press, Manila: 2d Regular Division Association, 1967), 15–27.

10. *The Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy* (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, 2005), 5–15; George Munson, "The Best of The Best (91st Coast Artillery, Philippine Scouts): A Short History," Units & Personnel, Corregidor – Then and Now, 2000, [http://corregidor.org/chs\\_munson/91st.htm](http://corregidor.org/chs_munson/91st.htm) (accessed 15 Nov 2023).

11. "Report of the Adjutant General," in *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 171.

12. GO 21, Headquarters, Philippine Dept., 5 Apr 1918, Manila, P.I., in *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 172.

13. "Report of the Governor General of the Philippines, January 1 to December 31, 1917," in *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), 1.

14. "Report of the Chief of Militia Bureau," in *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 1132.

15. *Report of the Governor General of the Philippines to the Secretary of War, January 1, 1919 to 31 December, 1919* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 26.

16. "Report of the Governor General of the Philippines, January 1 to December 31, 1917," 2.

17. Ltr, Ofc Ch Mil History to HQ, Personnel Center, 6020 Service Unit, Oakland Army Base, n.d., sub: Information on Philippine NG, Org Hist Br Files, CMH.

18. The U.S. Army end strength dropped once more to 125,000 by 1922. Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History*, vol. 2, *The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2003*, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 57; Robert K. Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 29–93, 233.

19. The National Defense Act of 1920 also stipulated that all officers in the scouts holding U.S. citizenship had to be reintegrated into the Regular Army. Only 62 of the 188 officers in the scouts were eligible for reintegration. *Report of the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary of War, 1921* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), 18, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/>

[pt?id=mdp.39015035881591&seq=3](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015035881591&seq=3) (accessed 12 Dec 2023).

20. Franklin, *History of the Philippine Scouts*, 22–24.

21. *Ibid.*, 29.

22. War Dept. Cablegram 1063, 29 Apr 1921, per AG 322.82 (21 Apr 21), Unit Data Card, HQ and Mil Police Co, 12th Inf Div, Org Hist Br Files, CMH.

23. Constituted in 1921 and organized in 1922, the 23d Brigade (PS) was the parent organization of the 45th and 57th Infantry Regiments (PS). The 24th Brigade initially oversaw the 15th and 31st Infantry Regiments (U.S.) before being redesignated as a Philippine scout formation with responsibility for the inactivated 44th and 62d Infantry Regiments (PS).

24. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1920* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 26; *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1922* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922), 137.

25. Although inactivated, the 43d Infantry Regiment (PS) remained assigned to the Philippine Division. John E. Olson, *The Philippine Scouts* (San Antonio, TX: Philippine Scouts Heritage Association, 1996), 78–80.

26. Franklin, *History of the Philippine Scouts*, 27.

27. *Ibid.*, 29.

28. GO 8, War Dept., 1924, para. 21, 91st Coast Artillery (Philippine Scouts); 4th Indorsement, War Dept., AGO, 26 Oct 1925, Commandant, Army War College, Historical Section, Washington, DC, 92d Coast Artillery (Philippine Scouts); both in Org Hist Br Files, CMH.

29. GO 36, 27 Jun 1920, in *War Department General Orders and Bulletins, 1920* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), 5; James P. Finley, "The Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca," *Huachuca Illustrated: A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum* 1 (1993), 54, [https://home.army.mil/huachuca/application/files/4316/6577/8846/Vol\\_1\\_1993\\_Buffalo\\_Soldiers.pdf](https://home.army.mil/huachuca/application/files/4316/6577/8846/Vol_1_1993_Buffalo_Soldiers.pdf) (accessed 13 Dec 2023).

30. "Troops Mutiny, Dissatisfied Natives, Philippine Episode," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 Jul 1924, <http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/16152584> (accessed 6 Jul 2012).

31. Chris Yeazel, "America's Sepoys (Part II)," *Philippine Scouts Heritage Society* (Fall 2008): 11–12, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e10ea57f51cd16ca72b46b4/t/5e7ee35486693d3dcc07fd4f/1585374037113/2008-PSHS-Fall.pdf> (accessed 12 Dec 2023).

32. "Philippine Scout Rebellion," *Straits Times*, 29 Aug 1924, 9, <http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19240829.2.67.aspx> (accessed 6 Jul 2012).

33. Richard B. Meixsel, "An Army for Independence? The American Roots of the Philippine Army" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1993), 181–90, UA853.P6.M44, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
34. Brian M. Linn, *Guardians of Empire, The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 158.
35. Meixsel, "An Army for Independence?" 172.
36. For example, no large-scale combined maneuvers were held in the continental United States during 1925 because of lack of funds. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1926* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), 45–46.
37. Munson, "The Best of The Best (91st Coast Artillery, Philippine Scouts): A Short History," n.d.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Senator Millard Tydings and Representative John McDuffie chaired the respective Senate and House committees on insular affairs.
40. "Manuel L. Quezon," MacArthur, Features, American Experience, PBS, n.d., <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur/peoplevents/pandeAMEX108.html> (accessed 15 Nov 2023).
41. Daniel D. Holt and James W. Layerzapf, eds., *Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 1905–1941* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 287–88.
42. *Ibid.*, 294–95.
43. James F. Lacy, "Origins of the United States Army Advisory System: Its Latin American Experience, 1922–1941" (PhD diss., Auburn University, 1977), 88, FL1418.L3, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
44. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1935* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1935), 20.
45. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation 2148, "Establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," The American Presidency Project, 14 Nov 1935, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2148-establishment-the-commonwealth-the-philippines> (accessed 9 Dec 2023).
46. Philippine Independence Act, PL 73–127, 48 Stat. 456 (24 Mar 1934), 459, <https://govtrack.us.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg456.pdf> (accessed 12 Dec 2023).
47. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, vol. 1, 1880–1941 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 484–86.
48. Marconi M. Dioso, *The Times When Men Must Die: The Story of the Destruction of the Philippine Army during the Early Months of World War II in the Pacific, December 1941–May 1942* (Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Publishing, 2010), 11.
49. Holt and Layerzapf, *Eisenhower*, 312.
50. *Ibid.*, 295.
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52. *Ibid.*
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62. Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War II* (1953; repr., Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 10.
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64. Jose, *Philippine Army*, 65–66.
65. Holt and Layerzapf, *Eisenhower*, 324–25.
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67. *Ibid.*, 327.
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84. James, *Years of MacArthur*, 534–35.
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100. The War Department agreed to all of

U.S. Army Forces Far East's equipment requests except for providing commonwealth troops with M1 Garand rifles. Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 48.

101. OCMH Study No. 94, Jun 1973, "Status of Members of the Philippine Military Forces during World War II," 11; James, *Years of MacArthur*, 588.

102. Whitman, *Bataan*, 34.

103. Jonathan M. Wainwright and Robert Considine, eds., *General Wainwright's Story: The Account of Four Years of Humiliating Defeat, Surrender, and Captivity* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1949), 13.

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105. Jose, *Philippine Army*, 194.

106. John M. Fitzgerald, *Family in Crisis: The United States, the Philippines, and the Second World War* (self-published, 2002), 16.

107. Plan, Philippine Dept., 1 Apr 1941, "Plan-Orange (1940 Version), HPD WPO-3," Exhibit R, G-1 Annex, sheets 1-2.

108. The exceptions primarily were confined to the 21st and 41st Divisions. Mallonée, *Naked Flagpole*, 9.

109. Dioso, *Times When Men Must Die*, 12.

110. Peña, *Bataan's Own*, 30.

111. Memo, Ops Div, War Dept. Gen Staff, for unknown recipient, 3 Oct 1945, encl. 1, in Diary, Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones, 1, 370.2 HRC, S. Luzon, Geog Philippines, CMH; Ops Rpt, 11th Eng Bn, 29 Aug 1941-10 Apr 1942, 4 Feb 1946, 1-2, 314.7 HRC, Geog Philippines, CMH.

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113. Memo, unknown issuer for unknown recipient, 12 May 1942, sub: United States Forces in Mindanao in March 1942, 320.2 HRC, Geog S. Philippines, CMH; Dioso, *Times When Men Must Die*, 12.

114. Mallonée, *Naked Flagpole*, 14.

115. Wainwright and Considine, *General Wainwright's Story*, 15.

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117. General William F. Sharp's rank was effective as of 18 December 1941. "William F. Sharp," official biography, 19 Sep 1945, General Officer Biographies, CMH.

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119. Memo, Ops Div, War Dept., for unknown recipient, n.d., sub: Strength and principal units in the Philippines as of Dec. 20, 1941, 320.2 HRC, Geog S. Philippines, CMH.

120. Wainwright and Considine, *General Wainwright's Story*, 15.

121. James, *Years of MacArthur*, 604.

122. Plan, Philippine Dept., 1 Apr 1941, "Plan-Orange (1940 Version), HPD WPO-3," G-3 Annex, 6.

123. *Ibid.*

124. Whitman, *Bataan*, 32.

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126. *Ibid.*, 2.

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128. Fitzgerald, *Family in Crisis*, 16.


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131. E. B. Miller, *Bataan Uncensored* (Little Falls, MN: Military Museum of Minnesota, 1991), 145.

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133. Williford, *Racing the Sunrise*, 307-8; Kaushik Roy, *Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941-1942* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019), 221-25.

A banner for Army History Online. The background is a dark blue grid of hexagons with white dots at the vertices. In the center, the words "ARMY HISTORY" are written in a bold, red, sans-serif font, with "ONLINE" below it in a larger, white, sans-serif font. Below the text, a white paragraph reads: "The Center of Military History makes all issues of *Army History* available to the public on its website. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at [www.history.army.mil/armyhhistory/issues\\_complete\\_guide.html](http://www.history.army.mil/armyhhistory/issues_complete_guide.html)." The text is in a white, sans-serif font.

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# MUSEUM FEATURE

## HARBOR DEFENSE MUSEUM



By Justin M. Batt

School groups end their visit with lunch on the Bluff, overlooking the Narrows.

Nestled within the heart of Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, the Harbor Defense Museum preserves the history of New York City's coastal defenses. The museum is part of the Army Museum Enterprise and is an annex of the West Point Museum. All activities at the museum focus on achieving the museum's mission, which, as defined by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, is to collect, preserve, exhibit, and interpret historically significant materiel related to the history of U.S. Army Garrison Fort Hamilton and the seacoast defenses in New York.

The only Army museum in New York City, the Harbor Defense Museum has a fine collection of military artifacts. A large portion of the collection—2,838 items—originally was part of the Fort Wadsworth Military Museum on Staten Island. Established in 1966, that museum remained open until 1979, when the U.S. Army ceased operations at Fort Wadsworth. On 11 June 1980, the Harbor Defense Museum opened its doors for the first time at Fort Hamilton. About 125 artifacts are on display at any given time.

The museum is housed in the original caponier—a freestanding bastion located in the dry moat that was designed to defend the


rear of the original fortification. The caponier itself, considered one of the finest examples of such a structure in the United States, is the museum's most precious artifact. It has survived largely intact, preserving many of the fort's original architectural elements, which have been lost elsewhere to renovations.

The museum's storyline focuses on generations of harbor defenses from 1794 to 1950, as seen through the eyes of Fort Hamilton and the surrounding fortifications in the New York City area. Within this storyline is an exhibit dedicated to the Battle of Long Island (1776), which began on the grounds that Fort Hamilton sits on today.

Fort Hamilton is one of the oldest continuously serving U.S. Army installations in the country. Built between 1825 and 1831, Fort Hamilton was part of a system of fortifications erected throughout New York City. The fort is named in honor of distinguished Revolutionary War officer Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton. The fort had two missions. The first was to support actions against enemy warships seeking to pass through The Narrows—the primary entrance into New York City's harbor. Its second was to



**In this aerial photograph, Fort Hamilton's large guns can be seen along the shoreline, ca. 1930.**




**The caponier, shown here ca. 1869, was designed to defend the rear of Fort Hamilton.**

defend against land-based infantry attacks. Fort Hamilton's last gun was removed in 1948.

The museum is committed to providing training and educational opportunities to all soldiers of the U.S. Army, as well as other service members, veterans, and civilians. It welcomes tour groups of all kinds and offers a guided tour of the museum along with a structured classroom program, which is tailored for various grade levels. The education programs focus on the development of harbor defenses in the New York City area, a program on the history of Fort Hamilton, and an engaging presentation on the Battle of



**Fort Hamilton's seacoast-facing wall, ca. 1875**



**The firing of a disappearing gun, ca. 1910**

The Harbor Defense Museum is located inside the historic caponier.



A docent and a soldier discuss the purpose of a 24-pounder flank howitzer, which was used to defend against land-based infantry attacks.





The sixty-first superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, Lt. Gen. Steven W. Gilland, points out Fort Lafayette, which is located on an island in the Narrows, in a museum exhibit.

Long Island. Included in the Battle of Long Island program is a demonstration of loading and firing a flintlock musket. The tour concludes on the bluff, which provides a spectacular view of The Narrows.

The Harbor Defense Museum is located on U.S. Army Garrison Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York. Hours of operation are Tuesday–Friday, 1000–1600. The museum is free and open to the public. Although not required, scheduling an appointment is recommended before visiting the museum. Nonmilitary visitors require a valid photo ID and a visitor pass. For more information, please call 718-630-4349 or visit the museum’s website at <https://history.army.mil/museums/IMCOM/fortHamilton/index.html>.

**Justin M. Batt** is the curator of the Harbor Defense Museum.



Students pose for a group shot during their field trip. Many schools from the New York City area visit the museum to learn more about Fort Hamilton and the U.S. Army.

# U.S. ARMY ART SPOTLIGHT

## ARMY ARTISTS DOCUMENTING DISASTER RELIEF


By Sarah G. Forgey

Since the creation of the Army's artist-in-residence position in 1992, the Army has assigned one active duty artist to the U.S. Army Center of Military History. During his or her tenure, this artist's mission is to document the current Army. Numerous artists have covered peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts around the world, training activities and exercises, and the Global War on Terrorism. In addition to capturing images of major Army operations and day-to-day soldier life, the artist-in-residence often records the Army's response to natural disasters.

The Army's first artist-in-residence, Sfc. Peter G. Varisano, had an early opportunity to observe relief efforts after Hurricane Andrew in August 1992. Traveling with General Gordon R. Sullivan, Varisano witnessed the distribution of food and supplies to local citizens who had been affected by the hurricane. From this experience, he produced four watercolor paintings. In 1994, Sgt. Carl E. "Gene" Snyder created a colored pencil drawing, based on one of Varisano's photographs of Hurricane Andrew relief efforts, as his first artwork as artist-in-residence. Years later, in 2017, Artist-in-

Residence Sfc. Juan C. Munoz traveled to Florida and Puerto Rico with General Mark A. Milley to document the Army's response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria. Munoz completed four watercolors related to Hurricane Maria relief and a drawing of a soldier responding to Hurricane Irma.

When artists-in-residence have not been invited to observe disaster response efforts, they have used their ingenuity to create opportunities. Hurricane Sandy hit the eastern coast of the United States in 2012, very early in Sfc. Amy L. Brown's tenure as artist-in-residence. Not wanting to miss the response efforts, Sergeant Brown identified an engineer unit from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, that was leaving for New York. She was able to travel in their company, creating three artworks based on the experience. In connecting with a local unit to document its disaster response, Brown unknowingly had followed in the footsteps of one of her predecessors. In 1992, former Army artist Janet R. M. Fitzgerald, who was working as a civilian employee for the Corps of Engineers at Fort Belvoir, had offered her artistic services to document its response to Hurricane Andrew. She



*In the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,*  
Janet R. M. Fitzgerald, oil on canvas, 1997



*Nurse Ambrosich,* Juan C. Munoz,  
watercolor on paper, 2018

*Talking to the Troops,* Juan C. Munoz,  
watercolor on paper, 2018



# DISASTER RELIEF

traveled to Florida just weeks after Varisano had been there.

Disaster response efforts are an important part of the artist-in-residence's mission to document the current Army and a key way in which the Army connects with the American public during times of great need. Like the rest of the Army Art Collection, these disaster relief artworks are preserved at the Army Museum Enterprise's Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

**Sarah G. Forgey** is the chief art curator for the Army Museum Enterprise.





*Corps of Engineers*, Amy Louise Brown, oil on canvas, 2012


*Food Line - Hurricane Andrew*, Carl E. "Gene" Snyder, colored pencil on paper, 1994






*Providing Necessities,*  
Peter G. Varisano, watercolor on paper, 1992

*Dry Goods,* Peter G. Varisano,  
watercolor and pencil on paper, 1993








# NEXT YEAR



# "MAKING WAR UPON THE MAP"



## The U.S. Army's Forgotten Map Problem, Meade's Gettysburg Campaign, and Depicting Operational Art

BY THOMAS BRUSCINO  
AND MITCHELL G. KLINGENBERG

Maps of military campaigns, both in practice and historical, have never adequately depicted operational art. They have not shown how commanders of campaigns array their forces and arrange tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. This article tells how this shortcoming in campaign mapping came about, describes what proper historical campaign maps should include, and provides new operational maps from the Gettysburg Campaign to demonstrate how such maps can improve understanding and analysis of how campaigns are fought and won.

### The Map Problem in the U.S. Army on the Eve of World War I

In the years before World War I, the United States Army line and staff schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the War College in Washington, D.C., had a problem: "We had no military maps of any part of North America," remembered one Fort Leavenworth graduate. "We groused bitterly because we had to use German maps of the Franco-German frontier in the area around Metz."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, students and faculty routinely lamented the absence of good maps. Maj. Gen. Fox Conner, the future American Expeditionary Forces operations officer and the mentor of both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, famously grumbled about the lack of uniquely American maps.<sup>2</sup> In fact, published lessons on military

Composite image showing a map of Gettysburg by Matthew Forney Steele, General Robert E. Lee (left), and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade (right)  
Library of Congress, National Archives

geography at Fort Leavenworth referred readers to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "it being impractical to illustrate [schoolhouse] lectures with suitable maps."<sup>3</sup>

Half a century after his time at Fort Leavenworth, Marshall himself admitted that he and his peers had become more familiar with the Metz map, "very much more so than [with] any map [he] ever knew in this country."<sup>4</sup> Hunter Liggett, the great World War I corps and field army commander, recalled, "We used French and German maps for the most part at the Leavenworth schools and the War College, with the result that many of us found Western Germany, Lorraine and much of France as familiar as the hills and valleys of our boyhood."<sup>5</sup> John A. Lejeune, the first marine to attend the Army War College (and a graduate of the class of 1910), noted that early in his year there, the new commandant Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon grew so exasperated with the ubiquitous German maps that he declared that, in the future, studies at the War College "would be directed towards those parts of the world where it was at least possible we might some day be called on to serve. Thenceforth," Wotherspoon continued, "we devoted our attention to the continent of North America and the contiguous islands, to Hawaii and the Philippines, and to other theaters of possible operations."<sup>6</sup>

Across the board, American officers of the World War I era pointed out the salutary irony that the maps they so grudgingly had studied ended up depicting the very ground over which they would fight the great campaigns of Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne in the war. Their comments, however, illustrated a more fundamental problem. At the great Army schools of the United

States—and, in the case of the War College, located only a stone's throw away from the ground on which the campaigns depicted in the memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan had been fought—students lacked proper military maps from which to study how American armies operated in their greatest of wars.

This lack of maps was not merely a problem at the schoolhouse before World War I. It also had been a problem for the Army in the field during the Civil War. Often, engineers acted as scouts, creating basic sketches of terrain to give commanders the information they required for sound decision making. For example, Robert E. Lee began building his military reputation by acting in such a capacity for Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott during the Mexico City campaign in 1847.<sup>7</sup> Even in the Civil War, on familiar ground, the Americans generally lacked proper maps. What maps did exist varied wildly in quality. To better understand the maps they managed to procure or produce, soldiers supplemented them with direct observations by engineers, cavalry, local civilians, and even journalists.<sup>8</sup> The intelligence gap between what maps depicted and what commanders needed to know for prudent decision making of course was evident throughout the far-flung theaters of the war, but it also existed in the well-populated and mapped East, even in key areas such as those traversed in the Gettysburg Campaign. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac and a Pennsylvanian with some knowledge of the region and in possession of some maps, nevertheless had to dispatch important senior officers to scout the terrain. Most famously, he tasked the Army of the Potomac's Chief of Artillery Maj. Gen. Henry J. Hunt and Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren with surveying a potential defensive line in northern Maryland.<sup>9</sup> These officers managed to do so, but it was an ad hoc solution.<sup>10</sup>

After the Civil War, as U.S. Army officers attempted to improve their institutional deficiencies in mapmaking, the maturing Prusso-German staff system offered a solution. As part of their many reforms following the Napoleonic Wars, the Germans had developed a national-level general staff, including an accessory branch and then a survey department that possessed a cartographical section.<sup>11</sup> This Great General Staff, in its broad outlines, became the foundation for general and field staffs and their operations the world over. Of course,

the Americans did not copy the German model in its entirety. For one thing, and for the good reason that it smacked of militarism, the United States never created a national general staff with the full powers, responsibilities, and organizations of the German version. In 1903, the Americans organized the War Department General Staff, which included Second Division, a fledgling military information section tasked with furnishing a "system of war maps, American and foreign," among its many responsibilities.<sup>12</sup> More importantly, the Americans adopted the concept of field staffs being internal to line formations. Critically, however, these developing staffs lacked dedicated cartography sections until World War I. Additionally, outside of war, field armies, corps, and divisions existed only conceptually, meaning that even if American field general staffs had had cartography sections, there were no personnel staffing those sections in peacetime to do the work.

This is not to say the Americans ignored the problem of producing maps for war. To the contrary, the staff and war colleges taught mapmaking, but in a manner consistent with older methods of preparing officers for the traditional practice of producing maps in

the field and as the situation demanded. The map section of the Second Division of the War Department General Staff assisted these efforts as best it could with limited resources in a contentious era of reform, but in the main, the basic problem persisted.<sup>13</sup> Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Army chief of staff in 1909, authored a critique from his time in the Philippines in 1907 in which he remarked, "There is an apparent entire ignorance in the War Department concerning Subic Bay. No topographical maps exist; waiting on them now."<sup>14</sup> Schoolhouses tried to appropriate money for map production and procurement, but mapmaking efforts progressed only modestly because of the resource-constrained environment of the period from the Civil War to World War I.<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, U.S. military schoolhouses took note of the problem, and to prepare senior leaders and staffs for large-scale military campaigns, they procured the intricate and precise German maps. Thus, General Conner and his peers in the U.S. Army found themselves studying in detail these German-made maps of the ground around the French communities of Metz and Gravelotte and Saint-Mihiel and Verdun and Sedan. Though the course of military



**General Hunt**  
*National Archives*



**General Warren**  
*Library of Congress*

events from 1917 to 1918 vindicated the usefulness of the German maps for the American officers who fought in France, there was still something odd about the inability of the U.S. Army to develop maps from which to study the campaigns of the American Civil War—the greatest war in American history to 1917, and one fought in the proverbial backyard of the students who studied it.

### The Problem of Perspective

Eventually, American schoolhouses did get better maps. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, they developed internal mapmaking capabilities and even enlisted support from the U.S. Geological Survey to produce topographical maps of places like Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in appropriate detail for military use. However, because the military professionals involved wanted maps that would be useful in potential future conflicts, the resulting maps depicted key terrain and infrastructure without historical military formations. Military mapmakers, therefore, devoted less attention to depicting how military units had appeared on the ground while on campaign.<sup>16</sup> This emphasis, while understandable, came with serious and far-reaching implications.

Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett, a corps and field army commander in World War I, best described this conundrum. When assessing potential military problems from a strategic and operational perspective, Liggett believed it imperative to analyze “everything in the art of war—the supply, equipment, transport, mobilization of both troops and industries, recruiting, training, replacements, and disposition of the rapidly expanding army,” and to include, if necessary, “sea transport.”<sup>17</sup> On the importance of good maps for the basis of such assessments, Liggett continued:

The first necessity of such theoretical fighting is absolutely complete and accurate maps. . . . The ordinary atlas map of commerce is no map at all to a soldier; it is made for the layman who is interested only in the relative location of Altus, Oklahoma, and Quanah, Texas, the approximate course of the main roads, railroads, perhaps the more important streams, and the imaginary state line. A railroad folder map on which the B.C. & D. is shown in geometrically straight lines and its competitors largely ignored would be only a little less useful in

war. A proper military map is so intricately comprehensive that it is forbidding for ordinary lay uses; the untrained eye cannot see the forest for the trees.

The most complete map can be no more than a flat projection on the ground, but a good one gives a perfect perspective to those who know how to use it. If the trained eye cannot recognize every major feature of the landscape after an hour’s preparatory study of the projection, the map is of little value. It must be photographic in its accuracy; delineating, for example, every elevation, where the ordinary map is oblivious of anything less than a mountain range.<sup>18</sup>

This was not *all* of what reading a map entailed, however, as Liggett continued to explain. Having a detailed, comprehensive map alone was not enough. In fact, the ability to read a map well often meant the difference between success and failure in war. “Obviously, an officer cannot afford to guess at what lies over the hill from him,” Liggett wrote. “He should, in fact, be able, by study of the map, to foretell pretty nearly what his opponent will do

and where he will go under any given condition.”<sup>19</sup>

In World War I, General John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces adopted the numbered general staff organizational structure that is still in use today. Well aware of the necessity of good military maps and building on the experiences of their French and British allies, the Americans embedded map production into their staffs. Yet this improved organization and the resulting procurement of better topographical studies did not make the planning or conduct of military operations easier.<sup>20</sup> In fact, mapmaking for campaigns grew more complicated. It now entailed three broad categories that mirrored the staff organizational structure: intelligence, operations, and supply. The intelligence specialists focused on depicting enemy order of battle, movements, and dispositions. The operations section depicted friendly formations, movements, and plans. Those responsible for the logistics of the campaign had to illustrate friendly bases, lines of supply, depots, and distribution centers. As a result, each section of the American Expeditionary Forces’ staff—the G-2, G-3, and G-4—produced maps in World War I, and these maps reflected different planning considerations. Thus, so focused as they were on their own concerns and the various specifics of engagements and battles, staff officers never produced a synthesis—a comprehensive, overall campaign map—even for the massive Meuse-Argonne offensive.<sup>21</sup>

The problem of producing good maps for military use persisted in all theaters of World War II, the Korean War, and even the Vietnam War. In more recent years, the advent of satellite imagery has fundamentally transformed the Army’s ability to render accurate terrain and road features in military mapping. But Liggett’s observation—that a good map allows an officer to visualize what friendly and enemy forces can and will do on the terrain under certain conditions—points to something else missing from even the best maps: namely, the visualization of a battlespace that happens only in the officer’s head. For all its impressive accomplishments, to date the U.S. Army has never possessed a standard system for producing the kind of campaign maps that depict the dispositions and intentions of military forces—enemy and friendly,



**Hunter Liggett, shown here as a major general**

*Library of Congress*

combat and support—from a field army commander’s purview.

### Matthew Forney Steele, Vincent Esposito, and Pumped-Up Battle Maps


The story of how the U.S. Army makes its maps for war intersects with the story of how military professionals and historians have mapped historic campaigns. These maps also struggle to convey a thorough understanding of campaigning in war. Such a statement may seem incredible. Historians have plenty of battle maps—many, in fact, of tremendous quality—that more than suffice for understanding even vast tactical actions. Most military historians, while inquiring into operational-level warfare, have scrutinized so-called campaign maps in their study. Consider, for instance, the widely accepted, state-of-the-art maps that countless students of war have referenced through the years: the West Point atlases. Historians have used various versions of the atlases, either in print or in digital form from the United States Military Academy Department of History website. For good reason, they are the standard, and almost always excellent for battles. But the clarity with which these maps depict the tactical level of war is simultaneously lacking—or absent altogether—in their substandard depiction of armies on campaign.

These maps also have a history, which is rooted in the learning that happened at American military schools before World War I. Before 1914, Matthew Forney Steele, one of the great instructors at Fort Leavenworth, taught a course entitled *The Conduct of War*. In keeping with the theme then in vogue that American officers should study warfare only through the lens of the American experience in war, Steele structured his course around American campaigns. That course—and the lectures Steele delivered in it—became the foundation of his *American Campaigns*, a two-volume work published in 1909. The first volume contained many of Steele’s lectures; the second contained maps to accompany those lectures. Because no one then in the Army produced original maps depicting historic campaigns, Steele had to look elsewhere for maps to grace his text. None of the maps in *American Campaigns* were originals drawn for the express purpose of instructing students in the art of campaigning. Instead, Steele reproduced battle and campaign maps from a variety of published secondary sources, usually

the volumes he relied on most to write his lectures. Because the book’s publication was to be paid for by the War Department and used primarily for educating officers, Steele wrote to, and received permission from, a variety of publishers and individuals to reproduce their maps.<sup>22</sup>

The Civil War dominated Steele’s work, accounting for 428 of the 627 pages of text in Volume 1 and over 230 of the 298 maps in Volume 2. Steele drew from several sources for those maps but leaned heavily on the maps contained in the multivolume series *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (1887–88). For instance, maps depicting the Gettysburg Campaign—thirty total—are original to the *Battles and Leaders* series. Those maps in turn first appeared in the *Century Magazine* from 1884 to 1887. Steele’s process of reproducing these maps involved a small team of draftsmen and photographers at Fort Leavenworth and attached to the Military Information Committee of the General Staff. They took close photographs of previously published maps and traced terrain and infrastructure from the photographs. The most original contribution used “colored blocks and lines representing troops and routes of march . . . specially for the lectures.”<sup>23</sup> All such blocks appeared colored in blue and red. For the French and Indian War, Steele depicted French units in blue and the British in red. From the Revolutionary War onward, the Americans appeared in blue, and various enemies were depicted in red.<sup>24</sup>

Steele’s volumes proved influential in American professional military education (formal and informal) and beyond.<sup>25</sup> Some copies went to overseas militaries, one set prompting German Chief of Staff Col. Gen. Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) to write that *American Campaigns* was “a much appreciated addition to the library of the General Staff, as it presents in an exceedingly skillful manner as well as instructive, the most essential matter of American War history, aided by splendid sketches.”<sup>26</sup> In the late 1920s, the West Point Department of Civil and Military Engineering adopted Steele’s text. Several years later, what would become the Department of Military Art and Engineering adopted *American Campaigns* as a primary text for its History of Military Art course, focusing on the Civil War chapters, and continued to use the text until 1959. *American Campaigns* underwent several printings and editions—all of which included the second map volume—largely unrevised from edition to edition.<sup>27</sup>



**Matthew Forney Steele, shown here as a major**

*Courtesy of North Dakota State University Libraries*

In 1938, however, the academy began producing its own maps, beginning with Civil War campaigns, to accompany Steele’s text. In 1941, it published the first significant revision to Steele’s work—a dedicated volume of Civil War renderings.<sup>28</sup> While the new study was larger, and somewhat different in matters of style and in depiction of units on the ground, the specific formations and key terrain details remained essentially unchanged.<sup>29</sup> Steele’s work was largely ignored as the academy devoted more space in its curriculum to the campaigns of both world wars. Eventually, an officer named Vincent J. Esposito led a department-echelon effort to replace all of Steele’s works. In 1959, the department published its new, two-volume *West Point Atlas of American Wars*, complete with a preface from President Eisenhower. This atlas embedded campaign narratives replete with operational and tactical detail to accompany the maps. But even in this atlas, the Civil War maps were unchanged from the 1941 edition, following the distinctive Steele style for both battles and campaigns.<sup>30</sup>

In more recent versions and in subsequent volumes that have expanded to include non-American wars, editors have removed

accompanying campaign narratives and analysis, leaving only the maps, but with less operational detail. Of the 2002 Civil War edition, series editor Thomas E. Griess wrote that because the West Point Civil War course “was modified to include more than purely operational military history, the treatment of the subject demanded compression and accommodation to course-long themes.” As a result, the current atlas “provide[d] less detailed graphical treatment than the Esposito text-atlas.”<sup>31</sup>

Given the imprimatur of the United States Military Academy and due, perhaps, to the widespread availability of the West Point atlases, they have become an industry standard for military historians. In American circles, these maps have been reproduced in numerous books, lectures, and presentations. When not reproduced as direct copies, the pattern and style of the West Point atlases remain, depicting combat units in mostly uniform shapes and in their rough proximity on the ground at given moments in time. For the purposes of undergraduate education at West Point, such maps have proven utility. Cadets who are decades removed from future senior commands first must learn tactics and the strategic situations of wars. In the process, they can acquire a feel for the

overall course of a military campaign under review. But cadets also have neither the time nor the relevant experience and perspective to grasp what these atlases omit.

And therein lies the problem—and it is not a negligible one—which dates to the genesis of the atlas series. When Steele wrote *American Campaigns*, his readership was not cadets at the United States Military Academy, but rather midgrade officers preparing for command and staff work at higher echelons. With his focus, however, on campaign narratives, and given the paucity of military mapmaking capabilities at the time of his work, Steele did not have the capability to create new maps that depicted high command and staff perspectives that illustrated higher operational details in the campaigns under review. Instead, Steele reproduced maps from a popular magazine, and those maps reflected the common battle-map style. Despite subsequent revisions and updates made by various West Point instructors and reflected in the Esposito volumes, the battle-map style remained unchanged.


Battle maps themselves are not the problem. Put another way, battle maps depict tactical actions well, but this style of map, when scaled up and out, does a poor job depicting a campaign. Maps of the Battle of Gettysburg from 1 to 3 July 1863 illustrate this basic problem. Without fail, these maps zoom in on familiar features of the battlefield, including Oak Hill and Barlow’s Knoll in the north, McPherson and Seminary Ridges in the west, just beyond Culp’s Hill in the east, and extending to Big Round Top in the south. The town of Gettysburg, usually depicted in a grid, sits in the upper-middle portion, with roads intersecting it from all directions. Depending on the granularity of the tactical detail, units of varying sizes take up their position in the engagement, sometimes depicted by standard markers and sometimes shown in their rough disposition in battle formation. Engaged in combat, units are depicted in line, usually off roads and with an emphasis on the portions of units actually engaged in the fight.

In such renderings, beyond general orientations to basic terrain features and the forces engaged, roads, railroads, and rivers are reduced to second or third positions of importance and serve little purpose. Depictions of reserves, hospitals, ammunition trains, and other supply assets often are neglected entirely, either because they fall outside the scale of the map or because they risk confusing the depiction of frontline

fighting. To be sure, battle maps focused on tactical actions impose much-needed clarity on the chaos of combat. They serve a useful and necessary purpose in rendering intelligible the basic contours of an engagement for popular readers and enthusiasts.

However, the virtues of the battle-map standard in the West Point-style atlases became problematic when scaled up and out to depict military campaigns. When warfare expanded out beyond the relatively constrained battlefields of the pre-Napoleonic era into increasingly expansive, protracted, and successive campaigns, mapmakers for popular depictions of wars needed to adjust their maps to match. What they did, in the main, was simply expand the style of battle maps onto wider theaters of war. As a result, units, often of larger size and sometimes even at corps echelon, were depicted as they were on battle maps—using standard unit designations in rough approximation to their place at a given time on the terrain. Rarely, if ever, were such units depicted in their actual formations between engagements, out of contact with the enemy, and moving and maneuvering on campaign (usually in an extended column on a road, or sometimes embarked on trains or flotillas of ships). Furthermore, support elements such as various supply trains or hospital trains almost never made it onto the map. In fact, a good number of larger West Point campaign maps, including those for Gettysburg, did not depict roads at all. As Steele himself acknowledged in his preface to *American Campaigns*, “Better maps, no doubt, are in existence than many of those reproduced, but the best one available has been taken in every case.”<sup>32</sup> In a manner indicative of the difficulty inherent in expanding tactical battle maps to the level of campaigning, Steele wrote, “It has seldom been possible to represent the troops to a scale, the main purpose having been merely to suggest, by means of blue and red blocks, the relative positions of hostile troops on a battle-field or in a theater of operations.”<sup>33</sup>

The maps contained in Steele’s *American Campaigns* and the subsequent West Point atlases were and are important and influential but do not represent the totality of operational mapmaking. Plenty of other historical campaign maps have endeavored to fill some of the gaps described above in great detail. Furthermore, the growing scale and complexity of warfare in the twentieth century—including a greater number of joint operations and a significant variety



**Vincent J. Esposito, shown here as a West Point cadet**




*U.S. Military Academy Library*

**Matthew Forney Steele's map of Gettysburg, showing troop position on 30 June 1863, produced in 1909**

*Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society*

**A map from *Century Magazine* of the Gettysburg area and troop positions on 30 June 1863, produced ca. 1886–1887**

*Courtesy of the Wisconsin Historical Society*



**United States Military Academy Atlas map of the Gettysburg Campaign, 1941 U.S.**

*U.S. Military Academy*

of types of military formations—have made the problem of depicting military campaigns ever more complicated, and there are no simple solutions. But even for the relatively simpler campaigns of the nineteenth century, historians and military professionals never have settled on a clear approach for choosing what elements of a campaign should appear on a map detailing the operational level of war nor how these maps should be depicted. The campaign map style of Steele and the West Point atlases remains the standard.

### The Bachelder Maps

The 1863 Gettysburg Campaign offers an excellent encapsulation of the problems described in this article and also serves as an example rich in solutions. Few battles in American military history have been so closely and carefully studied or so thoroughly scrutinized, even in the production of maps depicting the engagement. Indeed, before the guns fell silent in the summer campaign, John B. Bachelder, a civilian artist, started creating a thorough and historically faithful account of the engagement at Gettysburg, even seeking to identify and lay out the location of every unit that participated in the battle.

Days after the battle, Bachelder traveled to Gettysburg to make detailed, written accounts. By the fall of 1863, he had produced his first map of the battle—an isometric map, which would become famous and is still widely reproduced. For the next thirty-one years—the rest of his life—Bachelder meticulously gathered details concerning the great campaign and guided memorialization efforts at what would become Gettysburg National Military Park. In 1880, the War Department commissioned Bachelder to write a history of the battle. He delivered his 4-volume, 2,500-page manuscript—which included 58 maps—in 1886. It never was published. The War Department decided to produce and publish *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* instead, which rendered redundant much of Bachelder's labor. In 1893, the War Department shipped Bachelder's manuscript and maps to the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission, and they have been stored in the archives of the national park ever since. In 1997, Morningside House Press published an edited version of his history along with twenty-seven of Bachelder's original maps covering the events of 1 to 3 July.<sup>34</sup> The



**John B. Bachelder with his wife Elizabeth at the Gettysburg Battlefield, ca. 1888**

*Courtesy National Park Service, Gettysburg National Military Park, Museum Collection*

thirty-one remaining maps of the campaign before and after the battle never have been published but were consulted in researching and writing this article.<sup>35</sup>

Significantly, Bachelder's campaign maps were consulted in making the original maps that were used in *Century Magazine*, which later appeared in *Battles and Leaders*, then in *American Campaigns*, and finally in the West Point atlases. Notably, the *Century Magazine* maps removed roads and depicted major units—army corps and divisions—as unscaled icons floating on the map in their general locations. Most major accounts of the campaign have followed suit with their maps, rarely depicting roads for the campaign, and almost always with units as floating icons.<sup>36</sup>


Two of the better mapping depictions of the campaign, those found in Edward J. Stackpole's 1956 *They Met at Gettysburg* and Edwin B. Coddington's 1968 *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command*, relied on Bachelder's maps. Both show major units on roads in daily time frames.<sup>37</sup> Neither work, however, depicts the movement of units to scale on the march and relative to terrain or in relation to presumed enemy positions and sources of army supply—considerations

of paramount importance for a field army commander visualizing those factors and the movement of his forces in time and space.

### Mapping Meade's Campaign from 29 June to 1 July 1863

What follows is not a map of the entire Gettysburg Campaign, but rather a snapshot that clarifies the approach to the campaign from Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's perspective as commander of the Army of the Potomac from 29 June to 1 July 1863. The major pieces in the proverbial field of play are his army headquarters, seven infantry army corps, three cavalry divisions, the Artillery Reserve, his base of supply, and the associated support commands and trains.

The paramount question is this: How did Meade visualize his campaign? Meade and the Army of the Potomac staff, which, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, operated in a manner based loosely on the French model, adhered to the following principles on campaign. The commanding general formed the "general strategical plan." The chief of staff provided advice "as to the condition of the troops" and "in devising the details."<sup>38</sup>



John B. Bachelder's map of the Gettysburg Campaign, which was produced in 1866, depicting the troop movements on 30 June 1863  
 Gettysburg National Military Park

Other responsibilities were as follows:

His adjutant general's office must contain full records of the numbers of troops—effective and noneffective—armed and unarmed—sick and well—present and absent, with all reports and communications relative to the state of the army. His quartermaster must have been diligent to provide animals, wagons, clothing, tents, forage, and other supplies in his department; his commissary and ordnance officer, the same in relation to subsistence and munitions—all having made their arrangements to establish depots at the most accessible points on the proposed route of march. His chief of artillery must have bestowed proper attention to keeping the hundreds of batteries of the army in the most effective condition. His chief engineer must have informed himself of all the routes and the general topography of the country to be traversed; he must know at what point rivers can be crossed, and where positions for battle can be best obtained. . . his maps [must be] prepared for distribution to subordinate commanders. His inspector must have seen that the orders for discipline and equipment have been complied with. His medical director must have procured a supply of hospital stores and organized the ambulance and hospital departments. His provost marshal must have made adequate arrangements to prevent straggling, plundering, and other disorders. His aides must have informed themselves of the positions of the various commands and become acquainted with the principal officers, so as to take orders through night and storm with unerring accuracy.<sup>39</sup>

Additionally, all of the “staff officers at the headquarters of the army [would] organize general arrangements and supervise the operations of subordinate officers of their department at the headquarters of corps.”<sup>40</sup>

Also, the staff, subordinate units, and other headquarters—adjacent and superior—provided information as to enemy numbers, dispositions, and intentions. Meade needed to be aware, at least in general terms, of all these considerations before he conceptualized his campaign. He also had to create and describe his conceptualization, which, in turn, required a common language for campaign planning, direction, and execution. In the parlance of Civil War generalship, this language was *strategy*, as expressed in nineteenth-century theoretical

works and doctrinal books and manuals. In current military theory and doctrine, this is the terminology of operational art.<sup>41</sup> Meade, his subordinate commanders, and their staffs likely possessed some awareness of objectives, strategic points, concentration, lines of communications and supply, lines of operation, interior and exterior lines, bases of operations and supply (including depots), and plans of campaign. For the purposes of this article, two applications of these theories stand out. First, the base of operations functioned less as a single point and more as a line of departure, usually with a single point base of supply behind and protected by the base of operations line. Second, a line (or lines) of operation for a field army were understood as a series of marches by the various corps of an army along two or more parallel roads, all within a single day's march of each other. Commanders could and generally did distribute their corps laterally (a corps to its own road) and in depth (multiple corps per road). The total lateral disposition of the line or lines of operation formed the front on which an army advanced. The formation of the march on the line of operation depended on numerous factors including terrain features, the availability and quality of roads, and an army's position relative to the enemy.<sup>42</sup>

Meade, with his corps commanders and staff, conceptualized his approach in these terms. But when he and his staff issued written orders, they did not always insert the language of nineteenth-century military theory. As a matter of practicality for a vast field army managing numerous moving parts, orders often found expression in simple, practical instructions. For instance, and as a generic example, “Tomorrow morning, march your corps to x town down y road.” But most of Meade's subordinate officers, especially his most trusted corps commanders, implicitly understood this basic theoretical foundation.

The original maps produced for this article create a visual link between Meade's concept of the campaign, his orders, and the actions executed by the Army of the Potomac. Everything on these new maps—corps, cavalry, the Artillery Reserve, headquarters positions and dispositions, bases of operation and supply, roads, railroads, mountains and their passes, and enemy positions—reflect what Meade knew and needed to know on 29 June to 1 July for the campaign. Rivers, creeks, bridges, railroad extensions, minor hills, and valleys that were not necessary

to Meade's visualization of the campaign are not on the map. Although rivers and creeks might seem strange omissions, few were obstacles enough to impede marches, in Meade's view, and none required special bridging or fording efforts.<sup>43</sup>

Those rivers and creeks that *are* marked on the map held the potential to serve as fighting positions, offered opportunities for the tactical defense, and were mentioned as such in correspondence to or from Meade. To those who have studied the campaign, the most famous of these in Meade's defensive planning was Pipe Creek, but Pipe Creek itself is *not* depicted because it is small and divided and less important as a terrain feature than for identifying a general defensive line, which *is* depicted. Historians long have noted Marsh Creek, primarily because it marked a resting point for I Corps, especially on its route of march to Gettysburg, but that was not why Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds mentioned it so often, as the operational map will reveal. Marsh Creek—and Middle Creek, farther to the west—offered potential defensive positions from enemy attacks from the direction of Gettysburg down the Emmitsburg Pike and from the Fairfield and Emmitsburg Gaps.

The depiction of units on the enclosed maps requires explanation. Arrows depicting the seven U.S. Army corps (labeled as I, II, III, and so forth) and the Artillery Reserve (labeled AR) are roughly to their scale on the march. For 29 June and 30 June, the seven corps ranged in size from 9,000 to 14,000 soldiers. With their wagons, these corps consumed 7–9 miles in column on the road. The Artillery Reserve, some 150 guns, took up a similar space on the march. If the corps arrows are shorter for those days, it is because those corps executed a shorter ordered march. Also of note: the Headquarters, Army of the Potomac (depicted on the map as HQ), took up 4–5 miles in column on the road. Its locations are depicted, but not in arrows, because the headquarters tended to move within the arrow depicting the central column of dispersed marches. For 30 June and 1 July, Meade ordered his corps to drop their extra wagons (which usually contained such camp gear as tents) for increased speed and maneuverability in anticipation of battle. The 30 June to 1 July maps thus depict shorter corps marching columns: 4–5 miles of road space. U.S. Army cavalry divisions (depicted as 1c, 2c, and 3c), took up considerably less road



**General Reynolds**

*Library of Congress*

space (approximately 2 miles) and moved much faster. All arrows depict the heads of corps and cavalry divisions arriving at their ordered or final destinations for the day.<sup>44</sup>

Confederate corps (*First*, *Second*, and *Third*, depicted on the map in red as *I*, *II*, and *III*) in the *Army of Northern Virginia* constituted much larger formations—roughly 20,000 soldiers each—and, with their wagons, they consumed 14–15 miles of road marching in column. Additionally, the rebels organized and maintained an army-wide *Reserve Train* (labeled RT) of wagons, which moved with Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's *Second Corps* to carry supplies and stores gathered during their invasion of Pennsylvania. Naturally, the *Reserve Train* grew as Confederates foraged for supplies and captured wagons, and by 1 July, it consumed approximately 14 miles of road. Meade had some idea—though slightly overestimated—of the size of the *Army of Northern Virginia*, but he did not have precise knowledge of its locations.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, rebel columns appear as Meade likely would have visualized them. Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's *Third Corps* and Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's *First Corps* are in full columns where Meade's intelligence placed them at the time. Likewise, Meade knew that Ewell's *Second Corps* was split, with two

of its three divisions and the *Reserve Train* in the Cumberland Valley near Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and its third division in the vicinity of York, Pennsylvania. The main Confederate cavalry unit (labeled C) under Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart appears larger than the U.S. Army wagons from a previous raid.<sup>46</sup>

The 30 June to 1 July maps thus depict what Meade visualized on 30 June and what he anticipated would transpire on 1 July. First are the ordered marches for the corps and cavalry divisions on 1 July, with the same outlined arrows as the 29 June and 30 June maps. Second are arrows and blocks without outlines to depict where Meade might send his corps, the Artillery Reserve, and his cavalry, depending on General Lee's actions. The rebel arrows on the 30 June to 1 July maps depict Meade's visualization of what they could do on 1 July, given his understanding of their positions, movements, and the available roads. In other words, they show what Meade imagined *he* might do if *he* commanded Lee's army.

In all, Meade's orders and correspondence for the campaign make better sense when depicted on appropriate operational maps. The following is a day-by-day assessment of Meade's orders and the movement of his army, depicted on corresponding maps.

### 29 June

Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac on 28 June, took stock of the situation, and gave orders for an early march the next day. He had orders to protect Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., and act "as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels" in order "to give him battle."<sup>47</sup> His army was in position around a base of supply (labeled BS) at Frederick, Maryland, using the Baltimore-Frederick Railroad, and with a base of operations oriented west toward previous Confederate positions in the Shenandoah Valley. Opposing the Federals, the rebels had marched north. One division of Ewell's lead *Second Corps* had broken off through the Cashtown Gap toward York, and Ewell's other two divisions approached Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, through Carlisle.


Meade inherited the army from the position of corps command. He promptly reviewed the status of his army and avail-

able intelligence on the enemy and realized that he should move quickly to position the Army of the Potomac between the *Army of Northern Virginia* and both Baltimore and Washington, D.C. This required a rapid march from positions around Frederick to the north and east, as depicted on the 29 June and 30 June maps. Several aspects of this movement stand out. At least part of Lee's army (two divisions and the cavalry of Ewell's corps) already approached the Susquehanna River at Carlisle and York. What remained of Confederate forces were reported to be between Hagerstown, Maryland, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, adjacent to three passes through the South Mountain (the western-southern mountain range of the Shenandoah-Cumberland Valley). From south to north, these were the Mechanicstown-Hagerstown Pass, the Monterey Pass, and the Cashtown Gap.<sup>48</sup>

As a result, the Army of the Potomac needed to account for these enemy forces as it moved to protect Baltimore and Washington, D.C., on a vast arc stretching from Hagerstown to the Susquehanna River. Meade also had to consider the size and scale of his army, because its corps, Artillery Reserve, and associated wagons—strung out together on the march—would require nearly 100 miles of road. Combined, these factors meant the Army of the Potomac needed to move far and fast on a broad front.

Meade therefore marched his corps and Artillery Reserve on multiple parallel roads, all oriented generally to the north and northeast, and within a day's march of nearby corps to allow for swift concentration in the event of enemy contact. The Artillery Reserve, a critical support requirement for any contingent battle, occupied center position in the elongated marching front, along with army headquarters. As depicted on the 29 June map, Meade and his corps commanders settled on five main roads for the seven corps, Artillery Reserve, and two of their cavalry divisions. The other cavalry division, the 1st Cavalry Division under Maj. Gen. John Buford Jr., marched over the pass at Mechanicstown (now known as Thurmont), Maryland, to Cavetown, Maryland, then turned northeast to the center of the Monterey Pass. (One of Buford's brigades stayed at Mechanicstown to guard that pass.) This movement necessitated other important changes.

# 29 June



## Army of the Potomac

- Infantry Corps I II III V VI XI XII
- Artillery Reserve AR
- Cavalry Divisions 1c 2c 3c
- Headquarters HQ

- Base of Supply BS
- Ordered Marches →

## Army of Northern Virginia

- Infantry Corps I II III
- Cavalry C
- Reserve Train RT
- Presumed Positions and Marches →

Note: All Army of the Potomac ordered marches are depicted to scale on the road and as arriving at their final destinations for the day. All marches began in the vicinity of Frederick. All Army of Northern Virginia marches are depicted in positions and scales as estimated by Maj. Gen. Meade.

Meade moved the army's rail line of supply from the Baltimore-Frederick line to the Baltimore-Westminster line and the base of supply from Frederick to Westminster, Pennsylvania. The changing supply situation and orientation of the army also meant moving the base of operations from its westward-facing line at Frederick to a north-northwest front on a line north of Westminster.<sup>49</sup>

Meade accepted risks associated with this 29–30 June movement, especially to his lines of supply and communications, base of supply, and base of operations. Rebel General Jeb Stuart had taken some 5,000 troopers, roughly half of Lee's cavalry, on a raid south of the Army of the Potomac. On 28 June, Stuart's force had captured a wagon train and cut the telegraph line at Rockville, Maryland, on the supply road between Washington, D.C., and Frederick, thus rupturing communications with Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in the nation's capital.<sup>50</sup> This action made Meade aware of Stuart's location on 28 June, but Meade only could anticipate where the fast-moving Confederate cavalry might move next. Meade assumed that Stuart would continue on his path around the Federal army to link up with Ewell's forces on the Susquehanna River. Such a route would take Stuart across the new line of supply from Baltimore to Westminster. It might have inspired a more cautious approach, with Meade sending his army more directly eastward to reestablish communications through Baltimore and to take up defensive positions. Instead, Meade accepted the risk of a rapid march north and northeast. That move offered greater opportunity to seize the initiative—to dictate the terms of action in the upcoming battle—by placing the Army of the Potomac in a central position between the presumed locations of the dispersed *Army of Northern Virginia*.<sup>51</sup>

"[The rebels] have a cavalry force in our rear, destroying railroads, etc., with the view of getting me to turn back," Meade wrote to his wife on 29 June, "but I shall not do it. I am going straight at them, and will settle this thing one way or the other."<sup>52</sup> Meade thus mitigated the risk posed by Stuart (and Ewell's forces near the Susquehanna River) on 29 June by sending Brig. Gen. David M. Gregg's 2d Cavalry Division toward Westminster to screen for enemy cavalry, followed by Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick's

large VI Corps to anchor the eastern end of his line against a larger infantry attack.


### 30 June

In general, Meade's ordered marches for 30 June were a continuation of what he started on 29 June. That is, as depicted on the map, Meade utilized parallel roads wherever and whenever possible to orient his force to the north and northeast in a dispersed formation that could concentrate and fight in multiple directions. Practically, this meant longer marches for the three corps arrayed farthest east (VI, V, and XII). The three corps arrayed westward (I, XI, and III) made shorter marches. The Artillery Reserve had a medium-length march to resume its central position along with army headquarters. The II Corps remained in place, in a central-rear position where it could function as a reserve in the event of enemy contact anywhere. Federal cavalry divisions remained spread out in a wide arc in advance of their infantry counterparts in the direction of known or possible positions of enemy corps.<sup>53</sup>


For 30 June, the depiction of Meade's understanding of enemy movements is of special importance to explaining the movement of his corps. Stuart's cavalry, burdened with captured wagons and



**General Gregg**  
*Library of Congress*




**John Buford Jr., shown here as a brigadier general**  
*Library of Congress*



**General Sedgwick**  
*Library of Congress*

# 30 June



## Army of the Potomac

- Infantry Corps    I   II   III   V   VI   XI   XII
- Artillery Reserve    AR
- Cavalry Divisions    1c   2c   3c
- Headquarters    HQ

- Base of Supply    BS
- Ordered Marches    →

## Army of Northern Virginia

- Infantry Corps    I   II   III
- Cavalry    C
- Reserve Train    RT
- Presumed Positions and Marches    →

Note: All Army of the Potomac marches are depicted to scale on the road and as arriving at their final destinations for the day. All Army of Northern Virginia marches are depicted in positions and scales as estimated by Maj. Gen. Meade.

bound northward to find the *Army of Northern Virginia*, was less of a threat. Indeed, on 30 June, U.S. Brig. Gen. Hugh Judson Kilpatrick's 3d Cavalry Division fought an indecisive action with Confederate cavalry at Hanover, Pennsylvania. Far more important to Meade were the actions of Ewell's still divided *Second Corps*. Reports placed both parts of Ewell's corps at the river: two-thirds west of Harrisburg and the other one-third at Wrightsville, Pennsylvania, on the Susquehanna River. Spurred onward by panicked politicians and frightened citizens, Meade realized the potential importance of a direct assault on the state capital, but, more importantly, he foresaw only favorable military outcomes from the rebels crossing to the east side of the river. In such an event, Meade was posturing his eastern corps to "fall upon [the enemy's] rear and give him battle."<sup>54</sup> In fact, Meade seemed more worried about the possibility that Ewell's corps and other parts of the *Army of Northern Virginia* might concentrate on the line between Harrisburg and Baltimore, thereby threatening the latter city. This concern explains why Meade pushed two of his three cavalry divisions in that direction, to give word of Ewell turning south toward Baltimore, and with the V, VI, and XII Corps in position to confront such a move.

Meade could not understand what Lee intended for his large *First* and *Third Corps*. Meade remained as confident as he could reasonably expect to be that General Hill's *Third Corps* held the Cashtown Gap. Meade also knew that General Longstreet, Lee's only experienced corps commander, commanded *First Corps*. All of Meade's intelligence placed Longstreet's corps at Chambersburg.<sup>55</sup> This perplexed the field army commander who carefully had placed his corps on as many different roads as possible, lest these formations become strung out for scores of miles on a single road. As he considered the possible dispositions of the Confederates' *First* and *Third Corps*, Meade foresaw the problem these units would face when they needed to leave the Cumberland Valley and concentrate to the east and south of South Mountain. To move through only one pass or mountain gap would make for a ponderous column more than 30 miles long. Naturally, Meade assumed Lee would use other passes or gaps south of Cashtown, Pennsylvania, and he predicted, reasonably, that Long-



**Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, shown here as a major general**

*Library of Congress*

street's powerful *First Corps* would move in that direction.<sup>56</sup>

If the *First Corps* (or some new reserve unit Meade's intelligence had not detected) exited the Cumberland Valley through the pass between Hagerstown and Mechanics-town, that unit would fall to the left rear of the advancing Federals and pose a threat to Washington, D.C.<sup>57</sup> This was a dangerous but unlikely prospect; nevertheless, Meade placed one brigade of his 1st Cavalry Division at Mechanicstown to provide warning. It seemed more likely that Longstreet would use the Monterey Pass and mountain gap toward Emmitsburg, Maryland, which would also place the *First Corps* on the west flank of Meade's formation. Such a contingency might well benefit the Army of the Potomac, but only if it maintained positions that allowed U.S. forces to cover both the Cashtown Gap and the Monterey Pass. To prepare for this, Meade sent I Corps toward Gettysburg to face the rebel *Third Corps* exiting the Cashtown Gap but kept XI Corps in the vicinity of Emmitsburg to guard the Monterey Pass, with III Corps en route from Taneytown, Maryland, to provide additional protection there.

Even as reliable intelligence continued to confirm the placement of Longstreet's corps

in Chambersburg, Meade worked to account for some version of the Emmitsburg contingency. A small detail on the map helps explain Meade's thinking. On 29 June, General Buford took two-thirds of his cavalry from Mechanicstown to Cavetown and northeast into the Monterey Pass. They saw no rebel forces and gathered no evidence that placed any significant number of Confederates near the pass. That night, Buford camped on Jack's Mountain at the southwest end of the Fairfield Gap. The next morning, on 30 June, Buford did not travel the direct route to Emmitsburg to report to General Reynolds, but instead passed through the Fairfield Gap to that town. There he encountered a rebel force belonging to Hill's *Third Corps*. Buford disengaged, backtracked to Emmitsburg, and reported to Reynolds. Then Buford moved on to Gettysburg at approximately 1100, encountered Confederate troops—again from Hill's *Third Corps*—and again reported that to Reynolds.<sup>58</sup>

Reynolds, in turn, reported to Meade. His reports were of great importance to the new army commander. Its many corps made the Army of the Potomac unwieldy in terms of command and control and intelligence. Meade had to direct and track these corps and sort through their many reports. The fractured politics of leaders and staffs of the army complicated matters further. Meade, for example, had inherited a chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel A. Butterfield, whom he at once distrusted but chose to retain under the pressing circumstances of the Pennsylvania invasion. Reynolds, who probably received an offer to command the army before Meade, was a subordinate Meade trusted, especially on matters of military judgement. Indeed, on 30 June, he put Reynolds in command of the left wing of the army (I, III, and XI Corps). Meade perceived in Reynolds a highly competent extension of himself, someone who would evaluate the situation with the perspective of a field army—and not merely a corps—commander.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, on 30 June, Reynolds did more than forward Buford's report to Meade; he also offered his interpretation of what that intelligence meant and the contingencies it portended. Reynolds did not mention anything about rebels in the Monterey Pass because they were not there. However, and for good reason, Reynolds drew Meade's attention to Buford's encounter with enemy forces at Fairfield, Pennsylvania. Like Meade, Reynolds could read a map and visualize the problem rebel forces certainly would

encounter if their long formations were confined to one road running from Chambersburg through the Cashtown Gap to Gettysburg. But instead of anticipating that Longstreet might move south on the west side of the mountain and cross through the Monterey Pass, Reynolds foresaw other possibilities. Rebel forces could split off from the Chambersburg Pike after utilizing the gap at Cashtown, where at least four roads ran from north to south, going to Arendtsville, Pennsylvania; Mummasburg, Pennsylvania; Gettysburg; and Fairfield.

Of course, Meade already knew that rebels had used the Chambersburg-Cashtown-Gettysburg road a few days earlier, when portions of *Second Corps* went through en route to York, and again that morning, when Buford had encountered an enemy regiment. The Federals reasoned that these Confederates might use one or both of the two northern roads and move toward York. Indeed, Buford told Reynolds that he believed Confederate Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division (*Third Corps*) was on the march to Mummasburg and Berlin, Pennsylvania.<sup>60</sup> But what intrigued Reynolds was Buford's discovery of Hill's troops at Fairfield marching from the direction of Cashtown.



**General Butterfield**  
Library of Congress

Like Meade, Reynolds perceived that the rebels put too many troops on the Chambersburg-Cashtown-Gettysburg road to allow for a rapid concentration for battle. These officers anticipated that, to accommodate Longstreet's *First Corps* (evidently leaving the Cumberland Valley via the Cashtown Gap), Lee likely would order elements of *Third Corps* troops off of that road and out of Longstreet's way. In this light, Buford's report concerning Anderson's division made sense. After all, Buford had encountered rebels from the other two divisions of *Third Corps* at Fairfield and Gettysburg. This implied that Anderson's was the last of Hill's divisions. If that unit broke off to the east, there would be sufficient space for Longstreet's troops to close critical distance in time. But Reynolds disbelieved this contingency and seems to have assumed the rebels were preparing for imminent battle not a concentration eastward. "I do not believe the report of their marching on Berlin, which would lead them to York," he concluded.<sup>61</sup>

If the rebels wanted to give battle with *First* and *Third Corps*, then utilizing the Cashtown-to-Fairfield road made more sense, especially because Reynolds believed *Third Corps* was moving in force on Gettysburg on 30 June and 1 July. Anticipating that a Confederate corps would take the aforementioned road, Reynolds wrote a detailed message to Meade:

I think if the enemy advances from Gettysburg, and we are to fight a defensive battle in this vicinity, that the position to be occupied is just north of the town of Emmitsburg, covering the Plank road to Taneytown. *He will undoubtedly endeavor to turn our left by way of Fairfield and the mountain roads leading down into the Frederick and Emmitsburg pike, near Mount Saint Mary's College.* [Emphasis added. Today, this juncture is at the intersection of Cashtown, Orrtanna, Fairfield, and Emmitsburg Roads.] The above is mere surmise on my part. At all events, an engineer officer ought to be sent up to reconnoiter this position, as we have reason to believe that the main force of the enemy is in the vicinity of Cashtown, or debouching from the Cumberland Valley above it. [This latter statement probably refers to the southeast-running road to the west of Cashtown—the first split outside of the pass—now known as Bingaman Road.] The corps are placed as follows: Two divisions of the First Corps behind [south

of] Marsh Run, one on the road leading to Gettysburg, and one on the road leading from Fairfield to the Chambersburg road at Moritz Tavern [now Bullfrog Road, northwest of the town of Fairplay, Pennsylvania]; the Third Division, with the reserve batteries, is on the road to Chambersburg [now Middle Creek Road], behind [south of] Middle Creek, not placed in position. This was the position [for the I Corps] taken up under the orders to march to Marsh Creek. *I have not changed it, as it might be necessary to dispute the advance of the enemy across this creek [from Gettysburg, down the Emmitsburg Pike, with a flanking attack from Fairfield] in order to take up the position behind Middle Creek, which is the one I alluded to near Emmitsburg.* [Maj. Gen. Oliver O.] *Howard occupies, in part, the position I did last night which is to the left of the position in front of Middle Creek [west of Middle Creek, where it crosses the Taneytown-Emmitsburg road] and commands the roads leading from Fairfield down to Emmitsburg and the pike below.* [Emphasis added. The 1858 Adams County map depicts two such roads: (1) What is now County Highway 116 (Fairfield Road) and Pennsylvania Route 16 (Waynesboro Pike) and (2) what is now Tract Road along Flat Run.]<sup>62</sup>

### 30 June to 1 July

As operational-level mapping depicts, the focus and vision of a field army commander who is on campaign must be fixed toward the future. Because the commander is out of imminent contact with the enemy, such a future-forward orientation equates to a matter of days. In anticipation of contact with the enemy, this perspective narrows to a matter of hours—usually twelve to twenty-four—while yet accounting for and accommodating the longer view. Thus, commanding on campaign is an inherently complicated endeavor that necessarily requires decisions and orders for numerous contingencies that involve tens—if not hundreds—of thousands of human beings. Any number of small moves and actions that may appear inconsequential in fact produce, in the aggregate, a wholly new situation. Future effects cannot be known in full. Often, there are too many moving parts, and too many weighty elements beyond the control of an individual, to make corrections in real time if a commander's vision is flawed. Even commanders with a

singular ability to anticipate the course and conduct of a campaign are never wholly correct. Factors beyond the commander's control—weather, errors of subordinates, enemy choices, elements unknowable—inevitably send the situation askew. Gathering accurate intelligence, possessing a common vision, and providing clear direction to communicate a commander's intent can reduce, but of course never truly eliminate, uncertainty. No wonder so many commanders—in the American Civil War and in other contexts—struggled to command on campaign. Most humans do not possess the capacity to handle what such a command requires. Many become paralyzed, attempting to divine the future and waiting for unattainable certainty.

At no time was such complexity more evident than on 30 June, which, for Meade's purposes and in his sense of time, translated to a focus on the next day: 1 July. From his vantage point on 28 and 29 June, Meade foresaw two broad possibilities for an impending battle. In the first, he would go north and take a central position inside of the rebel forces arrayed in their wide arc from Chambersburg to York. If the Confederate *Second Corps* tried to cross the Susquehanna, Meade would punish the enemy for splitting its forces and assume the offensive, defeating the enemy corps in detail. Then, Meade could turn and fight what remained of the *Army of Northern Virginia* in either offensive or defensive action as it exited the Cumberland Valley. Alternately, in the second possibility, and if the enemy did not cross the river but instead concentrated its formations beyond the valley, Meade would find and develop a strong position that the enemy would have to approach and defeat if it was intent on threatening Baltimore or Washington, D.C. Depending on the terrain and his enemy's disposition, Meade could give battle on the tactical offensive, defensive, or both. In both scenarios, Meade intended to hold at least one corps in reserve to support the attack, to solidify his defensive position, or to counterattack.

On 30 June, Meade's visualization of the campaign remained fundamentally unchanged, but it attained greater clarity and specificity. Meade anticipated that a major engagement was likely to occur in the next one to three days, and he issued orders that corps should drop extra wagons and that troops should receive ammunition and rations for an impending battle. He also issued a message to his army to

boost morale and prepare his command for the fight.<sup>63</sup> As the day lengthened, Meade received confirmation that Confederates at Harrisburg and Wrightsville were leaving the Susquehanna River, removing the threat to eastern Pennsylvania and the state capital, and eliminating the possibility of offensive action against enemy forces engaged in a river crossing.<sup>64</sup> Meade's attention therefore turned to the west and the greater threat of *Third Corps* and, especially, Longstreet's *First Corps*, all while trying to ascertain how those enemy forces could effect a linkage with *Second Corps*, which would be moving south and west from the Susquehanna.


In this context, Meade received and internalized the recent intelligence from Reynolds. In one of the most important documents produced during the campaign, Meade personally wrote Reynolds before noon on 30 June, noting, "We are as concentrated as my present information of the position of the enemy justifies. I have pushed out the cavalry in all directions to feel for them, and so soon as I can make up any positive opinion as to their position, I will move again. In the meantime, if they advance against me, I must concentrate at that point where they show the strongest force."<sup>65</sup>

The 30 June to 1 July "option" maps presented here uniquely depict what Meade meant. As June turned to July, Meade correctly perceived that rebel forces confronted two major choices for 1 July. In both cases, Meade recognized that Lee's main problem remained removing Longstreet's *First Corps* from its logjam on the Chambersburg-Cashtown-Gettysburg road. Thus, the first Confederate approach, depicted on the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg Line West map, entailed moving *First Corps* down the west side of the mountain to the Monterey Pass or splitting *Third Corps* and *First Corps* off the road at Cashtown by sending them down the Cashtown-to-Fairfield road. That Confederate forces would use the Monterey Pass seemed increasingly unlikely, but Meade could not afford to dismiss the possibility entirely, because it made sense for Lee to get *First Corps* on its own road as soon as practicable.<sup>66</sup> In the meantime, Reynolds insisted the rebels would move from Cashtown to Fairfield and Emmitsburg. For Meade's purposes, either path effectively presented the same dilemma: some combination of the Confederate *First* and *Third Corps* likely would threaten the left wing of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg and Emmitsburg

while *Second Corps* would make longer marches from the vicinities of Carlisle and York. Meade was optimistic, depending on the judgment of Reynolds, that his army would be in a favorable position to fight a battle somewhere along the Gettysburg-to-Emmitsburg line. He also accepted Reynolds's recommendation and sent Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys to scout the ground around Emmitsburg for favorable fighting positions, which Humphreys did on 1 July.<sup>67</sup>

Meade knew the enemy had a second option to prevent *Third Corps* from impeding the advance of Longstreet's *First Corps*. At Cashtown, Lee could move either *Third* or *First Corps* off the pike and put it on roads to Mummasburg and Arendtsville, respectively. In that eventuality, Meade surmised, Lee's intent probably would be to concentrate the *Army of Northern Virginia* around or to the north and east of Gettysburg. In this scenario, as in the first, *Second Corps* would move back from Carlisle and York with clearer intent and the threat of effecting a linkage with *Third* and *First Corps*, which were marching east.<sup>68</sup>


How Meade had arranged the corps and Artillery Reserve of the Army of the Potomac, where he positioned these units



**General Longstreet**  
Library of Congress

# 30 June - 1 July

## Emmitsburg-to-Gettysburg Line



### Army of the Potomac

- Infantry Corps I II III V VI XI XII
- Artillery Reserve AR
- Cavalry Divisions 1c 2c 3c
- Headquarters HQ

- Base of Supply BS
- Ordered Marches →
- Potential Marches →
- Potential Positions III


### Army of Northern Virginia

- Infantry Corps I II III
- Cavalry C
- Reserve Train RT
- Potential Positions and Marches →

Note: All Army of the Potomac ordered marches are depicted to scale on the road and as arriving at their ordered destinations. All Army of Northern Virginia marches are depicted in potential positions and scales as estimated by Maj. Gen. Meade.

# 30 June - 1 July

## Pipe Creek Line



### Army of the Potomac

- Infantry Corps I II III V VI XI XII
- Artillery Reserve AR
- Cavalry Divisions 1c 2c 3c
- Headquarters HQ

- Base of Supply BS
- Ordered Marches →
- Potential Marches →
- Potential Pipe Creek Line Positions - - -

### Army of Northern Virginia

- Infantry Corps I II III
- Cavalry C
- Reserve Train RT
- Potential Positions and Marches →

Note: All Army of the Potomac ordered marches are depicted to scale on the road and as arriving at their ordered destinations. All Army of Northern Virginia marches are depicted in potential positions and scales as estimated by Maj. Gen. Meade.

for marching orders for 30 June, and where he would send them in his orders for 1 July allowed the commander flexible options to counter either enemy approach. Those orders, for the infantry corps and from east to west, retained VI Corps in Manchester, Maryland. Meade put V Corps on the move to Hanover, and XII Corps to Two Taverns, Pennsylvania. The II Corps was to advance to Taneytown to join the Artillery Reserve in center position of the Army of the Potomac, and together they would function as the reserve for any action. Meade ordered III Corps to push west to Emmitsburg, replacing XI Corps, which in turn would move to Gettysburg with I Corps. The cavalry divisions would remain in a wide arc around the army, with the 2d Cavalry Division moving to Hanover Junction, Pennsylvania, the 3d Cavalry Division moving toward Abbottstown, Pennsylvania, and Berlin, the two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division with Buford spreading out to the west and north of Gettysburg, and the other brigade of that division remaining to guard the pass at Mechanicstown.<sup>69</sup>

If intelligence gathered during the day indicated a Confederate concentration to the west along the Gettysburg-to-Emmitsburg line, Meade would rely on Reynolds to determine if and where the left wing of the Army of the Potomac would give battle. Throughout 30 June and the early part of 1 July, Meade and Reynolds were careful to position forces to be ready to counter a rebel advance toward either Emmitsburg or Gettysburg. Meade wrote to Reynolds on 30 June, "In case of an advance in force against you or Howard at Emmitsburg, you must fall back to that place, and I will re-inforce you from the corps nearest you, which are [Maj. Gen. Daniel E.] Sickles', at Taneytown, and [Maj. Gen. Henry] Slocum's, at Littlestown[, Pennsylvania]."<sup>70</sup> Meade gave III Corps, in particular, clear instructions to watch for rebel forces approaching Emmitsburg, and the corps commander, General Sickles, initially left one of his three divisions there to follow that directive, even as he marched his corps to Gettysburg on 1 July.<sup>71</sup> Regardless, in the event of a rebel concentration in the west, V, XII, and II Corps, along with the Artillery Reserve, would be in position to move up and concentrate for either defensive or offensive action during the day.<sup>72</sup> VI Corps, still in place to defend a potential rebel advance toward Baltimore, would have a longer march, turning it into the army reserve for that contingency.

A scenario in which Confederate forces concentrated to the north and east of Gettysburg was more complicated. In their ordered marches for 1 July, the various corps of the Army of the Potomac held a central position. It is possible Federal forces might have found good ground upon which to fight east of Gettysburg, but Meade had neither good intelligence of the ground in that vicinity nor a trusted subordinate like Reynolds to tell him where the army could fight at an advantage. As Meade wrote to Reynolds, "If the enemy is concentrating on our right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be the proper strategic point of concentration for this army."<sup>73</sup> He therefore determined that the best option in the event of an enemy concentration east of Gettysburg was to fall back to prepared defensive positions in northern Maryland. This move would involve reversing the direction for all corps on the march, except for VI Corps, and moving them south. The army was positioned to make this move, but such a march could become confusing, and the roadways congested, so Meade prepared detailed instructions for that contingency. He would issue those instructions—the so-called Pipe Creek Circular—as a provisional order in the late morning of 1 July. Army of the Potomac corps commanders needed to know how to fall back to the Pipe Creek line, but the circular was not an order for corps commanders to execute. Instead, it functioned in today's parlance as a warning order, not to be executed until Meade issued "notice of such movement."<sup>74</sup>

### 1 July: What Happened



Events on 1 July did not transpire exactly as Meade had envisioned in either broad option, as the 1 July map makes plain. Meade did not anticipate two factors on 1 July. For one thing, Lee—in a manner inexplicable to the Army of the Potomac commander—decided to keep *Third Corps* and *First Corps* on the Chambersburg-Cashtown-Gettysburg pike. He neither moved *First Corps* south to the Monterey Pass, nor split *First* or *Third Corps* off from the road at Cashtown, either to the north or south. Though General Hill had in previous days sent forces south on the Cashtown-to-Fairfield road, neither Hill nor Lee made any attempt to use that road on 1 July. Nor does any evidence exist that Lee made an effort to use any of the other roads leaving Cashtown. Moreover, not only did Lee retain *First* and *Third Corps* on the road, but on 1 July he and

Longstreet also allowed Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division from *Second Corps*—along with the *Army of Northern Virginia's Reserve Train*—to merge onto the same road between *First* and *Third Corps* at Greenwood, Pennsylvania. On 1 July, the *Reserve Train* alone measured some 14 miles in length. Longstreet's lead division was ready to march at 0800 on 1 July but did not move past Greenwood until 1600.<sup>75</sup>

Lee's decision to allow Johnson's division (*Second Corps*) to march ahead of Longstreet's *First Corps* made some sense if his intent was to position that division to rejoin the rest of *Second Corps* on 1 July. But this linkage was possible only because of the rapid movement of Ewell's other two divisions, and this was the second factor that Meade did not anticipate. On 29 June, upon learning of the Army of the Potomac's rapid northward movement, Lee ordered Ewell to bring his forces back from the river and to concentrate in the vicinity of Cashtown or Gettysburg. Part of those instructions involved moving one division (Johnson's) with the *Reserve Train* back down the Cumberland Valley toward Chambersburg. Ewell's troops moved quickly, which is why those formations were in position to march between *Third* and *First Corps* on 1 July. More importantly, Ewell, whose headquarters were with a division at Carlisle, and Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, who commanded Ewell's other division at York, moved with remarkable speed on 30 June. Both divisions marched some 22 miles and camped east and west of Heidlersburg, Pennsylvania, that night. Thus, both divisions, each on its own road, awoke 10 manageable miles from Gettysburg on the morning of 1 July.<sup>76</sup>

Meade, not knowing these Confederates would move so fast and so close, sent cavalry toward Berlin on the morning of 1 July "to get the earliest information of the enemy."<sup>77</sup> That enemy would have been Early's division, but that division was already 5 or 6 miles west of Berlin the night before.<sup>78</sup> Had Meade known the true location of this element of Ewell's *Second Corps*—two-thirds its full strength—his concern about a rebel concentration at or east of Gettysburg would have been realized.<sup>79</sup> In this event, Meade almost certainly would have issued the Pipe Creek Circular as an order. As he wrote to Reynolds on 1 July, "The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's [*Second Corps*] withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received."<sup>80</sup> Around noon

# 1 July



## Army of the Potomac

- Infantry Corps I II III V VI XI XII
- Artillery Reserve AR
- Cavalry Divisions 1c 2c 3c
- Headquarters HQ

- Base of Supply BS
- Ordered Marches →
- Follow-on Marches →

## Army of Northern Virginia

- Infantry Corps I II III
- Cavalry C
- Reserve Train RT
- Marches →

Note: All Army of the Potomac ordered marches are depicted to scale on the road and as arriving at their ordered destinations. Follow-on marches are to scale on the road, except VI Corps. Army of Northern Virginia marches depicted as full marches and not to scale on road, except cavalry.

that day, as details of the battle came in and Ewell's presence was confirmed—but before he had any clear tactical picture of the battlefield—Meade directed Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock to clear the Taneytown Road to allow Reynolds and I Corps to fall back to the Pipe Creek line.<sup>81</sup>

Within forty-five minutes, as news of Reynolds's death arrived, along with reports that I Corps held the town and perhaps occupied good ground for a battle, Meade ordered Hancock to take command in Gettysburg and prepare II Corps to move forward.<sup>82</sup> Contrary to what Meade had anticipated, Lee buried Longstreet's *First Corps* behind all of *Third Corps*, Johnson's division of *Second Corps*, and the army's *Reserve Train*, all on the same road. He allowed *Third Corps* to enter the action piecemeal. Additionally, the leading divisions of *Third Corps* sustained frightful casualties attacking Federal forces on 1 July. On the whole, what saved the *Army of Northern Virginia* from disaster that day were the actions of Ewell on 30 June and 1 July.

Despite the uneven tactical performance of Federal units in the first phase of the fight, Meade's execution of the campaign put his army in a position of advantage for the battle on all three days. On the morning of 1 July, without knowing where a battle would take place, Meade had positioned four of his seven corps (I, XI, III, XII) and his Artillery Reserve closer in distance to Gettysburg than all but four divisions (those of Maj. Gens. Henry "Harry" Heth, William D. Pender, Robert E. Rodes, and General Early) in the *Army of Northern Virginia*. Just as important and, again, without knowledge of where a battle would begin, Meade issued marching orders for the day that had six of his seven corps—in addition to his Artillery Reserve—moving closer to the eventual battlefield. Although all of Hill's *Third Corps* and all of Ewell's *Second Corps* were at Gettysburg by nightfall on 1 July, only two of the three divisions from each corps (the four mentioned above) fought that day.

Numbers tell only part of the story, and how Meade had arranged his forces in time, space, and purpose mattered as much as the distance of his formations from Gettysburg. On 1 July, though it used the standard duration of time to move from marching columns into battle lines, Reynolds's I Corps arrived on the battlefield as one unit, with artillery, because it marched on one road all to itself. This fact helps explain why the numerically inferior Federal corps managed

to decimate two divisions from the rebel *Third Corps* that entered the fight incrementally—almost regiment by regiment. In addition to engaging the Confederate *Third Corps*, Reynolds's I Corps even held for a time against the lead elements of Ewell's *Second Corps*.

In a similar vein, the arrival of the much-maligned Federal XI Corps—under the command of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard—reflects well on Meade and the oft-criticized XI Corps commander. Meade ordered this unit to Gettysburg in support of I Corps but gave latitude to Reynolds and Howard about how the corps would approach the town. On 1 July, Howard diverted two of his three divisions from the Emmitsburg Road to the Taneytown Road, which facilitated the arrival of XI Corps at Gettysburg as a complete formation.<sup>83</sup> It was by prudent choice—not an accidental side effect of a piecemeal arrival—that Howard kept a significant portion of his corps (and, most importantly, his artillery) on key terrain at Cemetery Hill, even as he moved forward the rest of his formations along too wide an arc north of the town.<sup>84</sup> Had Confederate divisions under General Rodes and General Early (*Second Corps*) not arrived so soon, it is entirely plausible that the U.S. Army I and XI



**General Hancock**  
Library of Congress

Corps alone would have defeated, in detail, all rebel forces available operating under Lee's design. Even the Federal XII Corps, which did not march as rapidly as it might have, made free use of the Baltimore Pike all to itself, and the arrival of that corps—like the others, all in one piece—later in the day on 1 July allowed Federal commanders to distribute that corps along the line as needed to hold Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, and Cemetery Ridge into the night.

On 2 July, the advantages of Meade's campaign design came into even fuller and clearer view. Although Meade maintained his concern for some sort of rebel maneuver in the vicinity of Emmitsburg until late in the day on 1 July, he allowed two-thirds of III Corps to proceed to Gettysburg on the open Emmitsburg Road. They arrived by evening, and the remaining division arrived at the battlefield in the early morning. Likewise, on the afternoon and evening of 1 July, Meade ordered II and V Corps to advance from their planned marches toward Gettysburg, he sent the Artillery Reserve forward in two parts from its camp in Taneytown, and he ordered the VI Corps on the east flank of the army at Manchester to begin its grueling march to the battlefield. The II Corps enjoyed complete freedom of movement on the Taneytown Road, with two-fifths of the Artillery Reserve joining the corps on the march. These forces bivouacked a few miles from Gettysburg and arrived on the battlefield between 0730 and 0830 on 2 July. What remained of the Artillery Reserve and the bulk of the army headquarters marched early from Taneytown and arrived at Gettysburg around 1030.<sup>85</sup>

The Army of the Potomac's V Corps advanced down the road from Hanover on 1 July, arriving near the vicinity of Gettysburg that evening. Proof positive that Ewell's Confederate *Second Corps* moved faster than Meade had anticipated, V Corps found its path toward the town on the Hanover Road blocked by Ewell's troops. (Critically, the approach of V Corps along this road helped delay the attack of the *Second Corps* on Culp's Hill the next day.) The V Corps cut over to the Baltimore Pike and two-thirds of the corps arrived at the battlefield at 0700—the other third arrived around noon—and Meade placed the corps into tactical reserve. Far removed from the field, VI Corps needed to cover a lot of ground—a total of 38 miles—but arrived on the evening of 2 July after a difficult and historic march.

Thus, by midmorning on 2 July, the Army of the Potomac had brought to bear the weight of six of its seven corps, along with its Artillery Reserve, on the battlefield, arrayed those formations in a defensive posture replete with interior lines and a reserve element, and in a position with direct lines of communications to its base. Putting aside the specific tactical actions of 1–3 July, the picture is clear: as an operational commander, Meade put his army in a position to win a critical battle.

Meade's success stands out all the more when compared to Lee's performance in positioning the *Army of Northern Virginia* for the fight at Gettysburg. Lee's decision to overload the Chambersburg-Cashtown-Gettysburg pike came with severe consequences for the fate of rebel arms in the battle. On campaign in the summer of 1863, Confederate and U.S. Army corps were not created equal. Each rebel corps possessed more than twice the numerical strength of a standard Federal corps and occupied more than twice the amount of space on the road, and, by all accounts, each moved with all its wagon trains in tow on 1 July. Whereas the nimbler, smaller, and combat-ready Federal corps, marching on single roads, could transition—as entire units—from columns into lines quite rapidly, one large rebel corps with its trains, marching on a single road, took hours to arrive on the battlefield and deploy for combat. This was the fate of *Third Corps* and its lead divisions under Confederate major generals Harry Heth and William Pender on 1 July. The third division (Anderson's), which started the day at Fayetteville, Pennsylvania, some 18 miles away, “moved leisurely forward” with “frequent halts” in crossing over the mountain pass at the Cashtown Gap.<sup>86</sup> This division made it no farther than Herr Ridge, west of town, between 1600 and 1700, where it halted for two hours. This division had ample time to fight, but Lee did not order it into action on 1 July. Lee explained later that “without information” concerning the proximity of the rest of the Army of the Potomac, “the strong position which the enemy ha[d] assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.”<sup>87</sup>

The next Confederate unit in the line of march, Johnson's division of Ewell's *Second Corps*, did not link up with Ewell until just before nightfall. Behind this division,

strung out for a considerable distance, was the 14-mile-long *Reserve Train*. Behind the train came two divisions of Longstreet's *First Corps*, which began arriving at Gettysburg in the middle of the night. These delays were the inevitable consequence of Lee's arrangement of his forces during the campaign. That Lee even had any fleeting tactical opportunities to consider late on 1 July is credited solely to the rapid marches of two *Second Corps* divisions on 30 June and 1 July, which happened primarily under Ewell's initiative. Those divisions proved effective because Ewell marched and directed them to the sound of the guns on separate roads, all so they could concentrate almost simultaneously on the battlefield.<sup>88</sup>

Lee's poor arrangement came with harsh consequences for the duration of the battle. Heavy casualties sustained by at least three of the four divisions (those of Heth, Pender, and Rodes) fighting far from Lee's main body on 1 July rendered them essentially combat ineffective for offensive action for the second and third days of the fight, leaving *Second* and *Third Corps* with one fresh division apiece (Anderson's and Johnson's) to attack on 2 and 3 July. Only Longstreet's *First Corps* remained fit for significant action. Its late arrival with only two divisions (those of Maj. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and John Bell Hood) on the night of 1–2 July, 4 miles from the battlefield and 7 miles from its eventual attack points, contributed to the delay of the attack of Longstreet's corps on 2 July until 1700. Long before that time, Meade had concentrated all available units—VI Corps excepted—for the defense.<sup>89</sup> Even that corps arrived near the end of action on 2 July, giving Meade another strong reserve.


And so, on the evening of 2 July, Lee's only remaining, unengaged unit was the last division of Longstreet's *First Corps*, then back at Chambersburg. Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett's division left Chambersburg at 0200 on 2 July, marched 25 miles, and arrived 3 miles from Gettysburg in the middle of the afternoon heat. Lee ordered it to rest. This division moved into attack positions around 0900 on 3 July. That afternoon, after intense but largely ineffectual artillery fire, Pickett's division attacked alongside remnants of Hill's *Third Corps*, because the *Army of Northern Virginia* had, after two days' fighting, expended its offensive capabilities.<sup>90</sup> In the meantime, the entire Army of the Potomac was concentrated in even stronger defensive positions than it had held on 1 and 2 July, still with interior lines,

and still with an open and developing line of communications to its base.

Military experts often observe, with plenty of examples, that elite tactics cannot overcome bad strategy. But military historians too seldom demonstrate the opposite: that good strategy and operational art can overcome unremarkable tactics. As the enclosed maps help to illustrate, Meade's superior arrangement of his campaign, understood and ably executed by competent subordinates, gave the Army of the Potomac advantage enough to overcome even its worst tactical mistakes at Gettysburg.

### Mapping a Path Forward

As even the relatively simple example of the Gettysburg Campaign demonstrates, operational warfare—moving and fighting large military formations on campaign—is difficult even for competent commanders like George Meade. As a result, operational military historians evaluating the performance of commanders have a difficult task of their own. It is hard enough to describe what happened in a campaign; it is something else altogether to judge how well or poorly commanders fared based on what they knew in the moment. Standard campaign maps—of which the West Point atlas variety are but




**General McLaws**  
Library of Congress

one common example—are of limited help for the former and inadequate for the latter.

The maps provided here offer new directions for both describing historical campaigns and studying them to understand operational warfare. The 1 July map furnishes an example of a standard historical campaign map that depicts both sides as the armies moved and maneuvered to the battlefield. But this map depicts key terrain—and, critically, roads—in addition to the placement and spacing of formations around that terrain and on those roads. This map also depicts formations that were of critical importance to commanders of both field armies—mainly infantry corps and cavalry divisions—with the notable additions of the Confederate *Reserve Train* and the Artillery Reserve and headquarters formations of the Army of the Potomac. Any map accompanying a narrative description of what happened in a historical campaign would benefit from these additions.

Effective operational histories seek to evaluate how and why commanders made their decisions. Such evaluation is impossible without *seeing* how a commander *saw* the battlespace—that is, how he or she visualized friendly and enemy forces on the ground. The new maps presented here offer great usefulness in four main ways. First, they require historians and students of campaigns to pay careful attention to what field army commanders in charge of campaigns, like Meade, understood about the geography of the operational area. Second, such maps depend on a deeper understanding of what a commander identified as key elements of friendly forces and how that commander visualized those forces moving in space and time. Third, the maps make essential an awareness of how a commander like Meade, in charge of a campaign, saw the enemy at given moments in time—including that commander's identification of the main enemy commander's pieces, their placement, and their potential (as much as their actual) movement in space and time. Fourth, maps such as these force students of campaigns to consider how a commander anticipated and intended to adapt to contingencies, chance, and volatility in war. Such considerations are necessary for any accurate evaluation of commanders on campaign.

One major caveat: this article makes no claim for stunning originality. Careful students of the Gettysburg Campaign have noted much of what is depicted here in their narratives, though not with the



**General Hood**  
*Library of Congress*

same emphasis on operational warfare. Important work remains. For the Gettysburg Campaign, similar maps could be drawn from Robert E. Lee's perspective to provide a more thorough and comparative assessment of his command performance. More importantly, and for all the detail presented here, Gettysburg was a relatively simple, nineteenth-century land campaign. Future studies might apply this style of operational mapping to joint campaigns in the Civil War, and to other sea, air, and joint campaigns in other wars throughout military history.

The future of modernized, comprehensive, operational maps brings this story full circle to the military professionals of the post-Civil War U.S. Army who sought to learn and practice the craft of leading large warfighting formations on campaign. After all, there is a practical and urgent component to operational mapping. If campaigning, as Antoine-Henry Jomini famously wrote, “is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations,” then maps are essential to the art.<sup>91</sup> In their time, previous generations of students at the line and staff schools and at the nation's war college lamented the absence of maps to help them in this important task.

Although satellite imagery has improved the depiction of terrain significantly, and other technological improvements have clarified the depiction of friendly and enemy forces, commanders still would benefit from operational maps that better depict how general officers visualized their approaches on campaign. At a minimum, better operational maps of historic campaigns would improve how commanders learn about the unique problems and approaches to campaigning; with luck, they will help future commanders train their minds' eyes to visualize properly the application of operational art. Such habits may well improve how a new generation of commanders map future campaigns, enabling them to win the nation's future wars.

### Authors' Note

The authors thank Mr. Russell S. Hartman, Graphics Manager, U.S. Army War College Network Enterprise Center, for his efforts in editing and finishing the newly rendered maps.

### Managing Editor's Note

All contemporary map illustrations in this article are the original work of the authors and are not products of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. We have retained the original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation in quoted materials.

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## Notes

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3. Arthur L. Wagner et al., *Military Geography: Lectures in the Department of Military Art, 1893–1895* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Infantry and Cavalry School, 1895), 4n.

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5. Hunter Liggett, *AEF: Ten Years Ago in France* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928), 289–92.

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9. Henry J. Hunt, “The First Day at Gettysburg” and “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, eds. Johnson R. Underwood and Clarence C. Buel, vol. 3 (Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1982), 273–74, 290–91.

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16. Black, *Maps of War*, 130–34.

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25. For example, see H. H. S[argent], “Review of *American Campaigns*,” *Journal of the Military*

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26. Telg, Helmuth von Moltke to Ch Gen Staff Army, 24 Feb 1910, trans. H. L. Todd, in Ltr to M. F. Steele, 15 Mar 1910, Folder: American Campaigns, 1. Critiques, 2. Acknowledgements of receipts, 1909–1946, Box 19, Matthew F. Steele Papers, USAHEC.

27. Most subsequent editions of *American Campaigns* were based on a resetting by Infantry Journal Press in 1922, after the original plates from 1909 were destroyed in a fire. The 1922 edition changed each section title from “Lecture” to “Chapter,” and a number of typographical errors occurred along the way. Steele lamented the changes and mistakes. For years, he tried to have them corrected, but with no success. See, for example, Corresp, Matthew Steele to T. Dodson Stamps, 8 Oct 1942, Folder: American Campaigns, 1. Critiques, 2. Acknowledgements of receipts, 1909–1946, Box 19, Matthew F. Steele Papers, USAHEC.

28. *Information Relative to the Appointment and Admission of Cadets to the United States Military Academy, Edition 1930* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), 52–53; *Information Relative to the*

*Appointment and Admission of Cadets to the United States Military Academy, Edition 1933* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), 19; *Information Relative to the Appointment and Admission of Cadets to the United States Military Academy, Edition 1939* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 18; Corresp, E. F. Harding to Matthew Steele, 5 Feb 1938, Folder: American Campaigns, 1931–42, Box 19, Matthew F. Steele Papers, USAHEC; Henry O. Kelley, “The Social Studies Curriculum at West Point,” *The Social Studies* 31, no. 5 (May 1940): 221–23; T. Dodson Stamps, “The Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S.M.A.,” *Assembly* 10, no. 3 (Oct 1951): 3–5, 12; Arthur P. Wade, “Civil War at West Point,” *Civil War History* 3, no. 1 (Mar 1957): 5–15.

29. For example, in the Gettysburg Campaign, corps, divisions, and brigade positions on the approach to the battle were in the same general locations but redrawn with new symbolism that showed them in camp or bivouac.

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31. The 30 June map remained the same from the 1941 edition through at least the 1962 second edition of the Vincent J. Esposito volume, but it has disappeared from more recent editions. Thomas E. Griess, ed., *Atlas for the American Civil War* (Garden City, NY: Square One Publishers, 2002), foreword.

32. Steele, *American Campaigns*, vol. 1, iv.

33. Steele, *American Campaigns*, vol. 1, iv–v.

34. David L. Ladd and Audrey J. Ladd, eds., *John Bachelder’s History of the Battle of Gettysburg* (Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1997), 9–12.

35. The correspondence relating to the return of John B. Bachelder’s account, along with the bound original draft and maps, can be found in Series III, Official History of the Battle of Gettysburg Manuscripts, Battle of Gettysburg Official History, J. B. Bachelder, c. 1893, Gettysburg National Park Commission, Office of the Commissioners, Records of the Official History of the Battle of Gettysburg, 1880–1893, Box 11, GETT 41120, Gettysburg National Military Park, Gettysburg, PA.

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38. C. W. Tolles, “An Army: Its Organization and Movements, First Paper,” *Continental Monthly* 5, no. 6 (Jun 1864), 715.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Carol Reardon, *With a Sword in One Hand & Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

42. The most famous such formation is the so-called *battalion carré* or *bataillon carré* used by Napoleon Bonaparte in the Jena and Auerstadt Campaign, depicted in David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), 133–201, 467–79. Napoleon used that terminology as a metaphor in instructions to Jean-de-Dieu Soult on 5 October 1806. “You can imagine [the army] marching in this place in a battalion square of 200,000 men.” No one used *bataillon carré* to describe the formation until after Napoleon’s correspondence was published in the 1860s, after which the French army adopted the terminology to some degree. British military reformers led by Col. F. N. Maude picked up on the concept around the turn of the century. See Henri Plon and J. Dumaine, eds., *Correspondance de Napoléon I*, tome 13 (Paris: Emperor Napoleon III, 1863), 309–10, and F. N. Maude, *The Jena Campaign, 1806* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 124–27. Nevertheless, the prevailing military theory of the 1860s did account for the concept of marching corps of field armies on parallel roads. See Emil Schalk, *Summary of the Art of War: Written Expressly for and Dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army* (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), 176–77, and Edouard Delabarre-Duparcq, *Elements of Military Art and History*, trans.

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43. It was common practice for corps to camp near creeks in order to get fresh water during marches. But, again, from Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s perspective as field army commander, because there were so many creeks and small rivers in the route of march, he did not have to consider sources of water for the campaign. Nor did his corps commanders call out such creeks for special attention—their presence was more a matter of tactical standard operating procedure. For more emphasis on geography and waterways in the campaign, see Troy D. Harman, *All Roads Led to Gettysburg* (Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 2022).

44. All estimates of column length are derived from standard returns from the armies and the charts and figures in Rodney C. Lackey, “Notes on Civil War Logistics: Facts & Stories,” U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Fort Gregg-Adams, Virginia, n.d., ca. 2017, [https://transportation.army.mil/history/pdf/Peninsula\\_Campaign/Rodney%20Lackey%20Article\\_1.pdf](https://transportation.army.mil/history/pdf/Peninsula_Campaign/Rodney%20Lackey%20Article_1.pdf) (accessed 6 Dec 2023).

45. Meade’s overestimate of the *Army of Northern Virginia* is a matter of some historical dispute, partly because of unclear rebel accounting for support personnel, many of whom were enslaved people who alone accounted for as many as 10,000 additional people who would have been counted by intelligence sources. Brown, *Meade at Gettysburg*, 47–48, 56. On estimates of enslaved people in the *Army of Northern Virginia*, see Kent Masterson Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 49–50.

46. Corresp, John F. Reynolds to Daniel A. Butterfield [for George G. Meade], 29 Jun 1863, 3:15 p.m., in U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1889) (hereinafter cited as *OR*), ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 397; Corresp, Darius N. Couch to George Meade, 29 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 407–8. For intelligence estimates throughout the campaign and on 29 June, see Thomas Ryan, *Spies, Scouts, and Secrets in the Gettysburg Campaign: How the Critical Role of Intelligence Impacted the Outcome of Lee’s Invasion of the North, June–July 1863* (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2015), 391, 393.

47. Corresp, Henry W. Halleck to George Meade, 27 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 61.

48. See Corresp, George Meade to Henry Halleck, 28 Jun 1863, 7:00am, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 61–62; Corresp, George Meade to Henry

Halleck, 28 Jun 1863, 3:00 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 64.

49. Corresp, George Meade to Henry Halleck, 29 Jun 1863, 11:00 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 66–67; Orders, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 28 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 375–76; SO 99, HQ, Cavalry Corps, 29 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 400–1; Earl J. Hess, *Civil War Supply and Strategy: Feeding Men and Moving Armies* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2020), 312–14.

50. Edward G. Longacre, *The Cavalry at Gettysburg* (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1993), 148–60.

51. Corresp, Meade to Halleck, 29 Jun 1863, 11:00 a.m.

52. George Meade, *The Life and Letters of General George Gordon Meade*, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 13–14.

53. Corresp, George Meade to Darius Couch, 30 Jun 1863, 10:45 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 67–68; Cir, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 29 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 402.

54. Corresp, George Meade to Henry Halleck, 30 Jun 1863, 11:00 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 67.

55. Corresp, Meade to Couch, 30 Jun 1863, 10:45 a.m.; Corresp, George Meade to Henry Halleck, 30 Jun 1863, 4:30 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 68–69; Corresp, Seth Williams [for George Meade] to Oliver O. Howard, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 415.

56. For Meade's ongoing concern about the passes out of the valley, see Corresp, Seth Williams [for George Meade] to Alfred Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 421.

57. There were some reports that rebel forces under Lt. Gen. D. H. Hill might join Robert E. Lee's army. Corresp, Darius Couch to [first name unknown] Stanton and George Meade, 29 Jun 1863, 6:20 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 407–8.

58. Corresp, John Buford to Alfred Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863; Corresp, John Buford to John Reynolds, 30 Jun 1863, 10:30 p.m.; both in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 923–24; Ryan, *Spies, Scouts, and Secrets*, 402, 406.

59. Corresp, Seth Williams to John Reynolds and Oliver Howard, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 414–15; Cir, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 416–17.

60. Corresp, John Reynolds to Oliver Howard, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 417.

61. *Ibid.*

62. Corresp, John Reynolds to Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade], 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 417–18.

63. Cir, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 30 Jun

1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 415–17; Corresp, Williams [for George Meade] to Howard, 30 Jun 1863.

64. *Ibid.* See also the Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch correspondence for confirmation of rebels leaving Carlisle and York later on 30 June, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 433–34.

65. Corresp, George Meade to John Reynolds, 30 Jun 1863, 11:30 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 419–20.

66. In addition to Maj. Gen. John Buford Jr. discovering no rebel forces in the Monterey Pass on 29 June, on 30 June, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard reported that a citizen from Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, gave information of no rebels in that town or on the pike from Waynesboro to Emmitsburg. Corresp, Oliver Howard to Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade], 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 421–22.

67. Corresp, Seth Williams [for George Meade] to John Reynolds, 1 Jul 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 460–61. Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys was a trusted subordinate and Meade's future chief of staff and, at the time, a division commander in III Corps, which was headed to Emmitsburg anyway. He later reported that the ground was not good for fighting around Emmitsburg. Testimony, Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, *Battle of Petersburg*, 38th Cong. (21 Mar 1864), *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Army of the Potomac* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1865), 388–91.

68. Corresp, Williams [for Meade] to Reynolds, 1 Jul 1863.

69. Orders, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 416. The 1 July marching orders went out late on 30 June, and, because of a communication error, Howard and Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds did not receive them until the middle of the night. They still had time to arrange their marches and leave between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m.. See Oliver Otis Howard, *Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard*, vol. 1 (New York: Baker & Taylor, 1908), 404–8.

70. Corresp, Meade to Reynolds, 30 Jun 1863, 11:30 a.m.. Additionally, Buford, Reynolds, and, later, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock remained concerned about, and distributed forces to deal with, a rebel approach to Gettysburg on the Fairfield Road. Rpt, Abner Doubleday, 14 Dec 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 244; Corresp, Winfield Hancock to Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade], 1 Jul 1863, 5:25 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 366.

71. The 30 June and 1 July correspondence is replete with references to positioning and fighting around Emmitsburg, indicating how seriously Meade and Reynolds took that threat.

See Corresp, Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade] to Oliver Howard, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 418; Corresp, Oliver Howard to John Reynolds, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 419; Corresp, Oliver Howard to Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade], 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 419; Corresp, Seth Williams [for George Meade] to Daniel Sickles, [III Corps], 30 Jun 1863, 12:45 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 422; Corresp, Daniel Sickles to Seth Williams [for George Meade], 30 Jun 1863; Corresp, Edward Baird [for John Reynolds] to Daniel Sickles, 30 Jun 1863; and Corresp, Daniel Sickles to Edward Baird [for John Reynolds], 30 Jun 1863; all in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 424–25; Corresp, O. H. Hart [for Daniel Sickles] to Charles Graham, 1 Jul 1863; Corresp, Daniel Sickles to Seth Williams [for George Meade], 1 Jul 1863, 3:25 p.m.; both in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 464; Corresp, Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade] to Daniel Sickles, 1 Jul 1863, 4:45 p.m.; Corresp, George Meade to Winfield Hancock and Abner Doubleday, 1 Jul 1863, 6:00 p.m.; Corresp, Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade] to Daniel Sickles, 1 Jul 1863, 7:30 p.m.; and Corresp, Daniel Sickles to Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade], 1 Jul 1863, 9:30 p.m.; all in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 466–68.

72. Corresp, S. F. Barstow [for George Meade] to Henry Slocum, [XII Corps], 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 420–21; Corresp, Seth Williams [for George Meade] to Winfield Hancock, [II Corps], 30 Jun 1863, 1:00 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 422–23.

73. Corresp, Williams [for Meade] to Reynolds, 1 Jul 1863.

74. Cir, HQ, Army of the Potomac, 1 Jul 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 458–59.

75. Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," *Southern Historical Society Papers* 7, no. 2 (Feb 1879), 67.

76. Scott L. Mingus Sr. and Eric J. Wittenberg, "If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania": *The Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac March to Gettysburg*, vol. 2 (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2023), 257–58, 295–98. On the movement of rebel units 29 June–3 July, see Gottfried, *Roads to Gettysburg*, 191–223; Schildt, *Roads to Gettysburg*, 357–534.

77. Corresp, Alfred Pleasonton to David Gregg, 1 Jul 1863, 6:30 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 469. According to Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's report, on 2 July they even sent Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Kilpatrick's 3d Cavalry Division "toward Gettysburg from the direction of Heidlersburg, to prevent the enemy from concentrating his forces by that road." Because Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early was already at Gettysburg, there were not many enemy forces left

to concentrate. Rpt, Alfred Pleasonton, 31 Aug 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 914.

78. On 30 June 30, General Kilpatrick of the 3d Cavalry Division reported to Alfred Pleasonton after the battle at Hanover with Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart's cavalry that "a strong column of the enemy's forces left York at daybreak this morning," and that they were "concentrating at Gettysburg." He added that he thought there was "a considerable force at Berlin." Corresp, Hugh Kilpatrick to Alfred Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 987. A little later he said he had "information that Lee's headquarters are at Berlin," to which Pleasonton added the endorsement that "General Lee's being in Berlin is important." Corresp, A. J. Alexander to Alfred Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 987–88. Later that afternoon, when Buford accurately reported that Lee was at Chambersburg, Pleasonton noted that "this information contradicts Kilpatrick's, of Lee being at Berlin." Corresp, Buford to Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863. Between the news of the battle at Hanover, Kilpatrick's lack of specificity about the forces leaving York or being in Berlin, the unlikely rumor that Lee was at Berlin, and Pleasonton's poor judgment in emphasizing that rumor, the important information that Early was moving quickly west seems to have been lost on Meade.

79. At midnight on the night of 30 June–1 July, after he had issued his marching orders for 1 July, Meade reported to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck that "[Lt. Gen. Richard S.] Ewell is massing at Heidlersburg," the phrasing of which indicates that Meade thought Ewell's corps was on the way to Heidlersburg, not already there, which would be consistent with Buford's reports (see note 71). Corresp, George Meade to Henry Halleck, 1 Jul 1863, 12:00 a.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 70–71.

80. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* includes a captured order from General Early to an unidentified colonel (probably cavalry) with these instructions: "Get between Gettysburg and Heidlersburg, and picket at Mummasburg and Hunterstown, [Pennsylvania]. Send in direction of Gettysburg, and see what is there, and report to General Ewell at Heidlersburg." The document is dated

30 June 1863, and Buford says it "was captured last night on the road to Oxford, [Pennsylvania]. The bearer of it said he saw Early last at Berlin." Despite its location in the 30 June correspondence, it almost certainly was captured the night of 30 June–1 July, and Buford forwarded it the morning of 1 July. Orders, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, 30 Jun 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 414. Likewise, two reports from Buford (one to Reynolds and another to Pleasonton) dated 30 June, 5:30 a.m., and 12:20 p.m., in the *Official Records* are almost certainly from 1 July. The information therein matched the situation on 1 July, not 30 June, including the 5:30 a.m. note describing sending parties toward Mummasburg, "due north," and Littlestown—all three were directions from Gettysburg, not the Monterey Pass, which is where Buford was on the morning of 30 June. In addition, the due north party "captured a prisoner from [Maj. Gen. Robert E.] Rodes' division," 3 miles out. If true, that only could have been on the Carlisle or maybe Heidlersburg Roads on the night of 30 June–1 July. Rpt, John Buford, 30 Jun 1863, 5:30 a.m.; Rpt, John Buford, 30 Jun 1863, 12:20 p.m., both in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 922. See also Rpt, John Buford, 27 Aug 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 927; H. P. Moyer, ed., *History of the Seventeenth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry* (Lebanon, PA: Sowers Printing, 1911), 59–63; and Newel Cheney, *History of the Ninth Regiment, New York Volunteer Cavalry* (Jamestown, NY: Martin Merz & Son, 1901), 101–7. The most compelling case for the misdating of these three documents is that Buford includes none of that information in his 30 June 10:30 p.m. report to Reynolds, reporting instead that he captured a courier from Lee near Heidlersburg, who said, "Ewell's corps is crossing the mountains from Carlisle," with the Rodes division in the lead at Petersburg, Pennsylvania. At that point, he only had "rumors and reports" of Early's division approaching from York. He made a similar report to Pleasonton. Corresp, Buford to Reynolds, 30 Jun 1863, 10:30 p.m.; Corresp, John Buford to Alfred Pleasonton, 30 Jun 1863, 10:40 p.m.; both in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 923–24. Meade probably referred to the misdated dispatches from when they actually arrived on 1 July in his note to Reynolds that morning, writing, "the various movements reported from Buford, seem to indicate the concentration of the enemy either at

Chambersburg or at a point situated somewhere on a line drawn between Chambersburg and York, through Mummasburg and to the north of Gettysburg." Corresp, Williams [for George Meade] to Reynolds, 1 Jul 1863.

81. Corresp, Daniel Butterfield [for George Meade] to Winfield Hancock, 1 Jul 1863, in *OR*, ser. x, vol. 27, pt. 3, 461. Meade made a similar assessment to John Sedgwick. Corresp, George Meade to John Sedgwick, 1 Jul 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 462.

82. Corresp, Butterfield [for George Meade] to Hancock, 1 Jul 1863, 1:10 p.m. and 1:15 p.m..

83. Corresp, Oliver Howard to John Reynolds, 1 Jul 1863, 6:00 a.m.; Corresp, E. C. Baird [for John Reynolds] to Oliver Howard, 1 Jul 1863; both in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 457.

84. Corresp, Oliver Howard to George Meade, 1 Jul 1863, 2:00 p.m., in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 3, 457–58.

85. Rpt, Robert O. Tyler, 30 Aug 1863, in *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, 871–72.

86. Eric A. Campbell, "'Sacrificed to the bad management . . . of others': Richard H. Anderson's Division at the Battle of Gettysburg," *High Water Mark: The Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg Campaign*, Programs of the Seventh Annual Gettysburg Seminar (Gettysburg, PA: National Park Service, 1999), 107.

87. *Ibid.*


88. If Lee had ordered Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's corps to march on 30 June from their positions around Chambersburg to the Monterey Pass as Meade feared, and if Longstreet's troops had moved as far as Ewell's that day (22 miles), they would have made it to the east side of the pass. On the morning of 1 July, they would have been on the east side of the mountain, on their own roads, 12 miles from Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's corps at Cashtown, 11 miles from Gettysburg, and 6 miles from Emmitsburg.

89. Arguably, the Army of the Potomac would have been in a better defensive position on 2 July had the rebels attacked earlier, before Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles moved III Corps forward and out of line.

90. Lesley J. Gordon, *General George E. Pickett in Life & Legend* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 108–20.

91. Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), 69.

# BOOKREVIEWS



## FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO THE BAY: THE WAR IN VIRGINIA, JANUARY–MAY 1862

BY ETHAN S. RAFUSE

University Press of Kansas, 2023  
Pp. xxi, 400. \$49.95

REVIEW BY SHANE D. MAKOWICKI

Over the past 150 years, historians have spilled a tremendous amount of ink detailing military operations in the Civil War's Eastern Theater, particularly Virginia. For this reason, Ethan S. Rafuse acknowledges that his study, *From the Mountains to the Bay: The War in Virginia, January–May 1862*, is "to a great extent a work of synthesis" (xvii). Nevertheless, Rafuse's holistic approach to this period of the war allows him to cast an oft-covered subject in a new light. By treating the varied operations as "part of a single grand effort" by the U.S. and Confederate high commands, Rafuse demonstrates how small-scale campaigns and battles of seemingly minor importance had

"major ramifications for every other part of the system" (xviii).

In his preface, which functions as the book's introduction, Rafuse makes a compelling case for Virginia's importance in the war writ large. Although it was the location of the Confederate capital, Virginia held more than just symbolic value. In addition to the Confederacy's largest population (1,596,318 inhabitants, of whom 31 percent were slaves), the state boasted the rich agricultural lands of the Shenandoah Valley, the commercial centers of Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Petersburg, and the growing industrial hub of Richmond. As Rafuse points out, Jefferson Davis, Abraham Lincoln, and their military commanders realized that "without the Old Dominion's agricultural, human, and industrial resources . . . the Confederacy's ability to wage warfare in the industrial age would be severely, if not fatally, compromised" (xiv).

These critical factors combined to make Virginia the scene of a "remarkably diverse range of operations," conducted by U.S. and Confederate military forces on a grander scale than had ever been attempted in North America (xiii, xvii). The bulk of Rafuse's work, divided into ten chapters, is devoted to describing these campaigns, which stretched from Bath and McDowell in western Virginia to the Tidewater region and the Virginia Peninsula. The book progresses chronologically from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Romney Campaign in January 1862, through the arrival of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac outside the gates of Richmond in late May.

The first three chapters discuss McClellan's appointment as general-in-chief of the Federal armies, his subsequent (and often contentious) debates with Lincoln regarding U.S. strategy, the Confederate retreat from Manassas Junction in the early spring of 1862, and the clash of the CSS *Virginia* and the USS *Monitor*—the first fight between ironclad warships—at the Battle of Hampton Roads on 8–9 March. Chapters 4–5 describe fighting in the Shenandoah Valley, including

Jackson's defeat by Brig. Gen. James Shields at Kernstown on 23 March, and the opening of McClellan's campaign on the Virginia Peninsula (between the York and James Rivers). The greater portion of Chapters 6–8 focuses on McClellan's subsequent siege of Yorktown, which lasted from 5 April to 4 May. The final two chapters cover Jackson's victory at the Battle of McDowell (Sitlington's Hill) in the mountains west of Staunton on 8 May, the repulse of Cdr. John Rodgers's Navy squadron at the Battle of Drewry's Bluff below Richmond a week later, and the Army of the Potomac's advance up the peninsula to the Chickahominy River.

Throughout the book, Rafuse demonstrates his mastery of writing operational narrative. He possesses a keen sense of when to zoom out to discuss larger strategic or political questions and how much detail to apply when describing tactical engagements. Moreover, he never loses sight of what sets his work apart from the scores of other studies on the spring 1862 campaigns in Virginia. Repeatedly, he draws clear connections between the fighting in disparate regions of the state and illustrates how one military action or decision fed into another. For instance, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's withdrawal from Manassas Junction in early March, which was partly a result of U.S. advances in the Shenandoah Valley, forced McClellan to adjust his "vision of operations" and abandon his initial plan to shift the Army of the Potomac to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River (57). Another example is Rafuse's analysis of Kernstown. Although the battle was a tactical U.S. victory, Jackson's aggressiveness convinced Lincoln to detach Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker's division from McClellan's control and send it to Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont in western Virginia. This weakened McClellan's field force and placed additional pressure on the already strained relationship between the general and the president.

Apart from his deft handling of military operations, numerous other factors strengthen Rafuse's work. He consistently notes how terrain, weather, and logistics imposed

limitations on campaigns and affected their outcomes. Jackson's movements during the Romney Campaign were hampered by winter snows and a shortage of rations. At the same time, the "unusually wet" weather on the Virginia Peninsula throughout the spring flooded roads and bogged down horses, wagons, and artillery trains (136). Rafuse also pays due attention to related developments such as the "professionalization" of the U.S. Army's officer corps in the decades preceding the Civil War (11) and the creation of Thaddeus Lowe's "corps of aeronauts," which provided reconnaissance for McClellan (159). Yet while Rafuse's analysis of these subjects helps to contextualize the operations he describes, he avoids getting mired in tangential material.

Another refreshing aspect of Rafuse's book is his willingness to challenge common perceptions of major military figures. The most notable example here is General Joseph E. Johnston, who is often treated as a purely defensive general with no inclination for offensive operations. Conversely, Rafuse notes that Johnston advocated drawing Confederate forces closer to Richmond not because he was obsessed with retreating but because he sought to husband strength for an attack that would assist the Confederate cause far more than a futile attempt to hold Yorktown ever could. "We must change our course, take the offensive," Johnston told General Robert E. Lee in late April 1862. "Our troops have always wished for the offensive and so does the country" (187).

Nevertheless, Rafuse's study would benefit from connecting the campaigns in Virginia to those that occurred simultaneously in other theaters. The book is about the Old Dominion, and there its focus must lay, but just as operations in the state could not be isolated from each other, nor could they be isolated from the larger war effort. This is particularly true because, until mid-March 1862, McClellan was general-in-chief of all U.S. armies. McClellan acknowledged this in the strategic vision he outlined for Lincoln in February, in which he stated that Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside's command in eastern North Carolina and Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's army in Kentucky were critical parts of his "general plan."<sup>21</sup>


This is, however, a relatively minor quibble that does not seriously detract from the book's significant contributions. Rafuse's engaging and informative operational narrative, his ability to link each campaign to the larger whole, his impressive archival research, and the extremely useful orders of battle that he provides (Appendixes A and B) make *From*

*the Mountains to the Bay* a worthy addition to the shelf of any military historian who seeks to understand the interconnected nature of strategy, operations, and tactics.

#### Note

1. U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 5, 44.

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## GUNBOATS, MUSKETS, AND TORPEDOES: COASTAL SOUTH CAROLINA, 1861–1865

BY MICHAEL G. LARAMIE

Westholme Publishing, 2022

Pp. xii, 383. \$35

REVIEW BY LUKE CARPENTER

A valuable contribution to Civil War military operations, Michael G. Laramie's *Gunboats, Muskets, and Torpedoes: Coastal South Carolina, 1861–1865* offers a comprehensive look at military and naval operations studies in the South Carolina littoral. Although it is a companion volume to Laramie's earlier work *Gunboats, Muskets, and Torpedoes: Coastal North Carolina, 1861–1865*, readers can profit from reading either book independently of the other.

Laramie begins with a geographic overview, describing the features of South Carolina's coastal region and its initial Confederate fortification efforts. The first major military operation described is the successful Union expedition against Port Royal in November 1861, in which Port Royal Sound's fortifications fell to U.S. Navy Adm. Samuel F. DuPont's skilled tactics and naval ordnance. This expedition demonstrated the Navy's ability to defeat isolated coastal fortifications and land troops at will along the coast.

Confederate leaders reexamined their defensive plans in the wake of Port Royal's

fall, while Federal forces busied themselves with fashioning their prize into a forward operating base. However, Confederate forces repulsed an ill-conceived attack at Secessionville, just south of Charleston, in June 1862 with heavy losses for Federal troops. This defeat, combined with the failure of U.S. military expeditions against the Savannah-Charleston Railroad, demonstrated that Confederate forces could muster sufficient strength rapidly at threatened points to counter and defeat Federal incursions.

Confederate forces developed more effective systems of coastal fortification with the return of General P. G. T. Beauregard, a military engineer famous for leading the bombardment of Fort Sumter in April 1861. Beauregard embraced a strategy of abandoning exposed fortifications guarding coastal inlets, like the ones defeated at Port Royal, in favor of withdrawing defense forces into the interior along a line protecting the Savannah-Charleston Railroad. This conceded the initiative to Federal forces in choosing the time and place to make landings but also facilitated Confederate use of the railroad to concentrate troops quickly in response to those landings. The soundness of this flexible operational approach was demonstrated repeatedly, particularly at the November 1864 Battle of Honey Hill. Confused and dilatory Federal troop movements after the landings, combined with alert Confederate defense pickets and prompt communications, enabled the rebels to concentrate their troops and repel the U.S. incursion, albeit with substantial losses. This book's central focus is the U.S. Navy's efforts against Charleston. The "Cradle of Secession" invoked strong desires for revenge among Federal leaders and the public. After U.S. forces failed to capture Charleston via the back door at Secessionville, U.S. naval planning shifted focus to the use of a new type of weapon: ironclad warships. Ironclads joined modern naval ordnance with steam power and armor plating in a combination that, to naval leaders, appeared unstoppable. Despite Admiral DuPont's ambivalence regarding the effectiveness of ironclads against coastal fortifications, President Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet ordered DuPont to attack Charleston with an ironclad fleet in a bid to destroy the harbor fortifications, principally Fort Sumter, thereby gaining access to the inner harbor. This would enable the Navy to bombard Charleston directly and end the port's usefulness as a destination for blockade runners.

DuPont's assault failed against Beauregard's well-designed harbor defense. Naval power alone was insufficient. Subsequent Federal operations around Charleston under two new commanders, Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore and Adm. John A. Dahlgren, followed a different method. Gillmore, an exceptional military engineer credited with the reduction of Fort Pulaski outside Savannah, Georgia, in 1862, favored a siege approach to the Charleston problem. Dahlgren, an ambitious naval ordnance expert, was willing to provide whatever assistance the Army needed.

Federal efforts in South Carolina's littoral reached their peak in 1863. The target was Fort Wagner, a sand fortification on one of the barrier islands near Charleston's entrance. Taking Fort Wagner was, in Gillmore's view, the first step in reducing Fort Sumter and then gaining passage to the inner harbor. Two direct assaults by U.S. Army infantry on Fort Wagner failed in spectacular fashion, in spite of the valor of regiments such as the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, one of the first African American units in the Army. After settling into a siege, Gillmore's persistence and Dahlgren's outstanding naval gunfire support resulted in the fall of Fort Wagner in September 1863. Another failed Federal landing followed, this time by a boat attack against Fort Sumter made by sailors and marines. Dahlgren's blockading fleet suffered heavy personnel losses, reducing its effectiveness. Despite the reduction of Fort Sumter's artillery capabilities by Gillmore's siege artillery in a series of bombardments, it remained useful as an outpost and anchor for protecting underwater obstacles that barred Dahlgren's fleet from the inner harbor for the remainder of the war. Charleston defiantly resisted Federal forces until Sherman's overland invasion of the Carolinas in 1865, which prompted the city's abandonment by Confederate authorities.

Laramie does not ignore the varied naval aspects of the struggle for South Carolina's coast. He argues that concentrated Federal naval strength near Charleston did lead to a substantial drop in the level of blockade-running into and out of the port. However, this traffic reduction was due as much to vessels diverting to ports like Wilmington, North Carolina, as to Federal captures of blockade runners. Laramie also sheds light on torpedo warfare at sea, in terms of mines and spar torpedoes. In combination with


underwater obstacles, mines proved a simple yet effective barrier in denying Dahlgren's fleet access to Charleston's inner harbor. The success of Confederate torpedo rams and submersibles against U.S. Navy warships yielded mixed results, with a single vessel sunk and an ironclad heavily damaged, but both pointed to future possibilities.

Laramie excels at placing naval and military operations in a historical context. Comparing combat during the siege of Fort Wagner to trench warfare in the First World War is an overreach. However, the detailed background Laramie provides on siege theory and methods before the Civil War, especially in the book's extensive glossary, builds a scaffold for the reader to understand how troops conducted siege operations. His analysis of the U.S. Navy blockade's effectiveness is well-argued and backed by solid sources, as is his criticism of promising Confederate naval torpedo operations being undercut and under-resourced in favor of harbor ironclads. Laramie also highlights the role human foibles played in military operations, most notably in the failed boat attack on Fort Sumter, a demonstration of Admiral Dahlgren's ego and desire to reap naval glory trumping sound military planning. The book is not without faults. Inconsistent editing makes for a confusing read at times, with multiple ship or place names spelled differently or changed in the same paragraph. Despite his prominence in the narrative, no picture of Admiral Dahlgren is provided, although other personalities mentioned less frequently are featured in photographs.

Laramie delivers a comprehensive synthesis of Federal and Confederate operations on the South Carolina coast. Efficient use of modified nineteenth-century coastal survey maps enables the reader to follow military operations with ease. Laramie's analysis is judicious in using sources, logic, and a wry understanding of human nature to explain why events unfolded as they did. This book will appeal to readers seeking to deepen or expand their knowledge of Civil War military operations, to military professionals contemplating the complexities of littoral and expeditionary warfare against a far-flung hostile coast, and to theorists and scholars examining interactions between military theory and weapons development.

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## OBSTINATE HEROISM: THE CONFEDERATE SURRENDERS AFTER APPOMATTOX

BY STEVEN J. RAMOLD

University of North Texas Press, 2020  
Pp. xiii, 490. \$34.95

REVIEW BY STEPHEN M. DONNELLY

*Obstinate Heroism: The Confederate Surrenders after Appomattox* presents a compelling tableau of the final days of the rebellion after the surrender of General Robert E. Lee to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House. Most Americans view Lee's surrender as the climactic end of the Civil War, and in many ways it was. However, many history buffs know there is more to the story, but even their knowledge is often fragmentary and incomplete. There were elements of three Confederate armies still on the field, each of which had the potential to continue the war for an indeterminate period. These armies had to be brought to heel and subdued before victory could be considered complete and the Union could be guaranteed. This fascinating volume closes many critical gaps in our knowledge about these crucial face-offs, which if bungled by any of the parties involved could have led to the appalling specter of guerrilla warfare for years to come.

Even before Lee's surrender, the South was in desperate shape. Dissent was wide-

spread and desertion was almost epidemic, far worse than generally known. The North's preponderance of men and supplies, combined with the strategy of Grant (finally a general who fights) and President Abraham Lincoln to apply pressure simultaneously to all compass points, made continued resistance seem hopeless and futile. Despite some incredible victories and brilliant generalship, the South was hampered by a series of factors that contributed to the eventual hopelessness of its situation.

Military reversals, bad economic decisions (the cotton boycott), some incompetent generals (Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood and General Braxton Bragg), no navy, little industry, no allies, internal states' rights arguments with governors, inadequate supplies of food and uniforms due to ineffective logistics and deficient rail lines, and a worthless currency, all contributed to the desertion of thousands of troops. Many of these deserters left the service to go back to support their homes and families, who already were devastated economically. But many hundreds more turned to organized banditry to support themselves, thereby adding to the ever-expanding woes of the South.

General Joseph E. Johnston was one of the best defensive generals of the war, perhaps only rivaled by U.S. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. Cagey and cautious, Johnston repeatedly had delayed and annoyed Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army for months on their march to Atlanta. But Confederate President Jefferson Davis was looking for a general to beat Sherman back from Atlanta, not delay him, and he made the disastrous decision to replace Johnston with Hood, a stand-up fighter who disdained a war of maneuver in favor of slashing direct attacks. Hood wrecked his army first against Sherman and then incredibly against Thomas until he was finally relieved of commanding the pitiful, broken remnants. In the meantime, Lee had become General in Chief of the armies of the Confederate States and over Davis's objections, reinstated Johnston to his old command. The degree of animosity and misunderstanding between Johnston and Davis is illustrated by the incredible revelation that Johnston almost spurned the command because he believed that Davis only allowed him the position so that he could serve as the scapegoat for Southern failure and defeat. Johnston's new command was reduced to the remnants of Hood's army, combined with scattered

elements of militias, units assigned garrison duty, stragglers, and other assorted riff-raff. Previously, Johnston could delay and annoy Sherman. Now, Johnston could do nothing but annoy.

Once Lee surrendered, Johnston and Davis reached an accord. Davis was unwilling to surrender the cause while there was still any chance of success with forces willing to fight. But he bowed to reality and Johnston's insistence that he be allowed to surrender his army only, while at the same time, Davis personally would escape across the Mississippi to continue the war with General Edmund Kirby Smith. As we shall see, this was a forlorn hope, but it was the hope of a man of fierce determination and dauntless courage. These two qualities had served Davis well during the conflict, and now they only served to prolong a lost cause.

In the wake of Lincoln's assassination, the terms of Johnston's surrender to Sherman triggered a diplomatic crisis that endangered the surrender and set two natural allies, Sherman and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, at each other's throats. This is because Sherman's terms deviated into the political realm from Grant's purely military terms and were therefore unacceptable. Stanton, a hard, uncompromising man, overreacted in his denunciation of Sherman and his terms. The cease-fire was halted, the terms renegotiated, and the surrender was renewed, but the personal relationship between Sherman and Stanton was never to be the same.

Simultaneously, Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor was tasked with defending Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana with a small garrison at Mobile and an outnumbered cavalry force. The eventual and inevitable fall of Mobile closed another window to the outside world and added another Southern defeat to the long-growing list. Meanwhile, Federal cavalry forces under Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson and infantry forces under Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby were doing to Alabama what Sherman's troops did in Georgia, demonstrating that the South could not effectively defend itself.

Even Lt. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, widely recognized as a cavalry wizard extraordinaire, was unable to stem the tide of the seemingly inexhaustible supply of men and supplies. Forrest agreed with Taylor on the need for surrender. The generals were in fitful communication with a fleeing Jefferson Davis, who naturally wanted to


fight on to the end. He eventually bowed to the inevitable and allowed Taylor to reach his terms with Canby, putting an end to all his hopes to escape to the trans-Mississippi region and continue the fight there. When negotiations commenced, Taylor was not surrounded and conceivably could have fought on, but he realized that nothing could be gained by doing so. A cease-fire was called, and surrender negotiations commenced in a respectful atmosphere that surprised the Southern participants. Unfortunately, the cease-fire occurred just as Sherman's initial peace terms to Johnson were rejected, prompting President Andrew Johnson to order the cease-fire to end and the terms of surrender to be the same for Taylor as they were for Lee and Johnson. Taylor had little recourse, and the terms were generous, so the negotiations and subsequent surrender recommenced on those terms. Included in the surrender was Forrest, who was urged to continue fighting or escape to Mexico with other officers but decided to stay as an example to his men. He felt that continuing the fight would be tantamount to murder, and to his everlasting credit he decided he wanted to go home rather than continue the slaughter. This was a bigger risk for him than for most officers because Forrest was a commander of "irregulars," and no one could be sure how the Yankees might treat such a character. But surrender he did, and the Federals respected their bargain, and he was unmolested after the war. The war was over for these men, and all that remained was the daunting task of demobilizing a mass of men with few supplies, no transportation, and little hope.

Meanwhile, General Smith was doing his level best to improve the fortunes of the Trans-Mississippi Department under his command. He commanded few troops, a battered economy, and a fractured government and had no hope of receiving troops or supplies that might alleviate the situation. Once Vicksburg and New Orleans fell, any Confederate forces based west of the Mississippi were rendered helpless in the war. Unable to safely cross the Mississippi in the face of Union control of the river, Smith's army was nullified as an effective fighting force. Losing control of the river effectively bottled-up Smith's troops the same way that selected Japanese forces were bypassed during World War II. They successfully "island hopped" seventy years before the term was coined.

The Confederate armies could not cross the Mississippi, but the Federals could and did cross the river. Small actions occurred throughout the theater, and the garrison at Shreveport was surrendered by Brig. Gen. M. Jeff Thompson without Smith's approval or even knowledge. Desertions were now rampant, with hundreds of soldiers "self-demobilizing." There were no funds to pay the soldiery or purchase supplies, no chance of reinforcement, or reasonable chance of victory. Even so, Smith continued to resist when his subordinate, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, surrendered the army on his authority. Whether Buckner acted on his own initiative or was confused by his orders and/or command structure is open to debate. But the terms of surrender were similar to Lee's; they would not get any better and were the best that could be hoped for. Smith was faced with this reality and with the increasing levels of desertion and disorder that were verging on anarchy. So, the terms eventually were agreed to by all parties, and the final deed was done. The isolation of the trans-Mississippi, combined with the delayed surrender, eventually led to the Federal holiday of Juneteenth, commemorating the day (19 June 1865) when enslaved people in Texas learned that they were free, which is a fitting way to end this review.

*Obstinate Heroism: The Confederate Surrenders after Appomattox* is highly recommended to anyone who wishes to learn more about the last days of the Confederacy and how the first steps were taken to heal the nation by instigating surrenders that were just and fair. Just as Lincoln would have wished.

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WAR IN THE FAR EAST,  
VOLUME III: ASIAN  
ARMAGEDDON, 1944-1945

BY PETER HARMSEN

Casemate Publishers, 2021

Pp. viii, 239. \$34.95

REVIEW BY IVAN A. ZASIMCZUK

In *War in The Far East, Volume III: Asian Armageddon, 1944-1945*, Peter Harmsen completes his trilogy of the Asian and Pacific war with a rare combination of succinct and excellently researched history of the last twenty months of World War II. This final volume picks up where he left off in *Volume II: Japan Runs Wild, 1942-1943*. The impressive range of his analysis covers key personalities, major battles and campaigns, tactics, operations and strategies, and both sustainment issues and other lesser-known aspects of this history. Overall, he balances the right amount of detail on each subject with a brevity of writing that easily keeps readers engaged. Although his focus is narrow at times and broadly sweeping at others, the diversity of themes and topics covered is a testament to the complexity of the Asia-Pacific Theater of World War II. With effortless transitions across time, space, and themes, he has produced a tightly woven and concise contribution to the field. This engaging, dense work of 186 pages, divided into nine chapters, will spark readers' interest in this topic.

Typically, works about the conflict between the Allies and the Japanese focus mainly on the fighting and politics of the war and short-shrift the non-Japanese Asian perspective of the conflict. *Asian Armageddon* clearly demonstrates the national and ethnic complexities of the Asia-Pacific Theater in a meaningful manner. Because they were Allies supported by the United States, most works include the contribution of General Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist Army against the Japanese. However, fewer works give details about the other two Chinese forces; Mao Zedong and the Communists; and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Chinese collaborationist regime in Nanjing. In this volume, readers learn that American envoys serving in “rebel territory” in Yanan, in the “Dixie Mission” to the communists, were impressed by Mao and his organization (152). Harmsen describes how hopelessly knotted and complex the Chinese Civil War became as it resumed so terribly by November 1945 (180).

Harmsen demonstrates that some Asians welcomed the Japanese claim and message of liberation from European colonizers. The British were susceptible to this claim in India. The Japanese exploited the bitter resentment of Subhas Chandra Bose, head of the Nationalist Indian government-in-exile, and the *Indian National Army*, which fought the British in Burma, hoping to liberate India from the British. Harmsen discusses the anxieties of various Asian peoples who, sensing the end of the war, feared that the British, French, and Dutch would return in their colonial capacity to reclaim the lands taken from them by the Japanese. For some, this fear was realized in worse ways than they could have imagined. The war’s end did not necessarily result in peace. As a result of the lawlessness and chaos of the war, in some cases, the British allowed areas they previously had ruled to be patrolled ruthlessly by the Japanese after the war ended until the British properly reestablished prewar colonial control (169). Readers learn of two war-induced famines, one in Indochina, where the Vietnamese resorted to cannibalism (128), and the other in Indonesia, which claimed 2.5 million lives (130). Harmsen’s inclusion of these significant events is fleeting, but they leave readers with indelible impressions.

Harmsen’s coverage of *Operation ICHI-Go* and other Japanese land offenses in China is especially welcome. China was a bright spot for the Japanese, as it was the only place on

the map where their forces were advancing and winning. The Japanese operational objective in June 1944 was to subdue Hunan Province and then neutralize the threat of China-based American bombers. The tactical objective was to seize Changsha, Hunan’s capital. Learning from three previous failures to capture Changsha, the Japanese deployed three massive columns across a 100-mile front from Wuhan toward Changsha. The Japanese earned a victory in three weeks through their improved tactics, as well as miscalculation and poor judgment from the Chinese. Chinese Nationalist General Zhang Deneng decided to preserve his force and forfeited Changsha after a sharp fight with the Japanese (46–47). Chiang Kai-shek was furious with Zhang for losing Changsha and its massive cache of artillery. Zhang was executed a few days later.

A revelation to this reader was the shockingly bad relationship between the Nationalist Army and the Chinese people, whom those forces were bound to protect and defend. This problem was rooted in the corrupt practices of undisciplined soldiers, who were inveterate thieves more interested in transporting smuggled and stolen goods rather than the accoutrements of war. Embedded American observers later testified that locals surrounded the retreating Nationalist Army and seized their weapons (50). It is no wonder that Nationalist commanders often reported the emergence of a fifth column, the mobilization of Chinese civilians against their own army (49). Harmsen captures these episodes often left out of many surveys of the Asian-Pacific war.

Besides a chronological development of the many Allied campaigns on land, at sea, and in the air, there are the individual struggles of those who fought and lived through these harrowing events. Harmsen’s battle narratives are from an extensive list of principal campaigns, which include Roi Namur, Kwajalein, Los Negros, Hollandia, Biak, Saipan, the Philippine Sea, Guam, Peleliu, Leyte Gulf, the various landings on the Philippine Islands, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, the firebombing campaigns against Japan, and finally the Soviet drive into Manchukuo. Rather than a litany of battles, this sequence helps readers feel the war’s magnitude and mounting cost as each struggle had enormous human tolls. The ferocity of each fight was driven by the urgency to win each conflict to accelerate the war’s conclusion.


The work is enhanced by twenty-four pages of high-quality photographs that depict and graphically support the text. Another worthy inclusion is the thirteen operational-level maps that help clarify the major troop and ship movements. The maps establish a tyranny of distance and make clear the magnitude and true scale of these tasks.

The author’s tendency to deliver such critical information in small servings is an intended feature rather than a fault. However, the question remains for this reader: what is the main course? One may wonder what Harmsen thinks is most important. While readers are broadly exposed to all the events and issues, the overall effect is that it all has equal value and importance. For example, people less familiar with this era and area of World War II history may need clarification on Harmsen’s style. They potentially may fail to understand the genuine significance of the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He treats both critical events like any other campaign. Yet both represent a break in time and a new age.

In *Asian Armageddon*, Peter Harmsen has made a segment of complex history accessible. This volume is perfect for those with neither the time nor the need for in-depth coverage. It is best suited for executive defense officials and policymakers who are unfamiliar with this history. It will get them up to speed quickly. Additionally, this volume will serve well for entry-level students of this subject who may want broad exposure to these events. For readers who want deeper coverage, this volume could be supplemented with Ian Toll’s *Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945* (W.W. Norton, 2020).

**Ivan A. Zasimczuk** has been the military history instructor in the Signal History Office, Office of the Chief of Signal, Fort Eisenhower, Georgia, since June 2019. He graduated from the University of California at Davis (UCD) with a bachelor’s degree in history and political science and a minor in English. He joined the Army through the UCD ROTC and entered active duty in 1997 as an Adjutant General Officer. He has served in Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Iraq, and Jordan. He attended Kansas State University, earning a master’s in history with a follow-on teaching assignment at the United States Military Academy at West Point, where

he taught military history and leadership. He ended his career in 2017, managing a marketing portfolio in the Army Marketing and Research Group. He then worked at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., for one year before assuming his current role.



## U.S. GO HOME: THE U.S. MILITARY IN FRANCE, 1945 TO 1968

BY M. DAVID EGAN AND JEAN EGAN

Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 2022  
Pp. vi,608. \$49.99

REVIEW BY ASHLEY VANCE

When the U.S. Army stormed the beaches of Normandy in June 1944, it became a seemingly intractable force in France for the next two decades. In the final year of the war, Allied forces set up temporary encampments and hospitals, buried their dead, and used the ports in Cherbourg, Marseille, and Le Havre to process soldiers and supplies in and out of Western Europe. By all accounts, it appeared as if the United States would leave when the wartime dust settled. However, just as the Allied powers chose France as the ideal location for the invasion of Europe during the war, leaders at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) chose France as the best location for their international headquarters and supply route into West

Germany for the Cold War. When French Communists started the “U.S. Go Home” chant in response to their arrival, General Dwight D. Eisenhower responded that the Allied forces were there “to protect France and would gladly go home when they were no longer needed” (34).

Western forces spent the next two decades erecting various facilities throughout France to support the Western Alliance for the Cold War. Office buildings, training grounds, equipment warehouses, airfields, storage depots, soldier barracks, and dependent housing were constructed in locations that varied from the French countryside to the heart of Paris. Like their wartime predecessors, Allied forces in the 1950s and 1960s struggled to fully accommodate the French during their stay. Problems developed over how to house the arriving soldiers and diplomats, especially given the existing acute housing shortage for French civilians. The Western powers debated over who would pay for and construct the needed facilities. And, depending on the year, the French populace did not welcome another foreign military in their already war-torn towns and villages. Tensions ultimately escalated to the point that French President Charles de Gaulle finally asked the U.S. military to leave in March 1966. In *U.S. Go Home: The U.S. Military in France, 1945 to 1968*, M. David Egan and Jean Egan chronicle the presence of U.S. military forces in France from their initial arrival in the summer of 1944 to their eventual departure in 1968.

The authors undertook a massive project when they chronicled the history of U.S. forces in postwar France. Across twelve chapters, *U.S. Go Home* is a 520-page history that offers an additional 70 pages of supportive materials and references, including images, maps, and diagrams throughout the chapters. To do justice to the complexity of the international landscape at the time, the authors tackle not just the U.S. military presence in France. They also deal with the history of the Cold War, events in divided Germany, and the development of NATO and SHAPE. They explain the French engagement in the Cold War and French responses to the Western forces setting up there, and address the political relationship between France and the United States until the late 1960s. The book serves as a rich introduction for readers who want an internationally focused understanding of U.S. forces in Western Europe after World


War II. The book has a chronological arc with topically arranged chapters, each with nearly two dozen subsections. Given the massive amount of information to be covered in each section, most are only two or three paragraphs in length. Thankfully, extensive footnotes guide readers to locate richer sources on each topic.

Because the book is almost encyclopedic in nature, it misses many of the nuances one would achieve in a narrower history. For example, in Chapter 2, the authors discuss the return of combat troops to Europe in 1951 after the Korean War began. They note General Eisenhower’s visit to the United States in January to persuade Congress to authorize the troop buildup, which they did in early April. However, the short two-paragraph summary of the troop return to Europe ignores the fact that President Harry S. Truman authorized the buildup in November 1950 and that, by January 1951, the Army was already mobilizing troops and erecting housing for them in West Germany. Less than a month after Congress approved the buildup, the 4th Infantry Division arrived in Bremerhaven. In West Germany, Army commanders negotiated with local governments for housing and base construction. This task likely informed how negotiations of the same kind took place in France months later. The missing domestic and foreign context limits the reader’s understanding of the complexity and significance of the troop buildup authorization.

Yet the lack of nuance should not dissuade readers. Many lesser-known aspects of the troop deployment to Europe are highlighted. For example, Chapter 1 tells the story of the redeployment of “Cigarette Camps” near Le Havre that existed until mid-1946; Chapter 5 provides a wonderful overview of Camp des Loges, known at the time as the “Little Pentagon” because of its dense concentration of U.S. generals and officers; and Chapter 11 highlights the need for soldiers and their dependents to maintain “NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] Kits” stocked with supplies in case of an emergency evacuation. Additionally, the authors have a passion for architecture, as all of the chapters provide detailed diagrams to explain how buildings and equipment were constructed and used in France. Their use of maps, which are drawn and easy to read, is also incredibly valuable for readers unfamiliar with France and its connection to neighboring nations.

The French decision to ask U.S. forces to leave by mid-1967 was as much about the American imposition on the French people as it was about fundamental political differences between the two nations. As the authors note, Charles de Gaulle believed “that the U.S. would not sacrifice American cities to save French cities” (489). He was unhappy with President John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, personally disliked President Lyndon B. Johnson and loathed his movement into Vietnam, and refused to accept America’s insistence that France not possess a nuclear arsenal to defend itself. When de Gaulle asked America to leave, the U.S. military had already stationed 70,000 soldiers and their families in France. Additionally, the military stored nearly one million tons of supplies and equipment throughout the nation. The removal of personnel and equipment was “the largest peacetime exercise of transportation by land, sea, and air the U.S. military had ever undertaken” (493). Yet the U.S. military did not diminish its mission in Europe when its forces left France. Understanding the complexity of U.S. commitments to Western Europe throughout the first decades of the Cold War necessitates understanding how and why the military deployed to France and why it ultimately left.

**Ashley Vance** is a PhD candidate at Texas A&M University and a graduate research assistant at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. She is currently finalizing her dissertation, “On the Edge of Battle: Building a Cold War Army in Germany, 1945–1960”, which examines the transformation of the U.S. Army in Germany from a World War II fighting force to a peacetime deterrent for the Cold War.



## KOREAN SHOWDOWN: NATIONAL POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN A LIMITED WAR, 1951–1952

BY BRYAN R. GIBBY

University of Alabama Press, 2021  
Pp. xx, 388. \$54.95

REVIEW BY TOM HANSON

*Korean Showdown* sheds welcome light on a little-understood aspect of the United States’ involvement in the Korean War. Specifically, author Bryan Gibby argues that American military policy underwent a radical evolution from July 1951 to December 1952 (6–7). After the humiliation of the 1950 summer retreats from Osan to Pusan, the euphoria following the Incheon landing, and the sudden collapse of the North Korean state that fall, the reality of warfare against Communist China led the officials of President Harry S. Truman’s administration to slowly accept that a traditional military triumph could no longer be obtained at an acceptable cost. A general apprehension regarding escalation drove this change, as there was universal agreement set in Washington, D.C., that the Chinese effort in Korea was orchestrated in Moscow by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. As Gibby describes it, Truman administration officials feared that escalating the conflict horizontally into China or vertically through the introduction of atomic weapons might trigger a Soviet offensive into Western

Europe (11); thus, traditional metrics of national strategy no longer applied. This thought evolution took some time; it was not until late 1952 that a general consensus both in Washington, D.C., and the Far East accepted that “the generally unimpeded use of [all] conventional military weaponry in all dimensions” would be counterproductive (282). By then, with an impending change of presidential administrations, the Truman administration believed that further ground and air operations of the type employed thus far “were doomed to fail by virtue of the [previously adopted] American policy and strategy of limited war settled by negotiation” (287).

*Korean Showdown* is neither the latest single-volume treatment of the war in its totality nor a narrative of the “stalemate” phase. Rather, it is a detailed study of the interplay between politics (domestic as well as international) and military operations in classic Clausewitzian fashion. To illustrate this, Gibby uses the five principal agenda items first laid out by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to induce the Communists to negotiate a settlement in the summer of 1951. These issues were (1) an agreed-upon agenda for talks, (2) agreement on the necessity to establish a demilitarized zone to separate the two Korean states, (3) negotiation of both a quick cease-fire and a durable armistice agreement, (4) the full exchange of prisoners by each side, and (5) an agreement to support an international conference to craft a lasting settlement of the Korean problem (48). Acceptance of the need for an armistice symbolized a major change in the strategic outlook of American leaders. However, it was accompanied by a desire to wring every possible military benefit from the conflict.

Surprisingly, the repatriation of prisoners became the greatest obstacle to concluding an early armistice, and it was the Americans who raised it. The issue arose as a result of the Truman administration’s reversal of its support for the involuntary repatriation of prisoners after World War II. Badly shaken by accusations in the media and in Congress for forcibly repatriating anti-Communist Russians and Poles, Truman now “felt strongly [that] the United States has a moral obligation not to return POWs [prisoners of war] [to North Korea and China] who faced an uncertain future in the home territories” (154). Unfortunately for the United Nations Command (UNC) negotiators in Korea, definitive guidance came only in February 1952. Before that, Truman had sought to

maintain a dynamic and flexible strategy in Korea regarding all of the agenda items, whose downstream effects distracted the American armistice negotiators who led the UNC negotiation team at Panmunjom:

[We] never knew when a new directive would emanate from Washington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable and stable armistice agreement. . . . It seemed to us that the United States Government did not know exactly what its political objectives in Korea were or should be. As a result, the United Nations Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, fearing a new directive from afar which would require action inconsistent with that currently being taken (130).


Gibby notes that the rigid stance against forcible repatriation protracted the armistice negotiations, which could have ended the war as early as May 1952. Though not explicit in Gibby's narrative, this issue at this point marked a paradigm shift in Truman's understanding of the utility of military force. Disillusioned that he could not bring the war to a satisfying military conclusion in a repeat of 1945, Truman nevertheless felt the Communists "needed to pay a military and political penalty" for their recalcitrance and duplicity (155). Allowing enemy prisoners to vote with their feet helped impose that penalty.

Gibby also provides a perceptive analysis of the various ground and air strategies the UNC used to compel the Communists to agree to an armistice. He draws parallels between the Allies' early experiences with the Combined Bomber Offensive during World War II and the evolution of the Far East Air Force's Operation STRANGLE and the Railway Interdiction Program. Although the latter two produced spectacular destruction across North Korea, they could not by themselves force the Communists to a cease-fire. Gibby argues that the air campaign's success provided the necessary impetus for Mao and Marshal Peng Dehuai to institute a series of reforms to posture the Chinese army in Korea for attritional war. As a result, cadres began inculcating a doctrine of *lingqiao niupitang* ("eating sticky candy bit by bit") to the members of the *Chinese People's Volunteer Forces*. In place of maneuver to surround and isolate UNC formations, "[t]actical objectives were redefined to stress the capture and use of terrain and prepared positions to

inflict maximum casualties on the enemy over battles of annihilation of large units" (102–3). Together with more capable air forces and better-trained and equipped artillery, air defense, engineering, and logistics systems, "Chinese flexibility in their various operational approaches to counter American firepower and maneuver formed the basis for prolonged and successful negotiations"—much to the dismay of the UNC and U.S. leadership (176).

A variety of readers will find much to value in Gibby's work. The easy flow of the narrative belies the exhaustive primary and secondary sources underlying it. In fact, Gibby's coverage here (225–41, among others) of the success of the U.S. advisory effort with the South Korean army sets the stage for a comparative study of less successful results in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The book should be carefully read by policymakers and their advisors, civilian and military, as well as the wider academic community. Gibby's analysis of the interdependence of battlefield and political developments reinforces the curricula of the various senior service colleges and the services' flag officer education programs. Army officers especially will find instructive Gibby's account of Generals James Van Fleet's and Mark Clark's attempts to convince President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower to let them fight the war they wanted to fight instead of the one they had to end. Gibby's discussion of the many flaws of Clark's planned campaign for 1953, Operation Plan 8–52, offers a textbook case of military officers failing to provide not just "best" but proper professional recommendations to elected officials. Just as important, the author's detailed coverage of the Chinese Communists' ability to mitigate or nullify American technological superiority should give pause to policymakers favoring a more confrontational policy in the South China Sea.

**Dr. Tom Hanson**, a retired Army colonel, earned his PhD in history in 2006 and has taught on the faculties of the U.S. Military Academy, George Mason University, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, and the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies.



## THE INHERITANCE: AMERICA'S MILITARY AFTER TWO DECADES OF WAR

BY MARA E. KARLIN

Brookings Institution Press, 2022  
Pp. xvi, 304. \$37

REVIEW BY MICHAEL BONURA

Mara E. Karlin's *The Inheritance: America's Military After Two Decades of War* seeks to uncover the legacies of the post-11 September 2001 wars on the U.S. military and then to make some recommendations on how to address the negative aspects of those legacies. Karlin conducted nearly one hundred interviews with generals and admirals and a few civilian senior leaders in the Department of Defense to inform her analysis of those legacies. She also heavily leveraged her career as a civilian senior leader serving five secretaries of defense and is currently serving as an assistant secretary of defense. This is not a traditional historical analysis but an assessment of the war on terror on the national security establishment, including the military. It is focused on understanding how that establishment prosecuted the war and what its legacy on that establishment is to the present. This analysis of the legacies of the longest war in American military history would be important in its own right, but the fact that neither the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, or any of the

services have conducted or are conducting the same kind of review makes this inquiry even more critical.

Although Karlin sets an important and lofty goal for her analysis of the legacies of the Global War on Terrorism, *The Inheritance* has a much narrower focus. Because of her professional perspective and the senior rank and positions of the subjects of her interviews, *The Inheritance* provides legacies from the perspective of the senior military and civilian leaders who directed those wars. This includes an analysis of the effectiveness of the military's senior leaders and their inability to achieve strategic victory. It also discusses the challenges of civil-military relations from the Global War on Terrorism to the present. This senior-level perspective—which includes both the more recognizable commanders and advisors from the period, as well as a sizable portion of the subordinate generals and admirals who made and executed military plans and policies that have not made front-page news or treatment in studies of the wars to date—is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature.

Through interviews, the works of scholars of the military, poll results, social media bloggers, and Hollywood presentations, Karlin identifies three main crises that form the negative legacies from the post-11 September 2001 wars: a crisis of confidence in the military, a crisis of not caring for the military by the American people, and a crisis of meaningful civilian control between senior military officers and the civilian managers of violence in the Department of Defense, the White House, and Congress. With chapters explaining these crises, Karlin presents several issues that influenced them, including how the U.S. military goes to war, how the military fights, who serves in the military, who leads the military, and which theories of war are adopted and which ones are rejected. The book ends with general recommendations on areas that need to be addressed and overcome, more than any particular recommendation for how the military should come to terms with these legacies as it prepares for an era of competition between great powers.

For Karlin, the crisis of confidence represents the confusion of many service members about what the military does, how they do it, and why they should do it with respect to the lack of clear victory in the Global War on Terrorism. This is not a crisis

of the rank-and-file military but of the military's senior leadership, and their answers to why they did not achieve victory are telling. The general and flag officers Karlin interviewed expressed three reasons why they did not achieve victory: the military *did* achieve the victory of avoiding catastrophe at home by fighting abroad; the missions given to the military were impossible to win; and that victory was possible, but service members were failed by poor military and civilian leadership and given the wrong resources to achieve victory. The answers to the question of victory from senior military leaders would be a valuable contribution to a wider assessment of leadership over the past twenty years.


The crisis of caring focuses on the separation of the military from American society. Karlin identifies the concerns of generals and admirals about how isolated the military has become, as well as the problem of the military becoming a family business. The vast majority of Americans volunteering for service today come from families with a military background, thus further isolating service members from American society. Karlin identifies this as the biggest challenge the all-volunteer force has faced since its inception in the 1970s. However, neither she nor the generals or admirals she interviewed questioned the utility of the all-volunteer force based on this crisis. The logical result of decreasing the separation between society and the military would be an increase in concern about how and where the military is deployed. What would that do to the ability of civilian decision-makers to use the military for overseas missions to advance foreign policy goals?

The crisis of meaningful civilian control is the most straightforward and refers to the increasingly difficult relationship the military has had with the civilians in the national security enterprise. Again, this crisis of senior military leaders reflects the civil-military challenges of the recent conflicts.

Like many of the reports, studies, and after action reviews from the recent wars, Karlin's work raises many critical issues but does not treat any of them comprehensively. From how different secretaries of defense affected the promotion of generals to the integration of women into combat roles, each one requires a separate study or volume, or at least a broader treatment in the book. If there is any criticism to be made, it is that Karlin raises many important issues but does not explicitly state for the reader what

the short- and long-term implications of those issues are. Based on her interviews and professional experience, her perspectives on the implications of those issues also would have been an important contribution to the analysis of the post-11 September 2001 wars and their legacies.

**Dr. Michael Bonura** has been an assistant professor in the Department of Joint, Multi-National, and Interagency Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School since 2022. A retired Army colonel with over twenty-five years of service, he earned his PhD in history from Florida State University in 2008. He taught military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point from 2006 to 2009.



## SACRED DUTY: A SOLDIER'S TOUR AT ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY

BY TOM COTTON

William Morrow, 2019

Pp. viii, 301. \$28.99

REVIEW BY CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE

What happens to us when we die? If buried at Arlington, religious considerations aside, the answer is simple: a perfect funeral. At least, that is the goal for members of the

3d U.S. Infantry Regiment, known as The Old Guard or America's Regiment, who perform funerals for privates and generals alike. The 3d, incidentally, is "the oldest active-duty infantry regiment in the Army" (51). Because families of the deceased get only one funeral for their loved one, members of the regiment believe that every interment must be a no-fail, zero-defect event, and they always are, with only the rarest exceptions. Through its seemingly impossible yet completely internalized standard of perfection, The Old Guard respects the decedent and honors their service and sacrifice to the nation.

But The Old Guard is about more than just funerals, even though they are "the priority mission" (284). Across the country, but especially in Washington, D.C., its members participate in events ranging from evening tattoos to retirement ceremonies, constantly guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and welcoming foreign dignitaries at the White House or Pentagon. With the 3d consisting of "exotic units" (288) such as the Fife and Drum Corps, the Continental Color Guard, and the U.S. Army Drill Team, among others, the regiment is very much "the face of the Army" (198) to both the American public and, indeed, the world.

*Sacred Duty* by Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) is part personal memoir, part history, and part behind-the-scenes exposé (in the most positive sense of the phrase): occasionally he recounts his time as a member of The Old Guard; he offers a brief yet enlightening history of Arlington itself, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the

3d Infantry Regiment from its colonial roots to its response to the attacks of 11 September 2001; and masterfully he lifts the veil on ceremonies otherwise shrouded in mystery. After outlining the selection processes for the different units that make up the regiment, he likewise is keen to describe the training required to make members of The Old Guard proficient in their various duties, which necessitates the highest devotion (and multiple tests along the way!).

Senator Cotton undoubtedly is well-placed to write this account. A lawyer by training (Harvard), he served two tours overseas, one with the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq and the other with a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan; his time with The Old Guard divided his two deployments. Cotton writes with a free and effortless style, making page-turning very simple; it is not impossible to finish this 300-page book in three or four good sittings. His respect and admiration for the women and men of The Old Guard and their solemn responsibilities shines through but is not overdone, nor is his work polemic. If politics does not work out for the senator, he effortlessly could start a new career as a professional writer or journalist.

Not many books, to be sure, deserve the label required reading. This one, however, does. New members of The Old Guard undoubtedly would get something out of this book. However, the regiment does an admirable job of inculcating the meaning behind concepts such as duty, honor, and respect. Military members, and especially their families, probably would find comfort

in knowing that should they die in service, their remains, from the point of death through the dignified transfer at Dover Air Force Base to final interment at Arlington or elsewhere, would receive with reverence the "highest honors and utmost care" (291), as Cotton is at pains to describe. For members of the general public, knowing why their military does what it does can be beneficial.

*Sacred Duty* is an intimate and intensely emotional journey through service, death, and memory, that forces the reader to come face-to-face with the "nation's commitment to our fallen heroes" (276). If at times difficult to read—this reviewer freely admits to getting emotional more than once—it is also instructive as it demonstrates how genuinely and lovingly a country can mourn and remember its military dead. If society sometimes balks at tradition within the 3d, perhaps more so than anywhere else, "poignant, sacred rituals" (6) are a way of life . . . and for good reason.

**Dr. Craig Leslie Mantle** is an assistant professor at Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He is the primary editor of *In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery from Afghanistan, 2001–2007* (Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013) and is a sometimes contributor of book reviews to *Army History*.



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# Coming Soon <sup>to</sup> CMH





Jon T. Hoffman

## MANUSCRIPT EXTERNAL REVIEW PANELS

In mid-December, we held external review panels on back-to-back days. The first session looked at Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser's manuscript covering the surge in Iraq from January 2007 through December 2008. Because much of his source material is still awaiting declassification, we had to revert to the old method of having the group meet in person at Fort McNair rather than conducting the session online. The panel members also had to have security clearances, which limited our ability to draw from our usual pool of civilian academics, though regardless there are not many university professors who have a depth of expertise in the history of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we assembled a highly qualified panel.

Mr. Dale Andrade is a former longtime historian with the Center of Military History (CMH) and is now the deputy director of the Joint History Office. His published works include *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007–2008* (CMH, 2010). Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. is currently with the Joint History Office following service in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has a PhD in history and helped write the chief of staff of the Army's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM study. Dr. Gian P. Gentile is the associate director of the RAND Arroyo Center and a retired U.S. Army colonel. His service included two combat tours in Iraq, the second as a cavalry squadron commander in Baghdad in 2006, and he also was the director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Seth Givens is a historian with the Marine Corps History Division and is working on a volume covering the U.S. Marines in western Iraq, 2004–2010. Although he was not able to participate in the panel, Col. Francis J. Park reviewed the manuscript. He is the director of the Army War College's Basic Strategic Art Program and was part of the chief of staff of the Army's study group that produced *Modern War in an Ancient Land: The U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 2001–2014* (CMH, 2021).

The next day, we reverted to an online meeting to review Dr. Erik B. Villard's manuscript covering U.S. Army combat operations in Vietnam from October 1968 through December 1969 (a project initiated by Dale Andrade during his time at CMH). We had four leading scholars of the Vietnam War on this panel. Dr. Pierre Asselin is a history professor at San Diego State

University specializing in American foreign relations. His books include *A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement* (University of North Carolina Press, 2002), *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (University of California Press, 2013), and *Vietnam's American War: A History* (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Dr. Robert K. Brigham is a professor of history and international relations at Vassar College. His publications include *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army* (University Press of Kansas, 2006) and *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam* (Public Affairs, 2018). Dr. Ron Milam is a history professor at Texas Tech University and a Vietnam veteran. He is the author of *Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2009) and is writing another book, currently titled "The Siege of Phu Nhon: Montagnards and Americans as Allies in Battle." Dr. Edwin E. Moise is a history professor at Clemson University. His publications include *The Myths of Tet: The Most Misunderstood Event of the Vietnam War* (University Press of Kansas, 2017) and *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (rev. ed., Naval Institute Press, 2019).

Both panels thought the manuscripts were solid contributions in their respective fields, but the reviewers also offered observations and recommendations that will make each project even better. Many of their comments dealt with nuances that will ensure the volumes fully portray events, while others suggested including more Iraqi or Vietnamese perspectives or providing additional focus on certain aspects of the two wars. Neither author will have to do substantial fresh research or make major revisions, so we believe their final drafts will be complete in the second or third quarter of 2024. Dr. Villard's Vietnam manuscript will go into production immediately, but Dr. Schlosser's Iraq project will have to sit on the shelf until the source documents are declassified, a process on which we hope to make major progress this year. In the meantime, he will begin work on a campaign monograph on another phase of the war in Iraq, which will prepare him to write the subsequent full volume on that period.



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