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Field Marshal von Moltke the Elder His Importance Then and Now

Günter Roth

Brig. Gen. Günter Roth, Ph.D., is chief of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, the German Military History Research Office. This article is derived from a paper General Roth presented at the Center of Military History on 22 October 1991.

There are many different ways to view the great political events of our day—the ideological, social, and economic upheavals of Eastern Europe and their repercussions on the postwar political order. I would like to outline the importance for our present time of a unique personality among Prussian-German military leaders, a versatile, cosmopolitan, and infinitely receptive man, Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke. This approach gives young officers an opportunity to reflect upon a nineteenth-century, multifaceted character, one who reflected his era's modern, sober reality of Enlightenment reason, yet who also was a man of philosophical contemplation.

Moltke will be considered along with the other great personality of his age, Otto von Bismarck. Differences of opinion on the primacy of politics in war prevented their being friends and, indeed, made them antagonists. It is also worth noting, particularly following the experience of two world wars, that Moltke reversed one of Carl von Clausewitz's maxims—the primacy of politics in war. It will be demonstrated that Moltke's theory justifying absolute war and the independence of military leadership in wartime, as practiced by his pale imitators, had a significant negative impact on Germany's fate.

Moltke and the Philosophy of Carl von Clausewitz

For the younger generation, World War II has ceased to be the overriding contemporary event and, finally, has become a thing of the past. The new thinking among Eastern and Western European nations

is making obsolete the notion of war as an instrument of great power politics. To understand the contrast with the past it is necessary to reflect upon the ambivalence of Moltke, that humanist and military scholar, who broke with his teacher Clausewitz's maxim (the primacy of politics) and appealed to "absolute war" as justification for refusing the political leadership any role during wartime. (1) The importance of that break with Clausewitz can hardly be overrated, since the new theory became the guideline for the German chiefs of the General Staff after Moltke and achieved far-reaching and tragic significance under Alfred von Schlieffen, Erich Ludendorff, and Franz Halder. This paper will outline Moltke's theories and their influence on the thinking and actions of the German political and military elites in both world wars.

The most recent decisions by the United Nations and the American political leadership during the Gulf War suggest that Moltke and his imitators' view that absolute war justifies exclusive leadership by the military in wartime is out of date. Moltke promoted Clausewitz's real discovery, the idea of "absolute war." But from the basic premise that war is an extended duel and that its purpose is to render the enemy defenseless, Moltke took an isolated component, and for that reason saw no room for political interference in warfare. By leaving the machinery of war completely independent in its actions from the political leadership and allowing it to seek the complete suppression of the enemy by any means necessary, Moltke described the absoluteness of war with a consistency that reversed the maxims of Clausewitz. He reached a new level of purely military thinking on war to which Clausewitz would only concede "its own grammar," but no logic. (2)

The problems that resulted from this thinking before and during World Wars I and II can be men-

tioned only briefly along with the return to Clausewitz's principles, which declare the "absurdness" of developing "purely military" concepts of war and which reject the autonomy of war and ensure a steady role for politics during military operations. (3) A comparison of warfare and political maneuvering in both world wars to that of the recent Gulf War reveals two things: today the primacy of politics is undisputed among the major powers, even during war; and the complete submission of the enemy is not the only possible outcome of the duel between nations. An important statement of Clausewitz that was ignored with disastrous effects during both world wars has once again been validated: "A principle of moderation can never be introduced into the philosophy of war itself [by the military leadership]." (4)

Moltke stated that because of the vagueness of political objectives, strategy must strive to reach the highest goal possible with the means available, but in his view military strategy best served policy by "working only for its objectives, but in its operations, completely independent of it." (5) Although there is a certain logic to that outlook, Moltke fails to see that

there are limits to the use of military power, as well as occasions for the renunciation of total military victory.

Otto von Bismarck, on the other hand, realized that if the military leadership is concentrating only on the total defeat of the enemy, it will hardly be in a position to judge "when the right time has come to initiate the transition from war to peace." (6)

Bismarck opposed Moltke's view decisively, demanding a strict limitation of warfare because of the enormous sacrifices a modern war imposes on nations. In addition, he recognized that Germany, located in the center of Europe, must not take any action in foreign affairs without first considering its effects on the overall European situation. This became his foreign policy maxim. His successors, however, ignored his warning to consider carefully, should the European powers ever get close to an extended international controversy, whether there existed any prize justifying the efforts and the risk. By failing before World Wars I and II to heed Bismarck's basic conviction that "any war should only be conducted taking into account its effects on the claim of the German nation to lead an autonomous political life equal to the great European Powers," the



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German Empire always had to pay the price of the dictated peace it had planned to impose on others. (7) What followed was the separation of politics from strategic and moral considerations, the demonization of the struggle for existence where any actor in the great drama of world history is only a tool in the hands of a higher authority, reference to a "higher will" and the emergence of a confidence (however completely irrational) in a divine leadership over the world, and an escalation of war beyond all original plans and intentions. War then turns, as it did with dire consequences for Germany, from an instrument of politics to a dictator of politics. (8)

During the Gulf War Clausewitz's principle of the primacy of politics in warfare obviously prevailed, although with a conscious acceptance of political disadvantages, e.g., the survival of Saddam Hussein's regime. One of Bismarck's principles was modified and seemed to be a guideline for military objectives; namely, that the impact of these objectives on the overall situation—especially on third powers and their tendency towards interference and expanded warfare or their possible attitudes at international conferences—must be considered in advance. (9)

Moltke, the Literary Officer: Humanist, Cosmopolitan, and Military Expert


One of Moltke's models, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, held the belief that history provides the material to shape the human mind. (10) How extensively this attitude may have guided Moltke's thinking becomes obvious only if one knows that Moltke, even at the end of his glorious career, said it was a mere accident that he was placed into the Danish Corps of Cadets, and thus forced into a military career, when his inclination was to work on historical treatises and become a history professor instead.

He did not spend much time on military literature. Shortly before his death, when he was asked which five books had the most influence on him, Clausewitz's *On War* ranked last. (11) The young general staff officer concerned himself with questions of literary history in an almost universal way, reading both scientific and humane works in many languages, and writing treatises on political, politico-economic, and technical questions, and on railway matters, ranging from Belgium to Poland. His topographical and history-based geographical works and his letters from his travels in Turkey and at the English, Russian, French, and Italian courts are classed among the most exquisite pieces of German prose, whose poetic expressiveness is com-

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Administrative Assistant to the
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pleted by a wealth of pictures and scenes captured with pencil or brush. All of this bears testimony to Moltke's artistic talent and his many-sided historical, intellectual, and political education, which enabled him to capture the most recent and most revolutionary political developments of his time, along with the social and economic conditions.

Moltke was a product of his times. For that reason he was, like almost all nineteenth-century elites, deeply convinced on one hand by the ideas guiding mankind and on the other by a higher will, according to Christian understanding and Hegel's concept of the "spirit of the universe," the *Weltgeist*. (12) Only a knowledge of the inherent powers of those convictions enables later generations to trace the roots of German nationalistic idealism and its exaggeration which, in context with the overly excited national thinking of all great European nations in the era of imperialism, formed the background for the two great European conflicts of the twentieth century. The consequences, the "original disaster" (George F. Kennan) of the first division of Europe into fascism, bolshevism, and democracy after World War I, and the second division after World War II into Western-democratic and Eastern-Communist blocs, are only now being overcome by the radical changes in Eastern Europe.

On the threshold of the twenty-first century, a distinguishing feature of our times is the immense speed of political events. The so-called "German question" which kept the European nations occupied for more than 100 years, seemed to be answered finally on 8 May 1945. But the fortunate and recent reunification of Germany proves that eras are hardly ever fully completed. On the contrary, the twists and turns of an era demonstrate that deep rooted ideas will come to life again, and that notions believed dead can gain new efficacy. (13)

The founding of the German empire in 1871 created a new power in the center of Europe, severely disturbing the centuries-old principle of a balance of power. For that reason, the object of Bismarck's foreign policy was to integrate the German *Reich* carefully into the sensitive European power system. But this could succeed only if the new German empire did not become intoxicated with its new power and pursue a policy of expansion. Bismarck was serious about his statement that the German empire had no additional objectives to be obtained by the sword.

Moltke was a man of his century. He was seized by the national ideal that emerged from the Wars of Liberation and held to the idea that the world is deter-

mined by the trans-epochal driving forces of power and interest. The German educated elite, however, gained insight into the laws of power only after the defeat of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 and the resulting total loss of German freedom.

The insurrection against foreign tyranny started with the appeals to the nation's right to exist. The German national movement began with the Wars of Liberation and, at the same time, the beginnings of a national German political philosophy developed from Johann G. von Herder and the early Romantics to Georg W. F. Hegel. German thought, which for centuries had been more shaped by religion and the ecclesiastical community than by the political world, had found its way only with difficulty to the arena of political struggle for power and interests. For a long time German thinking had been determined by religious and moral traditions, but was then secularized during the Enlightenment and transformed towards general—almost cosmopolitan—ideals of humanity by the French Revolution. For that reason, the separate German states pursued a relatively peaceful policy that hardly gave a thought to realistic power politics and, for the same reason, Prussia took a long time to resist Napoleon Bonaparte. Once the educated German middle classes recognized the significance of the absence of national independence and political power, the change came about quickly and radically. Heinrich von Kleist, Ernst Moritz Arndt, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte turned nationalism into a belligerent idea. Fichte, who around 1800 was still talking about a Nation of Reason and about safeguarding Eternal Peace once all European nations had reached their "natural" limits, suddenly discovered a deep truth in the teachings of Machiavelli's foreign affairs, namely the insight into the law of power: who does not increase will decrease when others increase.

This interpretation of Machiavellian ideas provided a philosophical justification for the struggle for power, which reached a climax with a lasting impact on German intellectual life in the dialectics of Hegel. Hegel was more than an abstract systemic thinker—he transfigured the drama of earthly power struggles into a process of "world reason incarnating itself" (Gerhard Ritter). Hegel's writing on the condition of Germany in 1802 reflected his distress at the impotence of the old Holy Roman Empire against the French revolutionary armies. Carl von Clausewitz absorbed these intellectual observations, processed them, and set them forth in his military philosophical work *On War*. In Clausewitz's description of the nature of absolute war, a decisive

role is played by the insight that power is the driving force and that the religious community is replaced by the nation as the highest, most essential form of the moral ideal.

Moltke had digested all these tendencies and held a firm belief in an elevated order of the world which affected his thinking and his view of "war as fate." In Hegelian terms the state is an expression of divine will "unfolding into [the] real shape and organization of a world." (14)

The waking of political self-confidence and the impulse towards greater self-realization and a new identity—finally at world level—made German politics harder to predict and finally led to the end of isolation and the "encirclement" of the empire. The great reform of the army in 1860, with the introduction of general conscription, initiated the politicization of the whole nation. As a consequence, the day of the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century, with their limited warfare, was over. It became the basic law of modern warfare that whenever highly industrialized great powers opposed each other with their entire organized military power, because the ideals and reputation of the entire nation were deeply affected, this became a people's war—a total war. These realities led to the belief in the struggle for existence of the great powers, with decisive battles that would continue until one of the two opponents admitted defeat. World War I, and World War II all the more so, are examples of the conviction that when the existence of entire nations and not merely their governments is at stake, then "theoretically there can only be a 'decision' and thus an end of the war when the power of resistance of one of the two nations is completely exhausted." (15)

This concept contributed to a formula ("victory or destruction") wherein the more not only the economic power of a nation can be mobilized, but also the people can be convinced of the absolutely vital necessity of staying power—of using the nation's mental energies without reservation as well for the decisive battle—the less important is the ratio of gain to sacrifice. This formula leads to a fatalistic attitude. Politics must be silent, as "first of all war must cast its lots as decided by fate." (16) In World Wars I and II the German side reversed Clausewitz's principle of the primacy of politics in war and, thus, the relation of politics to warfare. Adolf Hitler declared war a natural law. In his hand the political instrument of military power dictated the militarization of the state, the people, and the entire national life.

After the bitter experiences of two world wars and

the collapse of communism as an ideology and as an instrument for the direction of major organizations, it seems that reason has finally predominated over the passions of the European nations. The troop reductions in Eastern and Western Europe mean the beginning of the end for armies of millions of soldiers. This is the time to reflect without emotion on questions of military and alternative service, professional or conscript forces, or a mixture of professional and reserve forces. The statement ascribed to Gerhard J. D. von Scharnhorst, "each citizen is the born defender of his state," originally was intended only to call forth the nation for the struggle of liberation against Napoleon. The *Landwehr* was, just like the Army Reserve before World War I, only a wartime element. Today we believe that— independent of the obligation to serve one's country— compulsory military service guarantees "democratic" armed forces. This conclusion, however, drawn from the experience of the Weimar Republic and the *Reichswehr* as a "state within a state," does not take into account that the Weimar Constitution determined the role of the *Reichswehr*. Today the *Bundeswehr* is embedded in the Basic Law; civilian command and control in peacetime and war, as well as control by the parliament, are clearly defined; and the soldier has maintained his status as a citizen—a citizen in uniform. (17)

Moltke and Bismarck: Two Great Antagonists

Moltke became the antagonist of the other great historical personality of the nineteenth century, Bismarck, in the words of Gerhard Ritter "the accepted master of a combative and at the same time responsible and creative and constructive policy," because the justification of war as Moltke saw it forced him into a virtually preprogrammed confrontation with the political leadership. (18) The reason was not, as Bismarck suspected, the narrow-mindedness and one-sidedness of a man who "occupied himself with one and the same thing for years" and for whom, therefore, only military aspects were important. (19) This assessment is completely inappropriate, and it originated primarily from their reciprocal deep exasperation during the winter of 1870-71 when they disagreed over continuing the war after the battle of Sedan. In reality, because of his universal education, Moltke understood the political arena very well.

Moreover, Moltke did not intend to expand military power beyond his limits of responsibility. In peacetime he never made the slightest attempt to use his position of trust with the emperor to enforce his

political ideas. He never used his right of immediate admission in peacetime without being summoned. Moltke's principle was that the emperor would call when he needed his advice. Only in war—and this led to the antagonism with Bismarck—did he claim to be the only adviser to the emperor and the supreme warlord so long as operations were ongoing. He resisted by all means any interference by the politician into the purely military sphere and any inclusion of political aspects into military considerations. Moltke formulated his theory on the justification of absolute war precisely in the following three terse statements:

1. "Politics uses war for the attainment of its ends; it operates decisively at the beginning and at the end of the conflict by claiming the right to increase its demands during war or to be satisfied with a minor success. In view of this uncertainty, strategy can only strive at achieving the highest aim possible with the given means. Thus it is of best assistance to politics by acting for its aim, but completely independent of it in its actions.

2. "The course of war is predominantly influenced by military considerations; the exploitation of its success or failure, on the other hand, is a matter of politics.

3. "Political aspects can only be considered for the planning of military operations if they don't demand anything that is inadmissible or impossible from a military point of view." (20)

These opinions, as noted briefly before, stand in harsh contrast to those propositions of Clausewitz that pronounce the absurdness of developing purely military war concepts and hold that it is absolutely wrong to accept the autonomy of war.

The significance of Moltke's theory on purely military thinking became obvious only when Bismarck, the *Lotse des Reiches* (pilot of the empire), was forced to disembark the ship of state. Only Moltke's epigones, the chiefs of the general staff (Alfred von Waldersee, Schlieffen, and Ludendorff), profited from the weakness of the later chancellors of the empire. They managed to exclude the political leadership from their war plans and, in the case of Schlieffen, to develop a war plan that not only tied down German politics in the July crisis of 1914 because of its lack of alternatives, but also deprived it of all diplomatic options by violating Belgian neutrality as an indispensable *conditio sine qua non* for victory. By determining general mobilization and by deployment and offensive actions in the West, the general staff attacked the political leadership from behind. The July crisis of 1914 was, in fact, a crisis concerning only the East, but the general

staff had already determined also to seek a decision in the West. (21)

The idea of annihilation, developed by Schlieffen and his followers on the basis of the encirclement of the empire, by its very nature aimed at the total defeat of the enemy. The situation in the geographical center of Europe and the expected war on two fronts called for a campaign plan to achieve everything all at once. Since the endurance of Germany as a continental power was limited, the decision had to be won early. The dictated treaty to follow was to eliminate the opponents as rivals for European hegemony.

These ideas and intentions, however, were in marked contrast with the fact that since 1789 no victorious nation or coalition of nations had been able to hold down a defeated country permanently. Therefore, it is highly doubtful—and Bismarck held this view—whether a total suppression of the enemy can really be a politically desirable war objective under all circumstances. Bismarck had always considered it his great task to conciliate the opponents as soon as he could and, in that way, to establish a peaceful order as durable as possible. If Bismarck's conviction that it was utopian to try to neutralize a nation of millions for all time had become a permanent part of German and Allied politics, and if the insight that a dictated peace breeds future wars had prevailed, then Europe could have been spared two large-scale wars. Moreover, Bismarck's ever alert feelings of responsibility as a European statesman reminded him to observe the rights of defeated nations to exist; in contrast to his successors, he would never have taken the risks caused by a German Empire challenging the whole of Europe. The worry that tormented him most after his resignation—that his ideal objective for German foreign policy after 1871 to win the confidence of the great powers by a peaceful, just, and conciliatory attitude would be abandoned—was perfectly justified. His ideal was replaced by the belief that the empire could claim a "place in the sun" as a participating world power.

Bismarck's strict limitation on the empire's political objectives was in stark contrast to Moltke's claim of the autonomy of war. Moltke's ideas, however, prevailed. His theories, which he applied only to wartime operations, were transferred to peacetime by his successors. Since Moltke's law justifying war dominated politics during World Wars I and II, a key phrase from Bismarck's political testament was simply ignored, namely the difficult task of judging when "the right moment has come for transition from war to peace." (22) During the winter of 1941, before Mos-

cow, some officers remembered that Clausewitz had analyzed the campaign of Napoleon I against Russia, but the findings of that analysis came to light too late to help them. The moment of transition from war to peace was missed after Stalingrad and Kursk, as well as after the Allied invasion in the West. In 1944 the clear separation between political and military responsibilities that Moltke hoped for was practically impossible because of the interrelationship between politics and warfare.

World War II brought another, particular dimension to the problem. Hitler was an absolute dictator. He alone held the political and military power in his hands. The commanders in chief of the three services (army, navy and air force) were reduced to mere assistants to carry out Hitler's ideas, and the general staff of the army was reduced to an organizational department. Hitler was regarded by many as a replacement for the emperor, while he served as his own Ludendorff. He believed himself to be part of a continuous legacy from Frederick the Great, who was both true statesman and strategist. Hitler, however, was a gambler, a reckless adventurer, and criminal ideologue in politics, and remained a dangerous dilettante in strategic matters, despite a striking instinct.

Moltke and His Importance for the Officer of Today

Just how much historical personalities can or should serve as models is a complex issue. Moltke's influence, for example, cannot be reduced to a simple formula. His thinking and actions were, as Madame de Stael once said about Prussia, Janus-faced; his one side was more philosophical, while the other side was more combative. For him war was a legitimate means of politics, but peace was the most valuable objective. During wartime he fought against the primacy of politics demanded by Bismarck, but in the end he always subordinated himself to it. Moltke was cosmopolitan, sophisticated, and traveled, and he had a broad education. He demanded of himself and all other officers that all actions be according to the imperative of moral law. This sense of morality became a principle for many Prussian-German officers even after Moltke's death, as well as an ethical guideline for the officers (mostly Prussians) who resisted Hitler's unlawful system. His descendant, Count Helmuth James von Moltke, lived and acted according to that moral law and paid for it with his life.

Moltke lived nearly an entire century. He was born 26 October 1800, and his childhood memories reached back to 1806—Prussia's fateful year, when only twenty

years after the death of Frederick the Great the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon's forces. Before his death on 9 April 1891 he became a witness to that historic night in the palace of Kiel when a brash naval captain, Alfred von Tirpitz, announced the necessity to construct a high seas battle fleet, because industrialization and imperialism had "once again started the wheel of history" and because the redistribution of the world raised the question whether Germany intended to be the "anvil or hammer" in the future. (23)

Although Moltke envisaged the totality of war and despite his proposals for preventive wars, he saw belligerent acts for political purposes only as a last resort: "Who would want to deny that any war, even a victorious one, is a disaster for [his] own nation, because no conquered terrain and no thousands of millions can replace human lives and make up for the mourning in the families. But who in this world is able to escape disaster—to escape necessity?" (24)

Moltke believed that history was made by a chosen few and that power was properly applied if it was based on moral law. He was influenced by important historians and their opinions on power, the importance of the state, and the nature of the German nation-state. In Heinrich von Treitschke he found the opinion that the high goal of a German-Prussian nation-state justified even bloodshed and war. Leopold von Ranke claimed that "the extent of its independence is important for the position of a nation in the world and at the same time forces it to arrange all internal circumstances according to the purpose of asserting itself"—particularly by means of military power. (25)

In spite of all this, in his *Consolations*, in which he summarized his life, he expressed a belief in reason. To Moltke, reason was more than the cognitive thinking mind and the voice of conscience. Rather, it was a power in the world "which penetrates the entire universe" and which in humanity had placed a "seed for good" that "needs only to be developed." This conviction reveals that Moltke, in the conflicts between conservatism and liberalism and nationalism and socialism, retained ideas born of German idealism and his humanistic education. Because of his preoccupation with the intellectual currents of his time, he was called—somewhat disparagingly—the learned officer or military scholar, that is, someone who is less qualified to act and to command. His biographers came to the conclusion that he was not a man of will or deeds in the sense of a conventional military man destined to become a commander or a warlord. Moltke's predecessor in the general staff and his commander in early

1850, for example, wrote that "he lacks the power and vitality which are essential for a commander in order to maintain his authority in the long run." (26) Moltke, however, proved during his three campaigns that he had the clear insights and the iron will necessary to deal with the commanders in chief of the army and the supreme warlord, his king.

The ambivalence of mankind becomes particularly evident in Moltke. A character in his early novella *The Two Friends* probably is describing Moltke himself when he says "Doubts are based in his character." He was, at heart, a humanist. In spite of that, the boldness of his decisions is dazzling. Bolder development plans were never conceived, and new technical means were developed—unimaginable until Moltke—to realize Scharnhorst's goal of "marching separately, battling as one." In addition, Moltke showed a personal discipline, a firm belief in his own planning, and last but not least, confidence that his commanders, despite some bad disappointments, would on their own carry out his instructions for achieving the overall objective. When, therefore, King William I, military expert and supreme warlord during the battle of Königgrätz, expressed his fear as the Elbe Army approached too slowly and the Second Army was not yet in sight: "Moltke, Moltke, we are going to lose the battle," Moltke calmly answered, "Today Your Majesty will not only win the battle, but the entire campaign." (27)

Although Austria had lost only one battle and was by no means at the end of its resources, the defeat at Königgrätz was so demoralizing that Emperor Franz Josef I refused to go on fighting. That confirmed Bismarck's conviction that the only and highest goal of a war need not be the utter defeat and defenselessness of the enemy. Already before the war of 1866 Bismarck had kept his chief of the general staff in suspense. Against Moltke's argument that time is essential for victory, Bismarck employed a diplomacy of delaying until Austria committed a decisive political error on 1 June by leaving the decision on Schleswig-Holstein to the discretion of the German Confederation. Politics, and not strategic considerations and necessities, determined the beginning of the war and also the end of the wars of 1866 and 1870-71. In spite of a deep antagonism between the military and political leadership, a breakdown of leadership during wartime was prevented. Other than World Wars I and II, the political leadership and not military considerations had the last and decisive word.

So once again I raise the problem of continuity in

Prussian-German politics from Frederick II through Bismarck and Wilhelm II to Adolf Hitler. Against this background the question is whether at least the old Prussian virtues, i.e., dutifulness, righteousness, and tolerance, are to be appreciated as traditions, and whether Moltke can have any (if so, what) significance in our times. (28)

Moltke is a figure of the past. He was a nineteenth century man and, in his heart, a conservative Prussian. He stood for the rule of the Prussian royal house and was against any notion of a republic, believing that "only soldiers are a cure for democracy." He was also of the opinion that "eternal peace is a dream...not even a beautiful one, and war is a part of God's order of the world." (29)

This background must always be assessed against a larger picture of the man. Moltke was once called the "son of the categorical imperative." That readiness to set universal principles for himself seems to be in striking contrast to his insistence on military discipline and obedience, but for Moltke, military hierarchy was no superficial formality requiring blind adherence. In his application of Immanuel Kant's imperative, particularly for officers, a military superior should always be able—apart from and above obedience—to use his own ethical maxims as a basis for his actions. As Moltke himself characterized his position: "Obedience is a principle, but man is above principle." (30)

Moltke's so-called system of substitutes, to which his entire strategic-operational leadership can be reduced, depended on men who consistently had to apply entirely new ideas of command and control in new situations. Such warfare required for Moltke a completely new kind of relationship among commanders of all ranks, as well as with the rank-and-file soldiers. The traditional model of the officer in combat was to be complemented by new mutual trust.

To us today, it does not seem in the least outdated when Moltke demands that an officer win the confidence of his men by setting an example. He stated that "the power of the army lies in the platoon leader at the front, in the captain and the cavalry captain on whom all eyes are turned." (31) This arrangement required a harmony of upbringing, education, and training, since the necessity of making independent decisions can only be accomplished by the strong will of an intelligent leader. This is where the effects of Moltke's typology can still be felt in our own time. To act according to the mission, to understand strategy and tactics in terms of Bismarckian politics (the art of the possible), a free, independent personality had to be the

goal of both education and upbringing. It sounds entirely modern when Moltke notes "it is obvious that theoretical knowledge alone is not sufficient, but the qualities of the mind and the character must achieve a free practical and artistic development, trained however by a military background, and guided by experience, be it from the history of war or from life itself." (32) Thus we have not only evidence of Moltke's modernism, but also another argument against those who fear that a preoccupation with military history and earlier theories of war will lead to unreflective imitation. Moreover, Moltke stated that he never intended to create a theoretical set of dogmas, since in theory one cannot teach statement by statement, and in practice one cannot execute statement by statement.

The proper approach to the study of Prussian history with its key personalities lies not in the founding of a new Prussianism, the reestablishment of old Prussian virtues, and certainly not in their blind glorification. Prussia, Frederick the Great, and Moltke the Elder belong to history. If, however, it is true that only the possession of history guarantees a grasp of the future, and if "the memory crystallized in the historical

knowledge is not only a necessary precondition, but the foundation of our self-identification as beings living in a society, that is, as human beings" (Leszek Kalakowski), then a careful examination of the past is one of the prerequisites for changing opinions, overcoming prejudices, and gaining insights based on knowledge and reflection. (33) To develop criteria for a well-balanced judgment, one has to deal with historical events. This process alone—liberation of man through knowledge—leads to developing a responsible person. (34) The search for historical truth and the related consideration of different opinions and attitudes contribute to a responsible and tolerant (though not always forgiving) judgment of the individual. The interpretation of the past and a study of its figures can shape a historical personality bound by the values of natural law. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke was one of those historical personalities.

General Roth's notes are based entirely on German-language sources.

Notes

1. Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland*, (München, 1954), 1:247.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 19th ed. (Bonn, 1988), p. 991.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 990; Ritter, *Staatskunst*, p. 248.
4. Ritter, *Staatskunst*, p. 193.
5. Helmuth von Moltke, "Über Strategie" (1871) in *Moltkes Militärische Werke*, Grosser Generalstab, Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte, ed., vol. 2, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1900), p. 291.
6. Otto von Bismarck, *Erinnerung und Gedanke, Die gesammelten Werke*, G. Ritter and R. Stadelmann, ed., (Berlin, 1932), 15:313 ff.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 422.
8. Ritter, *Staatskunst*, p. 242.
9. Bismarck, *Erinnerung*, p. 313 ff.
10. Rudolf Stadelmann, *Scharnhorst: Schicksal und geistige Welt*, (Wiesbaden, 1952), p. 164.
11. Franz Herre, *Moltke: Der Mann und sein Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1984), p. 13.
12. Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: Der weisse Revolutionär* (Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Wien, 1980), p. 22; Leopold von Ranke, *Über die Epochen der neueren Geschichte: 19 Vorträge vor König Maximilian von Bayern*, 8th ed. (München, Leipzig, 1921), p. 17.
13. Sir Michael Howard, "1989—enine neue Zeitenwende?" in *Europa-Archiv* 44 (1989): 437.
14. Georg W.F. Hegel, quoted in Ritter, *Staatskunst*, pp. 262-302 (especially p. 265).
15. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
17. Günter Roth, "Historisch-politische Bildung in Streitkräften," in *Von der Friedenssicherung zur Friedensgestaltung: Deutsche Streitkräfte im Wandel*, Heinrich Walle, ed. (Herford, Bonn, 1992).
18. Ritter, *Staatskunst*, p. 238.
19. Rudolf Stadelmann, *Moltke und der Staat* (Krefeld, 1950), p. 38.
20. Moltke, *Werke*, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 291; see also Moltke's marginalia described by W. von Blume in *Preussische Jahrbücher* 111 (1903): 228; Moltke, *Werke*, vol. 1, part 3, p. 417; Ritter, *Staatskunst*, p. 247 ff.
21. Sebastian Haffner and Wolfgang Venohr, *Das Wunder an der Marne* (Bergisch-Gladbach, 1982) discusses this problem thoroughly and in dramatic fashion.

22. Bismarck, *Erinnerung*, p. 313.
23. Stadelmann, *Moltke und der Staat*, p. 4.
24. Ltr, Moltke to Goubareff, 10 Feb 1881, in Helmuth Graf von Moltke, *Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten*, (Berlin, 1892), 5:199-200.
25. Herre, *Moltke: Der Mann*, p. 16.
26. Stadelmann, *Moltke und der Staat*, p. 449; Bismarck, *Erinnerung*, all of chapter 1.
27. Herre, *Moltke: Der Mann*, p. 239.
28. The discussion of this problem in the public media recently has been revived, particularly with quotations by popular historians and journalists, such as Hans-Peter Schwarz ("Precious Assets of Political Folklore from a Dead Country") in *Die Welt* (16 Aug 1991) and Joachim Fest ("And even the Prussian virtues, that have many unsuspecting advocates, [sic] will not return") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 Aug 1991.
29. Ltr, Moltke to Prof. Bluntschli in Switzerland, 11 Dec 1880, in Helmuth Graf von Moltke, *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 194-97.
30. Conversation between Moltke and Friedjung, 22 Sep 1889, in Heinrich, *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859-1866*, 3d ed., vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1899), pp. 567-571.
31. From "Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869," in Moltke, *Werke*, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 171-215.
32. *Ibid.*, "Über Strategie," pp. 291-93.
33. Leszek Kalakowski, "Nach dem Tode des historischen Menschen," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 Apr 1990.
34. Karl R. Popper, *Auf der Suche nach einer besseren Welt: Vorträge und Aufsätze aus dreissig Jahren* (München, 1984), p. 149 ff.

Editor's Journal

This issue of *Army History* was in preparation as the Center of Military History moved to our new building on 14th Street. Some of our readers may have sent changes of address, book reviews, or other mail that was delayed (or worse) in transit—please contact us again if your particular concern seems to have been overlooked.

Here are *Army History's* new phone numbers: DSN 285-5368; Commercial (202) 504-5368.

In this issue we have the opportunity—with two articles from each source—to learn more about official military history in Germany and about military history at the Army Materiel Command. The lead article is by Brig. Gen. Günter Roth, head of the German Military History Research Office in Freiburg, who shares his thoughts on the impact of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, while a second article by Col. Roland Foerster outlines the evolution and the operations of the Military History Research Office. Both the Focus on the Field, by Robert G. Darius and his staff, and a second article by Doctor Darius give our readers insights into the workings of the Army Materiel Command and its historical programs.

Returning to our overriding theme of commemorating World War II, the Archaic Archivist takes a look at the oft-neglected subject of the U.S. Army and the home front.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

As I write this column in mid-July, the Center of Military History is returning to full operations after our move to Franklin Court from the Southeast Federal Center. This planned move was far less traumatic than our emergency displacement following the fire in the Pulaski Building in the Spring of 1990, but it still required extra work from many employees and imposed inevitable inconvenience on many of our friends in the field. You have heard it said "no pain, no gain"—I think the gain was worth the pain in this instance.

We did not go back to the Pulaski Building because the Center had outgrown the space. The number of employees has not increased, but the complexity of operations and structure of the staff simply require accommodations that were not available there. In the old days the Center was built on two sturdy foundation structures: the Historical Services Division—the group that manages organizational history, maintains reference collections, and answers queries from the field—and the Histories Division—the people who write the "big histories" in the tradition of the "green books." Both of those structures are still central to our operations, but the Center also has changed its structure and diversified its functions to address the needs of a changing Army.

The Research and Analysis Division emerged and grew to meet senior Army leaders' expanded appetite for history. Their questions have become more numerous, and their expectation system has given us a generation of generals who have learned that historians may provide useful insights and perspective on problems and issues that appear to be new. This awareness, together with their increased willingness to cooperate in oral history projects, dictated increased attention to these new needs. New historians were crammed into tiny offices in the Pulaski Building. Today, their offices still aren't palatial, but they now have space for the people and files necessary to do this important work.

The growing military history education program had other implications. As units, schools, and indi-

viduals in our Army and abroad turned to the Center for advice, comments, and professional exchanges, a Field and International Division emerged to meet the need. Our well-received professional bulletin, *Army History*, would not be possible without that division. These historians also planned and conducted the June Conference of Army Historians on World War II that earned widespread acclaim, and they are involved in a wide array of activities from staff rides to foreign exchanges, all designed to further the study and use of our Army's history.

All of this increased activity would not be possible without a Production Services Division that turns out *Army History*, pamphlets, art posters, and monographs as well as the big books that made the Center's reputation. Our editors, cartographers, and graphics artists often find their priorities adjusted by high-level interest in a special project, but they always deliver the highest quality at the least cost.

The newest organizational change is the emergence of the Museum Division. They were among the most crowded in the Pulaski, scarcely able to unpack a box of artifacts from an inactivating unit without forcing a colleague to sit in the hall. They now have enough room to keep a reference collection, practice many of the skills necessary in the Army's world-class museum system, and plan for the day when they will continue their excellent work in the National Museum of the U.S. Army—a dream that continues to have great support from the Army leadership, even though a site has not yet been agreed upon.

But we wouldn't want to move too quickly to that new site. We need a few years to enjoy the fruits of this last move. We will just be moving Army Art to join us from Headquarters, Army Materiel Command, this autumn, about the time you read this issue. As you may have guessed, we are proud that we will be able to carry on traditions of excellence even more capably here at Franklin Court, and we hope you can come to see us soon.

Ahead of Its Time

Wilson's Cavalry Campaign of 1865

Stephen L. Bowman

The swift victory by American-led coalition forces in Southwest Asia is indicative of the type of operations that U.S. military leaders need to study and emulate. By using deception, speed, firepower, initiative, and agility throughout the depth of the battlefield, American forces attained decisive military victory, but without the heavy casualties that characterize most major campaigns in military history. Campaigns such as Operation DESERT STORM should be the models of victory for military leaders to study. In 1865 another such campaign occurred—a campaign little known or studied, but one with similar results.

During the last year of the Civil War, Union forces commanded by Maj. Gen. (brevetted) James H. Wilson conducted a military operation through Alabama and Georgia which in many ways foreshadowed military operations of a later era by using speed, mobility, and shock action, and by taking advantage of firepower and limited visibility to overcome superior enemy defenses. This campaign, one of the most significant yet least known of the Civil War, resulted in major battles at Selma, Alabama, and the final important battle of the war, at Columbus, Georgia, on 16 April 1865. (1) It was the best executed Union cavalry operation of the war.

To contrast Wilson's Cavalry Corps operations with prevailing tactics of the nineteenth century, traditional cavalry concepts of the period must be understood. In the mid-century the cavalry was the elite force in European armies. The lance and saber were the preferred weapons, and professional military officers commonly accepted the superiority of the mounted lancer to the infantryman—the foot soldier armed only with an inaccurate single shot musket for defense. The Napoleonic-style massed cavalry charge at the decisive moment was considered the decisive factor in battle. (2)

American Civil War cavalry was not used in the Napoleonic manner, much to the disdain of European observers. (3) The major activities of Civil War cavalry were raids—*independent actions of short duration behind enemy lines with no intent to hold territory, often conducted to raise the troops' morale when the*

prevailing tactical situation was less than favorable. Other common missions for the cavalry included carrying out reconnaissance, destroying railroads, protecting the armies' flanks, and escorting supply wagons. In almost all cases Union cavalry units were scattered among infantry forces and were used in a piecemeal fashion, although there were attempts at times during the war to conduct European-type cavalry operations, such as at Brandy Station. (4) The major difference between the American and European concepts of cavalry, however, was that the American cavalry was, in reality, mounted infantry, moving on horseback, but dismounting to fight on foot. The horse was merely a means of transport. Union leaders sometimes kept mounted forces ready to exploit an advantage created by dismounted units, but never in the strength considered necessary by European professionals to be the critical factor in deciding the outcome of a battle.

Although most European observers attributed the unusual cavalry techniques to inadequate training of the nonprofessional Union soldiers, there were other reasons why American horsemen were not used for the traditional climactic mission of the European cavalry, *i.e., the massed charge at the critical point in an infantry engagement. (5) One factor was the extensive use of terrain obstacles and entrenching by defending forces, more or less elaborate as time for preparation allowed, which became prevalent during the Civil War. Except for the early engagements of 1861, defending units at a minimum threw up earthwork defenses, using rocks, dirt, and fence rails whenever possible. The range, volume, and accuracy of individual rifled weapons allowed deadly employment at ranges up to 500 yards. By 1865 the Union cavalry was equipped with rapid-firing Spencer seven-shot repeating rifles. With these new magazine-fed weapons with their metal-cased rounds, it was no longer necessary to close with the enemy forces to cause damage. Because of their dependability, the new rifles were better than saber or lance for inflicting casualties, with less danger to the rifleman. It is true, however, that poor horsemanship was a contributing factor in the use*

of Union cavalry as mounted infantry, at least in some units. Although Confederate cavalry fought mounted whenever possible, Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, one of the most famous Confederate cavalry commanders, also believed that his men were most effective using dismounted tactics. (6) The essential point is that the cavalry forces engaged during Wilson's campaign through Alabama and Georgia did not fight classical, Napoleonic-style cavalry operations. Americans, both Union and Confederate, had significantly modified the role of cavalry from its traditional European concepts.

As General Wilson gathered his forces in the winter of 1864, he implemented some of his own innovative ideas concerning cavalry operations. The commander of the Union armies, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, wanted Wilson to conduct a demonstration into Alabama with a portion of his corps to worry and distract Confederate leaders. Wilson, however, was able to convince his superiors that his mounted striking force should be kept concentrated. He proposed to move into Alabama and Georgia to defeat Confederate forces and capture and destroy the Confederacy's last supply depots and manufacturing centers. Wilson's concept was to travel as fast as possible, using his mounted forces with speed and maneuverability. Rather than merely attempting to disrupt rail lines and cause panic among the civil population, Wilson intended to keep the Confederates off balance, then concentrate his forces against any enemy sent to oppose him. He planned to use his cavalry as a large, fast-moving strike column to discover enemy weak points and exploit them to the fullest. (7)

Another innovation within Wilson's Cavalry Corps was that "a thorough system of instruction for men and officers was instituted, and every necessary effort was made to bring the corps to the highest possible state of efficiency." (8) Such a training program was very unusual in the volunteer Union Army of the Civil War. Wilson later attributed the success of his operations to the training program conducted in his corps' encampments in late 1864 and early 1865. (9)

By the spring of 1865 the Civil War was drawing to a close as Union forces increasingly pressured the outmanned and outgunned Confederates. In Virginia Grant was pushing Lee toward Richmond, while Sherman, after cutting a swath through Georgia, was moving through the Carolinas. At the same time another Union force was moving from New Orleans to Mobile to partition the Confederacy further. (10) Even as this pressure was being applied, Union leaders were

looking at the remaining parts of the South and considering how to deny them to the Confederate government and armies. As the situation developed in Virginia, Union leaders increasingly feared that Confederate forces in Virginia and the Carolinas might withdraw into the Deep South, southern Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi—all relatively untouched directly by the war—to continue the fight. Sufficient food supplies were still available in these states, and the cities of Selma, Alabama, and Columbus, Georgia, were two of the South's largest manufacturing centers. (11)

In an attempt to deprive the Confederacy of these regions, cut off Texas, and support the attack on Mobile, Grant ordered Wilson's Cavalry Corps to destroy the Confederate ability to make war from the Southwest. (12) In response, General Wilson led his corps of 13,500 men from their camps along the Tennessee River into northern Alabama on 18 March 1865.

Wilson had graduated from West Point in 1860, less than five years earlier, and was a lieutenant of Engineers in 1861. By August 1864 he commanded the 3d Cavalry Division in the Army of the Potomac and, from October 1864 to March 1865, commanded a cavalry division in Tennessee. In March 1865, mature beyond his years, Wilson received command of the Cavalry Corps of the Military Department of the Mississippi. (13)

The corps that moved into Alabama consisted of three cavalry divisions, while an additional division had to be left behind for lack of horses. Wilson's forces included 12,000 mounted and 1,500 dismounted troops. (14) The First Cavalry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward McCook, had a beginning strength of 4,096 in two brigades, made up of the 8th Iowa Cavalry, 4th Kentucky Infantry (Mounted), 6th Kentucky Cavalry, 2d Michigan, 2d Indiana, 4th Indiana, 4th Kentucky, 7th Kentucky, and 1st Wisconsin Cavalry Regiments, and the 18th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery. (15) The Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Eli Long, had an initial strength of 5,127 in two brigades, consisting of the 72d Indiana, 98th Illinois, 123d Illinois Infantry (Mounted), 17th Indiana, 4th Michigan, 3d Ohio, 4th Ohio, and 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiments, and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, Illinois Light Artillery. (16) The Fourth Cavalry Division (Brig. Gen. Emory Upton) consisted of 3,923 men in two brigades, composed of the 3d Iowa, 4th Iowa, 10th Missouri, 5th Iowa, 1st Ohio, and 7th Ohio Cavalry Regiments, and Battery I, 4th U.S. Artillery. (17)

The Union Cavalry Corps was a veteran force in

which almost all units had served more than two years and many were in their fourth year of combat. (19) Each trooper was armed with a Spencer carbine with a seven-cartridge magazine (the result of Wilson's efforts as Chief of Cavalry in the War Department in early 1864), an extra belt of ammunition, a revolver, and a heavy saber. (20)

Opposing this Union force was the Confederate Cavalry Corps commanded by Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, plus other regular forces and militia under Maj. Gen. Howell Cobb and Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith. (22) Forrest had reorganized the Confederate cavalry in February, grouping his forces into brigades and divisions of men from the same states in an effort to improve morale. (23) Forrest's Cavalry Corps consisted of Brig. Gen. James Chalmers' Division from Mississippi (4,500 men); Brig. Gen. William Jackson's Division (3,800), two-thirds Tennesseans and the remainder Texans; Col. Edward Crossland's Kentucky Brigade and Brig. Gen. Phillip Roddey's Alabama Brigade, with 2,000 troops between them; and an undocumented number of regulars and militia other than Forrest's cavalry. (24-28)

Having scattered his force over parts of Alabama and Mississippi to avoid stripping the countryside of food and forage, Forrest was still reorganizing and reequipping when Wilson's troops moved into Alabama. (29) Initially, Forrest discounted the threat from Wilson's force. Cavalry raids, as practiced in the Civil War, were regarded as "showy but not dangerous," and Forrest did not want to overreact with his limited forces. (30)

Wilson's troops moved from their encampment toward the important city of Selma, fighting a series of running engagements with Forrest's forces and continually forcing the outnumbered Southerners back toward the city. At this stage of the war, Selma contained the South's principal gun factory, an armory, machine shops, and many other manufacturing shops and small factories. (31) According to rumors among the Union troops, the position of Selma was so strong that 40,000 Union infantry were being sent from Mobile to assist in the capture of the city. (32) As the Union cavalry approached, Upton's Division captured an English engineer who had helped with the extensive fortifications around Selma, obtaining from him a complete sketch of the defenses. A reconnaissance confirmed this intelligence. (33) The defensive works at Selma consisted of three lines. The outer perimeter, 400 yards out and 200 yards wide, was made of abatis and trees laid side by side with limbs still attached and

sharpened at the points. A second line, 200 yards out, consisted of low stakes with wire stretched between them and sharpened rails. The third, inner, line was made up of sharpened pine pickets, forming a solid wall six to eight feet high. Every 300 yards a lunette fort was positioned with three artillery pieces in each. The entire position was six miles long, anchored at both ends on the Alabama River. (34)

Wilson developed a plan for an attack at dusk. Long's Second Division, dismounted, was on the right (west), with Upton's Fourth Division—partially mounted—on the left (east). McCook's division was in reserve, guarding the corps' rear. Because he had accurate intelligence on the position, Wilson planned for Upton to cross a seemingly impenetrable swamp in the waning light. Once Upton was in place, both divisions were to make a coordinated last-light attack against the Confederate defenses. Before Upton was in position, however, part of Chalmers' Confederate Division, late in arriving to assist in the defense of Selma, chanced upon Long's divisional trains and began firing. General Long immediately seized the initiative and launched his attack toward Selma with two dismounted brigades (1,160 men) who literally had to "leapfrog" over each other's backs to cross the obstacles in front of the main defensive line. Confederate artillery and rifle fires were inaccurate, and the rapid fire from the Spencers caused great confusion among the defenders. Long's troops quickly seized the main position, and the Confederates started to flee into the city. In the meantime, Upton had urged his men forward and stormed the defenses in his area under light opposition. Once the dismounted troops opened a breach, Upton ordered his mounted units through the gap. The next defensive line temporarily stopped the charging troops, who dismounted, stormed the position, and routed the defenders. They then remounted and galloped into Selma, almost capturing General Forrest. (35) Approximately 1,500 troops had attacked a fortified position held by some 7,000 defenders with artillery. Forrest reported that although he had as many defenders as there were attackers in the area overrun, the speed and momentum of the enemy assault could not be stopped. (36)

Total Union casualties were 40 killed, 260 wounded, and 7 missing. (37) Confederate killed and wounded were never reported, but 2,700 troops, including 150 officers, were captured, along with 106 artillery pieces and other arms and munitions. The materiel loss was irreplaceable to the Confederacy. (38) Wilson's official report on the battle stated, "I regard the capture of

Selma as the most remarkable achievement in the history of modern cavalry, and one admittedly illustrative of its new powers and tendencies." (39)

Before moving on from Selma, Wilson took steps to organize some of the freed slaves—who had been following his force in ever increasing numbers—to make them a contributing part of the war effort. Wilson organized able men of military age into regiments and attached one of these regiments to each of his divisions. The black "soldiers" immediately were put to work in Selma, hauling ordnance and supplies to be destroyed. (40) Wilson then prevented the remaining old men, women, and children from following his column when it moved out by blocking the roads with a rearguard force. Officers from within the corps were assigned to the black regiments, which were mounted, on mules and horses unfit for the cavalry units. Those black soldiers without mounts walked. The black regiments subsisted off the countryside and were armed and equipped with captured materials. (41) Wilson was able to increase the size of his force in this manner, while the Confederates continued to suffer from a lack of manpower. (42) While this additional untrained force added little to Wilson's combat capabilities, it allowed him to keep his trained troopers concentrated and not dissipated on logistical or security details.

After consolidating his position at Selma, Wilson had the option of moving south toward Mobile or east toward Columbus and Macon, Georgia. He chose the latter, primarily because Columbus was the only major logistics center still producing significant armaments and supplies for the Confederacy. (43) Columbus had the largest naval yard remaining in the South and was second only to Richmond in the number of logistical facilities to support the war effort. On 10 April, after days of bad weather, Wilson pushed his forces across the Alabama River toward Montgomery and Columbus. The river crossing was extremely treacherous, with engineer bridges being swept away by the high water three times. (44) On 12 April Montgomery, the first Confederate capital, surrendered without a fight.

Wilson then began to plan for the capture of Columbus. Upton, who had been frustrated at Selma when Long's Second Cavalry Division carried the battle while his forces were trying to break through the swamp to get into position, was offered the prize of seizing Columbus. He accepted eagerly. Wilson gave Upton the mission of seizing the bridges across the Chattahoochee River, with no other restrictions or specific guidance. He was reinforced with Brig. Gen. Oscar H. LaGrange's brigade from the First Cavalry

Division. Upton sent LaGrange's brigade north toward West Point, Georgia, and moved with his own brigades toward Columbus. (45) His plan was to force a crossing of the Chattahoochee at West Point if the assault at Columbus failed.

Because he had the longest march, LaGrange moved first, followed by Upton's two brigades. LaGrange had a running battle with parts of an Alabama cavalry brigade. The Confederates fought dismounted from behind hasty earthworks until the leading Union units could muster sufficient force to attack the position, forcing the defenders to retreat. This fight continued until 14 April, when LaGrange's troops stormed a position killing twelve defenders and capturing another one hundred prisoners. The Southern forces then disappeared, leaving the road to West Point open.

At 1000 on 16 April LaGrange attacked the bridge at West Point. The bridge's primary protection came from Fort Tyler, a large redoubt on a hill to the west of town. The fort had a 12-foot-wide ditch, steep slopes covered with abatis and slashed timber, and was defended by 265 men and 3 guns, one a 32-pound siege gun. LaGrange had dismounted forces conduct demonstrations on three sides of the fort, supported by two field guns. Once the demonstrations had begun, a mounted battalion charged past the fort and captured the bridge before it could be burned. At the same time, the dismounted force assaulted the fort and captured it. Union casualties were 7 killed and 29 wounded; Confederate losses were 18 killed, 29 wounded, and 218 captured. (46)

In the meantime Upton's division continued to advance on Columbus. Upton had no idea of the composition of the defenses around Columbus, in contrast to Selma, and a reconnaissance was not possible because of the heavy vegetation in the area. Since enemy forces and emplacements were unknown, Upton decided to try to capture one of the bridges leading into Columbus by means of a surprise attack in daylight hours. He dispatched a brigade to move directly to the lower (southern) bridge to seize it. The First Ohio Cavalry galloped directly up the dirt road and was within 300 yards of the bridge when it went up in flames. Under fire from Confederate defensive positions and unable to attack the northern bridge because of broken terrain, the brigade withdrew to high ground to the west of Girard, Alabama. In the meantime, an attempt to seize another bridge three miles north of Columbus also resulted in that bridge's being burned. (47)

On the Alabama side of the Chattahoochee River

from Columbus was the village of Girard (now Girard and Phenix City), which was situated along Mill Creek, a significant obstacle. Two wooden bridges ran between Girard and Columbus, one-half mile apart, each 1,000 feet long. A railroad bridge crossed the river 500 yards north of the northern wooden bridge. The terrain around Girard was steep, with hills that were 100 to 400 feet higher than the valleys and covered with scrub oak. Mill Creek's banks were rugged, high, and uncrossable within a mile of the Chattahoochee.

The Confederate defenses were so extensive that the troops available could not man all of them. (48) The southern bridge, protected by steep slopes and deep ravines and conducive to defense by a small force, had already been burned in the daylight attack. The northern bridge and railroad bridge were protected by a series of forts and rifle pits along the military crest of the hills to the north and northwest: two forts approximately one mile from the bridges along the Opelika Road with three guns each; two lunettes with one and two guns; one fort in Girard with four guns reinforced with six guns in the adjoining streets; and five other outlying forts, each with three or four guns. The forts had abatis (felled trees) all along their front. The southern bridge had three guns located on its east end, the northern bridge had two howitzers on it to sweep its approaches with canister, and the railroad bridge had four howitzers located on its east end with a similar mission. In all, the defenses consisted of 27 artillery pieces and more than 3,000 well-armed and supplied—if not necessarily well-trained—Confederate defenders. (49)

The Southern forces were under the command of Maj. Gen. Howell Cobb, a well-known political figure in Georgia. (50) Although Cobb was the ranking officer, the commander on the field was a German officer, Col. Leon von Zinken, whom Cobb had successfully defended in a murder trial in February 1865. (51) The defending forces included experienced "regulars" from Texas, Alabama, and Georgia, part of Brig. Gen. James H. Clanton's Alabama Brigade, the 7th Alabama Cavalry, and parts of Brig. Gen. Abraham Buford's Cavalry Division. Also present were two regiments of the Georgia State Line, state militia who were well-drilled but mostly untested in combat, and a small number of Georgia state reserves. (52) General Cobb had previously been ordered to move into Alabama with part of his forces to attempt to stop Wilson in that state, but he had taken no action while he awaited permission from Governor Joseph E. Brown to take Georgia State Troops into Alabama—permission

that never came. (53) Governor Brown also failed to reckon with the speed of the mounted Yankee forces, not calling out the state militia to go to Columbus until 15 April. The reinforcements did not arrive before the Union attack on the 16th. (54) According to the Columbus *Enquirer's* report of the battle, the defending forces were joined by "a number of citizens of Columbus and a few hastily collected reserves of Russell County, Alabama." (55)

After two unsuccessful attempts to seize a bridge by surprise, Upton's staff conducted as extensive a reconnaissance of the defenses as possible. The reconnaissance got so close that the defenders captured one of the staff officers. Wilson came forward but gave no orders, waiting until Upton returned. Upton finally returned from his reconnaissance, upset that he had not been able to initiate the attack in daylight. Wilson commented to him that "an attack after dark would be accompanied by less loss and greater success than one in full daylight." (56) Upton enthusiastically agreed and quickly directed his forces into position for a night attack. He planned to seize a gap in the fortifications with dismounted troops, then push a mounted unit through the gap to seize the northern bridge. (57)

At 2030 approximately 400 men of the 3d Iowa advanced on foot. The Confederates started firing on the advancing shadows, who then charged, with great difficulty, into the rifle pits and first fort. Thinking they had seized the main position, the 3d Iowa halted to hold the gap for the mounted troops. Wilson ordered the 10th Missouri to charge through the hole in the defenses. Upton changed the order and sent only two companies down the road. (58) Much to their surprise, the advancing troopers discovered the main line of enemy fortifications. As the two companies rode in the darkness, the Confederates assumed they were friendly troops and did not fire on them. The two companies galloped to the northern bridge and seized it, along with fifty prisoners. The Confederate defenders, finally understanding the situation, attacked the unsupported unit and forced it to withdraw to the Union lines, which were regained with almost the entire force intact. (59) The 3d Iowa, now accompanied by Upton and Wilson, again was ordered to the dismounted attack, this time against the main position. Under extremely heavy fire, the 3d Iowa once more stormed the fortifications. In Upton's words, the attackers, "after a charge unexampled in cavalry service, and with but few parallels in infantry, crowned the works." (60) Shooting in the dark, the heavy Confederate fire was aimed high, a problem which continues to challenge modern military

forces. Said Wilson, "The roar of artillery and musketry was continuous and appalling, but the enemy fired so high that they did but little harm to our dismounted men. Darkness was their best protection...." (61)

As the 3d Iowa pushed into the main position, the seven companies of the 4th Iowa dismounted to reinforce the attack against the defensive works. Seeing the Confederates breaking under the assault, Upton urged his men onto the bridge without stopping to take prisoners or weapons. The 4th Iowa went through the breach and mixed with the fleeing Confederates as they crossed the bridge. The Confederates tasked with defending the bridge itself could neither fire their canister nor burn the bridge because of the intermingling of the forces and the speed of the attack. As the dismounted forces arrived at the bridge, Upton ordered the mounted battalion of the 4th Iowa forward. The mounted troops quickly crossed the bridge, captured the artillery pieces at the east end, seized the railroad bridge, and moved into the city of Columbus, completely routing the now-disorganized Confederate soldiers. No reserves had been retained to counterattack the Union forces as they crossed the bridge. Once the initial positions were broken and the bridge seized, the defenders could do nothing but flee. The entire battle had taken just over one hour. (62)

Columbus had been defended by approximately 3,000 troops. Conventional doctrine then, as now, required three attackers to every defender to be confident of overcoming the natural strength of the defense. The single brigade with which Upton initially attacked numbered 1,100 men, yet they captured the position. (63) Total Union losses were 5 killed and 28 wounded. The defenders lost 300 killed or wounded and 1,200 prisoners of war. War materiel captured in Columbus included 27 artillery pieces mounted on gun carriages, 36 additional guns in an arsenal, 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and an immense quantity of small arms, the gun/ram *Jackson* with 6 guns, 125,000 bales of cotton, 20,000 sacks of corn, 15 locomotives, 250 train cars, machine shops, a naval armory, a naval shipbuilding yard, 2 rolling mills, an arsenal for army weapons, 2 powder magazines, 3 oilcloth factories, a sizable amount of other military equipment, and more than 10 mills producing such items as clothing, shoes, pistols, and swords. It was an incredible victory for the small losses taken by the Union forces. The capture of Columbus made the seizures of Selma and Montgomery complete, since much of the materiel stored in those cities had been sent to Columbus to avoid capture. (64)

After consolidating in Columbus, Wilson's corps moved on to seize Macon, Georgia. Confederate Maj. Gen. Cobb, who had barely escaped capture in Columbus, met the Cavalry Corps' advance elements on 19 April and informed them of the impending truce between Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. On 20 April Sherman telegraphed Wilson over Confederate telegraph lines and announced a cease-fire, pending the final surrender near Durham, North Carolina, on 26 April 1865, ending the Civil War. (65)

Although the fighting itself had ended, Wilson's cavalymen had one more opportunity to show their mobility and versatility. Jefferson Davis was reported to be trying to escape from the country, moving south from North Carolina through Georgia. Wilson deployed his corps to locate and capture Davis and his party. On 10 May, members of the 2d Division of the Cavalry Corps captured Davis near Irwinville in south Georgia. (66)

The operations of Wilson's Cavalry Corps in 1865 were largely ignored by all except the participants, because the campaign occurred so close to the end of the war and because Grant's campaign in Virginia and Sherman's campaign in North Carolina were concluding at the same time, drawing most of the nation's attention. Nevertheless, the significance of the Cavalry Corps' operation has become increasingly clear over time. Wilson's expedition was not intended to be merely a raid, but was an invading army entirely composed of cavalry, an extraordinary event for the Civil War period. (67) It was a limited campaign designed not to seize and hold territory, but to deprive the Confederacy of the means of continuing the war. The destruction of industries, supplies, and transportation assets in Alabama and Georgia was an irreparable blow to the Confederate cause. (68) By making use of fast-moving mounted units, Union leaders were able to neutralize the Confederate advantages of fighting from entrenched positions. Union forces penetrated into the heart of the South in a strategic maneuver, without suffering large numbers of casualties. (69) As one of Wilson's brigade commanders noted in his after action report, the ability to use mounted forces to take advantage of favorable gaps created by dismounted troops was the key to the decisiveness of the Union victories with such light casualties. (70)

Wilson's force performed very few of the traditional missions of cavalry of the time: cutting lines of communication, destroying railroads, conducting reconnaissance for other units, escorting supply trains,

and so forth. Instead, Wilson's soldiers conducted operations more closely related to modern mechanized infantry and armor teams. Wilson moved his forces rapidly against the enemy, using mounted operations as long as the situation permitted. When his units ran up against a fortified position, they dismounted, established firepower superiority using the Spencer repeating rifle and the light artillery that was in close support, penetrated the defense, and then moved mounted forces through the penetration to exploit the situation.

Wilson's use of night attacks was not only critical to the small numbers of casualties suffered by his force, but was innovative at a time when fighting usually ceased at dark and began again with the light of day. (71) The operations Wilson devised were rarely conducted in Europe or the United States during this period. They were a great advantage in Selma, and particularly against the strong fortifications at Columbus. (72) Wilson used limited visibility attacks where the enemy had strong, well-established positions in order to minimize his casualties and take advantage of the initiative held by the attacking force. Foreign observers were not present with Wilson's Cavalry Corps in 1865, and the lessons concerning the value of mounted infantry armed with effective rifles were lost to all but the participants of the campaign and those who later gleaned the lessons from published reports of the operation.

Wilson's victorious campaign, using speed and daring instead of men's bloodshed, are valuable les-

sons in the art of warfare. Wilson was not anchored to the traditional concepts for the use of cavalry forces. Like Grant in the Wilderness Campaign, Wilson's operational concept was to try to avoid frontal attacks against heavily defended positions that could only be overcome through overwhelming superiority in numbers and huge casualty figures. His innovative ideas, executed by subordinate leaders who were likewise able to think beyond obsolete "rules" of warfare, resulted in the best-executed cavalry operation of the Civil War.

The relatively unknown campaign conducted by James H. Wilson and his Union Cavalry Corps is a sample of the meaningful military history still hidden in archives and libraries in the United States. Military leaders have much to gain by studying successful operations that avoid heavy casualties over a long period of time. The United States recently has witnessed another example of this kind of campaign in Operation DESERT STORM. Hopefully, future military leaders will study and emulate campaigns that emphasize speed, maneuverability, and firepower at the operational level of war, instead of needlessly sacrificing soldiers in battles of attrition fought because of failure to understand maneuver warfare.

Col. Stephen L. Bowman, Ph.D., formerly deputy commander, Berlin Brigade, is now on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College.

Notes

1. The last battle in the Virginia-North Carolina theater was the battle of Appomattox on 9 April 1865. Another skirmish took place between elements of Forrest's and Wilson's corps on 9 May, near the Sipsey River in Alabama, but the numbers involved were small, and the total casualties and prisoners were only about one hundred. The last battle of the Civil War was 13 May, on the Rio Grande River in Texas.

2. James P. Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg: Wilson's Raid through Alabama and Georgia* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976), p. 7; Col. George T. Denison, *A History of Cavalry From the Earliest Times* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1913), p. 393; Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 163.

3. See Jay Luvaas, *The Military Legacy of the Civil*

War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959) for a complete treatment of how European military observers saw the U.S. Civil War.

4. Elbridge Colby, "Wilson's Cavalry Campaign of 1865" in *Military Analysis of the Civil War* (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1977), p. 325; Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg*, p. 7.

5. Luvaas, *Military Legacy of the Civil War*, pp. 17, 110.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 73, 84, 110; Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 84; U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: War Dept., 1880-1901), ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 356 (hereafter cited as *OR*).

7. James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1912), 2:180-81; James, *Yankee Blitzkrieg*, pp. 7-8.
8. Frank Moore, ed., *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, 11 vols. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1868), 11: 651.
9. Ibid.; C. C. Andrews, *History of the Campaign of Mobile, Including the Cooperative Operations of General Wilson's Cavalry in Alabama* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), p. 243.
10. Big. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., *The West Point Atlas of American Wars*, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), 1:142-44; Colby, "Wilson's Campaign," p. 325.
11. Homes Mead, *The Eighth Iowa Cavalry in the Civil War* (Carthage, Ill.: S.C. Davidson, n.d.), p. 18. For a more extensive biography of Wilson, see *Webster's American Military Biographies* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam and Co., 1978), pp. 483-84 (hereafter cited as *WAMB*).
12. For a biography of McCook, see *WAMB*, p. 260.
13. Eli Long was an outstanding leader, often in the thick of the fight. He was severely wounded while storming the positions at Selma. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2: 170-71, 228.
14. For a biography of Upton, see *WAMB*, pp. 446-47.
15. Robert V. Johnson, ed., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4 vols. (New York: The Century Co., 1884-1888), 4: 759.
16. Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg*, p. 36; two examples of the types of units found in the Cavalry Corps were the 98th and 123d Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiments. The 98th was mustered in September 1862 and fought as infantry until March 1863, when it was converted to a mounted infantry unit. The 98th remained mounted through the end of the war. The 123d also mustered in September 1862 as an infantry regiment and fought campaigns in 1862 and 1863 as infantry. In May 1863 the regiment was mounted and issued Spencer rifles. In September 1863 the unit gave up its horses and fought at Chickamauga as infantry. At the conclusion of that campaign, the 123d was again mounted and fought the remainder of the war "having marched as cavalry and fought as infantry," in the words of the adjutant's report to the State Adjutant General. *Report of the Adjutant General of the State Illinois*, 9 vols. (Springfield, Il.: Phillips Bros. State Printers, 1901), 5: 515-16; *Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois*, 9 vols. (Springfield, Il.: Journal Company, 1900), 6: 416-19.
17. For a biography of Forrest, see *WAMB*, p. 127.
18. Johnson, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4: 759.
19. John M. Hubbard, *Notes of a Private* (St. Louis: Nixon Jones Printing, 1913), pp. 165-66.
20. Thomas Jordan and J.P. Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut. Gen. N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry* (Cincinnati: J. P. Miller and Co., 1868), pp. 657-62, 687-88; Peter Michie, ed., *The Life and Letters of Emory Upton* (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), p. 140; Capt. Eric W. Sheppard, *Bedford Forrest* (New York: The Dial Press, 1930), p. 264. For a biography of James R. Chalmers, see Franklin L. Riley, *Dictionary of American Biography*, 20 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1936), 3:593-94 (Hereafter cited as *DAB*). For a biography of William H. Jackson, see Samuel C. Williams, *DAB*, 9: 561-62. For a biography of Edward Crossland, see *Who Was Who in America, Historical Volume, 1607-1896* (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1963), rev. ed., 1967, p. 197. For a biography of Phillip Roddet, see Donovan Yeuell, *DAB*, 16:70-71.
21. Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Forrest*, pp. 658-59.
22. Colby, "Wilson's Cavalry Campaign of 1865," p. 328.
23. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 47.
24. B. F. McGee, *History of the 72d Indiana Volunteer Infantry of the Mounted Lightning Brigade* (Lafayette, Ind.: S. Vater and Co., 1882), p. 553.
25. William F. Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment: The Career of the Fourth Iowa Veteran Volunteers, from Kansas to Georgia* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893), p. 483.
26. McGee, *History of the 72d Indiana*, p. 275.
27. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army*, p. 46; Sheppard, *Bedford Forrest*, p. 272; McGee, *History of the 72d Indiana*, pp. 554-56; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 357, 496.
28. Sheppard, *Bedford Forrest*, p. 275.
29. Johnson, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4: 760.
30. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2:235; Andrews, *Campaign of Mobile*, p. 256.
31. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 360.
32. *James Nourse Diary, 1862-1888*, entry for 5-6 April 1865, Duke University Library.
33. For the Confederate controversy over the use of Negro troops, see Charles P. Roland, *The Confederacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 183-85. For an in-depth look at the question of emancipation and/or recruitment of slaves for the Confederacy, see Robert F. Durden, *The Grey and the*

Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972).

34. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 2, p. 347; Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, p. 482.

35. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 362.

36. For more on the life and career of LaGrange, see William D. Love, *Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion* (Chicago: Church and Goodman, 1866), pp. 554, 565-66, 881-83, 887-89.

37. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 428; Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, pp. 479-81.

38. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 474; Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, p. 488.

39. John H. Martin, *Columbus, Geo., from its Selection as a "Trading Town" in 1827 to its Partial Destruction by Wilson's Raid in 1865* (Columbus, Ga.: Thos. Gilbert, 1874), pp. 180-81.

40. For a biography of Cobb, see R. B. Brooks, *DAB*, 4: 241-44; Ltr. Howell Cobb to Joseph E. Brown, 9 April 1865, Howell Cobb MS, Duke University Library.

41. Martin, *Columbus, Geo.*, pp. 175-76, 180.

42. Ltr. Howell Cobb to Joseph E. Brown, 9 April 1865, Howell Cobb MS, Duke University Library.

43. Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg*, p. 132.

44. *Columbus Enquirer*, 27 June 1865, cited in Martin, *Columbus, Geo.*, p. 178.

45. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2: 259.

46. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, p. 343; Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, pp. 494-95.

47. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 474, 493-94.

48. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2: 261.

49. *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 475, 481, 496; Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, pp. 497, 499-500; Columbus, *Enquirer*, 27 June 1864, cited in Martin, *Columbus, Geo.*, p. 180.

50. Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment*, p. 501; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 408, 486; McGee, *History of the 72d Indiana*, p. 581; Johnson, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4:761.

51. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, 2:305-31; Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg*, pp. 170-76.

52. George T. Denison, *A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times*, 2d ed. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1913), pp. 383-86.

53. Moore, *Rebellion Record*, 11:660; William L. McElwee, *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons* (Bloomington,: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 160, 162.

54. After Action Rpt. of Brig. Gen. Winslow, Commander, 1st Brigade, 4th Cavalry Div., in Moore, *Rebellion Record*, 11:698.

55. See Bruce Catton, *The Centennial History of the Civil War*, vol. 3, *Never Call Retreat* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965). In the battles of Chancellorsville (1863), Gettysburg (1863), Chickamauga (1863), and the Wilderness (1864), all organized fighting ceased at night and the forces on both sides regrouped to fight again the next day. While desultory firing often occurred, planned tactical attacks were not conducted at night.

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Organizational Changes in the U.S. Army Materiel Command, 1962-1992

Robert G. Darius

Since its activation in August 1962, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) has seen major organizational changes. A major Army command, AMC combined most of the logistics functions of the seven technical services into a single organization as a result of the Hoelscher Report, a Department of the Army study that recommended the creation of a "materiel development and logistics command."

The new command, which abolished the 185-years old system of individual supply (Technical Services), came into being under the direction of General Frank S. Besson, Jr., who implemented the Department of the Army recommendation. AMC was organized initially into five commodity major subordinate commands (MSCs): Electronics Command, Missile Command, Munitions Command, Mobility Command, and Weapons Command; and two functional MSCs: Supply and Maintenance Command, and Test and Evaluation Command. In addition, thirty-six project manager offices were established to manage the development of major/visible weapons and equipment.

In July 1966 the Supply and Maintenance Command, an MSC responsible for stock control, storage, distribution, transportation, repair parts management, and emergency planning was absorbed by HQ, AMC. This action led to the creation of major directorates in the headquarters dealing with supply, maintenance and transportation, international logistics, management systems, data automation, and operational readiness.

The absorption of the Supply and Maintenance Command into HQ, AMC, affected the field programs as well. Depots and installations that had reported to the Supply and Maintenance Command now reported to HQ, AMC; procurement detachments were created in New York, Oakland, Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Chicago; new PMs were established at the MSC level; ammunition plants were reactivated to meet growing needs in Vietnam; and some installations (Erie Proving Ground and Dickson Gun Plant) were closed.

In 1969 General Ferdinand J. Chesarek, AMC's second commander, initiated a major realignment of Headquarters, AMC. Partly driven by a Department of the Army manpower survey calling for space reduc-

tions, this reorganization and realignment led to adding a third deputy commanding general and elevating the chief scientist to deputy level, cutting back the number of PMs, increasing the MSCs' roles in monitoring PM activities, decreasing the commanding general's span of control, and providing greater latitude to MSC commanders and to deputies in their specific areas.

Manpower cuts resulted from the drawdown in Vietnam and from general cutbacks in Federal employment. In 1970 AMC lost about 6,400 civilian authorizations, followed by a loss of over 15,300 in 1971 and over 7,700 in 1972. In 1973 AMC lost another 5,456 authorized spaces. The military side also experienced cuts. Reductions were handled through attrition and one-for-five replacement hiring.

In 1973 as part of the Total Optimum Army Materiel Command, the Department of the Army's Baseline Development and Utilization Planning Project, and the Army reorganization of 1973, AMC—with Department of the Army approval—pulled together Electronics Command elements at Fort Monmouth; consolidated the Munitions Command and Weapons Command into the Armament Command; and revamped a new MSC (the Mobility Command) as the Troop Support Command. Other mergers and consolidations took place as well.

General Henry A. Miley, Jr., became commander on 1 November 1970 and was heavily involved in the ongoing AMC reorganization, thinking that these changes would keep AMC "ahead of the power curve" during expected Army-wide reorganizations, consolidations, and closures. The Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee (AMARC), a Department of the Army-level, industry-heavy committee, was set up to study the sequential acquisition steps of requirements and concepts. The secretary of the Army chartered the committee to recommend improvements in the Army materiel acquisition process, while praising consolidations and cutbacks in AMC. AMARC called for extensive personnel cuts in a system it considered over-managed and, most notably, called for evolving separate research and development centers.

On 12 February 1975 General John R. Deane, Jr.,

took over the command and, having approved the concept of separate development centers, began implementing AMARC's recommendations. AMC was designated the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) on 23 January 1976.

DARCOM soon went from six commodity commands to eleven, six of which were primarily development commands. The eleven were increased to thirteen in January 1979, when the electronics and communications functions were split three ways. The International Logistics Command was organized and its missions were transferred in 1975 to the newly created Security Assistance Center. General Deane called for a study on how to shape the headquarters best to relate to the changes made elsewhere in AMC.

As a result of the Study to Align AMC's Functions (STAAF), the headquarters staff was cut from 2,138 to around 1,400. Some spaces were deleted and others were transferred to the field. The STAAF group explained the organizational changes being made and the trade-offs that would be required in the way DARCOM was to do business, including possible risks. When the command later decided that it had gone too far in shedding resources with expertise to function effectively in monitoring both development and support activities, the STAAF analysis was available to carry out "AMARC Revisited."

The Supply and Maintenance Command merger and changes brought about by STAAF gave more direct responsibility over the wholesale supply system to HQ, DARCOM. In keeping with AMARC's philosophy of decentralization, and to bring a centralized form of command and control closer to the depots, DARCOM established the U.S. Army Depot System Command (DESCOM) on 1 September 1976.

AMARC's emphasis on development paid dividends with the some 400 weapons and other items of equipment brought through the early development stages in the 1970s—a whole new generation of more capable Army equipment. The command did not work for long under the new organizational structure before the split between readiness and development commands began to chafe.

AMARC Revisited, initiated by General John Guthrie, began an effort to rejoin the severed commodity commands and to increase the authorized strength of the command. HQ, DARCOM's fiscal year 1978 baseline study calculated that DARCOM needed a total of 137,157 personnel and that it was short 21,631 authorized spaces in materiel readiness positions, and 330 at the headquarters. As a result of the study,

resources available to DARCOM began to increase. From 1979 to 1984 AMARC Revisited resulted in the reconciliation of the commodity commands and the elimination of the many problems created by AMARC.

In August 1979 a study group recommended a productivity improvement concept named the Resource Self-Help Affordability Planning Effort (RESHAPE), which sought to meet command baseline manpower requirements through, for example, greater use of overtime, overhire, streamlining, personnel incentives, reduced layering, merger of duplicative organizations, and more widespread automation. Personnel authorizations were increased for both DESCOM and HQ, DARCOM. The intent at headquarters was to reestablish a technical expertise that had been effectively removed under STAAF. This deficiency was rectified with headquarters growth and a matrix management initiated by General Donald R. Keith, keyed toward newly introduced weapons systems staff managers.

Under General Richard H. Thompson, the command continued to shed the AMARC legacy, adopting a more military structure with directorates redesignated deputy chiefs of staff and a name change from DARCOM back to the U.S. Army Materiel Command. DARCOM-Europe, established in 1982 under General Keith to centralize command and control and reduce costs in both Europe and the United States, became AMC-Europe.

The U.S. Army Laboratory Command (LABCOM) was established on 1 October 1985 under General Thompson to bring together AMC's research laboratories that generated new technologies and advanced concepts to carry the Army into the future, by the merger of some HQ, AMC, staff with personnel from the former Electronic Research and Development Command, based at Adelphi, Maryland.

In April 1986 AMC-Far East was established in Korea to provide centralized management and control of all AMC elements there and to provide more effective liaison and support to Eighth Army. In 1987, following the recommendations of the Packard Commission, most of the project managers under AMC were transferred to the newly created Department of the Army undersecretary, the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). The AAE had Program Executive Officers (PEOs) reporting directly to him, each given authority over project managers in a particular field of equipment development, with HQ, AMC, and its MSCs providing programmatic advice and assistance to the PEOs. This evolution, implemented by General Louis C. Wagner, Jr., had an impact on all AMC

elements involved in materiel development and acquisition.

In September 1989 General William G. T. Tuttle, Jr., inherited a command that was adjusting to major functional changes and declining resources, while maintaining the capacity to support the Army in both peace and war. Declining resources became an ever more prominent reality for AMC, largely as a result of changes in the international environment. AMC had to alter the way it worked to become more efficient. General Tuttle continued the emphasis on total quality management, which began under General Wagner, as a key component of any AMC activity.

General Tuttle initiated a detailed functional analysis of AMC to determine what it did, how it did it, what the best way to do it was, and what functions could be curtailed or eliminated. Like his predecessor, he dealt extensively with value-added total quality management, and a variety of Army and Department of Defense studies designed to improve the efficiency of the Army. Defense Management Review and the various Base Realignment and Closure acts had significant impact on AMC during the stewardship of Generals Wagner and Tuttle. These studies merged with AMC's own internal actions to effect a major restructuring and downsizing of the command.

Between 1987 and 1991 these actions resulted in a command-wide reduction in force (RIF), followed in the headquarters by a 30 percent reduction in authorized staff. The headquarters reduction was accomplished by attrition and personnel reassignments, rather than by RIF. Changes in the overall MSC structure included the planned consolidation of all AMC industrial activities—depots, ammunition plants, and arse-

nals—in a new Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal. Also planned was the merger of AMCCOM and MICOM into a Missiles, Armaments and Chemical Command at Redstone Arsenal. In addition, Troop Support Command and Aviation Systems Command were to merge in place in St. Louis and form the Aviation/Troop Support Command. The Army Research Laboratory would replace the current Laboratory Command.

AMC proved that its stress on realignment and downsizing did not prevent it from performing its primary mission—support of the troops in the field—as demonstrated by the command's support for Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

General Jimmy D. Ross returned to AMC and assumed command on 31 January 1992. General Ross initiated his "AMC Challenges" in line with Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan's "Enabling Strategies" for maintaining the edge, reshaping the force, providing resources, and strengthening the force. General Ross' focus includes the following emphases: sustain the force; provide superior technology and engineering; leverage industry and academia; retain a motivated, competent, quality, well-trained work force; continue to ensure that AMC is recognized as an integral part of the total force; downsize AMC consistent with the Army's requirements; exploit essential core capabilities supporting the Army's warfighting capabilities; provide "best value" products and service; strengthen AMC's strategic mobilization capability for power projection; and operate in peace as in war.

Dr. Robert G. Darius is command historian, HQ, USAMC Historical Office in Alexandria, Virginia.

New Training and Doctrine Command Volumes Published

The Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has published three new volumes we would like to call to our readers' attention. *King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery* by Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup is the first volume in TRADOC's Branch History Series. Meanwhile, Dr. Anne W. Chapman has two new publications to her credit: *The Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 1976-1984*, in TRADOC's Historical Monograph Series, and *The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990: An Overview* in its Historical Study Series. We would hope to review these publications in a future issue of *Army History*. Readers interested in these new books should contact the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (ATTN: ATMH), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5026, commercial (804) 727-3781, DSN 680-3781, FAX DSN 680-2504.

A. G. Fisch, Jr.

World War II

1942 July - September

1 Jul - Poland signs a lend-lease agreement with the U.S.
- All air transport responsibilities are transferred from the Services of Supply to the Army Air Forces. This includes the responsibility for the movement by air of all personnel, material, and mail for all the U.S. armed services.

10 Jul - Lend-lease aid is extended to Greece.

11 Jul - Lend-lease agreements are signed by Czechoslovakia, Iceland, and Norway.

13 Jul - The First Army's 1942 maneuvers begin in the Carolina Maneuver Area. Under the command of Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Dawley, VI Corps conducts the five weeks of maneuvers involving the 29th and 36th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division.

14 Jul - Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower names Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark commander of U.S. Ground Forces in Great Britain.

15 Jul - The 10th Armored Division is activated at Fort Benning, Georgia.

- Four divisions of the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service; the 80th at Camp Forrest, Tennessee; the 88th at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma; the 89th at Camp Carson, Colorado; and the 95th at Camp Swift, Texas.

16 Jul - The U.S. ends diplomatic relations with Finland, effective 1 August 1942.

17 Jul - General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King arrive in London to urge that a limited attack be launched in France in 1942. The British refuse, citing their preference to launch an all-out invasion later.

21 Jul - The Office of War Information announces that since U.S. entry into the war the Army has lost 902 men killed, 1,413 wounded, and 17,452 missing.

23 Jul - A U-boat plants mines at the mouth of the

Mississippi River.

24 Jul - Yugoslavia signs a lend-lease agreement with the U.S.

28 Jul - Franklin D. Roosevelt announces that the U.S. military has expanded to include 4 million servicemen.

31 Jul - War Department General Orders 38 establishes the Transportation Corps.

3 Aug - Seven weeks of Third Army maneuvers get under way at the Louisiana Maneuver Area as VIII Corps coordinates the training of 54,607 officers and men of the 2d and 31st Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division, 6th Armored Division, and 759th and 760th Tank Battalions.

7 Aug - 11,000 marines land on Guadalcanal and capture an airfield the Japanese were constructing there. Initial resistance is negligible, but the Japanese soon land additional troops and the ensuing campaign lasts for six months.

8 Aug - President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agree to place General Eisenhower in command of Operation TORCH, the North African invasion.

15 Aug - The 11th Armored Division is activated at Camp Polk, Louisiana.

- Four more divisions of the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service; the 78th at Camp Butner, North Carolina; the 83d at Camp Atterbury, Indiana; the 91st at Camp White, Oregon; and the 96th at Camp Adair, Oregon.

- The 82d and 101st Divisions are reorganized as airborne divisions at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

16 Aug - U.S. Army planes launch their first attack of the war in North Africa.

- The Manhattan District is established by the Corps of Engineers to manage the Army's atomic energy construction projects.

17 Aug - Elements of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion conduct a raid on Makin Atoll. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Japa-

Chronology

nese put up a fierce fight but all of them are killed.

19 Aug - Fifty U.S. Army Rangers join a force of 5,000 Canadian and British troops in a raid on Dieppe, France. The Allied force suffers numerous casualties.

20 Aug - The Army begins accepting men with I-B draft classifications (slight physical defects).

- The first U.S. planes arrive at the captured Japanese airstrip on Guadalcanal, now known as Henderson Field.

- XIX Corps is activated at Camp Polk, Louisiana.

22 Aug - Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy, securing a South Atlantic air transport route for the Allies.

27 Aug - The War Department announces that men up to age 50 may enlist in the Army if they have special skills which are in demand.

29 Aug - The first officer candidate class of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps is commissioned at Fort Des Moines, Iowa.

- XII Corps, Organized Reserves, is ordered into active military service at Columbia, South Carolina.

30 Aug - U.S. Army troops occupy positions on Adak Island in the Andreanof Group of the Aleutian Islands.

31 Aug - The first maneuvers begin at the recently created California-Arizona Maneuver Area, also known as the Desert Training Center. Conducted by II Armored Corps, the seven-week maneuvers include the 3d and 5th Armored Divisions and the 7th Motorized Division (soon to be redesignated as the 7th Infantry Division).

1 Sep - The 5th Tank Destroyer Group is activated at Camp Hood, Texas.

5 Sep - Roosevelt and Churchill agree that TORCH landings will be made at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca.

- XX Corps is activated at Camp Young, California.

9 Sep - Japanese pilot Nobuo Fujita uses a submarine-based Yokosuka floatplane to drop incendiary bombs near Brookings, Oregon, causing a small fire.

- Iran declares war on Germany.

15 Sep - Elements of the 126th Infantry, 32d Infantry Division, arrive in Port Moresby, establishing the first U.S. infantry presence in New Guinea.

- The 12th Armored Division is activated at Camp Campbell, Kentucky.

- Four more divisions of the Organized Reserves are ordered into active military service; the 94th at Fort Custer, Michigan; the 98th at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky; the 102d at Camp Maxey, Texas; and the 104th at Camp Adair, Oregon.

- The aircraft carrier *Wasp* is sunk by Japanese submarines near the Solomons.

16 Sep - The Army announces that fifty American pilots who had been flying for the Royal Air Force have been transferred to the U.S. Army Air Forces.

17 Sep - Headquarters Company, Mountain Training Center, is activated at Camp Carson, Colorado. This unit is the direct predecessor of Headquarters Company, 10th Mountain Division.

20 Sep - The Second Army's 1942 maneuvers begin in the Tennessee Maneuver Area. Conducted by I Corps, the seven-week maneuvers include the 4th Armored Division and the 6th and 8th Infantry Divisions.

21 Sep - Under control of IV Corps, 55,483 officers and men of the 28th, 38th, and 43d Infantry Divisions, 7th Armored Division, and 758th Tank

Battalion begin the second phase of the Third Army maneuvers in Louisiana.

28 Sep - The main force of the 32d Infantry Division arrives in New Guinea.

This chronology was prepared by Edward N. Bedessen of the Center's Historical Services Division.

The *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt*
(Military History Research Office)
of the German Armed Forces
A Short Introduction

Roland G. Foerster

Leafing through an old international issue of *Newsweek* recently, I came upon an article discussing Germany's "coming to terms with the ghosts of the past." That is, "it [Germany] bears almost no resemblance to the abject and vengeful republic that allowed Hitler to come to power in 1933. His 'thousand-year Reich' lasted only twelve. Yet for that relatively brief aberration in its history, present day Germans are still being held to account." (1) While one can debate the question of whether the period of National Socialism was only a "relatively brief aberration," the ghosts of the past indeed still influence the approach toward military history in Germany. It is only by keeping this fact in mind that one can fully understand the methodology, subject matter, and objectives of the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt* (MGFA).

The MGFA was established in 1957, shortly after the buildup of German forces (the *Bundeswehr*) in 1955 as part of Western security arrangements in the face of the Cold War. The MGFA has been a subdivision of the German Ministry of Defense ever since, i.e., a "Central Military Agency" under the Forces Deputy Chief of Staff. It is led by a brigadier general *Amtschef*, currently Brig. Gen. Günter Roth, Ph.D.

Tasks and Structure

Research Department One of the MGFA's official tasks is the "research and publication of military history, particularly of modern German military history, seen as part of history in general and conducted in accordance with the methods of academic historiography. Special emphasis is placed on the history of (1) the role of the armed forces within politics and society; (2) the command, control, and employment of land, naval, and air forces; and (3) military law, administration, economy, and technology." (2) This task is carried out by the Research Department (*Forschungsabteilung*) under the direction of the chief historian, Wilhelm Deist, Ph.D.

Department of Historical Education In 1978 a new department was added to the MGFA under the

somewhat cryptic title *Abteilung Ausbildung, Information, Fachstudien* (Department of Education, Information, Special Studies), now more appropriately named the Department of Historical Education. In essence, this department is responsible for the MGFA's second official task—the improvement of historical education within the armed forces. It represents, so to speak, the didactical branch of the MGFA, with a wide spectrum of educational activities. The director of historical education and deputy chief of military history is Col. Roland G. Foerster, Ph.D.

Military Museums Military historians have always regarded the exhibition of historical objects as an important educational means of disseminating knowledge. In 1969, therefore, the *Wehrgeschichtliches Museum* at the castle of Rastatt (Baden) became responsible to the MGFA. Since then, this museum has been a well-known and popular spot for many visitors, as well as a site for historical research, storing and displaying objects from German military history since the seventeenth century. Its director, a lieutenant colonel, coordinates all museological activities involving museums, exhibits, and collections of the German armed forces. At the present time the south wing of the Rastatt castle is being restored to provide more space for displays.

In 1987 another museum, the Air Force Museum near Hamburg, was added to those run by the MGFA. A semiprivate collection since 1956, this museum is tasked with the display of military aerial flight in Germany from its beginnings to the present, with a special interest in air force ordnance and uniforms.

With the incorporation of the People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic in the *Bundeswehr* in 1990, the MGFA became responsible for a third military museum, the *Militärhistorisches Museum* (previously *Armeemuseum*) in Dresden (Saxony). While in the midst of a complete revision of its didactical conception, this museum will exhibit German military history from its beginnings (Holy Roman Empire) to present times, with special attention to the military

history of Saxony and German postwar history.

At the present time, the "Commissioner for Museums" at the MGFA—the chief of military history himself—and the Department of Defense in Bonn are working very hard to develop a concept for the future conduct and maintenance of the military museums. Given the current very severe steps to curb public expenses, there is, quite frankly, a wide gap between personnel capabilities and material requirements of the three museums on the one hand and the availability of funds on the other. For the present, there is no solution in sight.

Methods and Approaches

In terms of approaches and methodology, military history has come a long way in the German armed forces. The Prussian and German General Staff, as it existed from 1809 until the end of World War II, and represented by such military educators, thinkers, and leaders as August von Gneisenau, Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Alfred von Schlieffen, regarded military history as one of the most important and formative means of training the military mind. (4) Using a strictly utilitarian approach, however, their view of military history avoided political, economic, and social implications and the interdependencies of military actions, and therefore to a great extent lacked critical and analytical scope. (5) If such methods may have had their merits at the time, in the long run they repeatedly led to deplorably detrimental results: Schlieffen's obsession with an outdated concept of war (Cannae and the battle of annihilation) in World War I, Franz Halder's conviction that the *Wehrmacht* could repeat its operational masterpiece of 1940 (the "Sickle Cut") in France with another *Blitzkrieg* against the Soviet Union, and the ideological abuse of military history during the National Socialist regime, to name but three examples.

When the MGFA was established 1 January 1957, therefore, it was clear from the very beginning that not only was the *Bundeswehr* to represent an entirely new type of German armed forces—existing solely to secure the peace, integrated into a democratic society, and part of a multinational alliance. Clearly military history as well had to play a part in this new concept. It had to be researched, published, and taught along the lines and standards of the scholarly approach of academic history. From now on, its major objective had to be the unabridged and unveiled examination of Germany's political and military past, thereby to understand better the challenges of the present. This

objective does not exclude dealing with the history of strategies and operations, so long as critical methods are applied. Military history, therefore, as understood by the MGFA, has always meant the comprehensive analysis of the role of the military as an integral part of the overall political, economic, and social process within a national and international framework of reference. (6)

Subjects and Research Projects

The subjects and topics researched by the MGFA focus on the recent past of German history, i.e., primarily the twentieth century. The causes, prerequisites, and implications of World War II were given the highest degree of attention, to examine from a German point of view German society and the *Wehrmacht* under the National Socialist regime. Another major field of interest and research was the outcome of the Second World War in Europe, particularly the integration of Germany's western zones of occupation into the Western world, the foundation of the Federal Republic, and the establishment of a military contribution for the defense of the West—in short, a history of Germany's surprisingly quick rearmament and her inclusion into the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, the MGFA has started looking into the very complicated and diversified historical problem of the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western defense system, not from a German point of view this time, but from the perspective of the alliance itself.

To cover these three major research projects, the Research Department of the MGFA has set up several teams of historians, responsible to three project directors. The first project is a ten-volume series entitled *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*. This work was considered a particularly urgent priority from the beginnings of the MGFA. After a vast amount of the documents previously held by the occupation forces had been returned to German custody, and after extensive preparatory work, it became possible to start research on a wide scale. The first volume was published in 1979. It analyzes the political, economic, social, and ideological preconditions and causes of the Second World War in Germany. To date six volumes have appeared (albeit only the first part of volume 5, a double volume) and have met with broad approval. The MGFA is very proud that, following wide international interest, the complete work is being published by Oxford University Press in English, the first volume having appeared early this year and volume 2 soon to follow.

Since 1974 in response to mounting interest in postwar history, another group of scholars has researched and written a four-volume project entitled *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956 (Beginnings of West German Security Policy, 1945-1956)*. This work, like the previous one, is based on extensive research efforts, both at home and abroad. Its major research interest is directed toward the question why, from virtually 1945 on, and within the scope of international power constellations, the three Western zones of occupation formed a federal German state, later to become an integral part of the Western community and the Western defense system. Substantial armed forces were thus reestablished in Germany only ten years after the catastrophe of World War II and the Potsdam Conference. The first volume, covering the period 1945-1950, was published in 1982. (7) Volume 2 became available to the public in 1990. (8) Volumes 3 and 4 are in the final stages of preparation.

The third major project, a history of NATO, has completed its planning phase. It requires a tremendous amount of research at various international archives, including the National Archives in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, as well as access to NATO documents at Brussels, the Public Record Office in London, and, as far as accessible, the Archive Nationale in Paris.

In addition, there are always a number of monographs being prepared, which cannot be listed because of space limitations. Two periodicals published by the MGFA should be mentioned, however. First is the semi-annual *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM)*, with its yearly bibliographical supplement, *War and Society Newsletter*, which surveys more than 700 periodicals and collective works. It is directed rather at the academic military history community and enjoys popularity and a sound reputation among scholarly and military circles as well as with the public. Since 1986 the MGFA has also published another historical journal, now called *Militär-geschichte. Neue Folge (NF)*. (9) Distributed as a supplement to the well-known periodical *Europäische Sicherheit*, this quarterly reaches a more general public. (10) It is generally limited to sixteen pages per issue.

Historical Education

The MGFA also has a mission in the field of military history education. Led by the director of historical education, Department of Historical Education (*Abteilung Historische Bildung* or *AHB*), the department commissioned with this task does not itself teach. Rather, the *AHB* is instrumental in developing

general concepts in the military education field for the entire armed forces and is responsible for the training and professional education of the instructors of military history in the *Bundeswehr*. The *AHB* also publishes text books, teaching aids, and instructional material. To broaden historical consciousness within all members of the military community on a wide scale, the *AHB* conducts national and international symposiums on military history. It develops exhibitions on special problems of German military history, usually on questions that are subject to public controversy. In addition, the *AHB* prepares, conducts, and accompanies staff rides for German and Allied units. The target groups and teaching objectives are manifold, but may be grouped roughly around three major foci:

- "Teaching the teachers", i.e., during the weekly instruction hours that are mandated by law for enlisted men, particularly for the young conscripts within the framework of *Innere Führung* (Principles of Leadership and Civic Education), to enable military leaders of all ranks to establish historical interrelations between current political events and their historical background;

- Enabling officers and noncommissioned officers to understand their role as soldiers in a democratic society and to recognize the purpose and meaning of military service in present times by a realistic, comprehensive view of history—to educate "confident and competent leaders," as the U.S. Army Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, once put it; and

- Training the military mind and judgment of present and future military commanders by presenting them with selected personalities, developments, and actions in the course of military history, so as to base their decisions on established historical knowledge.

All this requires broad academic and military cooperation and mutual information exchange, both on a national and international level, as well as close contact with the education and training facilities of friendly forces in Europe and North America.

Space limitations preclude describing all the activities of the Department of Historical Education or listing all of the publications, but a few bear mention:

- A three-volume series for all army units at brigade level and higher, called *Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele* (Case Studies in the History of War). By comparing examples taken from the battlefields of World War II, the case studies of operational and, in a few cases, tactical leadership are intended to revive and develop operational thinking from a historical perspective. The first volume deals with operational defense, the second and third with attack and delay, respectively. Each

contains an account of the course of events, slides of maps, photos of ordnance, and portraits of the military leaders involved and, most important of all, a generous collection of documents and source material. Thus the reader can indulge in conducting his own research and interpretation of a particular event—to learn by research. Also, commanding officers may direct one or several junior officers on their staffs to prepare series of historical instructions for tactical or operational training within their command;

-A general textbook on German military history under preparation for the period between the sixteenth century and the present time, called *Grundzüge der deutschen Militärgeschichte* (Outlines of German Military History). It will help the instructors of military history to guide their students, mostly officer cadets, through the periods of military history in an organized and systematic way. It will serve students as text and reference book in their preparation for oral and written examinations. Like the three-volume set, this book will also contain rich source material and a documentary supplement for "learning by research";

-The last example is a project called *Studies in Strategic and Operational Thinking*. It will be a series of roughly ten to twelve slender volumes, each containing an in-depth analysis of the creation, conceptualization, and implementation of one operational idea during World War II. Starting with a general overview of the development and interrelation of military theory and action in Germany from the early nineteenth century to the beginning of World War II, the series will carry on with operations of the *Wehrmacht* while it was still in control of the operational initiative (1939-41), when it struggled for this control (1941-43), and finally, after control was irretrievably lost (1943-45). Volume I, the general overview, regrettably was delayed by a number of adverse circumstances and remains unfinished. Manuscripts of three additional volumes are completed and waiting to be printed.

Military History and Tradition

Although it is true that "tradition and history are unseparably [*sic*] related with each other" in Germany, the problem has become much less a question of history than one of ethics and politics. (11) With Germany's involvement with National Socialism in mind and the latter's close interrelation with the armed forces—the *Wehrmacht*—it is extremely difficult, even today, to answer the question, for instance, if philosophically tradition is divisible into a "good" and a "bad" part, particularly with respect to historical per-

sonalities. Which values could be chosen to serve as an orientation for "acceptable" traditions, particularly with respect to guidelines for democratic forces? The MGFA has honestly tried to approach the problem from a strictly historical point of view. But tradition has many powerful facets, including emotions, not to mention social and political affiliation and utility. During the years the *Bundeswehr* has existed, thereby forming its own tradition, official attempts to solve the problem have agreed that all traditions honored in the *Bundeswehr* had to correspond with the values and the fundamental democratic order of the Basic Law (the German constitution). (12) This is how it should be, but it does pose the question to what degree military traditions that have developed over the centuries, i.e., partly under undemocratic conditions, can stand up to such demands—Gerhard Scharnhorst, von Clausewitz, and von Moltke, for instance, were no democrats! And the question becomes critical in the case of military leaders who were brilliant military minds during World War II, but who had supported Adolf Hitler unconditionally and who were possibly involved in war crimes.

The question of military tradition in the *Bundeswehr*, and in the Federal Republic, has thus not been solved satisfactorily—the spectrum of opinions and ethical convictions is too wide, particularly with respect to the *Wehrmacht*. (13) All in all, there is a very clear and very difficult obligation for the historian neither to glorify in a general way nor to condemn generally as "unworthy for tradition," but to differentiate carefully in each individual case. (14)

New Tasks

The memorable "fall of the wall" on 9 November 1989 marked an opportunity for entirely new perspectives and substantial new tasks in the relation between military history and the military profession in Germany. For the Federal Republic and within NATO, the necessity of the *Bundeswehr* will have to be reexplained, emphasizing the historical, more classical function of any military force—as the guardian of sovereignty and political self-determination within the framework of the constitution. This will be a most important mission for military history as an essential educational instrument, particularly in fostering the acceptance of the armed forces within society as well as the self-esteem of professional military men.

The second new reality is that military history will have to play a much more important role in the education of all German soldiers. Military history powerfully shapes military educators, instructors, and lead-

ers who are well grounded in a sophisticated, humanistic way, able to think analytically and in context, true to the ideals of the constitution, but who are also willing to risk their lives in its defense—their outstanding military training a matter of course.

Finally, there is another great task for military history in Germany, as an inalienable component of political education. Within the new eastern federal states there is a vast, unfilled demand for developing a democratic consciousness, for overcoming the lack of knowledge about ways and means of democratic decision making in general, and for explaining how to direct the armed forces in a democratic manner. There must be no patronizing complacency on the part of the "old" army, however. Forces in the *Bundeswehr* that were lucky enough to have had a head start of almost forty years of freedom have every reason to pass along this experience firmly, but with tact, consideration, and understanding. Military history can render important assistance with this task.

Conclusion

I would conclude by saying that the MGFA considers itself a research center, subject to the methods and approaches of academic historiography. Its mission is to promote historical knowledge and education for the German armed forces. It provides ways and means for the political-historical orientation of all soldiers, young and old, for the education and shaping of military leaders, and for the revival and continuous development of operational thinking. Since all the results of the MGFA's research efforts are unclassified and published in Germany (as well as often abroad), they are conducive to the understanding of Germany's past in general. Thus they form an important contribution to the political and military culture of our society.

Col. Roland G. Foerster, Ph.D., has served with the German armed forces since 1956. Formerly the German defense attache in Ottawa, Canada, Colonel Foerster currently serves as director of the Department of Historical Education, MGFA.

Notes

1. *Newsweek*, 26 Feb 90, p. 19.
2. According to StAN MGFA (1980).
3. Directive, StvGenInspBw, BMVg-Fü S I 3, 17 Aug 78.
4. A section of war history was suggested by General von Grolmann in 1816 as part of the Great General Staff, established in 1824. Detlaf Bald et al., eds., *Tradition und Reform in militärischen Bildungswesen* (Baden-Baden, 1985), pp. 20-32.
5. Ronald H. Spector, "Military History and the Academic World," in *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1982 reprint), pp. 435-36.
6. "Zielsetzung und Methode der Militärgeschichtsschreibung," in *Militärgeschichte. Probleme, Thesen, Wege*, Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, vol. 25, ed. (Stuttgart: MGFA, 1982).
7. *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan* (Munich, 1982).
8. *Die EVG-Phase*, (Munich, 1990).
9. *NF* since 1 Jan 91; previously *Militärgeschichtliche*

Beihefte zur Europäischen Wehrkunde.

10. Previously, *Europäische Wehrkunde.*

11. Günter Roth, Einführung, *Tradition in deutschen Streitkräften bis 1945. Entwicklung deutscher militärischer Tradition*, vol. 1, ed. (Hereford/Bonn: MGFA, 1986), pp. 11-18.

12. There were three directives: BMVg-Fü B I 4, 1 Jul 65, "Bundeswehr und Tradition,"-Traditionserlass, 7 Jul 65. Canceled 20 Sep 82; BMVg GenInspBw-Fü S I 3, 20 Sep 82, "Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr" *Weissbuch 1985* (Bonn, 1985), pp. 313-16.

13. Heirich Walle, "Tradition-Floskel oder Form? Neue Wege zu alten Werten," in *Von der Friedenssicherung zur Friedensgestaltung. Streitkräfte im Wandel*, ed. (Freiburg: MGFA, 1991) has analysed the latest development in this field from a number of different angles.

14. Manfred Messerschmidt, "Das Verhältnis von Wehrmacht und NS-Staat und die Frage der Traditionsbildung," in *Das Parlament. Beilage: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 17 (1981), pp. 11 ff. Messerschmidt is the former chief historian, MGFA.

Focus on the Field

Historical Office U.S. Army Materiel Command Robert G. Darius, Chief Historian

The Army Materiel Command (AMC) is a great place to work, with an important history and a tradition of contributions to our nation. When the AMC was activated in August 1962, it combined most of the logistics functions of the traditional technical services into a single organization. The seven technical services that contributed elements to AMC included Chemical, Engineers, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Surgeon General, and Transportation. AMC's mission is to provide equipment, supplies, and logistical support to the Army, our sister services, and our allies.

The mission of the AMC historian is to capture critical elements in the history of this dynamic major command. The function of our Headquarters, Army Materiel Command Historical Office (AMCHO) is to develop, manage, and oversee the historical activities of HQ, AMC, and our major subordinate commands (MSCs). Our work includes the command Annual Historical Review, command historical sources collection program, the oral history program, historical inquiries, heraldic matters, special/demand studies program, Logistics Issues Research Memoranda (LIRM), and—as resources permit—the monograph program. Our office also handles liaison with the Center of Military History, the Military History Institute, other major commands, and other governmental and private historical organizations.

Our MSCs are as follows: Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) at Rock Island, Illinois; Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) at St. Louis, Missouri; Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Laboratory Command (LABCOM) at Adelphi, Maryland; Missile Command (MICOM) at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) at Warren, Michigan; Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri; Depot System Command (DESCOM) at Chambersburg, Maryland; Armament Research and Development Center (ARDEC) in Dover, New Jersey; and the Chemical Research and Development Center (CRDEC) at Aberdeen, Maryland. ARDEC and

CRDEC report to AMCCON.

All these MSCs have historians except for DESCOM and TROSCOM. These currently lack historians because both of these MSCs will be absorbed through an ongoing reorganization with other elements of AMC. U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), another critical MSC, collocated with HQ, AMC, in Alexandria, Virginia, also lacks a historian. AMCHO, however, covers USASAC's key activities in the HQ, AMC, Annual Historical Review.

Establishment of our newest MSC, the U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) in Orlando, Florida, in June 1992 is indicative of the importance the Army and AMC attach to training and newly emerging simulation capabilities. These will help give our soldiers the best possible training environment, while saving critical tax dollars. We do not know at this time whether STRICOM will hire a historian, but we hope our newest MSC will capture the record of its exciting new role.

The Army museums and historical holdings at AMC installations deserve special mention. They include the Rock Island Arsenal Museum at Rock Island, Illinois (certified in 1987), which concentrates on the development of cannon; Picatinny Arsenal Historical Holding in New Jersey, which focuses on the arsenal's role in the development of artillery ammunition; and the Communications-Electronics Historical Holding at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The latter is largely a research collection of communications and electronics equipment developed for the military.

In late 1985 Maj. Gen. Jimmy D. Ross, then chief of staff of AMC (now commanding general, AMC), initiated the move to revamp the dormant AMC history program. In 1986 he directed the new AMC historian to "keep pushing our history program." By that, he meant that we needed to produce quality products on a timely basis and be more useful to the command. We have kept pushing, developing our skills as action officers as well as logistics historians, despite the continual decline in resources we have been experiencing since General Ross' directive.

How have we kept pushing? In addition to preparing the Annual Historical Reviews, AMC historians have published numerous monographs, special studies, and demand studies, with a focus on weapons

systems, support and maintenance, as well as a few monographs on organizational aspects of AMC. AMCHO has also begun a series known as AMC's Logistics Issues Research Memoranda, with the first LIRM—on the Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun—published in 1992. The DIVAD study, which in the words of its author explains "how the Sergeant York became the systems everyone loves to hate," provides valuable lessons for Army logisticians and others, particularly in the field of acquisition and procurement. Another important study soon to be published is the history of AMC's role in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Useful studies like these answer directly the unique needs of AMC's "customers."

In addition, we solicit manuscripts that focus on a broad range of Army logistics issues such as materiel acquisition; development and readiness; security assistance; logistics assistance; and other issues of concern to AMC and Army logisticians. We request that all manuscripts be cleared for publication and reviewed for Operations Security before submission to our office.

Another "push" is the effort to become more efficient. Since we and our MSC historical offices are trying to handle an increasing work load in a time of diminishing resources, we have turned to automation both for word processing and for automating our records holdings. AMCHO has a desk-top publishing unit and word processors for everyone in the office. In the ongoing effort to automate our archival collection, AMCHO looks to the joint Military History Institute-Center of Military History effort to provide more tangible guidance to develop a useful software program for all Army historians.

To overcome staffing shortages, we have used summer hires, including professors from the Historically Black Colleges and Universities summer hire program, and reservists. Based on the sound advice from one of our former commanding generals, General Richard H. Thompson, we developed and have been successfully using an outside typing contract for our oral history program since 1986, which lessens the burden on this office. We strongly recommend such a program to other historical offices. We believe that historians need to look at the entire gamut of measures available to help cope with an ever-increasing work load amid reduced resources.

Yet another effort is the drive to get soldiers out of the office occasionally and into the field for an invigorating history lesson. Several AMC historical offices have played an active role in organizing staff rides to

Civil War battlefields, particularly HQ, AMC; DESCOM; and TECOM, which are near so many major battlefields. In recent years HQ, AMC, has had one of the most active MACOM staff ride programs in the Army. In 1992 we will conduct staff rides for general officers and senior executive service officials and for AMC's Command Sergeant Major and our MSC's sergeants major to Gettysburg. We just finished the staff ride on First and Second Manassas for senior personnel, where we presented material with a strong emphasis on logistics.

AMC's oral history program has also been very active. We routinely interview retiring general officers and key personnel departing the command. We recently had an unusual opportunity to interview a number of people who had returned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. That is another "push" of which we are proud. The people we interviewed were not soldiers—they were the AMC Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs), who went to Saudi Arabia as part of the AMC support group. There were LARs and other civilians representing all of our MSCs, providing vital technical and logistics support to the soldiers in the theater of operations. LARs and other civilian personnel were a critical feature in the high readiness rates on equipment sustained in one of the world's harshest environments.

General Ross' guidance ("keep pushing our history program") and support over the years have paid off handsomely for the AMC history program, despite a huge loss of personnel. We hope that our experiences in AMC's history program will encourage creative "brainstorming" among other inventive Army historians who know about the past, live in the present, and plan for the future.

The dramatic world changes over the past three years—Berlin Wall breached, JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM, dissolution of the Soviet Union—have caused our nation and our Army, including AMC, to change. As the Army and AMC shift to meet the new world realities, the AMC history program is focusing on capturing the story of how AMC is being affected by these historic events. We also focus on the people behind the decisions being made on how AMC will help meet the challenges.

Our national military strategy is based on power projection. AMC is a critical element in the development of this strategy. As AMC evolves and moves toward enhancing our ability to support power projection, the AMC history program is standing by to record these historic and critical moments in our history.

The Berlin Wall

Highlight of Tankers' Career

John Cranston

The Communists' decision to erect the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 altered many lives, including those of American soldiers stationed in the city. Company F, 40th Armored Regiment, the only tank company in the Berlin Brigade, played an active military role in preserving the integrity of Berlin's Western Sector. Enlisted soldiers in the tank company will never forget the tense atmosphere in the fall of 1961—they were participants as well as witnesses to the unfolding drama.

(1)
Company F did not rush immediately to the barbed-wire barrier that was so suddenly uncoiled after 13 August. But, as the barbed wire became replaced by concrete block, Company F's noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and their tanks helped safeguard every inch of the Western Sector. The actions of the tank platoons within Company F helped to reveal the differences between Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Communists on the one hand and Walter Ulbricht's East German Communists on the other—differences which served to weaken the Communists' grip on the divided city. (2)

For months before mid-August, Khrushchev had threatened to turn East Berlin over to the East German Communist government, a government to which the United States refused to extend diplomatic recognition. Such recognition would have served to acknowledge a forever divided German nation. Ulbricht wanted action to curb the flight of East Germans to the American Sector, thence to freedom. The wall itself was Ulbricht's idea, and Moscow agreed with reluctance to the construction of the barrier.

As the East Germans began to uncoil the barbed wire on 13 August to construct the first barriers, Maj.Gen. Albert Watson, the West Berlin commandant, decided that he could not send tanks to knock down the obstruction, since this would symbolize the start of an invasion into East Berlin's territory. American tanks went to the wall only on 23 August, when the East Germans reduced crossing points from twelve to seven and tried to prevent West Berliners from coming closer than 100 meters of the wall itself.

The NCOs and other soldiers of Company F had been in a high state of combat readiness for the past ten

days. S.Sgt. Leonard Chatham, Sgt. Bert Chesteen, and Pfc. Charles Flowers held the responsibilities of tank commander, gunner, and ammunition loader, respectively. All had been called back to the barracks on 13 August. Each went with his tank to the wall eleven days later, on 24 August. It was an experience that none of them will ever forget.

Chatham and his tank driver were first ordered to the Tempelhof Airport, where they were to receive further orders. Arriving at the airport, Sergeant Chatham was instructed by a military policeman (MP) to follow the lead tank. In answer to the question, "Where are we going, and what are we going to do?" the MP replied, "I don't know, but I think you're going to start World War III."

From Tempelhof, Chatham followed the lead tank to Checkpoint Charlie. His tank, a fully loaded M48 "Patton," took up a guard watch on one side of the street leading to the checkpoint gate, while the lead tank stood guard on the other side of the street. Tankers were instructed not to fire unless fired upon, and then to return fire with the same type of weapon employed on the other side of the wall.

Chatham never had to fire at the wall, but he acknowledges today that the atmosphere was very tense. Several times he was ordered inside the turret or behind the main gun, as American diplomats, their cars clearly marked, passed through the checkpoint and into East Berlin, to return a few hours later. Chatham recalls that the American authorities wanted to make very certain that embassy staff could pass into East Berlin without showing papers to East German border guards. Paradoxically, automobiles with Soviet plates passed through Checkpoint Charlie traveling in the opposite direction, also asserting their diplomatic privileges. An American MP motorcycle escort usually accompanied the Soviet cars, making certain that irate West Berliners would not attack the car and its occupants.

Each American tank was equipped with a revolving searchlight of 1 1/2 million candlepower. From across the wall, similar searchlights on newly erected East German watchtowers probed for escapees. "We

turned the lights on them, and they turned their lights on us," Sergeant Chatham remembers. Perhaps, in all this confusion, refugees were able to jump the barrier and reach freedom in West Berlin, but Chatham and his fellow soldiers will never know for certain.

Mrs. Chatham, of German descent, read of Company F's move to the wall in the Berlin newspapers. She recalls finding her husband's tank and bringing him long underwear, noting that "even in August, the nights can be cold in Berlin." West Berliners had no problems finding the tankers. The American, French, and British all wanted the East Germans to know that West Berliners could come closer than 100 meters from the wall—after all, this was West German territory. When the Germans asked Chatham and his fellow soldiers what they were going to do next, he and his crew agreed to say that they would simply follow orders. Chatham clearly sensed that the West Berliners "definitely felt better because we were there." (3)

The commotion about the 100-meter limit died down after the tankers had spent about two weeks at Checkpoint Charlie. American authorities concluded that Khrushchev was willing to let Ulbricht build the wall, but stopped short of supporting Ulbricht's tougher policies, including the 100-meter limit. As for Company F, the tank crews set up a field kitchen, with tents, in a bombed-out building near the checkpoint. The different platoons of Company F rotated duty at the wall. By late September, some of the sense of an immediate confrontation had diminished.

Sergeant Bert Chesteen was a tank gunner with another platoon of Company F. After 13 August, he too was confined to barracks—it was two weeks before he saw his wife (a native Berliner) again. "Everybody was very uptight," Chesteen remembers, "We spent hours training and reequipping tanks, making sure everything worked the way it should."

For Chesteen, the first real challenge took place at Mariendammplatz, not far from Checkpoint Charlie. Word had come that the American consul had been detained across the wall by East German authorities. Chesteen's tank was third in line, covering two tanks ahead of him, which were equipped with bulldozer blades for assaulting the wall. Chesteen recalls the voice of Maj. Thomas B. Tyree, the company commander, on the tank's radio: "When I give the order, move to the checkpoint." (4)

As the three tanks clattered forward, Chesteen remembers uncasing ammunition for the coaxial and submachine guns. Suddenly, a couple of 2 1/2-ton American Army trucks came into view. MPs in full riot

gear dismounted to escort the consul through the checkpoint. The MPs drove an American car with diplomatic plates. East German police (*Vopos*) let the car pass without asking for papers. Like Staff Sergeant Chatham, Sergeant Chesteen had witnessed a successful American diplomatic challenge to the East German government where armed conflict had been avoided. Company F had participated in a carefully calculated risk.

Chesteen remembers that the West Berliners kept the Americans' morale high. There was always plenty of food, and the tankers learned to love bratwurst and hot German potato salad. In the August weather three of the four tank crew members slept outside on the rear deck of the tank, while one crew member remained inside by the radio, prepared to wake the others if an alert came from Army headquarters.

Pfc. Charles Flowers was called up to the wall around 0200 on 24 August. His tank was stationed at Huttenweg and Clayallee, named for General Lucius Clay, who had directed the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift. Flowers remembers that when he arrived at his position, it was too dark to see much of anything. At daybreak, he poked his head out of the tank hatch to see the ugly looming concrete mass of the wall, just a few feet away. Beyond that, Flowers looked straight into the main gun of a Soviet T-72 tank. "Their tanks were about seven feet away," Flowers recalls. "They had three tanks for every one of ours." It was eyeball-to-eyeball for weeks on end. Beneath the guns of the opposing forces, laborers from East Germany worked on the wall, guarded by the *Vopos*. "We never could find out who these workers were—maybe they were prisoners of war," Flowers says.

After this initial confrontation, Flowers and other enlisted soldiers were given a new and novel assignment. In full dress uniform, they boarded a bus for a drive through Checkpoint Charlie. The Army was reaffirming the right of uniformed military personnel to pass into the Eastern Sector in clearly marked vehicles without challenges from the *Vopos* or other officials of the East German government. (5)

Both Flowers and Chesteen recall the almost surrealistic nature of the subway rides after the wall had gone up. Subway cars passed East German stations without stopping. American passengers wondered how those looking out from the Eastern Sector must have felt, seeing the brightly lit trains going by.

Army humor brightened the tankers' dark moments. Major Tyree's sister had helped television entertainer Ed Sullivan find his first job. Just before the wall went up, Sullivan had visited Berlin. Company F,

remembering his visit and the impact of television, coined the motto "Have armored gun, will travel."

The southern part of the American sector was the scene of a comical encounter between opposing forces. An American tank platoon assigned to an open field found an East German crew there stringing more barbed wire. The American platoon leader decided to charge the East Germans in line (rather than in column) formation. At the sight of the five charging tanks, the East Germans fled back across the border. The tank platoon screeched to a halt to the cheers of admiring West Berliners. (6)

The tanks themselves mirrored their new front-line defensive role. The "spit and polish," including the white rings around the main gun, came off, as dull olive drab replaced the gleaming mirror finish. Training sessions took place next to the wall, with classes on the use of the tank bulldozer blades (to knock down the wall if so ordered), tank retrieval, and tank towing. Pfc. Flowers observed that the East Germans on the other side also practiced tank towing.

As always in the Army, there were inspections. An officer and a sergeant major inspected the tank platoons every day to make sure that everything was spic and span. "If anything, we tried harder to look ship-shape," states Sergeant Chesteen. "After all, the Berliners were watching our every move, and we wanted to make them feel good. Also, we never knew which dignitaries were going to visit us." Chesteen remembers, among others, Francis Cardinal Spellman of the New York Archdiocese, Vice President Lyndon

Johnson, and Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona.

The crisis at the Berlin Wall affected soldiers elsewhere in Germany and in the United States. After 13 August, for example, U.S. Army authorities repeatedly sent military brigades over the Helmstedt-Berlin *Autobahn* to emphasize the Western right of passage over the roadway. CWO (Chief Warrant Officer) Jerry Wayne's assignment was to fly a brigade commander and his staff from umpire duty at Detmold, in the British zone of West Germany, back to his unit at an *Autobahn* interchange between Helmstedt and Berlin. There was dense fog and heavy cloud cover all along the flight route. Originally, Wayne and his helicopter were to go first and chart the trip. Should he crash, the second helicopter, with the brigade commander and his staff, would then select an alternate way to reach the interchange intact. At the last minute, however, the commander decided in the best "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" military tradition to fly with Wayne. Everyone concluded that the potential flight hazards were less threatening than the dangers of a roadmarch to Berlin. Wayne's helicopter bore the brigade commander, his driver, and his Jeep. The second helicopter carried the commander's staff. All reached the interchange safely and on time. (7)

Reservists in the United States also made career sacrifices for the continued preservation of the American military presence in West Berlin. Col. (then Capt.) Raymond E. White was an employee of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation and a reserve officer in Louisville with the 100th Training Division when he



A graffiti-covered section of the Berlin Wall at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

was called to active duty because of the Berlin Wall. After two weeks at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, White proceeded to Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. White served for a year as commander of one of Camp Chaffee's receiving companies, training soldiers for active duty.

The first basic trainees arrived on 19 October 1961. White oversaw preliminary screening, including identifying those with police records and classifying those with special skills. "Priority skills included recruits who could play instruments in the band," White recalls. Basic training lasted about eight weeks; soldiers recently discharged who had just returned to active duty went through a special two-week refresher course which included requalification on the rifle.

White recalls there were about 3,200 called to the 100th Training Division. "The only reservist who could escape the draft was a bankruptcy judge. With Federal court approval, he went home, as his services were needed there." White remembers that General Motors, his own employer, was understanding and generous with leave provisions. After a year of training about 32,000 recruits, he returned to Louisville, where he has worked for General Motors ever since. (8)

Sergeant Chatham retired from the Army after more than twenty years of service and now works for the Radcliff, Kentucky, Post Office. He often sees fellow military "alumni" of the Berlin crisis on his mail route.

Sergeant Chesteen left Berlin on 25 November 1963, just three days after the assassination of Presi-

dent John F. Kennedy. As a sign of respect for the fallen American president, West Berlin turned off the blazing lights on thoroughfares like the Kurfürstendamm. The city's inhabitants instead were encouraged to burn candles in the windows of their dwellings. The Chesteens' last memory of the city was a sea of candles, burning brightly on a cold winter night.

Sergeant Chesteen retired from the Army in 1988 at Fort Knox with the grade of sergeant major. He completed his college education in Radcliff, Kentucky, where he and his family elected to stay. His wife prefers Radcliff's abrupt seasonal changes, reminiscent of Berlin, to sunnier alternatives such as Florida.

Flowers, who retired after twenty years of service with the rank of master sergeant, continued for several years to employ his gunnery skills through instruction at the Armor Center on the new Conduct-of-Fire Trainer, which tests tank gunnery accuracy in a simulated classroom setting. Flowers lives in nearby Vine Grove and often sees his colleagues on the streets of this small town or in neighboring Radcliff.

For all these soldiers, the 1961 Berlin crisis was the highlight of their careers. Except Colonel White, all have been back to Berlin at least once since their duty at the wall. And, since "the wall came tumbling down," all would like to see a united Berlin. "The people there are as friendly as any in the world," Chesteen recalls.

Dr. John W. Cranston is the Armor Branch historian, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Notes

1. On the role of Company F in Berlin, see Capt. Michael Easley, "The Berlin Wall and American Armor," *Armor* (July-August 1964): 19-21. For more on the wall itself, see John Bainbridge, "Wall That Divides Berlin: *Die Mauer*," *New Yorker* 38 (27 October 1962): 57.
2. Of the seven checkpoints, four were to be open to West Berliners, two to West Germans, and only one to foreigners—this last being the well-known "Checkpoint Charlie." On the 100-meter decree, see Norman Gelb, *The Berlin Wall* (New York: Times Books, 1986), pp. 230-31.
3. Interview, author with S.Sgt. (Ret.) Leonard Chatham and Mrs. Chatham, 20 Jan 89. Tape in possession of Armor Center historian.
4. Interview, author with Sgt. Maj. (Ret.) Bert Chesteen, 13 Feb 89. Tape in possession of Armor Center

- historian.
5. Interview, author with M. Sgt. (Ret.) Charles Flowers, 31 Jan 89. Tape in possession of Armor Center historian.
6. The information on Major Tyree came from the above-cited interview with Sgt. Maj. Chesteen. On tanks in the southern part of the American sector, see Easley, "The Berlin Wall and American Armor."
7. Interview, author with Mr. Jerry Wayne, Chief, Resource Management Div., G-3/Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 11 Apr 89. Transcript in possession of Armor Center Historian.
8. Interview, author with Col. (Ret.) Raymond E. White, 27 Mar 89. Transcript in possession of Armor Center historian.

The Archaic Archivist

World War II on the American home front is well documented in the holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. This column concentrates on manuscript holdings. Researchers should remember that the Institute has many other pertinent papers as well as numerous pictures and publications on this subject.

Some manuscripts come from senior officers in Washington. The diaries of Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Secretary of the Army General Staff; the papers of Maj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Chief of Ordnance; and the speeches of Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, Surgeon General, are substantive contemporaneous documents. Later perspectives on wartime events appear in the oral history transcripts of General Thomas T. Handy and Maj. Gen. John E. Hull of the Operations Division.

Mobilization of materiel and manpower represents crucial dimensions of home front activities. These logistical activities are reflected in the papers of Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding Army Service Forces. Other important collections of senior logisticians include the oral history transcripts of General Lucius D. Clay, Brig. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, and Maj. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, and the wartime papers of Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell and Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible. General William P. Campbell's papers study Army finances in purchases and payments, and General John E. Grose's papers focus on the history of the Army Exchange. Within the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) Collection, moreover, is a box of source material on industrial mobilization during the Second World War.

Coordinating logistics in various regions of America were the Army Service Commands. The oral history transcripts of Milton A. Reckford of the 3d and Henry S. Aurand of the 6th, the papers of George Grunert and Russell B. Reynolds of the 6th, and the memoirs of Kenyon A. Joyce of the 9th cover the commanding generals of some of those commands.

Also from the field might be mentioned the wartime papers of Col. John Slezak, chief of the Chicago Ordnance District; of Maj. Sidney Gruneck, construction quartermaster of the Red River Ordnance Depot; and of Capt. Michael R. Belinky, contracts termination officer of the Detroit Ordnance District. General Leslie R. Groves' diaries trace his command of the

Manhattan Project. The papers of Mr. John E. P. Morgan reflect his work as the lobbyist on behalf of Aeronca, Piper, and Taylorcraft concerning the sale of observation planes to the Army.

Allocating workers to war industry was the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission. Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry's papers record his service as director of operations for the Commission. Even more critical was the mobilization of manpower for the armed forces through the Selective Service System. An oral history transcript and 1,100 boxes of contemporaneous papers concern General Lewis B. Hershey's directorship of Selective Service, 1940-1970; a considerable part of that material involves World War II. The workings of a local draft board in Keokuk, Iowa, are documented in the papers of W. Carl Richardson.

Once inductees entered service, they needed training. The memoirs of General A.E. Schanze of the Second Army staff and the papers of Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, commanding the Fourth Army, cover the headquarters of the two armies principally responsible for such training. The wartime documents of Maj. Gen. Francis B. Mallon reflect his command of four replacement training centers at Camps Robinson, Fannin, and Adair and Fort Meade, while the papers of General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., concern the inspection of various training facilities in the Zone of the Interior. Inspector Lucien B. Rutherford's notebook records procedures for conducting post inspections.

Among the new military personnel were members of the Women's Army Corps. Medical aspects of their training and service appear in the papers of Col. Margaret Craighill of the Surgeon General's Office (filed within the Medical Historical Collection). Additional information on medical training is included in the collection on Carlisle Barracks, home of the Medical Field Service School during the war. Also from Pennsylvania may be mentioned the papers of state Adjutant General Frank D. Beary. The State Guard of New York, moreover, is covered in the papers of its commander, Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum.

The manuscripts cited in the three preceding paragraphs concern officers who spent much or all of the war in the United States raising and training troops. The Institute also has literally thousands upon thou-

sands of collections of papers from individual GIs, noncommissioned officers, company and field grade officers, and generals, who experienced such training. Their letters, diaries, memoirs, oral history transcripts, and questionnaires recount their service stateside. Within the World War II Survey, their papers are grouped by divisions or branches. Within the main archival collection, the papers are filed by each individual person. Together, they represent a tremendous source on the American home front.

The home front obviously includes—home. Many scores of these manuscript collections contain not only the letters which the soldiers sent home but also the letters they received while away. Most incoming letters were from family and friends. A more organized writing effort was conducted by the National Broach and Machine Company with its employees who entered service; the Institute now has these letters. A similar patriotic undertaking by the “Dads’ Association of Bradley Beach, New Jersey,” is documented in the Joseph Bilby Collection.

Another organization with particular interest in the Second World War was the Jewish War Veterans. Their papers for 1940-1941 reflect activities of these World War I veterans as war came again to America. The outbreak of war had a much different affect on Japanese-Americans. The Gordon Hirabayashi papers

concern his court suit in 1983 relating to his treatment during World War II.

Also from the West Coast, the Edward Sullivan papers come from the San Francisco branch of the Office of War Information. A different kind of public information, radio scripts for the Battery General Hospital in Rome, Georgia, are included in the papers of Lt. Jane E. Temple.

Besides American forces, there were Axis servicemen in the United States. The papers of Col. Harold C. Storke (OCMH Collection) and Col. Joseph R. Carvolth cover their command of prisoner of war installations at Camp Devens and Camp Hereford, respectively. The Fort Knox Collection, moreover, contains an album prepared by German prisoners there. Then too, Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry’s memoirs recount his service as a member of the military commission that tried the German saboteurs who landed from submarines in Florida and New York.

Any listing of Institute sources on the United States during the Second World War must include the oral history transcript of Congressman Dewey J. Short of Missouri, who served on the House Military Affairs (Armed Services) Committee, 1933-1955.

From prominent civilian and military leaders through junior officers and GIs to family and friends back home, the American home front in World War II

National Security Agency History Symposium

The second National Security Agency (NSA) Symposium, conducted by the Center for Cryptologic History, took place from 13-15 November 1991 at the National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The commencement of a planned five-year commemoration of World War II, the symposium’s theme, “Foundations of Modern Cryptology,” provided an unclassified look at American and British cryptology (codemaking and codebreaking) on the eve of that war and then in classified sessions shifted to the beginning of the Cold War. Historians from the Center for Cryptologic History and academia joined with distinguished retirees in a series of presentations and discussions, concluding with a lecture, “Did Roosevelt Know?” by Dr. David Kahn.

The 1992 symposium, marking the fortieth anniversary of NSA’s establishment, is scheduled for 28-30 October 1992. The theme, “In the Nation’s Service,” will spotlight the year 1942 with an unclassified commemoration of World War II as well as a parallel classified session. Although aimed at the internal workforce, the symposium format is designed to facilitate invitations to a limited number of external historians and researchers known to be interested in the period, as well as military service and other governmental historians suitably cleared for the subject matter. Inquiries may be addressed to Center for Cryptologic History (ATTN: D9), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6000.

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Two publications which concern Army aviation seem to contain some passages worthy of comment. One is Dr. Gabel's *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*, the other, Dr. Raines' review of *A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962* (Editor's note: *Army History, Issue #21, p. 57*).

Dr. Gabel's book has one paragraph on pp. 181-82 and two more sentences in another paragraph on p. 182 on the subject. The initial paragraph contains seven sentences on the subject, the first six of which shall receive attention:

(1) "The most innovative aviation-related development to come out of the GHQ maneuvers...[did so] against the direct opposition of the Army Air Forces." Misleading. The initiative began in February 1941, some months before the formation of the Air Forces, but the Army staff was opposed, as well, as was Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair in particular. In October 1941 McNair wrote—as a retort to the Field Artillery on this matter—that "the ground arms can and must learn to cooperate with aviation, and the process may as well begin with observation."

(2) "Early in 1941 the [three] aircraft firms...approached the Army with an offer to loan eleven light aircraft..." Wrong. In June 1941, Mr. Morgan, the front-man for the three firms, offered twelve, not eleven, aircraft.

(3) "These planes proved so useful...that the Army rented them, civilian pilots and all..." Wrong. In September 1941 Morgan tried, but failed to get \$24,000 for expenses; Mr. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air—and an old college chum of Morgan's—told him that the Army had no money to pay these expenses.

(4) "...these eleven planes...flew an estimated 400,000 miles and...approximately 3,000 non-combat missions during the 1941 maneuvers seasons without losing a single plane." Wrong. This is a claim that Morgan, the front-man, made to Lovett in 1942. Morgan's diary, on the other hand, notes that a Taylorcraft fell into a lake while its two crewmen were distracted by a young woman in a sailboat on said lake.

(5) "powered by 65-horsepower engines, the Grasshoppers cost about one-tenth as much as a standard observation plane, required less maintenance, and could be flown from virtually any level surface." Mislead-

ing. From the onset, even the Field Artillery, the main proponent of organic aviation, believed that the "performance (of the commercial airplanes) was not quite up to that of the [soon-to-be-standard] O-49..." the Cavalry, after the Bliss maneuvers of 1941, said that the O-49 was preferable in "...landings and take-offs from unimproved fields..." and the "...actual findings of the...pilots in the maneuvers was that the O-49 was far superior to the Cubs for all purposes."

(6) "The success of the Grasshopper Squadron prompted the War Department to order that six to ten such light planes, flown by the Army, not Army Air Forces, pilots, be assigned organically to every division..." Wrong. The Army Air Forces was part of the Army, and not every division received airplanes. The "success" also was dubious, in view of the comments in paragraph five; the triumph of organic aviation, not of the liaison aeroplanes, had far more to do with such factors as the Lovett-Morgan friendship and the active intervention of senior War Department officials—in a word, politics.

The key to the problems of this paragraph devoted to the establishment of what is now Army aviation lay in the principal source used for its construction, an unfootnoted article that attempts to identify the "Founding Fathers" of Army aviation, the foremost fathers being a Field Artillery captain and the head of Piper Aircraft Corporation. In this instance, the paragraph confirms the adage that the text is no stronger than its source(s).

The second publication, Dr. Raines' review of the recent combined edition of Mr. Weinert's original two-part *A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962*, makes two major points. One is that the book, particularly in the first part, largely ignores the players in its story, the other that the book is essentially a rendition of the role of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and of its predecessor organization in Army aviation. The second point is particularly valid, although the then-chief historian of CONARC acknowledged it on p. 1 in the foreword of the original part one of the two-part version.

Above all such considerations, though, one must take into account the underpinning of the book as two parts or as one. Excluding the few strictly explanatory entries from the four hundred odd notes in either text,

one discovered that secondary sources constitute the sole basis for nearly two-thirds of the remaining notes. Annual historical summaries are cited in over two-thirds of the notes and often dominate whole sections, such as those covered by the last thirteen notes for Chapter IX, p. 157, of the combined version (pp. 79-86, Chapter II, Phase II, of the original). Moreover, certain authors are sole sources for large segments; Bykofsky, for example, is the only reference for six of the last eight notes for Chapter IX (new version), and he shares billing in the other two. In addition, some of the original sources cited, such as the CG, AGF, memorandum in footnote twelve, Chapter I, p. 14 of the combined version appear, in toto, in Flying Training Command annual historical summaries. Such reliance on secondary materials usually indicates that a book has little originality to offer.

The amalgamation of the two original books, moreover, presents three special deficiencies. The first of these is the remarkable diminution of the role of one William D. Shaver, Jr. The 1971 Phase I book acknowledges (p. ii) that "Mr. William D. Shaver, Jr., formerly of the Historical Office, conducted a large part of the research and prepared a first draft of this monograph." In the combined version, Mr. Shaver's part drops sharply (p. xiii) "The cooperation and assistance of many individuals contributed significantly to the research [not writing!] of this project: Mr. William D. Shaver, Jr...[and others]."

Second, the combined version repeats the errors of the first two versions. On p. 6 of the 1971 edition, for example, the caption of a photograph states that "An L-4...taxi...during the Carolina Maneuvers in August 1942." Said maneuvers took place in 1941; the "L-4" was then a YO-59. The same error appears on p. 6 of the combined version.

Third, the combined version does not exhibit the greatest care in joining the two original books together. One example of the unconcern may be found in the footnotes—or "Endnotes" in the combined version: A comparison of two identical notes is illustrative. The combined version, Chapter XIV, Supply and Maintenance, has (p. 257) a paragraph under the heading, "Maintenance Training," which begins "In May 1954..." and ends with "...training were made. (17)" In the "Endnotes," p. 269, for this chapter, one finds, by number seventeen, Weinert, *Army Aviation*, p. 131.... In the Phase II book of the original, one finds (pp. 233-234) the same heading and identically-worded paragraph; the only difference here is the footnote number, which is eighteen—the combined version eliminated

explanatory footnote two of the original chapter.

The two p. 131s referred to are quite different. In the original, one finds p. 131 in Phase I, Chapter VII, "The Foundation of the Army Aviation School." This p. 131 begins with the heading "Training of Mechanics" and ends, under the heading "Movement of the Army Aviation School" with a partial sentence "Such rapid growth...and...." carrying over to p. 132. In the combined version, one finds p. 131 in Chapter IX, "Organizational Development," while the "Training of Mechanics" and its sequent sentences are located on pp. 99-100. These passages, as in the two-part version, are in Chapter VII, "The Foundation of the Army Aviation School."

These points above raise a paramount question about the combined version. If it repeats errors of the original two books, if it merges the two in such a way as to mislead a reader, and if it adds no new material, why not simply republish the originals?

Dr. Howard K. Butler
Command Historian
U.S. Army Aviation
Systems Command

Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr., responds:

The title of the monograph, *A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962*, is somewhat broader than its contents, which provide an office of the Chief of the Army Field Forces/Headquarters, Continental Army Command (CONARC), perspective on the subject. This focus, however, was inherent in the book's charter and not the product of the author's own choice. For these reasons, I devoted a considerable portion of the review to a discussion of the book's origin. As to the research, the Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has more than four file drawers of copies of original documents that Mr. Weinert collected in the course of his research. Some years ago he allowed me to examine his notes on the project—notes that indicate clearly his wide-ranging research into primary materials. He confronted a major difficulty, something faced by any student of CONARC—the failure to save the command's records. While Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces records at the National Archives (Record Group 337) constitute a very rich, indeed indispensable resource for any student of the institutional history of the

Army, the CONARC records simply are not there. In this context, reliance upon the annual histories becomes an understandable necessity. The TRADOC Office of the Command Historian republished the Weinert study because the two older volumes were out of print, not out of demand. Making them one volume

represented a return to the original conception of the project. I hope that Dr. Butler and other readers will contact the TRADOC Office of the Command Historian regarding errors of fact, so that appropriate corrections can be made in future editions.

Book Review: Brooks E. Kleber Reviews John Colby's *War From the Ground Up* *The 90th Division in World War II*

"*Maj. Gen. Eugene Landrum*: Short, fat, uninspiring, could not lift up or motivate troops. Commanded the Division from an arm chair in a cellar. Bypassed regimental commanders and talked by telephone directly to battalion commanders from his chair. No faith or confidence in his subordinates. Gloomy and pessimistic in outlook. Relieved 28 July after 5 weeks."

"*Lt. Col. Leroy F. Lester*, CO 2d Bn., 357th: Big, potbellied, coarse blowhard. Made one combat reconnaissance on or about 10 June, claimed he went blind, and never returned to his battalion."

What other division history describes a commanding general and a battalion commander in such exquisitely explicit terms? And there is much more frankness. In fact, one of the concluding chapters, "Command Analysis and Appraisals," evaluates in detail nine generals and innumerable regimental and battalion commanders. Many get high marks. Raymond McLain and James Van Fleet, two of the better division commanders in the entire European theater, receive much-deserved praise. In addition, these two get their photos in the book, something their less capable colleagues fail to do.

Before proceeding with this review, we should learn a bit about the background of the 90th Infantry Division. First appearing in World War I, it was reactivated on 25 March 1942 at Camp Barkeley, Texas. It took part in maneuvers in Louisiana early in 1943 and later trained in the Mojave Desert. The division sailed for England in March 1944, where it underwent specific training for the cross-channel attack. Prior to the invasion, the 90th was divided into two elements—two battalions of the 359th Infantry were designated Group A, with the remainder of the division serving as Group B. Group A landed on UTAH Beach on D-day, attached

to the 4th Infantry Division. The rest of the division landed on UTAH Beach on D plus 2. (To provide some degree of authenticity, I might add that as a replacement officer, I joined one of the 90th's D-day battalions on D plus 5. My "authenticity" was short lived; I was captured on D plus 20.)

During the early weeks in Normandy, the 90th performed poorly. In fact, Omar Bradley wrote later that if he could have had his way, he would have broken up the division and used its men as replacements. But after division commanders McKelvie and Landrum were relieved, the 90th was blessed with McLain and Van Fleet, both of whom went on to command corps in the theater.

Several years before his death, I had the privilege of being with General Bradley at a luncheon at Fort Bliss. There was a somewhat awkward pause while a photographer was summoned by our host, the center commander, to take a picture of General Bradley and me. I ventured, somewhat hesitantly, that I had served under him in Europe. There was no visible reaction. I was in the 90th Division, I added. Still no reaction. I then repeated the story of what he had wanted to do with the division. He looked up and nodded. I went on to say that I had been captured on D plus 20 and almost immediately the division had improved. He smiled. Sometimes when I tell this story I remind historians of the danger of single causation.

After this brief background, let's examine the preparation of this remarkable book. It was not written by some bitter and disillusioned colonel whose path to glory had been blocked by the inadequacies of division leadership. In fact, this book not only had an author, but also had a three-man editorial staff which oversaw its preparation. The author, John Colby, was a ninety-day wonder who rose to be a company commander in

the division and received three Purple Hearts. Colby had prepared for his mission by writing a 165-page history of his wartime experience entitled *Feet of Battle*, extensive parts of which fortunately appear in this present history.

Editorial staff members include Lt. Gen. Orwin Talbott, who ended the war commanding a battalion of the 359th Infantry and ended his career as deputy commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Maj. Gen. Frank W. Norris, who had commanded an artillery battalion of the 90th; and Lt. Col. Fames Yates, who had served as aide to three different generals of the 90th.

In front pieces to the book the author and the editorial staff give a complete description of the methods and sources used in preparing their history. They take justifiable pride in the diversity of sources. Letters, memoirs, diaries, unit journals, and unit histories all provided information. The editorial staff wrote that it was "trying to set the record straight, objectively and without bias." Later they opined: "We regret that a professional historian, who rightly insists on accuracy, precision, and a single well-told story, will find little benefit in our account. We lack the ability and research facilities to approach a 'Martin Blumenson effort,' so our work must stand as written, warts and all."

The editors should not have worried about the reaction from historians. This account's truth, diversity, and attention to detail will win the respect of historians and other readers alike. They will be interested in learning about the failure of leadership and details of the difficulties of hedgerow fighting and what the hell did the division band do in combat—no matter an occasional spot of unevenness. In other words, such disjointedness that does exist is overcome by the depth and breadth of coverage and the honesty of reporting.

So what does a division band do in combat? A week before the invasion the 90th Division's band, fifty-six members strong, crated and shipped away its musical instruments for the duration. Members were divided into six groups and assigned to other divisional units, four of which were medical. Bandmaster Harold Arison, a warrant officer, junior grade, describes his experience with a medical clearing station that had opened on 9 June. The next day the station's tents received direct hits from enemy artillery, killing nine previously wounded soldiers. Four days later, three bandmen rescued the driver of an ammo truck still under fire. They received the Silver Star for this action—one of them, Pfc. Virgil Tangborn, posthu-

mously. By the end of the war the 90th Infantry Division Band had earned the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque with two stars.

Those interested in engineer activities will learn that the 315th Engineer Battalion cleared and installed mines, removed destroyed vehicles and dead animals from roads, and charted roads and bridges for clear routes of advancement. All of this, of course, was in concert with the division's other fighting elements. Precise descriptions from the battalion's history give life to this mundane catalog of duties.

One engineer activity was clearing the hedgerows—the *bocage*—crisscrossing the Norman terrain. These age-old boundaries between small fields were six-foot mounds surmounted by trees and brush. Colby quotes such diverse sources as Honore de Balzac and Omar Bradley to describe them. J. Lawton Collins called them as formidable as the jungles of Guadalcanal, and, of course, he knew both situations. (They were indeed beastly; I was captured in a hedgerow behind enemy lines.) We also learn that despite the intense preparation for Normandy and what should have been an awareness of this terrain element, apparently there was no training in England for overcoming the hedgerow barrier. Col. George Barth, a commander of the 375th Infantry, describes the training he inaugurated for overcoming these obstacles.

Earlier, when the editorial staff explained "spotty and uneven" coverage, it gave as an example the Falaise Gap, covered by "five or six separate accounts." As a matter of fact, the thirty-page coverage of that operation relies on ten different sources. That's fine. An improvement, however, would have been the inclusion of a concise one-page description of that operation and the controversy surrounding it. The author could have written this himself, or perhaps could have included an excerpt from a conventional history.

I might add here that except for one cryptic reference to an unnamed Army history, the author eschews the use of any of the "green books." I fully realize that the purpose of this book and its makeup were the antithesis of the conventional history approach—and that is how it should be. But an extract from a green book, for example, well selected and well placed, could have helped set the scene or could have provided summary and analysis.

But the Falaise Gap account is the exception. Most other actions are well served by the multiple-source techniques. One of the best covers the Ardennes operation, portraying not only the nitty-gritty of battle,

but at one point providing an insight into causation that never would have been revealed in a conventional history. Eames Yates, one of the editorial staff triumvirate, explains a night attack of 9 January 1945: "No wonder Col[onel]s Bell and Talbot and all members of the 359th were surprised by the sudden order to conduct a night attack to seize their objective. The order resulted from an unusual sequence of events. When Gen[eral] Patton visited the 90th Div. HQ earlier on 10 January, a junior member of the G-3 section mistakenly informed him that the 359th was on its objective (this report was based on an erroneous report by the 359th's S-3 section). Well satisfied, General Patton left. The S-3 of the 359th soon realized his error and quickly informed the G-3, who in turn informed Van Fleet of what had occurred and why. When he returned to his CP that afternoon, the general decided two things. He was not going to misinform General Patton under any circumstances, and the 90th (359th) would seize the objective that night to keep the record straight." The attack was eminently successful.

The dissection of division leadership provides a fascinating part of this account. The division had six commanders in combat. The editorial staff writes that two were "totally inadequate," two were "magnificent," and two were "middle of the road." Already we have met the first four. General Van Fleet's successor came to the division from General Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff for a specific thirty-day term to learn how to be a division commander. He departed after a month. Apparently there is some merit in this training school philosophy, but I'm not sure what it is. The sixth wartime commanding general took command in March 1945 when his predecessor's thirty-day tour was completed.

The 90th had significant generals other than its commanders. One of the best was Brig. Gen. Sam Williams, who was unjustly removed as assistant division commander in July 1944. "Hanging Sam" went on to be lieutenant general in Vietnam. Equally efficient and even more colorful was Brig. Gen. William "Wild Bill" Weaver, also an assistant division commander. Our friend Eames Yates, who served as Weaver's aide, provides this matchless insight: "Bill, on occasion, imbibed heavily. When he did, he tended to be pretty reckless—and why not? He had paid his dues! Once, late at night in October, he announced we were going up to see the 3d Bn., 359th Inf., just east of Gravelotte.... Feeling strongly that Bill had too much beverage and was about to act irresponsibly, I went to Gen[eral] McLain and asked him to talk to Bill, which he did

immediately. He saw that Bill was in less than his usual, alert state and ordered Bill to bed. Some six hours later, more refreshed, Bill...and I left for Gravelotte."

This trip, unfortunately, resulted in the death of the radio operator, albeit not from any fault of General Weaver. Yet, one wonders about the whole episode. The general's aide begins the story by saying it was all right for his boss to be reckless—"He had paid his dues!" But there must have been others whose dues had not been paid. What I object to, of course, is Eames Yates' comment, not General Weaver's action.

General Weaver was one of the more significant members of the 90th Division. He was fifty-six years old, having graduated from West Point in 1912. He commanded a machine gun battalion of the "Rock of the Marne" Division in World War I. He headed Task Force Weaver in the early days of Normandy. He won two Distinguished Service Crosses and went on to command the 8th Infantry Division. The book includes his photo—similar to George C. Scott in *Patton*, but more impressive.

Contributing to the diversity of coverage and adding to the understanding of the 90th Infantry Division is an "Afterward" (*sic*) which includes lists of decorations and casualties—four Medals of Honor and 21,371 total casualties; sections on replacements and prisoners of war; and an eight-page extract of *Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired*, a useful document that illustrates the valuable U.S. Army Military History Institute program using Army War College students to interview retired general officers.

The book is blessed with maps, photos, bibliography, and index. Unfortunately, except for the dust jacket, there is no depiction of the famous "TO" shoulder patch that stands for Texas and Oklahoma as well as "Tough Ombres."

A few issues ago *Army History* carried a brief note signed by the editor stating that a new book on the 90th Infantry Division had been published and that Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson recommended it highly. Moreover, Martin Blumenson called it the "best account of combat in Northeastern Europe, 1944-45, I have ever read." I agree. If you want an understanding of combat in the European theater, read *War From the Ground Up*. You will never get a better picture of what war was really like.

Dr. Brooks E. Kleber, now retired, was formerly the U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Military History.

Book Review

by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne

The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest: The Untold Story of a Disastrous Campaign

by Charles Whiting

Orion Books. 288 pp., \$18.95

The Hürtgen Forest battles of the autumn of 1944 are some of the better known and more thoroughly studied engagements of World War II. The experience of the 28th Division at Schmidt in November 1944 has been the special object of study by generations of Fort Leavenworth students. The battles have attracted so much attention because there often are more lessons to be learned from failures than from successes. Charles Whiting has added to the literature on the subject with an impressionistic indictment of U.S. leadership, claiming to be the first to deal with the subject. Using awards citations, unit histories, and a series of unattributed interviews and letters, he has drawn a vivid picture of forest fighting under winter conditions. His contribution to the description of the "fog of war" will be useful to students of conflicts.

Mr. Whiting has used little new source material, instead presenting earlier secondary views and issues in summary form. When he goes beyond the description of the fighting, his analysis becomes polemical, lashing out in a critical, one-sided assault on American commanders to such a degree that his narrative loses credibility. His exaggerated contempt for anyone in authority and all those not actually in the front line strongly resembles the similar carping perspectives found in the works of David Irving and Cecil B. Currey, upon whom his notes indicated a heavy reliance. His repeated implications that because the generals who planned the battles were safer than common soldiers they were indifferent to the riflemen's fate is virtually libelous. His use of pejorative terms ("greenhorn" instead of new; "cry out for" instead of request) sound more like a prosecutor building a case than an objective history. The 28th Division commander, Norman D. Cota, is the object of much vituperation, but it does not appear that Mr. Whiting has consulted Cota's papers in the Eisenhower Library, figuratively allowing him a defense. Whiting is rightly critical of aspects of the 28th Division's attack plan. Then, however, he criticizes Cota, along with other generals, for not resigning in protest over his superior's directive when given a direct order. In the middle of a war zone, expecting

virtual mutiny from a senior officer is unrealistic and unfair. This churlish sniping at authority is contradicted, but not acknowledged, by Whiting when he tells stories of senior officers who do protest orders or act valiantly. Particularly distressing is Whiting's continual reference to something called "Top Brass." This is some kind of malevolent, corrupt entity located vaguely somewhere between regiment and SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) from which all errors flow.

The book wanders geographically, making it difficult even to determine the dimensions of the forest itself. The narrative frequently cites distant places such as the Our River in Luxembourg as if they were in the Hürtgen itself. The presentation of vignettes may help give a feeling for the fight, but they do not allow a coherent description of the sequence of events, troop movements, locations, and so forth. Getting an understanding of the struggle is made even more difficult by Whiting's extensive digressions into marginal topics such as Pvt. Eddie Slovik, parties at SHAEF, preparations for the Ardennes offensive of one sort or another, and a description of the later Ruhr Pocket operations.

As in so many English language books on the subject, the Germans are strangely faceless. One modern German secondary source is used briefly. Other, relatively rare, references to the Germans are based on American secondary sources. Little analysis of the German defensive victory is attempted. The implied impression, however, is that the German leaders and soldiers consistently were superior to their American counterparts. No remark, other than a description of its effect, is made on the brilliant use of German artillery. The view that defense of the Hürtgen was the initial vital component for a successful Ardennes offensive is not specified anywhere in this book.

Whiting's work is further flawed by details, of which the reader should be aware. The author seems unfamiliar with aspects of U.S. Army organization. Thus, armored infantry battalions are sometimes referred to as regiments, causing unnecessary confusion. At other points he mentions a U.S. "Provost Corps" as distinct from the military police, and U.S. chaplains wearing "dog collars." There are also frequent copy editing slips, e.g., "VIII Corps" instead of "VII Corps," and too frequently place names are misspelled ("Wilitz" instead of "Wiltz").

Because of Mr. Whiting's penchant for injecting opinion, the reader should approach this volume with caution. The book is very much an editorial using the Hürtgen as a vehicle to criticize the American high

command in this century. It adds little to what is not already known, manages to slander most Americans above lieutenant and challenges the integrity of Charles B. McDonald's fine official history and the program of which it is a part. Despite this, his accounts of the nightmare through which so many American and German soldiers passed are thought provoking. The greatest question, which still needs an answer, is how and why they did it.

Lt. Col. Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, USA (Ret.), is professor of history at Lord Fairfax Community College, Middletown, Virginia. He formerly was the historian for the Army Inspector General. His most recent book, Snake Hill: A War of 1812 Site, was published in Toronto in September 1991.

Book Review

by Rodney J. Ross

Caged Dragons: An American P.O.W. in WW II Japan

by Robert E. Haney

Sabre Press (Momentum Books Ltd.), 266 pp. \$19.95

Robert E. Haney's memoir is a welcome addition to the growing library of veterans' reminiscences from the 1941-42 Philippine campaign. Compiled partly from a wartime journal and without the use of secondary sources, the book portrays "one old corporal's war story," a therapeutic opportunity—excruciating yet exorcising—that frees Haney of haunting dragons and embodies the resilience of the human spirit.

Haney's account opens amidst the Great Depression, describing an idyllic background in Michigan and a decision to drive west, ultimately resulting in a Marine Corps enlistment. Originally stationed in northern China, the author was ordered to Cavite in the Philippines as Japanese-American relations deteriorated. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and invaded Luzon in 1941, he joined the pell-mell retreat to Bataan and, ultimately, Caballo Island in Manila Bay for the defense of Fort Hughes. Haney's capture following Corregidor's surrender commenced three years of agony as a prisoner, including "hell" transport to Japan — "for much of the rest of my life, this nightmare Pacific passage would color my impression of the Japanese culture—" and a slave existence in Nippon until repatriation in 1945.

Proud that Manila Bay's fortified islands endured

longer than other Pacific outposts, Haney writes to reveal the American and Filipino role in delaying Japan's timetable for conquest. "Your stories deserve to be told," he states, and "it is an injury to history that they have not been." Haney also regrets that "the story of POWs in general, and those of Bataan and Corregidor in particular, has been told neither often enough nor well enough." Their exploits, however, are on record. As early as 1942 and 1944, respectively, W. L. White's *They Were Expendable* and Welbourn Kelley's *Ten Escape from Tojo* appeared, both understandably propagandist. More recently, and aside from Louis Morton's official history *The Fall of the Philippines* (1953), Donald Knox's *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (1981) and Eric Morris' *Corregidor: The End of the Line* (1981) provided oral chronicles, while Ray C. Hunt's *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (1986), and Edwin Price Ramsey's *Lieutenant Ramsey's War* (1990) narrated guerrilla activity by former Bataan defenders. The autobiographical *Apocalypse Undone: My Survival of Japanese Imprisonment During World War II* (1990) by Preston John Hubbard parallels Haney's story line. Another 1990 publication, John W. Whitman's *Bataan, Our Last Ditch: The Bataan Campaign, 1942* might be the definitive work (*Editor's Note: See our review in the Winter 1991/1992 issue of Army History*).

Haney repeats charges by General Douglas MacArthur's detractors. The author, as Michael Schaller wrote in *Douglas MacArthur: The Far East General* (1989), reproaches MacArthur for the Filipino-American military disaster allegedly caused by the general's substitution of War Plan RAINBOW FIVE for ORANGE. The new strategy's consequent force dispersal, designed to protect Luzon's beaches, overextended the defenders, according to Haney, and after Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf "vast stores of munitions, gasoline, food, and medicine would be abandoned or destroyed at the RAINBOW FIVE outposts." War Plan ORANGE should never have been discarded, because it "would have concentrated men and material for a defense of the Bataan Peninsula and the fortified islands just off its tip, mainly Corregidor." Such a mass deployment, the author argues, would have indefinitely denied Japanese forces access to Manila Bay by prolonging the siege of "The Rock."

By the time the general departed for Australia in March 1942, Haney claims that MacArthur, viewed as conceited and self-promotional, had lost his credibility as a strategist, and his promises of reinforcements being on the way were not believed. The author is so

indignant about the general's shortcomings that he has written a special chapter entitled "Unfinished Business," suggesting "several areas of inquiry" for a "congressional investigation into MacArthur's conduct as leader of the islands' defenses."

Inasmuch as Haney writes from a perceived and traumatizing experience decades old, errors are understandable and somewhat excusable. Still, a professional historian's editing or, at the least, the author's consultation of standard histories could have prevented conspicuous mistakes. The book's paper maps, for example, misspell Davao as "Davato" and mislocate Mariveles too far westward on Bataan and Cavite too far eastward from its coastal position. Place names are rendered phonetically and incorrectly, i.e., "Bulacon" for Bulacan (p. 39), "Pompanga" for Pampanga (pp. 89-90), "Legaspe" for Legaspi (p. 37), "Lemay" for Limay (p. 41), "Luguna" for Laguna (p. 227), and "Raboul" for Rabaul (p. 93). Significant events are misdated, such as the origins of the Sino-Japanese War (p. 66), Japan's occupation of Indochina (p. 49), and MacArthur's exit from Corregidor (p. 61).

Finally, there is no evidence that Nichols Field, a fighter base, handled B-17s (p. 25), or that Japanese forces invaded Luzon's west coast province of Batangas in 1941 (p. 37).

Dr. Rodney J. Ross is professor of history at the Harrisburg Area Community College, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He has a special interest in the Philippine Islands.

Book Review

by Charles R. Anderson

Pearl Harbor, 1941: A Bibliography

by Myron J. Smith, Jr.

Greenwood Press. 197 pp., \$55.00

Just in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, historians and buffs alike could use a new research tool to study the event. *Pearl Harbor, 1941*, the "first book-length annotated Pearl Harbor resource guide" (p. x), in the words of its compiler, stands as a useful starting point for those interested in the attack, the weaponry used, and the planning and diplomacy preceding the event. For Myron J. Smith, Jr., a professor of library science and history at Tusculum College in Greenville, Texas, this is his third bibliography in the Greenwood Press series

"Bibliographies of Battles and Leaders," of which he is the series editor, and his ninth on military topics.

Pearl Harbor, 1941, includes over 1,500 entries in three chapters, the whole in typescript. Smith's front matter includes the standard introduction and acknowledgments plus a chronology of events preceding the attack and extending to June 1963, when President Kennedy dedicated the *Arizona* Memorial at Pearl Harbor. Smith's selection and description of events is overly burdened with technical detail and encourages the suspicion that he sides with the "revisionist" school, which blames President Roosevelt for provoking the attack, a slant inappropriate to the objectivity he holds up as a goal (p. xiii). Much more useful is a listing of relevant libraries, archives, and research centers in the United States and seven foreign countries.

The first chapter, "Reference Works and Sites," includes a list of libraries, archives, and research centers in the United States and seven foreign countries, as well as the beginning of the numbered entries—239 reference works. The second, "General War Histories, Hardware, and Biography," includes 402 entries. The third chapter, "Pearl Harbor, 1941," contains well over half the collection, some 870 entries. Even a cursory reading of the entries reveals a shining strength of this collection: impressive linguistic reach. Smith's familiarity with his subject extends into "ten other tongues" (p. xi), though Japanese is the most heavily represented. The collection ends with a list of the 196 journals Smith consulted, and author/participant indexes.

To publish this bibliography on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack, Smith had to halt compilation in 1989, a requirement which necessitated omission of books and articles provoked directly by the largest observance of the event to date. Given the fluff character of so many commemorative works, this result was not altogether undesirable. But the cutoff date denied Smith the chance to list the few quality works that came out closer to the anniversary. One of the best is Michael Slackman's *Target: Pearl Harbor* (University of Hawaii Press/Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 1990). An experienced historian at the USS *Arizona* Memorial, Slackman uncovered valuable interviews that not even the exhaustive Gordon Prange and his associates tapped.

This bibliography shares with others a defect all too common in the genre: inexplicable omissions of well-qualified authors. One such concerns the work of Paul Stillwell, editor in chief of *Naval History*, and director of the U.S. Naval Institute's oral history pro-

gram. Smith lists an oral history catalog and two articles by Stillwell but ignores his book *Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!* (Naval Institute Press, 1981). Smith also overlooks relevant government publications, among them a National Park Service archeological survey: *Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona Memorial and Pearl Harbor National Historical Landmark* (1989).

Another problem is Smith's explanation of many entries. Although this is generally a well-annotated bibliography, some notations are too brief to be helpful, while others are ungrammatical or confusing. Entry 1241 is explained with nothing more than "AG-16," a ship designation not likely to be understood outside the professional U.S. Navy community. Entry 812 ends with "(This work contains) much on the progressive upswing in a kind-of state irrationalism." Entry 1088 is a real baffler: "No. 994 above which was critical of the next entry."

A problem of bibliographers dealing with any topic is scope. How extensively should a book or article treat a subject to qualify for inclusion? The two entries by Edwin O. Reischauer illustrate Smith's less than satisfactory handling of the problem. Reischauer's book, *Japan: The Story of a Nation* (1980), a rewrite of his *Japan: Past and Present* (1946), has been widely used in American colleges and universities for decades, helping to fix his reputation as the dean of Japanese studies in the United States even before President Kennedy appointed him ambassador to Japan in 1961. Later he wrote an article for *American Heritage* at the fortieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Professor Reischauer's article is more valuable to Pearl Harbor researchers than his book, a general history treating twenty centuries of Japanese history in which the Pearl Harbor attack occupies but a single paragraph.

(Cont'd. on p. 48)

**Association of the United States Army
Call for Manuscripts
Personal Impressions: Experiences From the Gulf War**

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) is undertaking a project to document the professional experiences of soldiers and civilians who participated either directly or in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. ILW objectives are to:

- (1) Provide an outlet for those who have recorded their professional experiences and seek to share them with others;
- (2) Document the firsthand experiences of those who were involved in any phase of the operations so that others may learn from their experiences; and
- (3) Establish a written record of personal observations, in pamphlet and book form, for future research efforts.

Generally, candidate manuscripts should be original and no longer than 5,000 words in length; previously published manuscripts will be considered if accompanied by written copyright permission of the publisher. Accompanying charts, photographs and drawings must be reproducible in black and white. A half-page synopsis of the paper and a half-page biography of the author must accompany the manuscript.

Papers will be reviewed by an editorial board for overall significance of subject matter, quality, and readability. No honorarium is provided; however, all authors who submit manuscripts will receive gratis copies of the AUSA publication.

Individuals interested in the program should forward manuscripts (to include diskette, if prepared on a personal computer) to Col. James D. Blundell, USA (Ret.), Director of Programs, AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22201. Tel. 1-800-336-4570, extension 320.

Unfortunately, there are many more such marginal entries. Most fall into two categories: general histories of World War II and accounts of prewar diplomacy. There is also a large number of entries on the weaponry ("hardware") in use by both combatants in 1941, much of it carried over from earlier Smith bibliographies. The result is a sort of generic bibliography of World War II and the Pacific war with focused Pearl Harbor entries attached. This imbalance provokes the suspicion that something besides history sculpted the book: without marginally related entries, the collection would be too short to justify printing costs. Even with hundreds of marginal entries, the book is exorbitantly priced for only 197 pages. After paying too much for the collection, researchers must also wade through too many entries on the way to more relevant works. Nevertheless, *Pearl Harbor, 1941*, opens many doors for those looking into the stunning event that brought the United States into World War II.

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