

ARMY HISTORY

Winter 2014

PB 20-14-1 (No. 90) Washington, D.C.

IN THIS ISSUE

A French-Inspired Way of War

French Influence on the U.S. Army from 1812 to the Mexican War

By Michael A. Bonura

6

MacArthur's Small Ships

Improvising Water Transport in the Southwest Pacific Area

By Kenneth J. Babcock

26

U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

24

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

ARMY HISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Robert J. Dalessandro

Managing Editor
Bryan J. Hockensmith

Editor
Hildegard J. Bachman

Layout and Design
Michael R. Gill

Consulting Historians
Andrew J. Birtle
Mark L. Bradley

The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by e-mail to usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Those individuals and institutions that do not qualify for free copies may opt for paid subscriptions from the U.S. Government Printing Office. The cost of a subscription is \$20 per year. Order by title and enter List ID as ARHIS. To order online, go to <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>. To order by phone, call toll free 866-512-1800, or in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, 202-512-1800; by fax, 202-512-2104; or by e-mail, contactcenter@gpo.gov. Send mail orders to U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000.

The opinions expressed in *Army History* are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its constituent elements. The bulletin's contents do not necessarily reflect official Army positions and do not supersede information in other official Army publications or Army regulations. The bulletin is approved for official dissemination of material to keep the Army knowledgeable of developments in Army history and to enhance professional development. The Department of the Army approved the use of funds for printing this publication on 7 September 1983.

The reproduction of images not obtained from federal sources is prohibited.

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Winter 2014 issue of *Army History* presents an article by Michael A. Bonura, a major in the Army currently serving as a nuclear and counter-proliferation officer. This piece examines the influence of French military theory and doctrine on the U.S. Army in the years during and after the War of 1812. The American view of an army had always been traditionally tied to the colonial military experience and its dependence on local militias. The numerous and significant American defeats during the War of 1812, especially in the early years, highlighted the need for a larger and more professional standing army. The Army had no native guidebook for overcoming the obstacles and inherent challenges of building, training, administering, and fielding this new force. Bonura argues that senior Army leaders, like Winfield Scott, pushed for the American military establishment to adopt a French-inspired paradigm of war or "way of warfare."

The second article examines a lesser-known element of the fighting in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) during World War II. Author Kenneth J. Babcock, a retired Army logistics officer, highlights the exploits and contributions of the U.S. Army Small Ships Section. The SWPA presented some of the most daunting logistical and sustainment challenges of the war. Military shipping in this theater was wholly inadequate in the early years of the war and only by innovation and improvisation were Allied forces able to maintain an adequate defense while slowly preparing to take the offensive. The Small Ships Section leased, purchased, commandeered, or built hundreds of small vessels of all types, including tugboats, fishing trawlers, ketches, and barges. Without these versatile craft and their brave crews, the Japanese advance might have indeed reached the shores of Australia.

This issue's Army Artifact Spotlight features an iconic bladed weapon, the Model 1913 Cavalry "Patton" Saber, bearing Springfield Armory Serial Number 1.

In the Chief's Corner, the chief of military history updates the community on the status of the Army Historical Program as it relate to the ongoing Army Headquarters Transformation process. The chief historian, in his Footnote, discusses the usefulness of military history, arguing that it is the most valuable subject that any enlisted soldier, officer, leader, or planner can study.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor



THE CHIEF'S CORNER

ROBERT J. DALESSANDRO

PROGRAM SETBACKS AND THE WAY FORWARD

I thought this would be a good time to present an update on the status of our strategic initiatives for the Army Historical Program.

As you may recall, the Center of Military History (CMH) published its *Strategic Plan, 2012–2017*, in the Winter 2012 issue of *Army History*. This was followed by my Chief's Corner in the Winter 2013 issue suggesting the importance of a centralized Army History Command.

A key objective of these initiatives was the functional alignment of Army historical and museum programs. The intent was to develop this over a five-year period in cooperation with the Army history and museum communities.

However, the Center's goal in the Army Historical Program restructuring process was greatly accelerated by an Under Secretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff directive to rapidly reduce headquarters size and missions through the Army Headquarters Transformation (AHT) process. At the same time, we became aware of a growing trend in several Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), which abolished historian and museum positions to meet their own manpower reduction targets.

These events greatly compressed our staffing time and hampered our attempts to adequately engage the entire historical and museum community over time to find our way forward.

As a result of the AHT process, we proposed a new DRU, the Army History and Heritage Command (AHHC). This command would take us out of the Army headquarters, achieving its manpower reductions, and move all history and museum positions under the umbrella, and protection, of the new organization.

The AHHC was designed to preserve and protect all Army history and museum positions and manage them more efficiently. The historical and museum missions devoted to teaching, writing, preservation, and conservation of our collective past would only be improved over time under this new DRU, while still ensuring that local commanders maintained their essential control over, and link with, their historians and curators.

A second aspect of the initiative was the "Hub and Spoke," or collections consolidation concept, which was developed by the Training and Doctrine Command some years ago. This concept was adopted as part of the Center's plan in order to better manage museum property. This plan focused on eliminating collection redundancies and properly placing artifacts directly related to an Army museum's mission. Our budget climate no longer allows sustaining multiple unfocused collections that are spread across the Army and that follow no discernible collections plan. This concept mirrored a National Park Service plan, which yielded significant storage and conservation savings, while improving both collection content and exhibit quality. The essential teaching and training mission of our museums would be greatly enhanced by this initiative at less cost to the Army.

SO WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

The Office of Business Transformation conducted a thorough analysis, held several focused area reviews, and initiated a three-star General Officer Steering Committee that examined the DRU concept. The results of these high-level reviews, coupled with proposed new and drastic Army-wide force structure reductions, placed the establishment of an AHHC and any phased implementation of collections consolidation (except those previously mandated by the Army Audit Agency) on hold. Be assured that we will keep you informed as this situation changes.

As a result, we are in the process of resetting our strategic way forward. The Center will appraise the current CMH strategic plan, considering the Chief of Staff of the Army's strategic priorities, insights gained from the AHT initiative, projected reductions in budget and manpower, and Army-directed information technology initiatives.


Although we have faced some significant setbacks over the past two years, I am proud to report that we have also recently made some considerable progress in other critical areas.

Last year, the elimination of the Department of Defense Historical Advisory Committee, the parent committee of

Continued on page 23



Winter 2014



Features



5 News Notes

24 U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

43 Book Reviews

54 Chief Historian's Footnote

Articles

6



A FRENCH-INSPIRED WAY OF WAR
FRENCH INFLUENCE ON THE U.S. ARMY FROM 1812 TO THE MEXICAN WAR

By MICHAEL A. BONURA



26



MACARTHUR'S SMALL SHIPS IMPROVISING WATER TRANSPORT IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA


By KENNETH J. BABCOCK

NEWSNOTES

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY ISSUES NEW PUBLICATIONS

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) has released two new publications. *The Campaign of 1812* is the second in a series (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812) of campaign brochures commemorating the bicentennial of the War of 1812 and the Army's involvement in that conflict. Author Steven J. Rauch details the disappointing first campaigns of the War of 1812. Although the United States declared war on Great Britain, events soon illustrated that the nation, as well as the Army, was ill-prepared for the conflict. On the battlefield, the Army's training, logistical, and leadership deficiencies resulted in a series of embarrassing defeats. Despite these setbacks, the Army ended the year looking optimistically toward the next campaign season to restore its confidence and reputation. This 60-page brochure includes maps and numerous illustrations. It has been issued as CMH Pub 74-2. It is also available for sale to the general public from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00562-0.

The third brochure in this series is *The Canadian Theater, 1813*, by Richard V. Barbuto. After a calamitous start to the war in 1812, made evident by the startling loss of Detroit and a bloody defeat at Queenston Heights, the United States opened the 1813 campaign season with a successful raid on York (modern-day Toronto). General Henry Dearborn followed up this achievement by taking Fort George on the Niagara River. However, victory eluded the Army with twin defeats at Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams. The war along the border with Canada in 1813 saw a string of bitter defeats punctuated by victory in the Old Northwest. Perhaps



most importantly, the Army was recovering from its early mistakes and adapting to the challenges of war on the frontiers. *The Canadian Theater, 1813*, showcases these battles and leaders and sets them in the context of America's first foreign war. This 56-page brochure includes maps and numerous illustrations. It has been issued as CMH Pub 74-3. It is also available for sale to the general public from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00561-1.

OMAR N. BRADLEY HISTORICAL RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS

The Omar N. Bradley Foundation has announced that it will grant ten Omar N. Bradley Historical Research Fellowships in 2014. The Fellowship will provide \$2,000 to support an active-duty Army officer in pursuing research in military history. Funds

will be granted to those officers who are "actively engaged" in historical research and who have the best-developed plans for conducting significant historical work. The application deadline is 31 January 2014. For more information, please visit the following Web site, http://www.history.army.mil/banner_images/focus/bradley_research/.

IN MEMORIAM: DOUGLAS KINNARD (1921-2013)

Douglas Kinnard, a retired Army brigadier general and the former chief of military history, passed away on 29 July 2013 at a hospital in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. He was 91.

Kinnard graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1944 and served as an artillery officer in Europe during the last year of World War II. After the war, he attended Princeton University where he received a master's degree in politics in 1948, eventually earning a doctorate from that institution in 1973. Kinnard served in Korea and Vietnam, where he led the planning of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia in 1970. After retiring from the Army, he went on to teach at the Universities of Vermont, Oklahoma, and Richmond, and at the Naval War College. In March 1983, he became the chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, a post he held until November 1984.

Kinnard was the author of eight books, most notably *The War Managers* (Hanover, N.H., 1977). He is survived by his wife Wade Tyree Kinnard, and his son, Frederick.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maj. Michael A. Bonura is currently studying nuclear engineering at the University of New Mexico. He holds a bachelor's degree in history from the United States Military Academy and received his master's and doctorate degrees from Florida State University. He taught military history from 2006 to 2009 at the United States Military Academy and recently published his first book, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from Independence to the Eve of World War II* (New York, 2012). After being commissioned as an armor officer in 1997 and commanding an armored cavalry troop in Korea from 2001 to 2002, he is now a nuclear and counter-proliferation officer.



The American Soldier, 1814, by Hugh Charles McBarron



A French-Inspired Way of War

FRENCH INFLUENCE ON THE U.S. ARMY FROM 1812 TO THE MEXICAN WAR

BY MICHAEL A. BONURA

U.S. Army Art Collection

Tribal and irregular warfare, skirmishing, and militias characterized the American colonial military experience from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. This tradition played a major role in shaping the campaigns, operations, and battles of the War of American Independence. However, the events of the War of 1812 led America to turn away from this colonial tradition to adopt a very different understanding of war. This was a result of the transatlantic influence of French military thought produced during the French Revolution. American defeats in the War of 1812 provided the military impetus for change, but it took the support of Winfield Scott, the hero of the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, and a wider acceptance of French culture for the American military establishment to adopt a French-inspired paradigm of war or "way of warfare."

Historians have debated the concept of a national way of war, and in particular an American way of war, for more than thirty years.¹ A nation's way of war describes its strategic traditions that determine the ways in which military

force is used to accomplish political objectives. However, a nation's way of warfare combines intellectual military traditions, doctrines, and accepted ideas concerning the fundamental nature of war. These concepts influence the way a nation prosecutes war and includes the relationship between the citizen and the state, acceptable types of armies and soldiers, and military practices.² On the other hand, national strategy encompasses a wide number of both military and nonmilitary considerations such as politics, economics, and social issues. A nation's way of warfare informs strategy, but it does not dominate strategy. As a way of warfare is a national approach to war, it is by its very nature concerned with the interaction of armies in land warfare culminating in combat on a battlefield because "the battle is the climax of war."³ Due to its technical requirements and strategic nature, naval warfare is more a part of a way of war and thus not a national effort in the same way as land warfare. For example, it could be argued that the British way of war from the seventeenth through the twentieth

centuries sought to maintain a balance of power in Europe that protected the British Isles from invasion, but also supported British commercial interests. This way of war relied on a strong navy and a small expeditionary army. However, a nation's way of warfare describes more fundamental concepts of war and is as much a cultural construction as a military one.

THE PRE-PARADIGMATIC PERIOD IN AMERICAN TACTICS

In light of the frontier influence that forged a unique American colonial military tradition, the War of American Independence represented more continuity than change in that tradition. Despite his continued efforts, George Washington never created the European army he envisioned as critical to defeating the British. Soon after the end of the war, American defense was once more placed in the hands of individual state militias. The states were responsible for regulating their militias, which included choos-



Baron von Steuben drilling American recruits at Valley Forge in 1778, by Edwin Austin Abbey


ing a tactical drill regulation. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, better known as the *Blue Book*, remained the only drill regulation for the armies of the United States (this includes the regular army, volunteer units, and state militias) through the outbreak of the War of 1812.⁴ Beginning in 1810, the War Department attempted to adopt two tactical regulations based on the French system, one written by Alexander Smyth and the other by William Duane. Competing with these regulations and the *Blue Book* was the latest British tactical manual entitled *Principles of Military Movement* by Col. David Dundas.⁵ Dundas influenced American authors Epaphras Hoyt and Isaac Maltby, and both based their works on Dundas' tactical system and British warfare.⁶ The responsibility for determining the tactical system of the state militias rested with the individual state governments. Often they did not choose the regulations approved by the War Department. For example, Massachusetts adopted Maltby's *Elements of War* as the tactical regulations governing their militia in 1811.⁷ Militia commanders and Regular Army officers had ready access to large numbers of drill manuals that repre-

sented a variety of different tactical systems as they prepared themselves for war. When the armies of the United States went to war in 1812, they did so without a uniform system of tactics, or even a single vision of what war was and how it was fought.

This is reminiscent of the pre-paradigmatic period in Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions. In fact, there are many similarities between the phenomenon Kuhn observed as scientific communities

reached consensus concerning the fundamental nature of their disciplines and the search for an American system of tactics.⁸ Kuhn observed that science was not a cumulative process, but one punctuated by the adoption of paradigms through intellectual revolution that guided research and set forth the central questions that regular science and experimentation sought to answer. During a pre-paradigmatic period, there were a multitude of possible conceptualizations and theories that competed for adherents. Over the course of time, a consensus of the scientific community formed around a single theory, even though there were always individuals who never committed to the paradigm. A paradigm was thus a set of ideas "unprecedented enough to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity."⁹ However, Kuhn discovered that there were always social influences that worked outside of scientific research that encouraged consensus.¹⁰ The adoption of military ideas and doctrine followed a similar path, however, with perhaps different social influences at work than in the sciences.

For the purposes of this argument, a paradigm is thus a set of ideas agreed on by a professional community that




Library of Congress

Isaac Maltby

guides the actions of that community. In other words, the paradigm establishes a vocabulary of ideas that the members of the community use to indoctrinate new members, conduct research and write theoretical papers, and even have debates among themselves. Such a paradigm did not preclude descent or encourage dogmatic adherence. To use a musical metaphor, a paradigm is the theme on which all variations are based. The power of such a paradigm is that it focuses the intellectual activity of a professional community on solving the same set of problems using a similar methodology as opposed to all practitioners having to come up with their own unique theoretical framework for their professions.

This pre-paradigmatic period in American tactics lasted throughout the War of 1812. In his testimony to Congress in 1814, Secretary of War John Armstrong stated that “no system of discipline has heretofore been practiced in training the armies of the United States either in line, by battalion, or by company.”¹¹ He went on to blame poor American battlefield performance on this lack of a uniform tactical system to instill a standardized discipline on the armies of the United States. As an example of the lack of a uniform American tactical



Etching of George Izard

system, Maj. Gen. George Izard wrote to Armstrong from Plattsburgh in May 1814 that

different systems of instruction have been adopted by the officers of the division. As uniformity is indispensable in this particular, I am about to authorize the former practice agreeably to Baron Steuben's regulations—without, however, giving to the latter the formality of a general order until the first of June, when unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I shall adopt them as regulations for the troops under my command.¹²

Izard moved forward with his authorization of the older regulations despite the War Department's efforts to standardize the drill regulations first in 1812 and then again in 1813. The lack of a uniform system of tactics accepted by the armies of the United States encouraged local commanders to decide which regulation to use to train and fight their individual commands. It was onto this situation that Winfield Scott arrived at Buffalo in April 1814 to take part in the summer campaign on the Niagara River.

WINFIELD SCOTT'S FRENCH TACTICS AND THE 1814 NIAGARA CAMPAIGN

Scott made a name for himself early in the war by commanding a landing party during the attack on Queenston Heights, even though most of the militia under his command refused to cross into Canada. A self-educated military man, Scott was a Federalist officer serving in a Republican War Department that kept him from a major command through 1813. It was not until 1814, when the War Department advanced officers based on merit, that Scott became a brigadier general. He took command of a brigade in Maj. Gen.



U.S. Army Art Collection

Library of Congress

U.S. Army Art Collection

John Armstrong, portrait by Daniel Huntington, 1873 (left). Winfield Scott, shown here as a brevet major general, c. 1814 (center). Jacob Jennings Brown, portrait by John Wesley Jarvis, c. 1815 (right).


Jacob Brown's division that became the Army of the Niagara.¹³ Brown ordered Scott to take command of the whole division and train them for the upcoming campaign. Scott established the most ambitious training program of the war, based on the French tactical system. He established a French-style camp of instruction at Buffalo and drilled his men ten hours a day, seven days a week. Scott used his own understanding of the French regulations and the few available copies of the *Règlement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 1er août 1791*, or French Regulations of 1791, to train Brown's division.¹⁴ He focused on discipline, and this devotion to discipline led Scott's men to remember him as a martinet for his organization and training throughout the duration of the encampment.¹⁵ The men of Brown's division were all trained in the movements, commands, lines,


and attack columns of the French tactical system. In a little over two months, Scott turned Brown's 3,500 men into the best trained and disciplined American army of the war.

The 1814 Niagara campaign began with the swift capture of Fort Erie, which surrendered to the Americans on 3 July. Brown then ordered Scott's brigade to continue to advance up the west bank of the Niagara River.¹⁶ Failing to reinforce Fort Erie in time to prevent its surrender, Maj. Gen. Phineas Riall concentrated the British forces in the Niagara region in the area overlooking Chippawa Creek.¹⁷ Scott arrived on the plain south of the creek on 4 July and planned to spend the following day marching and drilling his brigade while he awaited the arrival of the rest of the division.¹⁸ On 5 July, Riall ordered his three infantry regiments in line overlooking the only bridge across the creek, while he deployed his militia and Indian auxiliaries into the woods on what would become the American left flank. When

Scott's pickets observed the British movements, he ordered his troops into a line of battle and advanced toward the British position.

Scott sent his irregular troops into the woods against the British auxiliaries while the rest of the brigade crossed the bridge over Chippawa Creek in column. Once across, the American regiments formed a line opposite the British, but with large intervals so that the 25th Regiment could move to the west and envelop the British left flank. This entire movement was done under British light artillery and musket fire, yet the American formation remained disciplined and in good order.¹⁹ When the American line was in position and began firing into the British regiments, the effect of the disciplined fire was devastating and caused the British line to waver. Seeing an opportunity, Scott ordered the 25th Regiment to execute a bayonet charge, which for the first time in the war swept the British from the battlefield.²⁰ This was the first Ameri-





can victory over regular British Army troops in any theater of the war.



Three weeks later, Scott again faced the British in line at Lundy's Lane and marched his disciplined brigade into the teeth of the enemy, supported by another envelopment by the 25th Regiment. While the envelopment was successful, the regiments in line facing the British were unable to close with the enemy due to terrain and effective British artillery fire.²¹ Scott's men suffered terribly and were only saved because of the reinforcement of the rest of Brown's division. Not wanting to let a chance at victory slip through his fingers, Scott re-formed his brigade at dusk and launched a French-style attack column at the enemy line.²² However, in the darkness and carnage of the battlefield, Scott's column turned to the west and marched parallel to both the American and British lines. Taking casualties from both enemy and friendly fire, the remnants of Scott's brigade succumbed to the high casualties and made no further attacks. Scott himself was injured leading the attack column.

Battle of Lundy's Lane, 25 July 1814, by Alonzo Chappel, 1859. The wounded officer at center is Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown.

New York State Military Museum



These two battles secured Winfield Scott's reputation and catapulted him into the senior leadership of the United States Army. However, an analysis of his victory and actions fails to identify anything new in his tactics. Scott was a proponent of the French system of tactics and trained his men in that system for months at Buffalo before the start of the campaign. Yet his victory at Chippewa was the result of discipline in general, not of French tactics in particular. If anything, Scott turned his back on the most powerful aspects of the French system by mirroring his British counterpart's deployment of irregular troops in the woods and by arranging the infantry regiments in linear formations. His actions until dusk at Lundy's Lane also closely resembled British tactics and discipline, when Scott organized and led a French-style attack column against the British lines. But that column was an abortive failure, never making it to the British lines. By any standard of military analysis, this was not a victory of the French tactical system. However, the Battle of Chippewa provided the War Department with the impetus it needed to finally ensure the acceptance of the French




drill regulations for the armies of the United States.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT ADOPTS FRENCH TACTICS

Resistance to French regulations was a by-product of political divisions within the American military establishment. In the decades following the War for Independence, the Federalist administrations of George Washington and John Adams advanced Federalist officers into the highest ranks of the small standing army. This was not hard because these officers were more competent than their Republican counterparts.²³ However, when Thomas Jefferson ushered the Republican Party into the presidency in 1801, he found himself with a Federalist officer corps that he did not trust. Jefferson immediately began promoting Republican officers at the expense of their better-qualified Federalist peers. He also authorized a national military academy at West Point in 1802 for the purpose of creating an officer corps from a wide section of the population. Jefferson hoped that officers educated in such an egalitarian environment would be more politically reliable.²⁴ Another way of reshaping the Army in a more Republican mold was to issue a new drill regulation. Military leaders from both parties recognized that Von Steuben's *Blue Book*, which served as the only national tactical regulation, was obsolete and in need of modernization.

This led Secretary of War William Eustis to commission his inspector general, Col. Alexander Smyth, to create an abridged version of the French regulations in 1810.²⁵ Eustis adopted the resulting *Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvres, and Conduct of the Infantry of the United States* on the eve of the War of 1812.²⁶ The response from commanders in the field was negative from both sides of the political spectrum. For the Anglophile Federalists, the regulation was too French and was a thinly veiled Republican attempt at consolidating more power over the Army. For the Francophile Republican officers, it was not French enough and represented a bastardization of the French tactical system. When John Armstrong replaced Eustis as the secretary of war, he chose another adaptation of the French system when he embraced William Duane's *A Hand Book for Infantry* in 1813.²⁷ Duane had an interest in military theory and had already self-published several works on military topics. As the editor of a Republican newspaper, the *Aurora*, Duane used his political influence to become Armstrong's choice for producing a new drill regulation. While Duane's manual was more of a synthesis of French tactics and Von Steuben's army administration, the response from the armies in the field was still negative.²⁸ Thus the pre-paradigmatic period of tactics during the War of 1812 was as much a political and cultural phenomenon as it was a military phenomenon.



Winfield Scott won the Battle of Chippewa in the middle of this tactical debate and provided Armstrong exactly the military figure he needed to garner enough support to adopt French tactics. Scott was a Federalist war hero who championed French tactics, not for political reasons, but from a military belief in their effectiveness. As Scott convalesced in the capital in the fall of 1814, Armstrong appointed him the president of a regulations board whose charter was to evaluate an English translation of the French Regulations of 1791 for adoption as the American infantry drill regulations.²⁹ It was not surprising that Scott accepted the French regulation without making any changes. Using Scott's reputation and the findings of the board, Armstrong was able to secure both congressional and presidential approval for the adoption of the French regulations in 1815.³⁰ Finally, the armies of the United States had a single system of tactics, and those tactics were an unabridged translation of the French Regulations of 1791.

A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF WAR IN AMERICA

The adoption of the French regulations as the tactics of the armies of the United States in no way meant that America would adopt the other elements of French warfare. In fact, Scott's 1815 drill regulations represented the third time in four years that the Republican administration tried to adopt French tactics. Nothing in the American experience through the War of 1812 supported the adoption of a French-inspired understanding of warfare. The colonial tradition of reliance on militia formations and a parochial view of warfare was antithetical to the ideas and concepts that made up French warfare. The only direct exposure to European warfare Americans had in the beginning of the nineteenth century was at the hands of the British Army as it achieved victory after victory during the War of 1812. No American had seen a Napoleonic battle, and even its greatest adherent Winfield Scott used only the form of the French system of tactics at the

Battle of Chippewa, not the combinations that allowed French armies to dominate Europe. From a pragmatic standpoint, there was little reason to change American warfare or adopt a more European-inspired paradigm.

However, the War of 1812 had a profound impact on America from a cultural and political perspective and provided just such a reason for change. Perhaps the most important modification was in the way Americans understood the nature of war itself. In the colonial period, warfare was a regional and local affair.³¹ Even though the American colonies fought together with the British Army during the French and Indian War, these efforts were sectional more than national.³² However, the effectiveness of the British in using Canadian and Indian proxies to fight their wars demonstrated a heretofore unknown threat of foreign invasion. The burning of the capital in 1814 was tangible evidence to the legislative and executive branches of the dangers from European aggression. In 1817, President James Monroe stated that the Army, Navy, and coastal fortifications should be "regulated upon just principles as to the force of each and be kept in perfect order."³³ This was clearly in response to the need for a more national capability to respond to emergencies.



A congressional report from 1819 identified the changes in warfare brought about by the French Revolution and epitomized by Napoleon as the pinnacle of modern warfare. It went on to identify Europe as a continual threat to the sovereignty of the United States as "it cannot be believed that any real friendship can exist in the breasts of sovereigns of that continent for a government which has been founded upon principles so opposite to theirs, and which, by the happiness it diffuses, affords an eternal satire and reproach upon their conduct."³⁴ This reflected a growing awareness of Napoleonic warfare by American political leaders. Following the War of American Independence, these measures and sentiments were diametrically opposed to those of the founding fathers who feared the creation of a large standing army. The War of 1812 lessened the fear of a standing army and made the need for a more professional force seem reasonable and prudent.

If the identification of a European threat was a significant change in American thinking on war, then the political maneuverings that followed the War of 1812 removed some of the strongest barriers to the adoption of a new French-inspired way of warfare. One of these was the death of the Anglophone Federalist Party.³⁵ The Federalist Party took a strong anti-war stance that culminated with the adoption of the Hartford Convention in December 1814.³⁶ The Republican Party used this against the Federalists and made them seem like traitors, which resulted in the rapid demise of the Federalist Party. Without the Federalist Party, Federalist officers rapidly discarded their political and cultural resistance to French military theory and accepted the French Regulations of 1791 as the American system of tactics.

The end to organized anti-French sentiment in American politics, combined with the continued animosity to all things British following the war, coincided with a French renaissance in America. French culture, art, literature, science, and education became standards of excellence to Americans in the

first half of the nineteenth century.³⁷ Several literary journals—among them the *North American Review* in Boston, the *American Quarterly Review* in Philadelphia, and the *Southern Literary Messenger* in Richmond—had large circulations and provided readers with the most current literature and thought coming out of Europe. While there were articles and references to other European countries, the most numerous of the European references were of French articles and French culture. This fascination was almost equally split between the French arts such as literature, music, and theater and French advancements in mathematics, chemistry, and engineering. As an example of the high regard the American reading public had of French military expertise, the following lines came from an article in the *North American Review* in 1832:

One reason for introducing French into the course of studies, independently of the consideration, that every well-educated young man ought to be acquainted with that language, is to enable the cadets to read French works with facility, many of their text-books being the productions of French authors. It is, we believe, the universal opinion of scientific men, that French writers have been much more successful and happy in their investigations and explanations of the sciences generally, and of that of war in particular, than those of any other nation. It is both an evidence and an effect of this opinion, that a large portion of the works on scientific and military subjects, contained in the library at West Point, are the productions of French authors; and the cadets derive great benefit from this collection.³⁸

As the article intimated, the French program at West Point was one of the first university programs of its kind, and Harvard added French studies to its curriculum around the same time.³⁹ Following the War of 1812, the American public was far more willing to accept a French-inspired conceptualization of war for its Army than it was at the turn of the nineteenth century.

THE TENETS OF FRENCH WARFARE

There emerged at the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution a distinct French system of warfare. This system was a synthesis of the writings of military intellectuals before the French Revolution and partially a function of the social and cultural changes of the revolution itself. The first element of this was institutionalized in the publication of the *Règlement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 1er août 1791* or the French Regulations of 1791.⁴⁰ These regulations embodied many of the recommendations of Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte Guibert and created a simplified and effective system of tactics.⁴¹ This scheme contained a series of formations and movements that, when taken together, removed the dogmatic nature of tactics of the armies of Frederick the Great and empowered commanders to make their own tactical decisions. It also introduced the small attack column to French tactics while at the same time improving existing linear formations.⁴² These improvements paved the way for an entirely different system of warfare that played an important role in the victories that saved the French Republic.

While the French Regulations of 1791 provided simplified tactics to

the armies of the French Republic, it was the *Règlement provisoire sur le service de l'infanterie en campagne* or the French Regulations of 1792 that demonstrated how the new system, combined with the capabilities of the French citizen-soldier, achieved victory on the battlefield. It outlined the French administration of armies on campaign and included a very important section entitled "*Instruction pour les jours de combat.*" This part was the only place in the French regulations that detailed how the new French tactics functioned on the battlefield. Beginning with a cloud of skirmishers out in front of the main infantry line, the artillery focused its fire on enemy infantry formations instead of enemy artillery batteries. Skirmishers engaged the enemy lines to cover the advance of the infantry in regular formations, including both lines and columns depending on the individual commander's mission and understanding of the terrain. Once the main line got close to the enemy, the skirmishers rejoined the regular infantry for a bayonet charge that penetrated the enemy line.⁴³ This new French warfare, or French combat method, consisted of a conceptualization of the battlefield that integrated the primacy of the offensive, a linear but noncontiguous order of battle, a nonspecialized infantry army, auxiliary arms in direct support of the infantry, and nondogmatic tactics to achieve victory on the battlefield.⁴⁴ This combat approach provided French armies with numerous advantages that allowed the French to defeat every major army in Europe. This, in turn, led those countries to adopt all or part of the French combat method.



Engraving of Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte Guibert, by G. Engelmann, 1825

AMERICA INCORPORATES FRENCH IDEAS INTO ITS WAY OF WARFARE

The pro-French environment in America that followed the War of 1812 offered powerful cultural support for the adoption of a conceptualization of the battlefield based on the fundamental elements of the French combat method. Winfield Scott was an integral part of adopting the nondogmatic




Plate from *Règlement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie* showing the various drill positions




Plate from *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of Infantry* with drill positions showing the obvious French influence

tactics of the French Regulations of 1791 as the American system of tactics in 1815. After a book-buying tour of France in 1815 to learn as much about French warfare as possible, Scott became very involved in the revision of Army regulations in 1821 and 1825, which incorporated other elements of the French combat method into the

American way of warfare.⁴⁵ In 1821, Scott recommended the approval of a translation of the French Regulations of 1792 as the general regulations for the U.S. Army.⁴⁶ This regulation, more than the tactical drill regulation of 1815, institutionalized the essential elements of the French combat method in the American way of warfare. The

American *General Regulations for the Army* published in 1821 included an exact translation of *Instruction pour les jours de combat* from the French Regulations of 1792 titled "Battles—general dispositions."⁴⁷ "Battles" contained the description of the French combat method in action and made that explanation the way American soldiers



visualized the battlefield. By including this section in the American general regulations, Scott and the Republican-dominated War Department explicitly adopted a conceptualization of the battlefield based on the French combat method.

While these first standard regulations, both tactical and general, were little more than translations of French doctrine, Scott presided over another board in 1825 that completed the institutionalization of the French combat method in the American way of warfare, and created American versions of those French regulations.⁴⁸ The *General Regulations for the Army* of 1825 retained the majority of the 1821 French-inspired regulations and did little more than update the language for a more modern American officer corps. However, new material appeared in several appendixes that covered the organization and operations of the United States Military Academy at West Point as well as standardized topographical and engineering language for the Army on the frontier.⁴⁹ These West Point regulations reflected French educational techniques such as the use of oral recitations, written examinations, and the organization into academic sections based on class performance. In this way, Scott reinforced the French-inspired reforms of the Military Academy that began in 1817.

For the tactical regulations, Scott's *Infantry Tactics* of 1825 also retained the spirit and format of the 1815 regulation but updated the language in a similar fashion as the general regulations. The only real substantive change made to the 1815 tactical regulation was the inclusion of a truly American light infantry and rifleman drill.⁵⁰ While skirmishing was an integral part of the French combat method, the French Regulations of 1791 contained no specific light infantry drill. Scott's drill codified the practice of riflemen fighting as heavy infantry and the line infantry battalions dispersing as skirmishers when necessary. It also provided a framework for these skirmishers to support the main infantry battle. This was an attempt to integrate the more irregular colonial heritage into the drill regulations, but intellectually it represented the reinforcement of another element of the French combat method.


Scott was responsible for one more regulations board in 1835 that did little more than modernize the language of the regulations, but it was far more controversial than previous regulations boards. Unlike the earlier boards, there was much more professional debate within the officer corps in 1835 as to the revised tactics and especially Scott's role in the process. However, the regulations Scott presented to the Army was vetted through an additional board of senior Army leaders presided over by then Commanding General of the Army Alexander Macomb.⁵¹ All of the movements and formations remained the same. Scott updated the light infantry section by providing commanders with more control over their skirmishers and furnished skirmishers more detailed movements to rejoin the line battalions.⁵² Thus, into the 1830s, American tactics continued to be influenced by the French regulations and supported a conceptualization of the battlefield derived from the French combat method.


While the *General Regulations for the Army* of 1825 introduced the elements of the French combat method to the armies of the United States at large, most of the art and science of

war was removed from the general regulations published in 1835. In these guidelines, there was no "Battles" section, and, overall, the regulations became a document focused on the administration of the Army both in garrison, on the frontier, and on the battlefield. One possible explanation for the removal of such an important part of the Army's conceptualization of the battlefield was the increased reputation of West Point as an institution and the proliferation of West Point officers throughout the Army.

WEST POINT TEACHES THE TENETS OF FRENCH WARFARE

An important part of the institutionalization of this French-inspired conceptualization of the battlefield was the adoption of a new curriculum at the young United States Military Academy. In 1815, the War Department sent Bvt. Maj. Sylvanus Thayer to study current French military education at the *École Polytechnique*. This experience reinforced his belief in the efficacy of French military thought.⁵³ When he became the superintendent of the Military Academy in 1817, he immediately undertook to make it more than just a school for the Corps of Engineers. Thayer created an American version of the French officer educational system by adopting French educational techniques,






Daguerreotype of Claude Crozet, c. 1850

French language as part of the curriculum, and the fundamental elements of French warfare taught through the military engineering curriculum.⁵⁴ This naturally led Thayer to appoint Claude Crozet the first professor of engineering at West Point.

Crozet was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and brought the French study of military engineering and the science of war to the academy. He was commissioned as an artillery officer in the French Army and graduated from the engineering school at Metz in 1809 just in time to become part of Napoleon's imperial headquarters for the battle of Wagram. Crozet then went on to command Marshal Michel Ney's artillery throughout the invasion of Russia before he was captured during the retreat in 1812.⁵⁵ His education and experience shaped his engineering course, which was modeled after the curriculum of the French school at Metz.⁵⁶ Crozet adopted an English translation of Simon Gay de Vernon's *A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification*. Gay de Vernon earned an excellent reputation as an engineer during the wars of the French Revolution and became the first professor of engineering and fortification at the *École Polytechnique*. Napoleon personally endorsed Gay de Vernon's



Title page from *A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification*, which contains the appendix, "A Summary of the Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations," by Capt. John O'Connor

Treatise for use in officer education in 1805.⁵⁷ This text trained thousands of French officers before it became a part of American officer education as a central part of the academy's engineering curriculum.

The two volumes of the *Treatise* created a complete course in engineering and fortification that integrated the fundamental elements of the French combat method throughout every section and subject. This began with a discussion of the role engineering played in officer development. For Gay

de Vernon, engineering was a critical part of the art and science of war and was essential for officers of all arms.⁵⁸ To reinforce this view, discussions of the art of war were placed conveniently within descriptions of the science of war. Thus, large formulas and diagrams of fortifications went side by side with detailed descriptions of the attack and defense of those fortifications. Historical examples were a part of every major subject, including campaigns and battles of the Wars of Napoleon and the French Revolution.⁵⁹

Overall, Gay de Vernon espoused the primacy of the offensive, the nonspecialized infantry army, and the use of artillery support for the main infantry attack.⁶⁰ These ideas reinforced elements of the French combat method and made the *Treatise* an excellent text for officer education at West Point.

The edition commissioned for use at West Point also contained a new appendix put together by American Capt. John O'Connor. Titled "A Summary of the Principles and Maxims of Grand Tactics and Operations," the appendix contained what O'Connor considered the most current European military theory available in any language.⁶¹ He attributed most of the theory in the appendix to Antoine Henri Jomini who "has transcended all writers on war, and has exhibited the most extraordinary powers of analyzing and combining military operations."⁶² The appendix began with the maxim that all strategy came down to the ability to carry your strength against the enemy's decisive point. Starting from this premise, O'Connor used Jomini's thought to outline an offensive system of war. On the offensive, successful generals used infantry armies supported by artillery and cavalry to move against the enemy's weak points. The principles outlined in this appendix linked current European military thought to the efficacy of the French combat method. The addition of the appendix was an excellent way to reinforce the lessons learned within the body of the text and contributed to the indoctrination of cadets in the essential elements of the French combat method.

With a new focus on academic excellence and modern engineering, West Point rapidly became the premier engineering institution in America. By 1822, Thayer's book acquisitions made the West Point library one of the best academic libraries in the country. While 50 percent of the holdings were physical sciences and engineering texts, 40 percent were texts on the science and history of war, which was indicative of the importance Thayer placed on the subject.⁶³ Overall, the vast majority of the books were in French, by French authors, or about


the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period. This collection reinforced the legitimacy of French warfare for generations of cadets. It also provided a unique resource for an academic education in the science of war.

DENNIS HART MAHAN CONTINUES TO TEACH FRENCH WARFARE AT WEST POINT

Thayer's reforms, the new engineering curriculum, and the library's collection ensured that cadets received an excellent education in the French-inspired American way of warfare. Although Crozet left the academy in 1823 due to poor health, his successors continued to use his engineering curriculum. It was not until 1830 that Dennis Hart Mahan, a West Point graduate of the class of 1824, introduced a more American synthesis of the French combat method to cadet education.⁶⁴ The War Department sent Mahan to study engineering at the French school in Metz, and he returned to West Point in 1829 convinced that the engineering course was obsolete. He created a unique Ameri-

can mixture of the French doctrines of the Wars of the French Revolution using the language of Jomini and the battles of Napoleon.⁶⁵ Through his teaching and writing, Mahan reinforced the elements of French warfare that formed an integral part of the American way of warfare.

Mahan set out to adapt the principles of the French combat method to the realities of North America for the future officers of the U.S. Army. He produced a set of lithographic notes for use in cadet instruction in the early 1830s. These notes provided students with the fundamental elements of the French war method in an accessible format. A section of these notes entitled "Composition of Armies" described the infantry as the critical arm to achieve victory and recommended an infantry-based army with cavalry and artillery as auxiliary arms.⁶⁶ This organization made the infantry attack the most important and powerful on the battlefield. In the section entitled "Strategy," Mahan stated his fundamental principle of war: "The object of every war ought to be to gain an advantageous peace,



and this object can be attained alone by decisive strokes.⁶⁷ This principle sounds remarkably similar to statements found in the works of Jomini. Mahan's pamphlet also contained a Battle section that introduced students to the army's intellectual framework. It described the battlefield in almost the exact way as both the French Regulations of 1792 and the *General Regulations for the Army* of 1821. It encouraged the primacy of the offensive and described a linear order of battle containing two lines with a reserve that integrated artillery and skirmishers into the main attack.⁶⁸ The Strategy section also ensured that students learned the fundamental elements of the French combat method in a way that reinforced their tactical and general regulations.

Mahan wrote his first military text in 1836 titled *A Treatise on Field Fortification*. Although its main purpose was the construction of fortifications, Mahan discussed the attack and defense of fortifications throughout.⁶⁹ He described a hypothetical attack on fortifications that began with an artillery barrage that cleared the parapet and covered the approach of an attack column supported by a reserve. The attack column cleared the enemy from the parapet using a bayonet assault while the reserve reinforced success and carried the enemy fortifications.⁷⁰ The defense used artillery and rifle fire to slow and damage enemy formations as they navigated obstacles and the parapet. The defense also culminated with a bayonet attack that broke the enemy formations.⁷¹ These descriptions matched similar passages in *Strategy* and the general army regulations of 1821 and 1825 and remained consistent with the fundamental elements of the French combat method.

In his descriptions, Mahan made the attack and defense seem to have similar organizations and principles. Both culminated with a bayonet charge designed to defeat the enemy. His belief in the offensive was so great that he discouraged adopting a defense in depth because it encouraged troops to retreat.⁷² In this way, he educated cadets in several elements of the French combat method that consisted of the

primacy of the offensive and the auxiliary arms supported the main infantry attack. West Point graduates would carry these lessons with them onto the battlefields of both the Mexican-American and Civil Wars.

A FRENCH-INSPIRED AMERICAN WAY OF WARFARE

This fascinating period in the intellectual history of the United States Army presents an interesting glimpse into what it takes to adopt a new conceptual framework or paradigm of war. The elements of French warfare came across the Atlantic in the form of drill regulations and professional education and, above all, through the reputation of Napoleon. These elements transformed European warfare and constituted the French combat method. This was an excellent system of war, but its adoption by the armies of the United States following the War of 1812 made no military sense whatsoever. No American officer had ever witnessed it in action on the continent. In fact, the only other system of war Americans interacted with from the 1770s through the War of 1812 was that of the British through the bayonets of the British Army and its auxiliaries. The British Army was the only army in Europe not to adopt some form of the French Regulations of 1791 or the other elements of the French combat method. Americans had ample opportunity to witness the effectiveness of the British conceptualization of the battlefield adapted to North America. In the War of 1812, the British bested the armies of the United States in every theater of the war, with the notable exception of the battle of Chippewa. With a colonial tradition and affinity for British culture throughout the United States, pragmatic military officers in 1814 and 1815 should surely have pushed for a wholesale adoption of British warfare. But instead of adopting British ideas and a British-inspired way of warfare, America turned to the French.

The social influences Kuhn talked about when discussing the requirements for a paradigm shift manifested themselves as cultural acceptance for new military ideas and the support

of a popular military leader in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Winfield Scott played that role in the years after the War of 1812 and was an important advocate for change. But it took more than just Scott's endorsement to gain the consensus required to adopt a new conceptualization of the battlefield. It took the movement of American culture and society toward French culture and the identification of excellence with all things French. With a strong leader and cultural acceptance, the American military establishment turned its back on the experiences of the War of 1812 and adopted a new paradigm of war based only on a set of French ideas and the reputation of Napoleon.

Using the concept of a Kuhnian paradigm to describe the process by which a nation adopts a series of ideas about the fundamental nature of war is a controversial subject with military historians and professionals. Some believe that the dynamic nature of war makes the application of a paradigm inappropriate.⁷³ Others think that continuity best describes warfare, that dramatic changes in military knowledge and theory are impossible to discern in military history, and that paradigms represent a complete break from the past.⁷⁴ Underlying these objections seems to be a belief in the military professional as the epitome of pragmatism and rationality, keeping whatever works and discarding whatever does not work on the battlefield. However, military theorists throughout history have attempted to codify the military art and, in effect, to create models for military professionals to follow to achieve victory. In its most basic form, a paradigm is simply a set of ideas. As for the argument for continuity and pragmatism, the adoption of the French ideas as the American way of warfare following the War of 1812 provides at least one example when an army adopted a set of ideas in a decidedly nonpragmatic fashion.

All of these criticisms and objections fail to understand the real power of the concept of a paradigm when analyzing the intellectual activity of a professional community. To adopt a paradigm requires the consensus of that

community, and that agreement has as much to do with social and cultural factors as it does with the compelling nature of the ideas that make up the paradigm. In the military context, the concept of a paradigm places the intellectual framework of an army as a central element of how the nation thinks about and fights wars. Far from pure pragmatism, the creation of an American system of tactics and wider general regulations that explicitly established a French-inspired way of warfare demonstrated the important influence of ideas for military professionals. Perhaps more so than a scientific paradigm, the military paradigm requires the support of a powerful and influential leader and the cultural acceptance of the society at large to create a military consensus. In this way, the army is a reflection of society. While the ideas that make up a paradigm are important in understanding the intellectual development of an army, it is a far more useful analytical tool in comprehending the social and cultural influences on that army.

The cultural acceptance of French ideas in America was so pervasive that by the 1830s that conceptualization was deeply embedded in the education and regulations of the armies of the United States. As the years progressed, that conceptualization based on the French combat method became the central component of the American way of warfare. The Army was able to retain all of the elements of its colonial heritage that reinforced the new conceptualization such as integrating the light infantry tradition into the drill regulations in 1825. The way of warfare defined what was and was not war. It determined educational curricula and tactical formations. Thus in the 1830s there existed across the Army's institutions a remarkable consistency in doctrine and military thought, and that consistency was based on the French combat method. It was not affected by the Army's experiences on the frontier or against the Indians in Florida but retained a European focus. This way of warfare and the resulting conceptualization of the battlefield produced American victory in the Mexican-American War. It led to Scott's famous "fixed opinion," which attributed the



The American Soldier, 1827, by Hugh Charles McBarron

short war directly to the efforts and actions of the West Point graduates that served under his command.⁷⁵ The officer corps continued to use a paradigm inspired by the French combat method through the fall of France in 1940 when another cultural affinity and strong military leader caused the adoption of a different paradigm of war.

Note: The author presented portions of this paper at the 2012 annual meeting of the Society for Military History.



NOTES

1. Brian M. Linn, "The American Way of War' Revisited," *Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (April 2002): 501–33.
2. For a more detailed definition and analysis of the concept of a "way of warfare," see Michael A. Bonura, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), pp. 3–6.
3. James S. Pettit, *Elements of Military Science: For the Use of Students in Colleges and*

Universities (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Press, 1895), p. 183.

4. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* (Albany: Daniel and Samuel Whiting, 1803).

5. David Dundas, *Principles of Military Movements Chiefly Applied to Infantry* (London: T. Cadell, 1788).

6. Isaac Maltby, *Elements of War* (Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1811); Epaphras Hoyt, *A Treatise on the Military Arts* (Greenfield: Russell & Ripley, 1798).

7. Pierce Darrow, *Scott's Militia Tactics; Comprising the Duty of Infantry, Light-Infantry, and Riflement*, 2d ed. (Hartford: Oliver D. Cooke, 1821), p. iv.

8. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

9. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

10. For a more thorough analysis of Kuhn's argument and a more complete description of how that argument applies to the military art, see Bonura, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon*, pp. 6–8, 260–62.

11. Ltr, John Armstrong to James Monroe, 23 Sep 1814, in *American State Papers: Military Affairs* 1:523.

12. Ltr, George Izard to John Armstrong, 7 May 1814, in George Izard, *Official Correspondence with the Department of War Relative to the Military Operations of the American Army under the Command of Major General Izard of the Northern Frontier of the United States* (Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816), p. 3.

13. Allan Peskin, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2003), p. 11; Timothy D. Johnson, *Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 42–43.

14. Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott*, 2 vols. (New York: Sheldon, 1864), 1:118–20.

15. Donald E. Graves, *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814* (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993), pp. 31–32.

16. Henry Adams, *The War of 1812*, ed. H. A. DeWeerd (New York: Cooper Square, 1999), pp. 175–76.

17. Although most histories of the War of 1812 refer to this creek as Chippewa, the actual name of the creek is Chippawa.

18. Edward Deering Mansfield, *Life and Services of General Winfield Scott* (New York: A. S. Barnes Co., 1852), p. 105.

19. Jeffrey Kimball, "The Battle of Chippawa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812," *Military Affairs* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1967–1968): 182.

20. Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara, 1814: America Invades Canada* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 177–78.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–18.

22. Scott, *Memoirs*, 1:143.

23. Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 299–303.

24. Samuel J. Watson, "Developing 'Republican Machines': West Point and the Struggle to Render the Officer Corps Safe for America, 1802–33," in *Thomas Jefferson's Military Academy: Founding West Point*, ed. Robert M. S. McDonald (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), pp. 155–57.

25. Alexander Smyth, *Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvres, and Conduct of the Infantry of the United States* (Philadelphia: T. and G. Palmer, 1812).

26. Ltr, Eustis to Senate, 13 Dec 1810, in *American State Papers: Military Affairs* 1:295.

27. William Duane, *A Hand Book for Infantry* (Philadelphia: printed for the author, 1812).

28. Donald E. Graves, "'Dry Books of Tactics': U.S. Infantry Manuals of the War of 1812 and After," *Military Collector and Historian* 38 (1986): 58.

29. General Order, 27 Dec 1814, front matter, U.S. Army, *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of Infantry* (New York: T. and W. Mercein, 1815).

30. Graves, "'Dry Books of Tactics,'" p. 173.

31. John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Kyle F. Zelner, *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip's War* (New York: New York University Press, 2009).

32. Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), pp. 158–68.

33. Inaugural Address of James Monroe, 4 Mar 1817, in *American Military Thought*, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 89–90.

34. "Report of the House Committee upon the Improvement on the Organization and Discipline of the Militia," 22 Jan 1819, in *American State Papers: Military Affairs* 1:824.

35. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 197.

36. Adams, *The War of 1812*, pp. 277–88.

37. Henry Blumenthal, *America and French Culture, 1800–1900* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), pp. 362–64.

38. "Military Academy," *North American Review* 34, no. 74 (January 1832): 249.

39. Blumenthal, *America and French Culture*, p. 570.

40. France, Le Ministre de la Guerre, *Règlement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 1er août 1791* (Paris: De Impremiere Royale, 1791).

41. Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte Guibert, *A General Essay on Tactics: With and Introductory Discourse, Upon the Present State of Politics, and the Military Science in Europe*, 2 vols., trans. James Douglas (London: J. Millan, 1781); Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 54.

42. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 114–18.

43. France, Le Ministre de la Guerre, *Règlement provisoire sur le service de l'infanterie en campagne* (Paris: De Impremiere Royale, 1792), pp. 109–16.

44. For the complete argument for a French combat method as a result of the French Revolution, see Bonura, *Under the Shadow of Napoleon*, pp. 11–40.

45. Scott, *Memoirs*, 1:157.

46. John C. Calhoun, War Department Order July 1821, front matter, U.S. Army, *General Regulations for the Army, or Military Institutes* (Philadelphia: M. Carey and Sons, 1821).

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 124–28.

48. Ltr, Calhoun to Monroe, 16 Feb 1824, in *American State Papers: Military Affairs* 1:623.

49. U.S. Army, *General Regulations for the Army, or Military Institutes* (Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 1825), pp. 167–275.

50. Winfield Scott, *Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of the Infantry of the U.S. Army*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 1825), pp. 170–90.

51. *Army and Navy Chronicle* 1, no. 15 (April 1835): 116.

52. Winfield Scott, *Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of the United States' Infantry*, vol. 1 (New York: George Dearborn, 1835), pp. 185–95.

53. William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 115, 123, 167–68.

54. United States Military Academy (USMA), *Regulations of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point* (New York: J. and J. Harper, 1832), p. 17; idem, *The Annual Report of the Board of Visitors for the Year 1819* (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy Press and Bindery, 1894), pp. 6–9.

55. Jennings C. Wise, *The Military History of the Virginia Military Institute From 1839 to 1865* (Lynchburg: J.P. Bell Company, 1915), pp. 28–29.

56. Eben Swift, “The Military Education of Robert E. Lee,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 35, no. 2 (April 1927): 103.

57. Simon François Gay de Vernon, *A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification*, trans. John Michael O’Connor, vol. 1 (New York: J. Seymour, 1817), p. v.

58. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 1, 9.

59. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 380–401.

60. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 73–160.

61. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 384–490.

62. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 385.

63. USMA, *Catalogue of Books in the Library of the Military Academy* (Newburgh, N.Y.: Ward M. Gazlay, 1822).

64. Thomas E. Griess, “Dennis Hart Mahan: West Point Professor and Advocate of Military Professionalism, 1830–1871,” Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1968.

65. Dennis Hart Mahan, Untitled Lithographic Pamphlet (West Point, N.Y.: USMA Press, 1838); idem, *A Treatise on Field Fortification* (New York: Wiley and Long, 1836).

66. Mahan, Untitled Lithographic Pamphlet, p. 1.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–14.

69. Mahan, *A Treatise on Field Fortification* (New York: Wiley, 1862), p. vi.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–101.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.

73. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001), p. 226.

74. Thomas A. Bruscano Jr., review of *Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII*, by Michael A. Bonura, *Michigan War Studies Review*, posted 21 Mar 2013 at <http://www.miwsr.com/2013-023.aspx>.

75. George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.: From Its Establishment in 1802 to 1890*, vol. 1, 3d ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1891).



Continued from page 3

the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC), forced us to stand down the DAHAC. We have now found a new parent committee for DAHAC, the Army Education Advisory Committee, and will reinstitute the DAHAC as the Department of the Army Historical Sub-Committee starting in early 2014.

In addition, we will shortly reconstitute the Military History Coordinating Committee and plan to hold a meeting of the Army Historians Council in July 2014. We will also restart Army museum curator training courses and plan to hold our first Army Historian Training

Symposium within the next year as a means to enhance collaboration, inspire innovation, and solicit input from across the entire Army history and museum community as to our future direction.

As always, I stand ready to join you in the deliberate planning process to preserve and improve the Army Historical and Museum Programs. Keep Army History Alive!



ARMYHISTORY

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

A *Army History* welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army's history extends to the present day, and *Army History* seeks accounts of the Army's actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable *Army History* to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.

U.S. ARMY ARTIFACT SPOTLIGHT

THE U.S. ARMY MODEL 1913 CAVALRY "PATTON" SABER, SPRINGFIELD ARMORY SERIAL NUMBER 1

By Dieter Stenger

U.S. Army soldiers used swords or sabers as supplements to firearms for well over a century before their obsolescence became apparent during World War I. Influenced by European designs, American mounted troops from the American Revolution until the Spanish-American War used combat swords and sabers that had wide-edged, curved "cut-style" blades.¹ After graduating from West Point in 1909, 2d Lt. George S. Patton closely examined the age-old controversy between the advocates of the "cutting edge" and those favoring the "stabbing point." According to Patton, "At first sight it seems rather curious that, though the saber has been a component part of our cavalry equipment ever since the beginning, it's [*sic*] use and form has never been given much thoughtful consideration."² Patton's studies in France with Charles Cléry, a "master of arms" and instructor of fencing at the cavalry school in Saumur, resulted in a new combat doctrine for the U.S. Cavalry. This doctrine favored the use of a longer robust saber and thrusting attacks instead of the standard slashing maneuver. Patton argued, "The present saber of our cavalry is almost the last survival of the incorrect application of the mechanics of the scimitar. It is not a good cutting weapon, being difficult to move rapidly."³ Indeed, his concerns surrounding the ability of the U.S. Cavalry to fight effectively were reflected in his writings, "many of our possible opponents are using the long straight sword and the point in the charge. To come against this with our present sabers and position of charge would be suicidal."⁴ In order to remain competitive with the armies around the world, Patton designed a well-balanced U.S. Army sword that could deliver a fatal blow using the point.

The blade is divided into the forte—the 18 inches nearest the hilt; the point; and the rest of the blade, which is double-edged. The front edge and half of the back edge are sharp to be more easily withdrawn from a body or, on rare occasions, to slash and cut. The hilt is divided into the guard, which protects the hand, the grip, and the pommel—the lower end of the grip—used to strike in close fighting.

Patton argued that the saber was solely a weapon of offense for use in conjunction with another offensive weapon—the horse. In the charge and in the melee, the trooper relied on the speed of his horse and his own offensive spirit for his chances of success.⁵

In executing the charge with the point, Patton instructed troopers to lean forward down and slightly on the left along the horse's neck while fully extending the arm and saber. A maximum reach was achieved by rotating the back of the hand skyward, which turned the handguard up and protected the hand, arm, and head from thrusts and cuts. The blade was held at the height of the horse's ears. From this ideal position, a trooper could easily turn hostile points to the right, by revolving the hand in that direction, while the point of his weapon remaining in the ideal line of the horse, and his body remained protected by the handguard of his saber.⁶ According to Patton, "He rides at a man to kill him, and if he misses, he goes on to another, moving in straight lines with the intent of running his opponent through."⁷

The influence of French swords on the Model 1913 cavalry saber cannot be overlooked when compared to a French heavy cavalry sword measuring 43.5 inches long. Albeit a single edge, that sword features a double blood groove, a massive brass basket



Model 1840 Cavalry Saber

French Heavy Cavalry Sword

hilt, with a wire-wrapped leather grip. The Model 1840 cavalry saber was the last of the cut-style swords used by the U.S. Army following the Mexican War up to the end of the Civil War.

The Springfield Armory manufactured more than 35,000 sabers between 1913 and 1918. All were stamped SA, with the Ordnance stamp (flaming bomb), and date on one side of the ricasso; the other side was stamped US and serialized. An additional 93,000 sabers were contracted to the firm of Landers, Frary and Clark in 1917 and 1918.

Saber serial number 1, a centerpiece of the Army's Core Collection of artifacts held at the U.S. Army Center of Military History's Museum Support Center, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, measures 42 inches long, 6.5 inches high, and 5 inches wide. The weight of the saber is 2.75 pounds. The double-edged straight blade has a single blood groove and a plastic black hilt with large hand guard. The scabbard is made of wood covered in canvas with a metal throat and drag.

While the Model 1913 cavalry saber may be considered the most effective combat saber used by the U.S. Army, it was quickly made obsolete by the introduction of greater firepower delivered by machine guns during World War I. Subsequent U.S. Army model swords were purely ceremonial in function.



NOTES

1. Dieter Stenger, "The Star-Spangled Banner Sword Carried by Captain John Berry at the Battle of Fort McHenry," *Man at Arms for the Gun Collector and Sword* 34, no. 5 (October 2012): 14–19.

2. First Lt. George S. Patton Jr., "The Form and Use of the Saber," *Cavalry Journal* (March 1913): 752.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 753.

4. Patton, "The Form and Use of the Saber," p. 759. In 1908, the British concluded a series of studies to resolve their own debate regarding the best type of cavalry sword that adopted a straight thrusting sword whose origin traced back to the Heavy Cavalry Pattern 1796. Other heavy cavalry swords include the Austrian 1769/75 Heavy Cavalry Sabre, the French An XI Cuirassier Heavy Cavalry Sword, and the Prussian M1889 Cavalry saber. See also Frederick Wilkinson, *Edge Weapons* (New York: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 154–56; John Wilkinson Lathan, *British Military Swords: From 1800 to the Present Day* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1966), p. 46; Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Pierce A. Chamberlain, *Spanish Military Weapons in Colonial America 1700–1821* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Press, 1972), pp. 84–85.

5. See *Saber Exercise*, War Department, Document No. 463 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914).

6. Patton, "The Form and Use of the Saber," pp. 754–55.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 759.

Dieter Stenger is currently serving at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the curator of firearms and edged weapons.



Model 1913
Cavalry Saber

All items: National Museum of the U.S. Army

**ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR**


Kenneth J. Babcock retired from the Army as a lieutenant colonel in 2013 after serving as a U.S. Army Logistics Corps officer assigned to the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He earned a bachelor's degree in history from Boise State University and recently earned a master's degree in military history from Norwich University.



General Douglas MacArthur surveys the beachhead on Leyte Island, 20 October 1944.

MACARTHUR'S

 small ships



IMPROVISING WATER TRANSPORT IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

BY KENNETH J. BABCOCK

Water transportation was crucial to the United States Army's success against Japan in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) during the Second World War. Here, the U.S. Army faced some of the most complicated sustainment problems encountered during the war. Transport distances were long and resources scarce throughout the region. On the front lines, Allied forces faced an enemy entrenched throughout a complex region of rugged islands and atolls. Further complicating matters, strategic planners estimated that there were not enough available resources from the United States to support offensive operations in the SWPA until the middle of 1943.

Despite these challenges, General Douglas MacArthur was not content to remain in a defensive posture for long when he assumed command of the General Headquarters (GHQ), SWPA on 18 April 1942. He and his logisticians operated in a military environment that stressed urgency and economy of force over other

considerations. Innovation and improvisation in transportation and supply operations were crucial to MacArthur's early transition to offensive operations. In fact, historian Martin Van Creveld argues that the Allies in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) achieved their victory partially due to "their disregard for the preconceived logistics plans as to their implementation."¹ In this regard, the SWPA was no different. The formation and employment of the U.S. Army Small Ships and deployment of the U.S. Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) illustrates the benefits of innovation and improvisation during MacArthur's New Guinea Campaign and beyond.

THE SWPA OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The United States faced complex challenges in worldwide strategic and operational sustainment as it undertook one of the largest military operations in history. These were the direct result of a two-ocean war.

Further, Japan's surprise attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 completely disrupted America's existing deployment and sustainment plan for the Pacific theater during the first seven months of the war. The Army quickly realized that "virtually every previously planned movement of forces had to be modified or abandoned."² This included service troops, equipment, and supplies. Sustainment challenges in the Pacific were further complicated by American strategic policy designating Europe as the decisive theater and the priority for support. Under this policy, the United States accepted greater risk over Far East interests by assuming that a citadel defense of strategic forward bases was sufficient to contain Japanese offensives until the crisis in Europe stabilized. However, Japan's rapid advance quickly threatened lines of communications between the U.S. west coast and Allied possessions in the Pacific. Japan captured Guam and Wake Island before the end of 1941 and applied tremendous pressure on




National Archives

Captured American and Filipino troops after the surrender of Corregidor, May 1942

U.S. forces in the Philippines, forcing their surrender in May 1942.

When MacArthur assumed command of the SWPA, the Japanese southern limit of advance stretched along a 3,000-mile-long front from Java to the Solomon Islands. Allied resistance on Papua New Guinea had prevented Japanese forces from advancing on the Australian mainland. Allied forces were successful in stalling Japanese advances in New Guinea through the all-but-impenetrable Owen Stanley Mountains. On the south coast, the Australians maintained a strategic base at Port Moresby, which became the Allied primary defensive anchor in New Guinea. The Kokoda Trail was the best avenue of approach across the Owen Stanley Mountains. Japan's only other feasible option was to attack Port Moresby by sea. Japanese military leaders needed all of New Guinea in order to secure Japan's southern defensive line and open up the eastern Australian coastline for possible invasion. Early in the war, Japan launched three failed invasions toward Port Moresby. These first resulted in a failed overland invasion from Dutch New Guinea, second in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and finally in a failed counteroffensive during General MacArthur's Papua Campaign along the Owen Stanley Mountains and the Buna-Gona region. These battles illustrate the brutal challenges of ground and ad-hoc amphibious warfare in the Southwest Pacific.

The geography and harsh environment of forward combat areas severely tested sustainment operations in the SWPA. The first problem was transporting men, equipment, and supplies from the United States to Australia to shore up and sustain theater defenses. Supply routes between the United States and Australia represented the longest lines of communications throughout the war. This "created a heavy strain" on available American shipping within the Pacific.³ Even within the SWPA itself, intra-theater shipping faced the prospect of operating in an area greater than the size of the continental United States. Transit distances between Australian ports and Port Moresby exceeded the






Natives transporting supplies and ammunition overland in Papua, 1942

length of the eastern coastline of the United States. The tactical distribution of supplies around New Guinea was also a daunting task. Resupply by sea, with some augmentation by aircraft, was the only practical method of supporting combat operations. Both Allied and Japanese armies quickly learned that effective ground resupply between Port Moresby and Buna over the Kokoda Trail was impracticable.⁴ Combat troops, even with the aid of local natives, could only pack a fraction of the supplies needed for any ground offensive over the Owen Stanley Mountains. At sea, coastal approaches to most SWPA islands, including New Guinea, were treacherous. Coral reefs and sandbars dominated much of these shorelines. To compound matters, military navigation charts of the area were outdated or incomplete and deepwater ports in the combat zone were scarce.

The second problem facing Allied forces in the SWPA, and one of the most pressing, was a shortage of intra-theater transport. General MacArthur's plan relied on a rapid rate of advance along the northern shore of New Guinea. During a staff meeting, he remarked that "island-hopping . . . with extravagant losses and slow progress is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible."⁵ However, his forces were still subject to two common principles of warfare. First, an army's rate of advance is a direct function of available days of supply. At one point during the Papua Campaign, Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Harding, commander of the 32d Infantry Division, reported that his slow advance during the Buna assault was directly related to chronic shortages of basic supplies. General MacArthur apparently did not accept this explanation and relieved Harding in the middle of the campaign. Regardless, MacArthur's forces could only advance as fast as the supply situation permitted. Second, an army's direction of advance is a function of its lines of communications. Allied forces in the SWPA required water transports capable of moving troops, equipment, and supplies in the U.S. Army's direction of advance along the northern



coast of New Guinea. Throughout the Papua Campaign, the Allies operated on a "logistical shoestring" that depended on Australian resources and innovative ways to maximize economy of force in operational planning.⁶ Fortunately, the U.S. Army was in the process of establishing local water transport capabilities to support both rate and direction of advance for the New Guinea Campaign. This gave MacArthur's forces freedom of maneuver during the first two years of the war despite a shortage of transportation assets from the United States.

U.S. ARMY WATER TRANSPORTATION IN THE SWPA


In early 1942, the United States dispatched a group of experienced American transportation executives to Australia to establish the Army Transportation Office. Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, who was appointed the Chief Quartermaster and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. forces in Australia on 21 March, recruited many of these profes-



sionals for their commercial expertise. Col. Thomas G. Plant was the first U.S. Army officer assigned over the Water Section of the Transportation Division. He was a businessman who at one time had served as the vice president of the



General Wilson, shown here as a major general, c. 1944



Thomas Plant, c. 1940

American Hawaiian Steamship Line.⁷ He brought with him a small team of “trained shipping men” capable of managing strategic ocean cargo operations. In April 1942, the Transportation Division reported that Colonel Plant’s team included “a staff of approximately nine experienced Water Transportation men with an additional seven to come.” The Army expanded this section to fifty officers, twenty soldiers, and forty-four civilians by the end of the year.⁸ The Army selected men with similar skills to plan and direct complex large ship operations throughout the SWPA. Concurrently, another group of specialists established a sister organization to manage a fleet of small local watercraft until American industrial production of amphibious and cargo ships caught up with demand.

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, American explorers John Sheridan Fahnestock and Adam Bruce Fahnestock proposed the idea of organizing a fleet of small vessels to infiltrate relief supplies to MacArthur’s forces in Bataan. The Fahnestock brothers were experienced adventurers with six to eight years sailing the South Pacific and were familiar with the New Guinea coastline. They skippered a Grand Banks fishing schooner named *Director II* in the years before the Second World War. Their crew included Dawson “Gubby” Glover,



Ladislav Reday


Phil Farley, Bob Wilson, and Ladislav “Laddie” Reday. Their unorthodox plan caught the attention of General Arthur Wilson.⁹ With his endorsement, senior Army officials accepted the Fahnestocks’ proposal. The Army commissioned Sheridan as a captain, his brother Bruce as a first lieutenant, and the next three crewmen as second lieutenants. Laddie Reday had already earned an Army commission by this point. Over time, the Fahnestocks recruited two other members of their family from Australia, including brother-in-law Sgt. Heath Steele and cousin Sgt. Frank Sheridan. Future colleagues affectionately referred to



Sheridan (left) and Bruce Fahnestock, c. 1940

these men as “the Originals.” In March 1942, the Army dispatched this group to Australia.¹⁰

The Army designated the Fahnestock relief mission to Bataan the “Mission X” expedition. These men arrived in Melbourne by air where they received news that Bataan had fallen.¹¹ Realizing there was still an immediate need for small watercraft, General Wilson placed the Mission X team under the command of Col. Harry Cullins with instructions to establish the Small Ships Supply




The Director II

Command directly under U.S. Army forces in Australian control.^{12, 13} This was no small feat for Colonel Cullins. The Originals had quickly developed a reputation as men who regularly ignored military discipline and decorum. According to Australian employee John B. “Jack” Savage,¹⁴ the Army recalled Colonel Cullins out of retirement specifically to “instruct the group in the ways of the Army. At times he despaired.”¹⁵ A few months later, Maj. George P. Bradford replaced Colonel Cullins. Major Bradford was also a former steamship executive having served as president of the Everett Steamship Company in Manila before the war.

On 29 May 1942, the Water Branch of the Army Transportation Office in Australia assumed operational control of the group, and on 14 July 1942, formally announced the formation of the U.S. Army Small Ships Section. The unit headquarters occupied a portion of the Grace Hotel in Sidney, Australia, from 1942 to

early 1947.¹⁶ As the war progressed, the section assumed a greater role in managing intra-theater lift using small vessels. The author of an anonymous memorandum released on 15 December 1942 predicted that “sooner or later, small water craft of a wide range of types would be indispensable as the island campaign gained momentum.”¹⁷

The U.S. Small Ships took an inventive approach to assemble a fleet of small watercraft capable of operating in the shallow coastal waters of New Guinea. According to Jack Savage, the section first established the administrative organization “needed to handle the acquisition of a fleet of small craft; to carry out the conversions, recruit crews, and attend to provisioning of these ships.”¹⁸ With the arrival of Major Bradford and additional experienced ship managers on 15 June 1942, Captain Fahnestock and the Originals were free to travel throughout the region to procure small commercial vessels suitable for military use.¹⁹



Sheridan Fahnestock at Milne Bay, 1943

A month later, the Transportation Service formally assigned the U.S. Small Ships a unique mission that included assembling and operating coastal vessels, the responsibility to “man, equip,

provision, repair, and maintain” the small boat fleet, and authority to coordinate small boat operations with larger U.S. Army–operated vessels. On 12 January 1943, the U.S. Small Ships assumed additional responsibility for small boat construction and tactical employment.²⁰ This task included the authority to directly hire local carpenters, mechanics, shipwrights, and laborers to operate certain boat repair facilities in northern Australia subject to ongoing Japanese air raids.²¹ The U.S. Small Ships hired these men under an exception to local Army policy. Typically, the U.S. Army arranged Australian-provided services through local labor unions. Under these circumstances, they did not hire union laborers due to strict union rules relating to hostile fire areas. Hiring nonunion laborers allowed the Army to continue to operate northern ports subjected to regular enemy attack.

The U.S. Small Ships took advantage of provisions in the American lend-lease program with Australia to acquire a variety of local commercial sailing vessels for U.S. military use. Lend-lease had greatly benefited America’s European allies, and the Army was determined to adapt this innovative program to the SWPA as well. Additionally, Australian naval officers assisted the U.S. Small Ships in purchasing vessels using credits accumulated under reverse lend-lease funds.²² Occasionally, Captain Fahnestock’s team was even able to procure vessels registered in other countries, including New Zealand and the Netherlands. The U.S. Small Ships focused mainly on commercial boats operating along the coasts of Australia and New Zealand. The Australian government granted authority to the U.S. Army to lease, purchase, or commandeer any private boat deemed suitable for wartime service. The U.S. Small Ships purchased a number of fishing trawlers, sailing sloops or ketches, plywood landing craft, and even obtained a few larger steel freighters operating in Australian territorial waters. They quickly learned that fishing trawlers were useful for amphibious operations due to a winch capable of pulling the vessel back out to sea. They also dis-



San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park



The *Will Watch* from New Zealand was typical of small sailing vessels employed by the Small Ships Section.


covered that ketches were useful for transport and lightering operations over shallow reefs and break tides. Larger vessels in the fleet included several commandeered Dutch freighters and a World War I destroyer converted into a commercial transport.²³ By 1943, the Army began placing orders with Australian shipyards for new wooden and steel barges, ocean lighters, and steel tugs.²⁴

The men of the U.S. Small Ships understood the urgency of their task and most times negotiated a purchase or settlement with each boat owner on the

spot. According to Australian employee Norm Oddy, “the haste of the whole business was astonishing. It had to be. The Japanese were getting closer to Australia each day. There was no time for extended haggling.” In each case, once the Americans procured a ship, “the Australian flag was taken down and the Stars and Stripes was raised.” With ownership papers in hand at the conclusion of each purchase, the U.S. Small Ships then opened negotiations with the crew. It should also be noted that according to maritime law, many of these vessels were not technically



Boats like this 125-foot derrick barge were common among the types of vessels procured by the Small Ships Section.



Smaller boats like this 85-foot diesel tug were often used for harbor and inshore work.



Boats like this 168-foot interisland supply vessel were built specifically for service in the SWPA.

American since they remained registered in Great Britain or other nations. (Australia did not maintain a distinct ship registry at the time.) The U.S. Army never formally registered these

vessels under U.S. authority. As a result, some Australian veterans who served as crew on these vessels argue that they technically did not operate foreign vessels during the war.²⁵

The U.S. Army used a practical and innovative approach to man the vessels of the U.S. Small Ships fleet. After concluding their business with the owners, the U.S. Small Ships offered contracts to the existing crews of each vessel at the time of purchase. “No longer having a boat to work with,” most crews agreed to employment with the Army.²⁶ The host government also authorized the U.S. Army to hire local civilians who otherwise did not qualify for Australian military service. Typical crews included men too old, too young, or medically unable to meet Australian military standards. This was the most expedient way to hire experienced crews in light of shortages of Army technical service personnel in the SWPA. Typically, the U.S. Army offered each crewman a six-month contract extendable to twelve months for satisfactory service. Interestingly, these contracts could only be entered into or renewed while on Australian soil. This restriction did not deter many from seeking extended service with the U.S. Small Ships throughout the war.

The Army’s newly acquired small watercraft performed a variety of amphibious, supply, medical evacuation, and reconnaissance missions throughout the New Guinea Campaigns and beyond. The U.S. Army exclusively managed this small watercraft fleet since the U.S. Navy did not provide amphibious vessels to the SWPA until 1943. The Army’s fleet was not originally designed for these missions, yet the fleet proved its effectiveness in many atypical roles. For example, in preparing for Allied landings at Buna in October 1942, a flotilla from the U.S. Small Ships shuttled rations and ammunition along with Army Quartermaster and Ordnance teams from Port Moresby to the staging area at Wanigela. An account of the 107th Quartermaster Detachment records that the commander of the 32d Division’s coastal task force then requested immediate transport for two companies of combat troops to Pongani. The division quartermaster, Lt. Col. Laurence McKinney, assigned two trawlers to transport “about a hundred men of the 128th Infantry” forward. These vessels were able to

navigate “treacherous and uncharted reefs around Cape Nelson, with the aid of native guides stationed at the bows to spot the reefs.”²⁷ As the campaign progressed, the U.S. Small Ships fleet also evacuated Allied wounded and Japanese prisoners on return trips. Control of the U.S. Small Ships fleet was largely decentralized in order to allow these small vessels to move supplies based on local needs.

The U.S. Small Ships were crucial to Allied efforts to defend New Guinea and Australia early in the war. Army vessels ferried a large portion of military supplies to Port Moresby and Milne Bay, while the Allied armies defended against Japanese incursions across the Owen Stanley Mountains. Facing chronic shortages on the battlefield, these ships delivered enough supplies to keep the Allied armies operational. Many vessels of the U.S. Small Ships operated freely along the coast despite the constant threat of air and sea attack. During a Japanese amphibious assault on 25–26 August 1942 against Ahioma on the north shore of Milne Bay, two ketches attempted to extract an Australian infantry company assigned to defend the area. One of the ketches sailed directly into a Japanese amphibious assault wave and was sunk. The other boat returned to Ahioma and the soldiers ultimately marched out of the area.²⁸ Although enemy action disrupted this particular operation, the Allies recognized the benefits of similar tactics using the U.S. Army’s small boats to move soldiers along the coast.

After the battle over Milne Bay, the U.S. Small Ships were able to undertake larger resupply missions. Dutch freighters *Anshun* and *Bantam* docked at Gili Gili on 6 September 1942, one day after the Japanese withdrawal. However, the *Anshun* capsized that evening after two departing Japanese warships attacked. The *Anshun* remained in place on its side as a breakwater at the port for about a year before the Allies refloated and towed it back to Australia for repairs.²⁹ This incident did not deter the Allied armies from launching the first of many amphibious landings in New Guinea the following month using the vessels



Port Moresby, August 1942

of the U.S. Small Ships employing nontraditional methods. Allied forces conducted their first landing on New Guinea on the morning of 18 October 1942 using ships never designed for amphibious operations. A group of 102 soldiers disembarked from two fishing trawlers thirty miles south of Buna at Pongani. The U.S. Small Ships continued to support amphibious landings, while R. Adm. Daniel Barbey, the Seventh Amphibious Force commander, was building and training General MacArthur’s main amphibious forces in Australia. The U.S. Small Ships also received additional support from Australian forces.

On 28 October 1942, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) attached a small team of military volunteers from the 2/7th Battalion, AIF 6th Division, to augment the U.S. Small Ships. The original twenty members of the 2/7th Battalion attached to the U.S. Army were also no strangers to improvisation during their six-month assignment. According to Australian veteran Harold W. Hopperton, these troops operated eight small marine plywood landing barges known as Higgins Boats. The Army gave the team just one day to learn how to operate their boats before dispatching them to Oro Bay. Upon their arrival, these men



Admiral Barbey, shown here as a vice admiral, c. 1945

worked to recover another Dutch freighter, the *Van Heutsz*, which the Japanese recently attacked and sank in thirty feet of water. “Using our Higgins Boats we unloaded all the gear on the deck. Then with Captain Collins and his heavy helmet and other diving equipment, and by using one

of our barges as a pumping platform, we brought up everything salvageable below the water. Of course we managed to bring up a case of beer with each dive!”³⁰ Weeks later, Australia expanded this small team with fifteen more soldiers to crew two additional boats. The U.S. Army assigned these men to transport amphibious forces as well as ammunition and rations during the Allied transition to offensive operations. This bridged a significant capabilities gap for Allied forces until MacArthur’s Seventh Amphibious Force received enough American combat landing craft in 1943 to continue the campaign.

Japanese attacks against Allied small coastal vessels also had a detrimental effect at times on tactical operations along the north coast of New Guinea. Even though the Army had the foresight to arm its small vessel fleet with machine guns, Japanese air attacks were still effective. The events of 16–17 November 1942 demonstrate how enemy interdiction against the U.S. Small Ships sometimes created significant problems for ground operations. On the evening of 16 November, eighteen Japanese Zero fighter planes attacked a small group of vessels unloading rations, ammunition, and weapons within the vicinity of Oro Bay. Each boat was equipped with either a .50-caliber or .30-caliber machine gun, but these did little to deter the enemy planes. During the attack, Japanese planes sunk the lugsail boats *Alacrity*, *Bonwin*, and *Minnemura*, and a captured Japanese barge, along with all of their cargo. The division commander, General Harding, was a passenger on the *Minnemura* but survived the attack. Col. Laurence McKenney, the 32d Division’s chief quartermaster, however, perished in this attack. His replacement, Maj. Ralph Birkness, immediately requested airdrops of supplies to replace a crucial portion of the high-value cargo that had been lost.³¹

Subsequent Japanese air raids against the U.S. Small Ships on 17 November resulted in the beaching of the *Willyama* and severe damage to the *Two Freddies*. The *Kelton* was the only lugsail boat that survived this encounter without damage. Concerned



San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park

The *Two Freddies* (background) under tow near New Guinea, c. 1942

with his immediate supply situation, General Harding ordered the 128th Infantry under command of Brig. Gen. Hanford MacNider to delay a planned advance against Buna until the Army could replace some of the lost supplies.³² For the most part, the 32d Division’s offensive against Buna stalled at this point. Author Bill Lunney argues that, in retrospect, General Harding overstated the shortage of available shipping in the area. “There was (as he must have known) an increasing number of Small Ships arriving in Milne Bay.” He cites evidence that several other boats transported a group

of Australian mountain howitzers to Oro Bay over the following weeks.³³ Regardless, MacArthur replaced Harding in late November as a result of the 32d Division’s stalled advance. Both the U.S. Army Services of Supply and the Army Air Forces (AAF) were able to mitigate this supply crisis by December 1942 when the Dobodura and Popondetta airstrips became operational. Further, additional boats arrived in the area under improved air coverage designed to protect coastal lines of communications. The U.S. Small Ships also increased night operations to avoid enemy air attack.


In 1943, the U.S. Army Small Ships Section continued to provide much-needed support for MacArthur’s




General MacNider (center, crouched, facing forward) discussing plans for the assault on Buna, November 1942

forces in forward locations. As the Allied ground and amphibious forces pushed up the coast of New Guinea, sailors also noticed a larger presence of warships, invasion barges, and aircraft. A steady buildup of Allied resources slowly overtook that of the enemy. Fleets of both small and large transport vessels increased in size, while Army Air Forces and Navy forces continued to interdict Japanese shipping. “Many new Small Ships were now being built in Australia,” including tugboats, which were an important addition to the fleet due to their flexibility. These boats could “tow barges laden with rations, ammunition, petrol,” or other items to forward storage depots while retrograding empty barges for reloading. Tugs presented an advantage since “ships had to wait to be loaded or discharged; tugs didn’t.”³⁴ This was an innovative way to efficiently transport supplies throughout an area that lacked a robust network of docks.

Strategic supply routes from the United States also slowly improved. At one point, the Army procured small commercial vessels in the United States for use in the Pacific. These included a fleet of coastal cargo ships called “lakers,” so named because of their previous service in North American Great Lakes.



Bodies of slain Japanese soldiers lie on the beach at Buna, notice the beached Japanese barge in the background, January 1943.



National Archives

Boats like this 143-foot diesel electric ocean-going tug were used in theater.



National Archives

Australian 3.7-inch pack howitzer being loaded onto a captured Japanese barge, November 1942



National Archives

Natives unloading a barge on a New Guinea beach, note the small trawler in the background

The first laker, *City of Fort Worth*, arrived in Australia on 12 March 1943. Nineteen other vessels eventually followed although one sank en route. Many of these vessels had already endured twenty years of service and required expensive reconditioning and constant upkeep for continued military service. Regardless, “the theater could not have done without them.”³⁵ In all, a total 469 domestic and foreign vessels served in the U.S. Small Ships fleet throughout the war.³⁶ A growing number of larger vessels of various types also supported the war effort in the SWPA as they became available.

Australian civilians served on the crews of some of the larger U.S.-flagged amphibious and supply vessels under control of the Water Transport Division of the Army Transportation Service (ATS). These civilian sailors mitigated shortages of replacement crewmen on U.S. cargo vessels dedicated to the SWPA. David Everett, an Australian veteran of the U.S. Small Ships, signed up with the ATS after fulfilling his U.S. Small Ships contract as a teenager. The ATS assigned him as a crewman on the American laker *Camorada* to replace a U.S. crewman returning home. According to Everett, local sailors commonly replaced “those that left and went back to the states” before new crews arrived. “They banded with Australians such as myself and a lot of other nationalities,” including Norwegian and English. Everett also saw service on other lakers, including the *West Texas*, *Colorado*, and *Atlantic Trader*. He recalls, “there were about seven or eight of them running; came out here with American crews and replaced them with whatever was available, mainly Australians.”³⁷ U.S. Small Ships sailors also lent a hand on the Army’s freight supply craft known as the FSs. Both Army and Coast Guard crews operated these vessels, but many U.S. crewmen were inexperienced. Australian veteran Bernie O’Brian sailed on the FS-285 as second officer. He recalls that he had “to teach these GIs how to steer. They’re all farmers from Tennessee, South Carolina, Alabama, and so on. . . . I taught them other things

as time progressed [including knots and] how to use a [boatswains chair] without killing yourself and so on.”³⁸ Even Admiral Barbey commented on the inexperience of his amphibious ship crewmen. He observed that “if the LSTs [Landing Ship, Tank] had green crews, the LCIs [Landing Craft, Infantry] had even greener ones.” He marveled at how a small cadre of experienced sailors chaperoned “so much inexperience across the seas to far-away Australia.”³⁹ As a combined force, the Allies were able to overcome many challenges at sea and along the shore through improvisation and clever innovation.

SWPA forces mitigated acute shortages of service personnel at forward tactical ports and amphibious landing sites by relying on local nationals, Army engineers, and even combat soldiers to offload U.S. Army watercraft in forward areas. Many of these personnel shortages resulted from a lack of strategic troop transports. This created a “backlog of 40,000 service troops earmarked for the SWPA, and MacArthur preferred that combat troops receive priority” movement.⁴⁰ Locals often filled technical service shortages out of necessity. Their use in forward secure areas was somewhat unorthodox, yet effective. U.S. Army watercraft often discharged cargo at night onto barges and auxiliary craft, which were then “manhandled through the surf and onto the beaches.”⁴¹ Along the New Guinea coast, the native population performed an invaluable service in discharging supplies onto amphibious landing sites. Known as Fuzzy Wuzzies, these natives at times even swam supplies from a boat directly onto shore. Bernard Smith, an Australian veteran of the U.S. Small Ships, recalls how a team of New Guinea natives did just this. He remarked, “They were terrific. We’d take heads of 44 gallons of aviation fuel, and they’d take these drums and they’d push them and swim with them up in the tide. They had done their bloody job well.”⁴²

Combat soldiers also provided much-needed labor at times to discharge supplies. However, this did little to boost morale. For many, “one of the most common, and hated, jobs



Natives assisting with coastal shuttle operations, c. 1942

that combat soldiers in the Pacific theater performed was unloading supply ships, usually in brutal heat and humidity.”⁴³ In 1943, Lewis Lapham, the civilian executive assistant to the general in command of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, remarked that “commanders who would not permit their combat troops to handle cargo were exhibiting ‘short-sighted stupidity.’ Only the 41st Division

has recognized the necessity of putting soldiers to work as stevedores.”⁴⁴ Army engineers also supported shore party activities, along with traditional engineer missions, to keep supplies running through the shoreline.

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL ENGINEERS

The Army introduced the 2d ESB into the SWPA in 1943. This increased



LCVPs, like the many pictured here, were mass-produced in Australia and were crucial to the campaigns in the SWPA.



Pontoon sections being used to ferry construction equipment in New Guinea, c. 1943

the Army's capability to move and sustain Allied forces during the New Guinea Campaigns. These engineers also operated in an environment in which "improvisation was the rule rather than the exception."⁴⁵ The Boat and Shore sections of the 2d ESB brought some added measure of organization to forward cargo discharge sites. In a typical operation, once the amphibious assault wave passed across the beach and into the jungle, the "shore engineers quickly organized the job of unloading supplies and getting them distributed over hastily-constructed roadways to their proper dump sites."⁴⁶ The engineers also developed an ingenious way of conducting field boat repair. In one instance, repairmen from the 562d Boat Maintenance Battalion "constructed log barriers on the beach at low tide and brought the boat over at high tide. When the tide receded, the boat was left high and dry and the prop could be changed easily."⁴⁷ This service was especially important in areas with high concentrations of coral reefs around an amphibious assault or cargo discharge site.

The 2d ESB also had to build its own boats. The War Department attempted a new method of transporting a large quantity of small assault boats to Australia quickly and efficiently. In a *Washington Daily News* article dated 27 March 1945, correspondent Lee Miller reported on the brigade's arrival in Australia. "But [the Brigade] didn't have a single boat. The plan was to ship

the boats knocked down and assemble them in Australia." The 2d ESB also had to construct the assembly facility. "On April 7, 1943, the first plywood LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) was turned out." More than a thousand of these boats followed out of the Cairns, Australia, plant.⁴⁸ These small vessels provided numerous advantages to Allied forces in the SWPA in support of General MacArthur's campaigns. Eventually, Allied forces were able to use a greater number of traditional ocean cargo vessels to sustain the closing part of the New Guinea Campaigns and subsequent objectives supporting the U.S. Joint Chiefs' Pacific theater campaign plan.

Rudimentary port conditions at forward bases often created delays in discharging cargo from larger vessels. In some locations, such as Lae, the U.S. Army engineers had to build expedient docks. To mitigate this problem, Sheridan Fahnestock (now a major) developed another innovative idea. To accommodate larger vessels, he loaded steel pontoon sections with construction equipment, installed a motor on each, and sailed the entire rig from Oro Bay to Lae. Once there, construction workers unloaded the supplies and equipment and then moored the pontoons together to create a functioning dock. This type of dock was not perfect but did allow up to six cargo vessels to discharge at the same time under austere conditions.⁴⁹ Cargo handling under such circumstances was never easy and often resulted in many cargo

vessels waiting days or weeks to unload due to a lack of berthing.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the U.S. Small Ships Section and the 2d ESB in the SWPA was decisive. Since the Navy's Pacific Fleet was unable to provide enough vessels to support SWPA operations early in the war, the U.S. Army Small Ships Section enabled General MacArthur's forces to proceed with an amphibious campaign beginning in 1942. The 2d ESB complemented this effort in 1943 by employing additional watercraft and managing forward tactical discharge sites. MacArthur understood that the battle for New Guinea was "entirely dependent upon lines of communication."⁵⁰ His logisticians knew they had to rely on sealift along these lines to support Allied forces along New Guinea's north shore. Resupply by sea offered the most feasible means of transferring large quantities of cargo to forward combat locations. The U.S. Small Ships and 2d ESB effectively established and maintained these primary lines of communication. Brig. Gen. Stephen Chamberlin, MacArthur's assistant chief of staff, G-3, reflected on the importance this had on Allied operations. He stated that "if it had not been for the small Dutch freighters and even smaller miscellaneous craft" moving personnel, equipment, and supplies, "he doubted if the campaign for [Buna's] capture would have succeeded, as air transport could not meet all the supply requirements."⁵¹

The contributions of Army transportation organizations in the SWPA have been largely forgotten. Units including the U.S. Small Ships Section and 2d ESB provided a much-needed capability to MacArthur's forces at a time when no other resources were available to sustain combat operations in New Guinea. In fact, the modern U.S. Army fleet of coastal support craft can trace its origin back to small boat operations during the Second World War. More importantly, many historical narratives on the Pacific War have largely ignored the contri-



Various types of small vessels discharge their cargo onto the beach at Leyte, 21 October 1944.



General Chamberlin

butions of Australian citizens toward the war effort. Fortunately, U.S. and Australian government officials have recently started to recognize the wartime service of Australians serving on American-flagged vessels. This attention is primarily due to the efforts of veterans and historians striving to preserve these relevant, but lesser-known aspects of the Second World War.

The accomplishments of the Army's technical service organizations and their Allied foreign-national employees

are just as important to Second World War history as combat narratives from the war. This lesser-explored aspect of the war provides greater insight into the success of Allied forces against the Japanese. Combat forces in the SWPA could not have advanced on Japanese Army positions without the presence of sea and air transport assets and without the support of Australian and American industrial bases. American logisticians discovered unique ways to sustain General MacArthur's forces against some of the greatest odds. In particular, Army service organizations in the SWPA demonstrated that Western ingenuity was prevalent throughout the battlefield, not just along the front lines.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The author is deeply indebted to Richard Killblane, the U.S. Army Transportation Corps historian, and his staff at the U.S. Army Transportation Museum at Fort Eustis, Virginia, for their assistance in researching source material for this project.



NOTES

1. Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 236.

2. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), p. 143.

3. John Kennedy Ohl, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 198.

4. Samuel Milner, *Victory in Papua* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957), p. 58. Wairopi, New Guinea, provides a prime example of the restrictive terrain along the Kokoda Trail. The site is located thirty miles southwest of Buna, where “a wire-rope bridge, from which the place took its name, spanned the immense gorge of the Kumusi River, a broad turbulent stream subject to dangerous undertows and flash floods.”

5. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 169.

6. Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), p. 230.

7. Ladislav Reday, *Raggle Taggle Fleet* (Coomba Park, New South Wales: Ernest Flint, 2000), p. 35.

8. James R. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941–1947* (Washington, D.C.: Transportation Unit, Historical Division Special Staff, U.S. Army, 1949), pp. 190–91.

9. It may have also helped that the Fahnestock family enjoyed close ties with the Roosevelt family as well as associations with some U.S. senators and representatives. Likewise, General Wilson also had friends among President Roosevelt's closest advisers.

10. Bill Lunney and Frank Finch, *Forgotten Fleet: A History of the Part Played by Australian Men and Ships in the U.S. Army Small Ships Section in New Guinea, 1942–1945* (Medowie, New South Wales: Forfleet Publishing, 1995), p. 11; Ernest A. Flint, “The Formation and Operation of the US Army Small Ships in World War II,” *United Service* 55, no. 4 (March 2005): 15–20.

11. Flint, “The Formation and Operation of the US Army Small Ships in World War II,” pp. 15–16.

12. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area*, p. 192; Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 11.

13. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, *The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, United States Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), p. 430. The Army Transportation Service changed the name of the Small Ships

Supply Section at least twice after assuming control of this organization on 29 May 1942. Subsequent names included Small Ships Section (1942) and Small Ships Division (1943). Lido Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), p. 69. In addition to Masterson, Lida Mayo is the only other official historian in the World War II series to refer to this organization as the Small Ships Section. In their memoirs, veterans generally refer to this organization as the “U.S. Small Ships.” Subsequent paragraphs in this essay reflect this tradition.

14. Reday, *Raggle Taggle Fleet*, p. 32. Savage was responsible for inspecting and accepting boats purchased or commandeered by the Army. He previously worked for J. J. Savage and Son Boat Builders of Victoria in Australia.

15. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 11.

16. On 15 May 2001, the U.S. Small Ships Association presented a commemorative plaque to the Grace Hotel depicting these dates. A replica resides at the U.S. Army Transportation Museum at Fort Eustis, Virginia.

17. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area*, pp. 193–94.

18. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 11.

19. Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront*, p. 71. Mayo identifies 1st Lt. Bruce Fahnestock as the head of the Small Ships Section. However, more recent authors, such as Bill Lunney and Ladislaw Reday, suggest that his brother, Capt. Sheridan Fahnestock, was the next ranking member and senior operations officer of the Small Ships Section under the command of Major Bradford. Lt. Bruce Fahnestock did not serve with the Small Ships for very long. He was killed on 18 October 1942 in a friendly fire incident involving an American B–24 bomber during the Buna landings in New Guinea.

20. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area*, p. 193.

21. Flint, “The Formation and Operation of the US Army Small Ships in World War II,” p. 3.

22. Reday, *Raggle Taggle Fleet*, p. 34.

23. Flint, “The Formation and Operation of the US Army Small Ships in World War II,” pp. 3–5.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

25. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 12. Norm Oddy accepted a job with the Small Ships

Section in July 1942. Flint, “The Formation and Operation of the US Army Small Ships in World War II,” p. 5. Surviving members of the U.S. Small Ships used this argument recently with members of the Australian Parliament to convince their government to recognize the wartime service of Australians serving on these vessels.

26. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 12.

27. Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront*, p. 71. The two vessels involved were the *King John* and the *Timoshenko*. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 16. Lt. Col. Laurence McKenney served as the commander of this particular Small Ships mission.

28. Milner, *Victory in Papua*, p. 82.

29. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 14.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

31. James Campbell, *The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea—The Forgotten War of the South Pacific* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2007), pp. 168–69.

32. Milner, *Victory in Papua*, pp. 169–71.

33. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, pp. 26–28.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

35. Bykofsky, *The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas*, p. 449.

36. “U.S. Army Small Ships Section USASOS [U.S. Army Services of Supply] in Australian Waters During WWII,” accessed 23 Oct 2011, <http://www.ozatwar.com/usarmy/usarmysmallships.htm>.

37. Interv, James Atwater and Richard Killblane with David Everett, Australian veteran of the U.S. Small Ships, 16 May 2010, interview WS218870, transcript, U.S. Army Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Va. Everett joined the Small Ships at around age seventeen as a seaman apprentice on a ketch. His formal training included about four weeks of maritime school in Walsh Bay.

38. Interv, James Atwater with Bernie O’Brian, Australian veteran of the U.S. Small Ships, 15 May 2010, interview WS218869, transcript, U.S. Army Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Va. O’Brian became a merchant seaman at age seventeen as a galley boy on a Norwegian cargo vessel. He returned to Sydney after the Japanese sank his vessel and joined the Small Ships. Before serving on the FS–285, he recalls serving on an American lumber transport, the *Esther Johnson*, the FS–12-B, an oil ship, and a tugboat.

39. Daniel E. Barbey, *MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), p. 46. LSTs (Landing Ship, Tanks) are capable of transporting large numbers of troops, vehicles, and cargo and discharging them directly onto a beach. LCIs (Landing Crafts, Infantry) are capable of transporting troops and discharging them directly onto a beach. An LCI is typically smaller than an LST.

40. John Kennedy Ohl, *Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 214.

41. Lunney, *Forgotten Fleet*, p. 28.

42. Interv, James Atwater with Bernard Smith, Australian veteran of the U.S. Small Ships, 15 May 2010, interview WS218865, transcript, U.S. Army Transportation Museum, Fort Eustis, Va. Smith first went to sea at age fifteen serving as a junior navigator on board the *Queen Elizabeth*, which was ferrying troops from Australia to the Middle East at the time. In 1941, at age seventeen, he joined the U.S. Small Ships and served on the *Muscutta*, a four-mast sailing ship for his first contract. After renewing his contract, he served as a coxswain on the *Moamoa*, the *Caledon*, and a crash ship supporting Army Air Forces (AAF) rescue operations. Smith served with the Small Ships until 1944.

43. Peter S. Kindsvatter, *American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), p. 38.

44. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area*, p. 485.

45. *A History of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 1942–1945* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1946), pp. 62–63.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 267. This article is reprinted in the history of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade.


49. Masterson, *U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area*, pp. 442–43.

50. Milner, *Victory in Papua*, p. 102. This book is based on an extract from General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area Operational Instructions No. 19, 1 Oct. 42.

51. Barbey, *MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy*, p. 9.

BOOKREVIEWS

Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776–1945



By Christopher H. Hamner
University Press of Kansas, 2011
Pp. xi, 281. \$29.95

Review by Gary Shattuck

Every battlefield presents two distinct objectives: the accomplishment of a military goal and the survival of those sent to make it happen, the combat soldier. *Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776–1945*, provides a pragmatic perspective examining the challenges that the soldier faces in accomplishing these tasks. Stepping away from doctrine that has been in place for the past sixty years, Christopher H. Hamner, an associate professor of history at George Mason University, Virginia, questions the applicability of primary group cohesion theory, which advocates bonds of affection and mutual interdependence, to explain why rational people do irrational things, finding that it fails to account for changes that have taken place on the battlefield. Rather, he argues that the proper focus is on

the more tangible, observable aspects of war, the increasingly sophisticated nature of weaponry and the ways in which soldiers rationalize and interact with the challenges that it brings.

In advancing his thesis, Hamner dissects the battlefield experience as it evolved over the course of three centuries in three wars, the American Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II. Utilizing numerous firsthand accounts in the diaries of soldiers involved in those conflicts, *Enduring Battle* provides an important viewpoint to the complicated problem of identifying the appropriate motivational triggers that the soldier employs when under assault in order to achieve a necessary end. The change that occurs over the centuries takes the soldier from being an automaton prodded and coerced into danger into an autonomous being relying on self-motivation. Battlefield tactics evolved from the necessity that then-current technology dictated when masses of shoulder-to-shoulder combatants, fighting in a linear fashion in order to throw out a single, concentrated blast against an oncoming enemy, and into those requiring dispersion in order to minimize the increased destructive power that improved weaponry afforded. Hamner contends that the change in technologies and altered tactics affected “ground combat profoundly, effectively inverting the relationship between soldiers’ awareness of danger and the options available to respond to it” (p. 61). Accompanying this transformation were the presence of new factors that affected the soldier on a psychological level: (1) Increased distances between contestants tended to depersonalize the experience; (2) Soldiers began to feel more isolated;

(3) Increased accuracy of weapons made soldiers feel like they were being specifically targeted; and (4) The length of battles increased from mere minutes to days, weeks, and months and which further adversely impacted their physical abilities (pp. 10–11). These changes meant that new rationalizations and motivations had to be generated internally, forcing the soldier to perform when neither comrade nor opponent could be seen, explaining further why a rational person is able to overcome his inner voice telling him to do irrational things.


Initiative is the underlying strength enabling the combat soldier to do his job, and Hamner states that it is affected by the soldier’s perception that he controls his surroundings. When acting in a dispersed manner, away from the comforts that seeing a comrade offers, the soldier must find a way to rally and surmount those inner thoughts telling him to flee. Overcoming fear (the tension that exists between instinct and duty) is possible, even if only temporarily, by instilling in the soldier a belief that he possesses some degree of personal agency (that is, individual choice), something that can be accomplished by various means. Factors that can free a soldier from worrying about his immediate predicament and allow him to think creatively to solve the immediate tactical problem include the repetition of tasks that training provides (“do these things and you will be okay”); having commanders who exhibit competence and empathy over personal courage; and effective, reliable weaponry. The author further notes that ideology holds little place as a motivating factor when one is dealing with flying bullets.

On the unit level, Hamner discounts any notion that a “band of brothers” mentality binds it together, arguing, rather, that maintaining one’s image and reputation, not tainted by an appearance of cowardice, are the main factors that make this possible. He further rejects the primary group cohesion explanation when it is applied to groups of soldiers. Instead, he contends that task cohesion, such as that involved in the accomplishment of a mission (“take that hill,” “hold your position until relieved”), much like a sports team working for a common goal, not only explains what binds the unit together, but also causes the soldier to place himself in a secondary role; at least until the threat of personal harm becomes real (p. 177).

Hamner notes that exhaustion occurs when the soldier is exposed to excessive combat and that the store of one’s courage is much like a bank account where a finite amount of it exists and when withdrawn over time diminishes the remaining balance. One remaining factor that trumps all others is the total randomness of fate. Sometimes the best trained soldier, with the best of capabilities, equipment, and leadership, will simply be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

While there is some acknowledgment in the conclusion of the challenges existing on the modern battlefield (improvised explosive devices, friendly fire, irregular warfare, war crimes prosecutions, post-traumatic stress disorder), *Enduring Battle* would have benefited, together with the modern-day warrior absorbing its lessons, had these issues been more fully addressed in their own chapter. Although the book has some instances of repetition, it does not detract from an interesting discussion of the motivations behind the soldier’s actions. Technology and tactics have certainly changed the way that war is conducted and, while Hamner’s overall perceptions of how the soldier rationalizes and deals with them appear valid in their various contexts, there remains that nagging, amorphous, hard-to-detect, hard-to-define, and hard-to-describe human quality that propels thinking, caring people to engage in conduct that screams danger.

Gary Shattuck is a retired federal prosecutor currently pursuing a master’s degree in military history, concentrating on the Revolutionary War. He also researches historical events from a legal perspective. He is the author of *Artful and Designing Men: The Trials of Job Shattuck and the Regulation of 1786–1787* (Mustang, Okla., 2013).



Review by Fred L. Borch III

This book is exactly what its title suggests: a day-by-day list of events in the Army from its origins as a colonial militia in early 1775 to the professional land force of today. Author John Fredericksen, who describes himself as an “independent historian,” writes that the intent of the book is “to capture the great canvass of U.S. Army history in a relatively modest space.” To achieve this goal, all “important battles and personages” in Army history are mentioned, as well as “notable draft laws, military texts, schools, weapons systems, and occasional political developments that affected military affairs” (p. viii).

The United States Army: A Chronology has entries for almost every year since 1775 (only one—1825—appears to have been omitted), and the book

does capture a considerable amount of detail in short paragraphs linked to a specific date. The number of events listed under a particular year varies (obviously) according to the significance of that year in American military history. For example, the years 1861 through 1865 each have more than one hundred entries, as do the years 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945. More typical is 1976: it has nine entries and covers events ranging from the first female lieutenant commissioned through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and the North Korean attack on American soldiers pruning trees in the Demilitarized Zone, to the publication of a new field manual on operations and the appointment of General Bernard W. Rogers as Army Chief of Staff.

Other years have many fewer entries and, in some cases, the reader will ask if the author included an entry just so that he would not have to skip that year. For example, the only event listed for 1938 is a three-line paragraph stating that, on 7 January, the Army abolished the use of spiral canvass leggings in all the services except the cavalry. Similarly, there are but two short entries for 1974: one stating that the Army activated the 75th Ranger Regiment in January; the other that General Frederick Weyand became Army Chief of Staff in September. The lone 1938 entry seems rather unimportant in the “great canvass of Army history,” and there must have been other (arguably more) significant Army training, equipping, or organizational events that could have been listed under 1974.

One of the strengths of *The United States Army: A Chronology* is that it contains a number of one-half to one-page entries that focus on a particular personality, event, or unit in order to highlight Army history. There are vignettes on Dorothea Dix, Alvin York, Matthew Ridgway, Creighton Abrams, and Colin Powell. Unit histories include the Regiment of Riflemen (described as the Army’s “first self-consciously elite formation” [p. 63]), the 442d Regimental Combat Team, the 761st Tank Battalion, the Green Berets, and Delta Force. All of these


entries—not tied to a particular date—are a welcome addition to the chronology. There are also black and white photographs throughout the book, which add much to the pages of the text.

While this book does not claim to be more—or less—than a chronology of events, this format unfortunately limits its usefulness in at least two ways. First, a timeline of facts and events does not explain how and why history unfolded in the Army as it did. Although the author has tried to “contextualize” (p. viii) events, this is almost impossible when history is organized by day, month, and year. Look, for example, at the entry for 7 December 1941: “The surprise Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, plunges the unprepared United States into World War II. General Walter C. Short is cashiered in the wake of the attack” (p. 260). This entry is factually accurate (except that this reviewer would use the phrase “relieved from command” rather than “cashiered”) but fails to convey why the Army did not defend the Navy that day, much less why Short was held responsible (along with Admiral Husband E. Kimmel) for the greatest military disaster in American history. Second, the book’s chronological format means that some key events and personalities have not been included when they should have been. For example, the Emancipation Proclamation, considered to be one of the critical events of the Civil War because it freed all the slaves in Confederate-controlled territory and focused the war on a single cause (the abolition of slavery), should be found in a 1 January 1863 entry—the date that Abraham Lincoln issued the proclamation. But it is not. Since Lincoln said at the time that he was freeing the slaves as a matter of military necessity and that he derived the legal authority for this decision from his powers as commander in chief, it should be listed as a key event. Similarly, *The United States Army: A Chronology* makes no mention of Lincoln’s assassination on 14 April 1865; but given Lincoln’s pivotal role in shaping the Union strategy that ultimately won the war, his murder

while serving as commander in chief deserves an entry.

For those who need a concise, well-written chronology of events in Army history, this book meets that need. Its \$85 price tag, however, will be out of the reach of many readers.

Fred L. Borch III is the regimental historian and archivist for the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He earned history degrees from Davidson College and the University of Virginia, and law degrees from the University of North Carolina, the University of Brussels (Belgium), and the Judge Advocate General’s School. He also has a master’s degree in national security studies from the Naval War College.



Review by Bruce E. Stanley

Although it has been six years since the original hard cover publication of this book, Brian McAllister Linn’s excellent assessment of intellectual thought in the United States Army is worth a new examination. Now that the war in Iraq has concluded, and the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan is proceeding, Linn’s encouragement to soldiers and citizens to understand what the Army hears in the echoes of battle is certainly relevant. He asserts

that “the wars the United States has actually fought are important less for what happened than for what military intellectuals believed they had learned from them after the shooting stopped” (p. 9). Linn concludes that the future of the Army’s way of war is shaped by its peacetime intellectual debate as much, if not more than its wartime service.

Three intellectual traditions are introduced in Linn’s work that underpins the debate about the Army’s way of war: the Guardians, the Heroes, and the Managers. Guardians are recognized by their insistence that war is both an art and a science. Trust is only placed in those officers who master the science of war. Linn points out that for the Guardians, “war is an engineering project in which the outcome is determined by the correct application of immutable scientific principles” (p. 7). He correctly predicted that Guardians would reject much of the recent experience with unconventional warfare and focus on wars with limited objectives backed by overwhelming force. Guardians are recognized by their scientific and rational approach to warfare waged with precision weapons that have predictable outcomes.

As the Army begins to reassess its professional ethos, the Heroes emerge. Linn argues that Heroes focus on the human element, where military genius, experience, courage, morale, and discipline are the key to winning. The recent emphasis on increased discipline, enforcement of Army regulations, and a low tolerance for misconduct are the attempts by the Heroes to regain the military professionalism eroded by twelve-plus years of conflict. Heroes will emphasize the value of combat experience as their moral argument for implementation of policies and regulations.

The Managers make up the third intellectual tradition. Linn points out that for the Managers war is fundamentally an organizational problem. Managers will argue for a large standing Army, focused on large unit operations to counter conventional threats from China or Russia. Linn accurately predicts that the Managers will seek to make war more effective by focusing on holistic reforms that rely on the interdependence of updated doctrine, training for conventional war, improved officer education,

a high-tech procurement program, and a reorganized force structure. If Linn is correct, the Managers' concepts of modern warfare will require a significant shift away from counterinsurgency and resemble the major offensive operation to capture Baghdad in 2003 or the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

The book is divided into seven chapters, spanning over two hundred years of U.S. Army history. Linn focuses on the intellectual debates that followed major American conflicts, using the three intellectual traditions as a guide. He begins with the Fortification Boards, formed in 1814 following the War of 1812, and headed by Joseph G. Totten to develop the national security plan for the United States. From here, Linn continues to trace the intellectual debates following the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and through the end of the twentieth century. In each period, Linn illustrates how a few officers create and disseminate their services' vision of war. In short, the military intellectuals represent factions rooted in one of the three martial traditions of Guardian, Hero, or Manager.

Linn is not without criticism for the military intellectual. He argues that "Army intellectuals have portrayed themselves as enlightened and informed professionals struggling against venal, ignorant politicians and an apathetic, selfish public" (p. 236). He charges that the Army has manipulated its military history to obfuscate the weaknesses of its military traditions. This historical "cherry picking" enforces complacency and a "comfortable vision of war." Linn suggests that this hubris comes with a high price, particularly when the Army is faced with unconventional warfare, military occupation, and pacification. Thus, Linn's critique of the three intellectual traditions during the pre-Global War on Terrorism era, though painful for many current Army officers, offers the most valuable analysis to consider as the Army once again transitions from war to peace.


Thus, this book is worth a reexamination by military intellectuals, civilian academics, national security think tanks, and national policy makers. As Linn suggests, "recognizing the strength of this intellectual legacy, or

legacies, allows both soldiers and civilians to better understand the underlying suppositions that inform peacetime budget and policy initiatives, influence its doctrine and training, guide its procurement of armaments, and thus ultimately shape the army's conduct of warfare" (p. 235). If Linn is correct, what the Army hears in the echo of battle is certain to influence its thinking about future war.

Bruce E. Stanley is an associate professor at the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He earned his doctorate degree in security studies from Kansas State University. He is a retired Army lieutenant colonel.



Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West



By Steven E. Woodworth
University Press of Nebraska, 2011
Pp. xi, 165. \$18.95

Review by Timothy R. Stoy

Steven Woodworth has written an excellent, succinct, and well-reasoned analysis of the Civil War in the western theater and its decisive importance to overall Union victory. He presents all relevant geographic, political, and strategic factors senior commanders in theater had to deal with and makes clear Ulysses S. Grant was the most successful at dealing with these and achieving victory. Woodworth offers a good overview of

the personality conflicts in both Union and Confederate senior ranks, which played significant roles in the operations of both armies.

Woodworth effectively argues the West was the Civil War's decisive theater due to its strategic importance to the Confederacy in terms of foodstuffs, railroads, and centers of industrial production. He also notes the broad expanse of the West, with the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers along which to operate, provided senior commanders the opportunity for strategic maneuver. In the eastern theater, the highly symbolic political targets of Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia, dominated strategic thought while limiting the true ability of senior commanders to maneuver on the scale done in the West.

In many ways, Woodworth's book is a paean to Grant. From his promotion to brigadier general in August 1861 until his eventual promotion to commanding general in 1864, Woodworth shows clearly how Grant's ability to identify the correct strategic objectives in the western theater, his aggressiveness, and his refusal to allow any obstacle to stand in the way of his objectives were the decisive elements in eventual Union victory in that theater. Grant learned more quickly and saw the big picture more clearly than other Union generals in the West. He was able to follow his instincts and not be hamstrung by "the book solution."

The author treats Grant, and the majority of his general officer subordinates in the Army of the Tennessee, sympathetically—especially William T. Sherman and James B. McPherson. Both of these splendid commanders mirrored their commanding general's aggressiveness, if not always his strategic vision and judgment. Blessed with a strong and loyal commander, they flourished. Had anyone besides Grant been Sherman's commander, he would have been held responsible for the unpreparedness which led to the first day's disaster at Shiloh and would most likely have been cashiered. Sherman, luckily for the Union, survived thanks to Grant's refusal to quit and Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's "in the nick-of-time" arrival, turning the tide of the battle the second

day. Grant's Shiloh was no less a bloody near-run victory than was Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans' battle at Stones River, yet the author judges Rosecrans much more severely. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas is criticized for failing to pursue Lt. Gen. John B. Hood's battered army after Nashville, while Grant is not, although he also did not conduct a full-out pursuit of the withdrawing Confederate forces after Shiloh.

Woodworth's judgments on the leaders of the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio are far more critical, especially of Major Generals Buell, Rosecrans, and Henry Halleck. Each of these officers had their shortcomings. None of them possessed Grant's aggressiveness, but then again, neither did any of the senior Union commanders in the East. Buell failed to meet Abraham Lincoln's expectations and was relieved. Rosecrans deserved to be relieved after his truly awful decision to draw his forces into Chattanooga after Chickamauga and cede the dominant terrain to General Braxton Bragg. Yet his maneuver at Tullahoma was well-conceived and executed, and he, as Woodworth notes, had successfully maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga before the Battle of Chickamauga.

Woodworth's great strength in this book is his enlightening analysis on command climate in the Confederacy's Western Armies. We see how Jefferson Davis' lack of discernment identifying the appropriate qualities required in senior military commanders, and his inability to impose his will as commander in chief of Confederate forces, led to complete dysfunction in his western theater. The author has nothing good to say about General Joseph E. Johnston as a theater or army commander.

As Woodworth presents it, the reader can only conclude the South possessed no competent corps commanders in the West; none who refused to allow their personal feelings and prejudices to override their love of country, devotion to duty, or professional judgment. Bragg, due to his alienating personality, is thwarted at every opportunity by subordinate commanders who failed to carry out his plans. He appears to have possessed sufficient aggressiveness and strategic vision to fight effectively, but

lacked the leadership qualities to enforce his will and realize his plans.

In his analysis of Hood's fighting to save Atlanta, Woodworth again presents the picture of an Army commander who has good ideas with decent chances of success despite the desperate situation, but who is obstructed at every turn by his subordinates' recalcitrance or incompetence. Hood, who is normally portrayed as having destroyed his army in "senseless" offensive operations against Sherman outside Atlanta and then Thomas at Nashville, was actually meeting Davis' intent and several times he came within reach of victory.

Throughout the book Woodworth provides insights missing in other books on the Civil War in the West. For example, his observation that many of the low-numbered Confederate regiments served in Virginia with Robert E. Lee. Being early regiments they were formed with men who had previous military experience. This left Confederate commanders in the West to fight the war with military amateurs, which impacted their combat capability.

Woodworth discusses political generals and the problems their incompetence and egos caused for both sides. In a civil war with the need to satisfy many different constituencies to hold their causes together, both Davis and Lincoln had to accept many officers who were not military professionals and under normal circumstances would never have been allowed to wear a military uniform, let alone general's stars. Luckily for Lincoln, at least two officers who had left the service earlier as company-grade officers—Grant, whose patron was Illinois Senator Elihu Washburn, and Sherman, whose patron was his brother, Ohio Senator Thomas Sherman—turned out all right despite owing their stars to their political connections.

In his analysis of Grant's victories at Forts Donelson and Henry and the campaign against Vicksburg, Woodworth reminds us it was the Union's ability to conduct joint Army-Navy operations on the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi Rivers which enabled Grant's win at Vicksburg, the great strategic victory in the decisive theater. Woodworth makes clear why it was decisive—"Before the fall of Vicks-


burg, it had remained to be determined whether the Union was capable of the military suppression of the Confederacy. After it, no doubt remained the Union could do so, if it maintained its will to persevere" (p. 67). From Vicksburg on, the Confederacy was truly living on borrowed time.

Decision in the Heartland belongs in the library of any Civil War aficionado and also serves as a good initial read on the western theater for the casual reader.

Timothy R. Stoy is a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1981 and served thirty-one years as an infantry and foreign area officer. He is the president and historian of the 15th Infantry Regiment Association. He was appointed a distinguished member of the 15th Infantry Regiment in 2004 for his long-running efforts in preserving the lineage, honors, traditions, and history of the regiment.



A Surgeon in Khaki: Through France and Flanders in World War I



By Arthur Anderson Martin
University of Nebraska Press, 2011
Pp. xxiii, 279. \$19.95

Review by G. Alan Knight

The Battle of Mons, which took place from 22 to 23 August 1914, has gone down in history as an epic clash for numerous reasons, not the least of which was the abysmal performance of Great Britain's Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) in clearing the wounded from the battlefield. Despite the

existence of the motorized ambulance, casualties were mostly evacuated by horse-drawn ambulance wagons reminiscent of those used in Napoleonic times and by motorized supply trucks returning to the rear. Ambulance rail trains were often in short supply. Deficiencies in evacuation contributed to many deaths.

A keen observer of this debacle was Arthur Anderson Martin, a highly respected, well-trained New Zealand surgeon with an international reputation, who had found himself in Britain when war broke out and had volunteered for service in the RAMC. Then thirty-eight years old, Martin had prior service in the New Zealand Army and experience as a civil surgeon with the military in South Africa during the Boer War. To his dismay, he was appointed only a temporary RAMC lieutenant, despite his experience and numerous published articles in medical journals.

Immediately deployed to France, he was, courtesy of the prevailing administrative chaos, shunted around for several days until initially assigned to the 15th Field Ambulance, providing organic medical support to the 15th Infantry Brigade. While on the battlefield, Martin noticed that a field ambulance was positioned behind an ammunition column and that ambulances were clearly marked with red crosses on their canvas, denoting to the enemy that a brigade was on the move. Martin observed that this visible placement virtually ensured that medics would be caught in intense incoming artillery fire.

The field ambulance of 1914 was not a vehicle to transport the sick and wounded; rather it was essentially a mobile first-aid post with a number of vehicular ambulances. In 1914, a field ambulance unit lacked basic equipment necessary to perform surgery. Operations performed were crude and, by Martin's standards, professionally unacceptable. He advocated from the beginning that wounded soldier should receive skilled surgery rendered in a fully equipped sterile treatment setting. Sadly, his insistence on providing definitive treatment as far forward as possible

led to his untimely death in 1916 as a result of multiple shrapnel wounds.

A renowned member of the medical community, he did not hesitate to circumvent the chain of command by writing influential colleagues in Britain, medical and nonmedical, to recommend urgent changes to the field medical structure, and to insist on provision of modern equipment, surgical instruments, and sufficient and appropriate medical supplies, most of which were lacking in the early months of the war.

By September 1914, the British had only a few motorized ambulances, provided by the French, but British-built motorized ambulances only began to appear in significant numbers in the field ambulance units in November of that year, largely due to the influence of Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, who had been made aware of Martin's unstinting efforts.

Many of Martin's observations and recommendations would eventually be adopted, though most not during World War I. He held strong opinions on the control of medical facilities. Yet, he insisted that medical officers control triage and the actual care of the sick and wounded, but suggested control of field ambulances and clearing hospitals should be under the command of administrative officers of the Army Service Corps. Not mincing words, he opined, "Too much military control or command changes the army medical officer from a doctor to a military officer, and this change is not to be desired" (p. 131). In terms of soliciting sound recommendations for changes in tables of organization and equipment, he advocated convening committees consisting of several junior medical officers with combat experience, rather than following the then-accepted RAMC practice of forming committees of only very senior and retired medical officers.

Readers with past experience dealing with the U.S. Army Medical Department (AMEDD), in particular the Medical Corps, will identify with Martin's comment that "in military life, experience means promotion to higher

rank, and the higher the rank, the less the professional work and the more the administrative work" (p. 132). Fortunately, the AMEDD now allows a medical officer, after several years of service as a clinician, to continue in a clinical track or move to a command track. Since the tenure of Lt. Gen. Alcide Lanoue as Surgeon General of the U.S. Army (1992–1996), entry into command by selected and qualified officers from all six of the AMEDD corps has been allowed, not just from the Medical Corps.

A Surgeon in Khaki is more than the story of one medical officer as a catalyst for change; it is also an engaging journal replete with observations on the mobilization process, the nature of war, the variety of wounds and diseases encountered and their treatment, the everyday life of officers and men in and out of combat, the invaluable contributions of medically trained French nuns in the hospitals, the military chaplaincy, and the countless pithy observations on the enemy. Martin obviously respects the martial prowess of the enemy but believes that he consistently demonstrated a rather inhumane treatment of French and Belgian civilians, and manifested an absolute lack of concern for cultural monuments. Martin observed that "chateaux, cathedrals and churches have a strange fascination for German artillerists" (p. 151).


Martin displays a significant knowledge of Allied and enemy weapons and wound ballistics and makes some interesting comments on the use of dum-dum bullets whose impact was so devastating. Nevertheless, on that topic and in his numerous medical observations, he displays an informative and engaging writing style with which a layman reading his account will be most comfortable. Like so many physicians of the period, Martin was also an avid student of history and culture, and his writings are replete with germane comments that show him to have been a broadly educated and cosmopolitan man. Readers will also appreciate Martin's ability to portray, often with humor, the various military and civilian characters

he met during the eight months in France and Flanders.

Had Martin survived the war, there is no doubt that he would be remembered in the pantheon of medical heroes who, postwar, went on to become world leaders in their respective specialties. Discharged from service in 1915, Martin returned to New Zealand; was recommissioned as a major in the medical corps of that country's army; made valuable improvements in its training and equipment; and again deployed with his fellow countrymen to France in 1916, where he was fatally wounded on 17 September, three days into the initial combat experienced by the New Zealand Division, while he was treating the wounded. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Order in 1917.

A Surgeon in Khaki is actually a reprint of the original volume published in 1916, but with an informative and comprehensive introduction by Glyn Harper, a professor of war studies at Massey University in Palmerston North, New Zealand. Of interest to a variety of readers, some of the timeless observations will resonate with providers or recipients of medical care in Iraq or Afghanistan.

G. Alan Knight, a retired Medical Service Corps officer, is an independent historian whose post-military career as a civilian included duty as curator of the U.S. Army Medical Department Museum, other curatorial assignments in the Army Museum System, and service as a historian at the National Guard Bureau. Holding a master's degree from Ohio State University, he also earned a master's in history from Roosevelt University. A previous book reviewer for *Army History*, he has published articles and reviews in *On Point* and the *Journal of America's Military Past*.



Review by Matthew E. S. Butler

David Edgerton delves into and elucidates Great Britain's ability to wage war preceding and during the Second World War in this welcome book-length study. *Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War* synthesizes multiple strands of recent scholarship, incorporates original research, and offers interpretations that aim to discredit many accepted conventions and myths.

Readers familiar with Britain's imperial and economic history will not be surprised by Edgerton's emphasis on how Britain could draw upon its vast array of global resources. The world's leading import economy remained just that in wartime; this translated into a productive and technological capacity the Axis could not match. Britain would neither fight alone nor fight poorly armed. In such a prewar position, that of "first-class power" (p. 2), British leaders were confident in ultimate victory. Provocatively, Edgerton posits that British defeat before the German invasion of the Soviet Union was unlikely, and that after the launch of Operation BARBAROSSA, British victory was quite possible. It was not until the Japanese attacks on the eastern portion of Britain's empire that they truly needed the active military involvement of the United States.

On the whole, Britain's war effort was technology-centric, in mindset and reality. Britons (fairly and unfairly) blamed battlefield setbacks on production failures while attributed victories to superior weapons. Edgerton persuasively makes this complex case by examining how Britain utilized its experts and resources to wage a thoroughly modern war of machines.

Political leadership and appointees were crucial to this war machine's success. Winston Churchill selected like-minded Conservative "cronies" who enthusiastically believed in the war-winning potential of innovation and mechanized weaponry. We meet many of these advisers and ministers, such as the extremely influential Frederick Lindemann. A good many of these "technocrats" held engineering or scientific degrees, and Edgerton describes them as "premature military modernists" (p. 2) who believed in weapon systems, which were far from ready early in the war; strategic bombing being an important case in point.

We learn about the little-known infrastructure of the British war economy, from airfields to fuel plants. In reminding us that interwar Britain possessed "the largest arms industry in the world" (p. 8), Edgerton corroborates other recent work detailing that Britain was an active participant in the 1930s arms race.¹ Important government laboratories and arsenals, many well-established before the war, like Chorley, Enfield, and Woolwich, were augmented by a slew of converted (shadow) civilian factories and a multitude of new plants, especially those for aircraft. There were also great public-private partnerships forged with almost "every major British firm" (p. 244), for example, the extremely innovative Imperial Chemical Industries and the logistically crucial shipping lines. The celebration of "wonder-weapons" by wartime propaganda and postwar self-promotion helped create a cult of heroic inventors and inventions that, to use the overused cliché, are said to have shortened the war by X amount of time. Backed by underutilized sources, Edgerton critically reap-

praises many self-serving memoirs, especially among academics. Crucial innovations, such as radar and sonar, can be owed to the nameless technicians of government departments and the research bureaus of British companies. So much exertion on so many simultaneous technological projects, many far from fruitful, demonstrated the ample resources at Britain's disposal, not a situation of dearth.

The services that most personified this machine-centric mentality were the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy. Far from muddling through, Edgerton argues, "If one of the forces was organized with Teutonic efficiency and regimentation, it was the RAF, not the Luftwaffe" (p. 66). The early failures of air defense and strategic bombing were the result of being too ambitious, not a lack of resources. In the later war years, Britain had an excellent air defense system which, for example, could locate and shoot down V-1 flying bombs and its own massive bomber force that laid waste to German cities. By late 1944, Edgerton reminds us that over ten thousand British four-engine bombers could drop more ordnance in one night than all the German V-1s and V-2s fired at Britain or all the combined ordnance dropped during the entire Blitz over London.

The Royal Navy began the war a world leader in battleships, all of which had been refitted, as well as cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft carriers. Edgerton explains the resources that went into the battleship leviathans: each was equal to a major factory in cost; its steel equivalent to thousands of tanks; and once underway, it was a self-contained barracks and ammunition depot capable of delivering incredible destruction. However, during the war the average ship tonnage declined because of the proliferation of smaller ships, mainly escorts. The Battle of the Atlantic is usually depicted as siege-like, but Britain was never actually blockaded, rather its naval forces blockaded continental Europe. The world's largest merchant marine and multitudes of new supply ships under British control, for instance, the British-

designed, but American-built Liberty Ship, allowed the continuous movement of supplies and empowered the global projection of force. The Royal Navy was crucial to Britain's ability to wage war on its own terms, to its strengths.

Compared to the Wehrmacht, the British Army was always better off, in terms of materiel, throughout the war. Noting the million horses and tens of thousands of handcarts on which the Wehrmacht depended, Adam Tooze, the Barton M. Biggs Professor of History at Yale University, has recently argued that Germany possessed a fundamentally "poor army."² Edgerton shows that the much-maligned British Army was hardly poor; compared to any Axis army it was more mechanized and far better supplied. Edgerton tries to salvage the reputation of British tanks during the war and argues that British retrofitting improved American tanks.

All of this stands in stark contrast to what Max Hastings, author of numerous books and recipient of the 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award, has recently described as "Britain's creaky war machine."³ Unfortunately, Edgerton pays little attention to the services', especially the British Army's, inability to effectively use their multitudes of machines in concert, which Williamson Murray, professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University, terms "military effectiveness."⁴ The British services had serious doctrinal problems regarding operations and battlefield tactics. Poor institutional decisions, and indecisions, seem to explain so much poor performance: the lack of a uniform and rigorous training regimen for the army; an army regimental system that discouraged interoperability; a lack of early-war close air support; a defective defensive paradigm for Singapore; and, a lack of quality aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm. However, Edgerton's treatment provides an arguable counter: Britain could afford to learn from battlefield mistakes as well as production problems. Ultimately, its behavior does not reflect scarcity, but rather "plenitude" (p. 2): Britain waged a war of production

and firepower on multiple fronts to wear down the Germans.

Edgerton's work should appeal beyond scholars to any student of World War II. His prose is never obtuse while the scholarship is solid. The author joins a growing historiographic trend, which submits interwar Britain remained a formidable world power. Britain was confident in its global logistical powerbase and technical prowess to deliver ultimate victory. Far from placing faith in racial superiority, a cultish leader, or martial spirit, Britons saw machines and technologies as their trump card. The conventional narrative of being a lone underdog or the relatively simplistic treatments attributing victory to a few just-in-time and ingenious breakthroughs should finally be placed aside. Those thinking America simply "saved" Britain during the war should consult Edgerton's work.

NOTES

1. Joseph Maiolo, *Cry Havoc: How the Arms Race Drove the World to War, 1931-1941* (New York: Basic, 2010).

2. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 454.


3. Max Hastings, *Winston's War: Churchill, 1940-1945* (New York: Borzoi, 2009), p. 279.

4. Williamson Murray, "British Military Effectiveness in the Second World Wars," in *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 3, *The Second World War*, rev. ed., eds., Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Dr. Matthew E. S. Butler is an independent scholar and political journalist based in Indianapolis. He studied undergraduate history at Purdue University and received a master's in British history from the College of William and Mary in Virginia. He recently completed his doctorate in modern history at the University of Cambridge. Both his thesis and dissertation examined ties between the British Empire and South America.



Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II



By Jörg Muth
University of North Texas Press, 2011
Pp. x, 366. \$29.95

Review by Harold Allen Skinner

In *Command Culture*, Jörg Muth explores the linkage between U.S. Army service schools as the primary “bearers of the [command] culture of the army” and officer leadership during World War II (p. 8). Muth surveys the topic with a historiographical review before introducing his analysis of the Army command culture, vis-à-vis the German Army, from 1910 to 1940. He narrows his analysis by focusing on the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point and Command and General Staff School (CGSS) graduates, and the analogous German *Kadettenschulen* (cadet schools) and *Kriegsakademie* (War Academy) graduates.

Muth draws extensively from primary sources to form a damning impression of a mediocre U.S. Army officer education system prior to 1940. Muth first pillories West Point: “The U.S. Army . . . did not have good officers because of West Point, but in spite of it” (p. 187). He describes the academy as culturally impervious to reform, wedded to outdated teaching methods, and staffed with instructors teaching subjects with which they were not familiar. Some instructors were clearly inept; other instructors received teaching assignments they were not qualified to teach. For example, after three years in Europe for language study, Joseph Lawton Collins returned to West Point only to receive

an assignment as a chemistry instructor. Academy curriculum focused on mathematics, science, and engineering as a way of producing “mental discipline,” a narrow practice that weeded out many promising cadets and saddled graduates with a mediocre education. One example was graduate Benjamin “Monk” Dickson (the First U.S. Army’s G–2 who correctly predicted the German Ardennes offensive), who later re-entered college believing himself “below par as to educational qualifications as compared to [other] young men” (pp. 51–52). Lastly, Muth disparages the institutionalized traditions of hazing, memorizing “plebe poop” and “excessive drills and . . . riding,” which did nothing to develop tactically adept lieutenants. By commissioning, cadets were proficient in little more than following rules and harassing junior cadets. General George Marshall noted, “The results . . . showed in the handling of our National Army, where officers . . . failed to get the most out of young Americans, and too frequently aroused their lasting animosity” (pp. 82–83).

Muth similarly heaps scorn on the CGSS, condemning the subjective entrance process, ossified curriculum, and emphasis on uniformity in judgment. The school was dominated by Great War veterans who were swift to punish any deviation from the “school solution” (p. 132). Classes revolved around obsolete tactics and map exercises, of which the visiting German General Werner von Blomberg derided as *Papierwissenschaft* (paper knowledge). Graduates were viewed by line officers as prepared for staff jobs but fundamentally unprepared for command. Lastly, Muth highlights the glaring lack of a formal officer development process in the time between service school attendances. The result of the process was depressingly predictable when war “revealed that many regular officers were of questionable competence . . . for higher command” (p. 5).

Muth writes positively of the German commissioning system, which developed leaders imbued with *kämpferisches Wesen* (a fighting spirit). To perpetuate excellence, only proven leaders, like Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian, were selected to serve as instructors. Muth highlights the poorly understood

role of the *kadettenschulen*, where cadets earned the *Abitur* (analogous to a high school diploma), while preparing for entry in the *Hauptkadettenstalt* (main cadet institute). Cadets were not hazed, and advanced in standing on their own merits. Besides mastering the tough academic curriculum, cadets had to demonstrate mastery of company-level tactics and leadership. After graduation, the *kadetten* advanced to officer aspirant, and returned to the regiment for development and (if recommended) subsequent attendance at a *Kriegsschule* (analogous to today’s Basic Officer Leader Course). Afterward, the new *Fähnrich* (ensign) completed more troop time and was commissioned only on approval of the regimental commander. In contrast to the American system, German *leutnants* were immediately ready for independent command; new U.S. Army lieutenants were fundamentally unprepared for combat, “and more of a liability than an asset until they had reached a certain rank” (p. 167).

Praise is similarly extended to the systematic German officer development system, which used a comprehensive annual exam on combined arms tactics to help select top performers for *Kriegsakademie* attendance. Unlike CGSS, the *Kriegsakademie* focused on regimental operations in the field, with the effects of the terrain and unexpected situational changes used to refine creative problem solving. Instructors actively encouraged “out of the box thinking,” and would accept any tactically sound solution. By graduation, a *Hauptmann* (captain) was well prepared to serve as a regimental operations officer or commander.

According to Muth, the only bright spot in the lackluster American picture was the Fort Benning Infantry School during George Marshall’s tenure as assistant commandant. Marshall was well aware of the flawed Army education process, and had ideas on how best to reform the “absurd system.” Given a free hand by the commandant, Marshall revamped the curriculum to include relevant experiential training on tactics and weapons. Here, Muth describes the largely unknown role of Maj. Adolf Von Schell, a *Reichswehr* exchange student who lectured on his Great War experiences, and helped influence Marshall in

his reforms. In closing his analysis, Muth draws the reasonable conclusion that the Infantry School, not the CGSS, helped prepare American officers for success in combat during World War II.


In conclusion, Muth comments on a baffling paradox: the democratic Americans perpetuated a system of regimented mediocrity, while the militant Germans fostered creative leadership excellence. In his afterword, Muth describes his affinity for Americans, developed in postwar West Germany and refined while a USMA guest lecturer. He does not let affection cloud his judgment: "I would not repay my debt if I just glossed over the problems. . . . History is by its very nature a harsh profession" (p. 216). Muth closes his book by praising the improved academy, but warns much is still needed: "West Point has always been one of the sacred cows of the US Army, and it has done neither of them any good" (p. 216).

Overall, *Command Culture* is a well-thought-out book, which includes ninety-five pages of detailed endnotes (unfortunately not cross-referenced to specific pages) with well-captioned photographs. Besides his detailed analysis of command culture, Muth draws some thought-provoking conclusions as to how the German command culture contributed to the willing collusion of the Wehrmacht officer corps in Nazi war crimes. He also makes cogent observations on the failure of the German system to produce strategically gifted general officers, noting "even the sharpest set of claws needs a brain to guide it" (p. 205).

Muth's work does have some minor flaws. Most notably, he does not include an analysis of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) or Officer Candidate School (OCS) processes. Muth notes that the *kadettenschulen* system produced an average graduation class of 560, versus 140 for the USMA—numbers that call into question his exclusion of comparative data. Although he acknowledges the linkage, Muth does not analyze the connection of French and American army doctrine and training techniques. Minor complaints aside, Muth's book is a must-read for senior policy makers of the Army making strategic decisions about the philosophy,

curriculum, and pedagogical methods in use in the current Army's officer education system.

Maj. Harold Allen Skinner is assistant professor of military science at Indiana University. Prior to his current assignment, he commanded the 138th Military History Detachment of the Indiana Army National Guard and taught U.S. history at Vincennes University as an adjunct instructor. To date, Major Skinner has contributed over ninety oral history interviews to the Operational Leadership Experience history project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received his master's degree in military history from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 2006.



Review by Jonathan Newell

Andrew Myers' work provides an instructive guide on the issue of implementing social change in the Army and supporting community structures. The author, an infantry officer and professor at the University of South Carolina Upstate, recounts in detail the successes and failures that marked the progress of

integration at Fort Jackson and Columbia, South Carolina. Drawing on a variety of sources, he approaches the issues from several angles. As a result, the work makes valuable contributions as an installation history, a history of civil rights in South Carolina, and a history of the complex political relationships that existed between municipal, state, federal, and military officials during the decades of racial and organizational change.

While Fort Jackson's history as a training post began during World War I, racial relations in that period did not reflect the struggles of the later civil rights movement. At that time, blacks and whites observed the Jim Crow laws of Columbia without much controversy. The leaders of the black community, such as Richard Carroll, sought a peaceful though separate coexistence with the more powerful white community. Black soldiers who trained at Camp Jackson (renamed Fort Jackson in 1940) received acclaim from Columbia's citizens, and no major racial incidents marred the post's record.

Race relations deteriorated, however, when the Army reactivated the post for training in preparation for World War II. Even though the Army trained on segregationist principles and stationed few blacks at the post, citizens and civic leaders in Columbia still viewed the presence of African American units on the post with suspicion. During early 1941, tensions mounted between black and white units, resulting in violence. Senior leadership reacted swiftly to cover the problems and worked with the local media to prevent the news from spreading into the community. These incidents did little to improve the situations on or off post. Black workers on the post were given menial tasks and received little support from superiors. In Columbia, common practice allowed military police (MP) to patrol with city policemen. Many times the MPs overstepped their authority and violated the rights of black soldiers and civilians. Black soldiers also had to use separate transportation, United Service Organizations (USO) accom-

modations, and recreational opportunities while in Columbia.

Even though Columbia's African American community suffered many of the same privations that black soldiers experienced, the community sometimes showed only a half-hearted support of the soldiers. Some of the upper-class blacks resented the activities of the soldiers, and the atmosphere they created. Yet the mistreatment of black soldiers, especially the blinding of a black veteran in 1946, sparked the beginnings of civil rights action among influential Columbia blacks such as James Hinton, John H. McCray, Modjeska Simkins, and Osceola McKaine. They made the cause of the soldiers their own. Black civic leaders, however, never enjoyed a productive relationship with the Fort Jackson command staff. They instead sought out solutions at the federal, not municipal or state, level. By 1950, Fort Jackson's racial issue had dropped from public view, and it appeared that the installation would be closed down. While many believed the post's potential closure to be a direct result of Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat campaign against Harry S. Truman, Myers proves that Truman had no such intent. The situation quickly changed when the Korean War erupted, and the Army reopened the post to meet the training demands.

While Truman ordered the integration of the armed forces in 1948, integration at the post was accelerated because of logistical pressures of training soldiers for the Korean conflict. As the number of black recruits increased, the pressure they placed on the segregated training system became too much. Post officials thus integrated not only because of the directive but also because of practical necessity. Even though Fort Jackson was located in the heart of the Deep South, the implementation of integration took place without significant protest. Command staff worked closely with Columbia newspapers to hush the news. Black and white soldiers trained together without serious incident. Yet the black soldiers lacked influential black leaders. The post had few black officers or noncommissioned officers.

Those who were stationed at Fort Jackson still faced informal racism and exercised minimal community influence because they lacked the municipal and state government contacts that their white counterparts enjoyed.

While no longer facing segregation on post, black soldiers dealt with discrimination in the Columbia community. Myers shows that many post commanders did not seek to use their leverage in the community to ease such restrictions on their soldiers. The most common area of contention became the busing system. Black veterans and soldiers received unequal and sometimes abusive treatment at the hands of local busing and police officials. Yet these events never occurred with the right timing or leadership in order for them to become issues in the national spotlight. In addition to transportation, black soldiers also faced inequality in the Columbia schools and housing market. Federal agencies such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Defense attempted to use economic coercion to open opportunities in the local community, but change occurred at a glacial pace.

As the post entered the 1960s, commanders succeeded in keeping soldiers out of the growing voting and civil rights protest movements. Black soldiers also distanced themselves from the escalating Vietnam protests because of a sense of patriotism and duty. While a few protests were attempted in Columbia, most fell apart because of divisions among the civil rights leaders and the reality that white civic leaders valued compromise instead of the negative publicity generated by confrontation. As a result, civil rights changes occurred with considerably less conflict than in other Deep South communities.

Politicians also began paying attention to racial issues at Fort Jackson as blacks began to exercise their newfound political influence. Although it seems paradoxical that many of the most outspoken Southern politicians tolerated an integrated post next to a capital city, Myers shows that such a result is quite explicable. Despite their pro-states' rights stance, the politicians

realized that federal dollars spent on Fort Jackson provided an immense benefit to the community. Winning a fight against integration would not be worth the victory since it meant losing the economic benefit of the post. Thus men like Strom Thurmond, though at one time a diehard segregationist, became staunch supporters of local defense spending. By the 1970s, the post and the Columbia community had adjusted to the changes brought by integration and continued on with the mission of training the nation's soldiers.

Black, White, and Olive Drab is of value on several fronts. Myers provides a thorough look at a major part of Fort Jackson's history. He tells much of the story of the civil rights movement in Columbia while also showing the possibilities and limitations inherent in using the Army as an agent of social change. While changes can be mandated from the top, they must receive support from the lower echelons of command; otherwise, no true change takes place. The complex relationships between a community and a military post also show that changes in one will not automatically cause the same result in the other. Military and civilian leaders must communicate openly and freely about their goals and policies in order for such transitions to occur with the minimum amount of friction. This valuable history serves as a guide to Army leaders as they consider the effects of social policy change on the force.

Jonathan Newell, a native of Columbia, South Carolina, served as an Army Reserve officer in religious support operations at Fort Jackson and along the East Coast. He is currently writing a Civil War biography of Col. Charles J. Colcock, commander of the 3d South Carolina Cavalry Regiment.



THE CHIEF HISTORIAN'S FOOTNOTE

DR. RICHARD W. STEWART



THE SHEER, AMAZING, DEMONSTRABLE USEFULNESS OF MILITARY HISTORY

From my earliest days as a student of history, I have been approached by those who don't understand the value of studying history with the complaint: "Sure history is kind of fun (or sometimes, 'very boring' but I ignore such troglodytes), but what can you do with history? What good is it?" All of us, especially those serving as historians in the services, have had to frame our answers to those questions in order to justify our life's calling and attempt to explain, often to unhearing ears, that there are few subjects more useful to soldiers and officers than history. This is especially true for those in the higher ranks in which strategy is built upon all the skills and knowledge that history provides. The higher up the foodchain you go in the Army, the more you need to read and study history. Here is my take on why this is so.

As the United States Army grows increasingly engaged throughout the world, there are few more vital skills for its leaders to possess than cultural awareness. Understanding the culture of different countries, regions, ethnic groups, or religions is vital to assessing the interplay of dynamics within societies; and critical to the comprehension of any culture is the understanding of its history. People throughout the world, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia, know their history (or at least their myths about their history) and the historical forces that shaped their cultures and identities. Without knowledge of major historical phenomena such as the Crusades or colonialism or the militant spread of Islam, it is impossible to understand how a nation or a people in Africa or Asia can view the same current events very differently than Americans. Deciphering a foreign culture is the first step toward dealing with it in a rational and sophisticated manner and understanding can *only* be obtained by the study of that culture's history.

With the study of history also comes the sharpening of one's critical thinking and analytical skills. History broadens our intellectual horizons and improves our ability to judge. Just as mathematics trains the mind to think in a logical and sequential manner, history trains

the mind to assess vast and complex issues, personalities, events, forces, and movements over time as we attempt to understand that strangest of phenomena: the human mind. The analysis of past events forces the student of history to weigh evidence, examine cause and effect, critically investigate facts, test theories, and drill down to the story behind the story to reveal at least a measure of what actually happened, who did it, and why. From that will come true understanding. By training the mind to think through issues involving human actors over time, the student of history gains perspective on mankind (things like this have happened before and here is how they turned out) and our collective endeavor to live, organize, and defend ourselves. Without perspective, every problem is new and every solution little more than an ad hoc hope. History gives us at least part of a map to how things might turn out.

Understanding human behavior is really only possible when one examines how humans have lived over time and there is probably no leadership skill more important than truly grasping how people think, act, believe, and react. How many times have you heard it said about a successful leader that "he is not brilliant, but he understands people"? Or seen a leader make instant connections with audiences small or large by showing empathy and insight? On a larger scale, recognizing how those connections happen and how they can affect world events comes from reading widely in history. Leadership, empathy, and intuitive understanding come in no small measure from the constant study of how humans have interacted in the past. Why limit oneself to learning about humanity from the relatively small numbers of people we actually come into contact with over our lives when we can sample hundreds and thousands of good and bad examples of humanity from all countries, cultures, and times? Broad perspective and broader insight come from the in-depth study of history.

Nor can I ignore some of the very practical aspects of the study of military history. In addition to training the mind how to think, history is replete with actual

examples (not theories or models) of specific actions in our military past that can guide—guide, *not* direct—our operations. When analyzing how to disarm and reintegrate the Afghan militia forces of the various warlords of that country in 2002, it was useful to examine how guerilla forces and regional militias were disbanded in France and Italy after World War II. As we began planning for the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, it was useful for the various staffs to look at the planning for the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 and 1973 to gain insights. When preparing the Army for the inevitable post-conflict drawdown of today, it has been useful to review the post-World War II and post-Vietnam drawdown as well as the downsizing of the Army after Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. History proposes but does not dispose, so none of these examples from the past determined exactly what would happen or directed the events into a single channel, but each was able to offer some experiences or guidelines that helped inform planning and generate new perspectives and ideas beyond the personal experiences of those involved. The study of history gives us the vast experience of previous generations of military planners and leaders. To cut ourselves off from that storehouse of knowledge condemns us to the limitations of our own relatively feeble training and limited experience. Why not ask: “Has this happened before? What did they think? How did they plan?” Tap into the past and gain practical insights while, at the same time, that study can train one’s mind to think widely and deeply about a host of other issues.

Finally, I can’t leave this subject without stating the obvious: history also has great stories. And much of what we learn and retain about life comes from stories. Unit morale and esprit de corps are often based on great stories from the past that inspire and personalize. Journalists know this and always have a “hook” or a story that will make impersonal forces and events seem real and personal.

Slavery was an unmitigated evil. But it took the story, albeit a fictional one, of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* to make it connect to the American people and stir the necessary outrage for that institution. Stories from the past, preferably based on fact rather than fiction, can inspire future generations of soldiers with genuine tales of heroism, valor, courage, defiance, and nobility. Stories of past failures can post warning signs about cowardice, despair, weakness, war crimes, and humiliation. With today’s reemphasis on the importance of Army values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage), it is useful to remember that many of us learn how those values are lived by studying history and reading stories of those soldiers in the past who have exemplified them. Words about values are just words unless they are lived by real people in real situations. History can inspire us to emulate those who have lived the values while providing clear examples of what happens when those values are violated or ignored.

In short, history is about the most useful subject any soldier, officer, leader, or planner can study. If pursued diligently, it can inform, inspire, guide, clarify, and deepen one’s understanding and intellect. I humbly submit that you just *can’t* get more useful than that.

I would be very interested in hearing from the various field history offices throughout the Army on how history has been useful in your organization in helping to solve problems, educate soldiers, or deal more effectively with staff actions. A future column might even highlight the best examples of such successes as we continue to prove not only the usefulness of history, but by extension, the usefulness of historians to the Army as well. As always, you can contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.



ARMY HISTORY UnLine

The Center of Military History makes all issues of *Army History* available to the public on its Web site. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at www.history.army.mil/armyhistory.

ARMYHISTORY

The Professional Bulletin of Army History
